From: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.270 commit 02ffb4ecf0614c58e3d0e5bfbe99588c9ddc77c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12970 CVE: CVE-2023-54110 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c7dd13805f8b8fc1ce3b6d40f6aff47e66b72ad2 ] Variables off and len typed as uint32 in rndis_query function are controlled by incoming RNDIS response message thus their value may be manipulated. Setting off to a unexpectetly large value will cause the sum with len and 8 to overflow and pass the implemented validation step. Consequently the response pointer will be referring to a location past the expected buffer boundaries allowing information leakage e.g. via RNDIS_OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS OID. Fixes: ddda08624013 ("USB: rndis_host, various cleanups") Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c index b807c91abe1da..6085eefd738cc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c @@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ static int rndis_query(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf, off = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->offset); len = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->len); - if (unlikely((8 + off + len) > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE)) + if (unlikely((off > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8) || + (len > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8 - off))) goto response_error; if (*reply_len != -1 && len != *reply_len) -- 2.43.0