[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
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From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAOP CVE: CVE-2024-56582 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU runner device: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 print_report+0x174/0x505 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60 lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60 __wake_up+0x44/0x60 btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs] ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780 ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0 ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x143/0x490 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ==================================================================
Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler. Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack. Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when analyzing the vmcore after a crash: *(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = { .wait = (wait_queue_head_t){ .lock = (spinlock_t){ .rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){ .raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){ .val = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-2005885696, }, .locked = (u8)0, .pending = (u8)157, .locked_pending = (u16)40192, .tail = (u16)34928, }, .magic = (unsigned int)536325682, .owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29, .owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 }, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .head = (struct list_head){ .next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca, .prev = (struct list_head *)0x47, }, }, .pending = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-1491499288, }, .status = (blk_status_t)130, } Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the large negative atomic values of ->pending or ->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic 0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus pointer values for ->wait->head. To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a use-after-free. Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com> Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1@huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index fae45b8d485e..1511405abfe0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9974,7 +9974,7 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(struct btrfs_bio *bbio) */ WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, bbio->bio.bi_status); } - if (!atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending)) + if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) wake_up(&priv->wait); bio_put(&bbio->bio); } -- 2.39.2
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From: Nihar Chaithanya <niharchaithanya@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit a174706ba4dad895c40b1d2277bade16dfacdcd9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAOK CVE: CVE-2024-56595 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- When the value of lp is 0 at the beginning of the for loop, it will become negative in the next assignment and we should bail out. Reported-by: syzbot+412dea214d8baa3f7483@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=412dea214d8baa3f7483 Tested-by: syzbot+412dea214d8baa3f7483@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Nihar Chaithanya <niharchaithanya@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1@huawei.com> --- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index 3ab410059dc2..f86af91b4184 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -2888,6 +2888,9 @@ static void dbAdjTree(dmtree_t *tp, int leafno, int newval, bool is_ctl) /* bubble the new value up the tree as required. */ for (k = 0; k < le32_to_cpu(tp->dmt_height); k++) { + if (lp == 0) + break; + /* get the index of the first leaf of the 4 leaf * group containing the specified leaf (leafno). */ -- 2.39.2
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mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit 313dab082289e460391c82d855430ec8a28ddf81 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAP7 CVE: CVE-2024-56626 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- An offset from client could be a negative value, It could allows to write data outside the bounds of the allocated buffer. Note that this issue is coming when setting 'vfs objects = streams_xattr parameter' in ksmbd.conf. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1@huawei.com> --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index a080f80256cb..aa2d281ff712 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -6866,6 +6866,8 @@ int smb2_write(struct ksmbd_work *work) } offset = le64_to_cpu(req->Offset); + if (offset < 0) + return -EINVAL; length = le32_to_cpu(req->Length); if (req->Channel == SMB2_CHANNEL_RDMA_V1 || -- 2.39.2
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反馈: 您发送到kernel@openeuler.org的补丁/补丁集,已成功转换为PR! PR链接地址: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14589 邮件列表地址:https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/J... FeedBack: The patch(es) which you have sent to kernel@openeuler.org mailing list has been converted to a pull request successfully! Pull request link: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14589 Mailing list address: https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/J...
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From: Paul Aurich <paul@darkrain42.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit c353ee4fb119a2582d0e011f66a76a38f5cf984d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEGF9 CVE: CVE-2024-56729 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Avoid leaking a tcon ref when a lease break races with opening the cached directory. Processing the leak break might take a reference to the tcon in cached_dir_lease_break() and then fail to release the ref in cached_dir_offload_close, since cfid->tcon is still NULL. Fixes: ebe98f1447bb ("cifs: enable caching of directories for which a lease is held") Signed-off-by: Paul Aurich <paul@darkrain42.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1@huawei.com> --- fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c b/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c index 0ff2491c311d..7a1e898e80c7 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ int open_cached_dir(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, } } cfid->dentry = dentry; + cfid->tcon = tcon; /* * We do not hold the lock for the open because in case @@ -292,7 +293,6 @@ int open_cached_dir(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, } goto oshr_free; } - cfid->tcon = tcon; cfid->is_open = true; spin_lock(&cfids->cfid_list_lock); -- 2.39.2
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反馈: 您发送到kernel@openeuler.org的补丁/补丁集,已成功转换为PR! PR链接地址: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14588 邮件列表地址:https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/A... FeedBack: The patch(es) which you have sent to kernel@openeuler.org mailing list has been converted to a pull request successfully! Pull request link: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14588 Mailing list address: https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/A...
