From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.108 commit 4cefe5be73886f383639fe0850bb72d5b568a7b9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0aeb54ac4cd5cf8f60131b4d9ec0b6dc9c27b20d ] Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space. Constructing a scenario in which we're under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send. Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there's really no way to recover. Reported-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser") Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917002814.1743558-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/tls/tls.h | 1 + net/tls/tls_strp.c | 14 +++++++++----- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls.h b/net/tls/tls.h index 5dc61c85c076..a3c5c5a59fda 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls.h +++ b/net/tls/tls.h @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ void update_sk_prot(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx); int wait_on_pending_writer(struct sock *sk, long *timeo); void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err); +void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err); int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx); void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx); diff --git a/net/tls/tls_strp.c b/net/tls/tls_strp.c index 6ce64a6e4495..ae723cd6af39 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_strp.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_strp.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *tls_strp_wq; -static void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err) +void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err) { if (strp->stopped) return; @@ -210,11 +210,17 @@ static int tls_strp_copyin_frag(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff *in_skb, unsigned int offset, size_t in_len) { + unsigned int nfrag = skb->len / PAGE_SIZE; size_t len, chunk; skb_frag_t *frag; int sz; - frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[skb->len / PAGE_SIZE]; + if (unlikely(nfrag >= skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags)) { + DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return -EMSGSIZE; + } + + frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[nfrag]; len = in_len; /* First make sure we got the header */ @@ -519,10 +525,8 @@ static int tls_strp_read_sock(struct tls_strparser *strp) tls_strp_load_anchor_with_queue(strp, inq); if (!strp->stm.full_len) { sz = tls_rx_msg_size(strp, strp->anchor); - if (sz < 0) { - tls_strp_abort_strp(strp, sz); + if (sz < 0) return sz; - } strp->stm.full_len = sz; diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 8915f2eedd09..2a6026b6f1fc 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -2438,8 +2438,7 @@ int tls_rx_msg_size(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE; read_failure: - tls_err_abort(strp->sk, ret); - + tls_strp_abort_strp(strp, ret); return ret; } -- 2.25.1