[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] Fix CVE-2025-38498

This patch set fix CVE-2025-38498. Al Viro (2): do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes fs/namespace.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) -- 2.39.2

From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15 commit 12f147ddd6de7382dad54812e65f3f08d05809fc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICPSUV CVE: CVE-2025-38498 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Ensure that propagation settings can only be changed for mounts located in the caller's mount namespace. This change aligns permission checking with the rest of mount(2). Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Fixes: 07b20889e305 ("beginning of the shared-subtree proper") Reported-by: "Orlando, Noah" <Noah.Orlando@deshaw.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> --- fs/namespace.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index b682a044cf0e..ef1398d176c6 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -2210,6 +2210,10 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags) return -EINVAL; namespace_lock(); + if (!check_mnt(mnt)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } if (type == MS_SHARED) { err = invent_group_ids(mnt, recurse); if (err) -- 2.39.2

From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit cffd0441872e7f6b1fce5e78fb1c99187a291330 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICPSUV CVE: CVE-2025-38498 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- do_change_type() and do_set_group() are operating on different aspects of the same thing - propagation graph. The latter asks for mounts involved to be mounted in namespace(s) the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN for. The former is a mess - originally it didn't even check that mount *is* mounted. That got fixed, but the resulting check turns out to be too strict for userland - in effect, we check that mount is in our namespace, having already checked that we have CAP_SYS_ADMIN there. What we really need (in both cases) is * only touch mounts that are mounted. That's a must-have constraint - data corruption happens if it get violated. * don't allow to mess with a namespace unless you already have enough permissions to do so (i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its userns). That's an equivalent of what do_set_group() does; let's extract that into a helper (may_change_propagation()) and use it in both do_set_group() and do_change_type(). Fixes: 12f147ddd6de "do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts" Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Tested-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Conflicts: fs/namespace.c [not merge 9ffb14ef61ba ("move_mount: allow to add a mount into an existing group")] Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> --- fs/namespace.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index ef1398d176c6..e6926ce98b2f 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -2191,6 +2191,19 @@ static int flags_to_propagation_type(int ms_flags) return type; } +static int may_change_propagation(const struct mount *m) +{ + struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->mnt_ns; + + // it must be mounted in some namespace + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ns)) // is_mounted() + return -EINVAL; + // and the caller must be admin in userns of that namespace + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return 0; +} + /* * recursively change the type of the mountpoint. */ @@ -2210,10 +2223,10 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags) return -EINVAL; namespace_lock(); - if (!check_mnt(mnt)) { - err = -EINVAL; + err = may_change_propagation(mnt); + if (err) goto out_unlock; - } + if (type == MS_SHARED) { err = invent_group_ids(mnt, recurse); if (err) -- 2.39.2

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