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From: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@axis.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit 4617fb8fc15effe8eda4dd898d4e33eb537a7140 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAGG CVE: CVE-2024-53171 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- After an insertion in TNC, the tree might split and cause a node to change its `znode->parent`. A further deletion of other nodes in the tree (which also could free the nodes), the aforementioned node's `znode->cparent` could still point to a freed node. This `znode->cparent` may not be updated when getting nodes to commit in `ubifs_tnc_start_commit()`. This could then trigger a use-after-free when accessing the `znode->cparent` in `write_index()` in `ubifs_tnc_end_commit()`. This can be triggered by running rm -f /etc/test-file.bin dd if=/dev/urandom of=/etc/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync in a loop, and with `CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION`. KASAN then reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950 Write of size 32 at addr ffffff800a3af86c by task ubifs_bgt0_20/153 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x340 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xbc print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b0 kasan_report+0x1d8/0x1f0 kasan_check_range+0xf8/0x1a0 memcpy+0x84/0xf4 ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950 do_commit+0x4e0/0x1340 ubifs_bg_thread+0x234/0x2e0 kthread+0x36c/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 401: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8c/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x34c/0x5bc tnc_insert+0x140/0x16a4 ubifs_tnc_add+0x370/0x52c ubifs_jnl_write_data+0x5d8/0x870 do_writepage+0x36c/0x510 ubifs_writepage+0x190/0x4dc __writepage+0x58/0x154 write_cache_pages+0x394/0x830 do_writepages+0x1f0/0x5b0 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x170/0x25c file_write_and_wait_range+0x140/0x190 ubifs_fsync+0xe8/0x290 vfs_fsync_range+0xc0/0x1e4 do_fsync+0x40/0x90 __arm64_sys_fsync+0x34/0x50 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260 do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0 el0_svc+0x34/0x70 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Freed by task 403: kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70 kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40 kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c __kasan_slab_free+0xd4/0x13c kfree+0xc4/0x3a0 tnc_delete+0x3f4/0xe40 ubifs_tnc_remove_range+0x368/0x73c ubifs_tnc_remove_ino+0x29c/0x2e0 ubifs_jnl_delete_inode+0x150/0x260 ubifs_evict_inode+0x1d4/0x2e4 evict+0x1c8/0x450 iput+0x2a0/0x3c4 do_unlinkat+0x2cc/0x490 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x90/0x100 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260 do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0 el0_svc+0x34/0x70 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 The offending `memcpy()` in `ubifs_copy_hash()` has a use-after-free when a node becomes root in TNC but still has a `cparent` to an already freed node. More specifically, consider the following TNC: zroot / / zp1 / / zn Inserting a new node `zn_new` with a key smaller then `zn` will trigger a split in `tnc_insert()` if `zp1` is full: zroot / \ / \ zp1 zp2 / \ / \ zn_new zn `zn->parent` has now been moved to `zp2`, *but* `zn->cparent` still points to `zp1`. Now, consider a removal of all the nodes _except_ `zn`. Just when `tnc_delete()` is about to delete `zroot` and `zp2`: zroot \ \ zp2 \ \ zn `zroot` and `zp2` get freed and the tree collapses: zn `zn` now becomes the new `zroot`. `get_znodes_to_commit()` will now only find `zn`, the new `zroot`, and `write_index()` will check its `znode->cparent` that wrongly points to the already freed `zp1`. `ubifs_copy_hash()` thus gets wrongly called with `znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->iip].hash` that triggers the use-after-free! Fix this by explicitly setting `znode->cparent` to `NULL` in `get_znodes_to_commit()` for the root node. The search for the dirty nodes is bottom-up in the tree. Thus, when `find_next_dirty(znode)` returns NULL, the current `znode` _is_ the root node. Add an assert for this. Fixes: 16a26b20d2af ("ubifs: authentication: Add hashes to index nodes") Tested-by: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@axis.com> Co-developed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@axis.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1@huawei.com> --- fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c b/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c index a55e04822d16..7c43e0ccf6d4 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c @@ -657,6 +657,8 @@ static int get_znodes_to_commit(struct ubifs_info *c) znode->alt = 0; cnext = find_next_dirty(znode); if (!cnext) { + ubifs_assert(c, !znode->parent); + znode->cparent = NULL; znode->cnext = c->cnext; break; } -- 2.39.2
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反馈: 您发送到kernel@openeuler.org的补丁/补丁集,已成功转换为PR! PR链接地址: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14591 邮件列表地址:https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/Y... FeedBack: The patch(es) which you have sent to kernel@openeuler.org mailing list has been converted to a pull request successfully! Pull request link: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14591 Mailing list address: https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/Y...
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反馈: 您发送到kernel@openeuler.org的补丁/补丁集,已成功转换为PR! PR链接地址: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14590 邮件列表地址:https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/3... FeedBack: The patch(es) which you have sent to kernel@openeuler.org mailing list has been converted to a pull request successfully! Pull request link: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14590 Mailing list address: https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/3...
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