[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2025-40198
Fedor Pchelkin (1): ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options() Theodore Ts'o (1): ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options() fs/ext4/super.c | 18 ++++++------------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.114 commit 01829af7656b56d83682b3491265d583d502e502 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID6BW2 CVE: CVE-2025-40198 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8ecb790ea8c3fc69e77bace57f14cf0d7c177bd8 ] Unlike other strings in the ext4 superblock, we rely on tune2fs to make sure s_mount_opts is NUL terminated. Harden parse_apply_sb_mount_options() by treating s_mount_opts as a potential __nonstring. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8b67f04ab9de ("ext4: Add mount options in superblock") Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Message-ID: <20250916-tune2fs-v2-1-d594dc7486f0@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> [ added sizeof() third argument to strscpy_pad() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1@huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/super.c | 17 +++++------------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index f68fbe8c82ff..3a3baff2d08f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2592,7 +2592,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - char *s_mount_opts = NULL; + char s_mount_opts[65]; struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL; struct fs_context *fc = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -2600,15 +2600,11 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) return 0; - s_mount_opts = kstrndup(sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, - sizeof(sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!s_mount_opts) - return ret; + strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sizeof(s_mount_opts)); fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc) - goto out_free; + return -ENOMEM; s_ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!s_ctx) @@ -2640,11 +2636,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, ret = 0; out_free: - if (fc) { - ext4_fc_free(fc); - kfree(fc); - } - kfree(s_mount_opts); + ext4_fc_free(fc); + kfree(fc); return ret; } -- 2.39.2
From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> next inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID6BW2 CVE: CVE-2025-40198 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/comm... -------------------------------- strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed: strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Call Trace: <TASK> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline] sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline] parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline] __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline] path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63 characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a non-NUL-term string here. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Conflicts: fs/ext4/super.c [ added sizeof() third argument to strscpy_pad() ] Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1@huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/super.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 3a3baff2d08f..0630acca9849 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2592,7 +2592,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - char s_mount_opts[65]; + char s_mount_opts[64]; struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL; struct fs_context *fc = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -2600,7 +2600,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) return 0; - strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sizeof(s_mount_opts)); + if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sizeof(s_mount_opts)) < 0) + return -E2BIG; fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc) -- 2.39.2
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