[PATCH OLK-5.10 V1 0/5] Fix CVE-2026-90329
2 dependencies brings back 2 more fixes for them, so we have 5 patches in total. Daniel Borkmann (1): bpf: Fix vmlinux BTF prep race in bpf_get_btf_vmlinux Vitaly Kuznetsov (1): HID: hyperv: streamline driver probe to avoid devres issues Xingrui Li (1): HID: sensor-hub: Fix out-of-bounds write in sensor_hub_get_feature Yehyeong Lee (2): IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received -- 2.34.1
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit f32a4a40bc635be25d6816da4bd91e9e58c31bf3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19531 CVE: CVE-2026-93138 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 92863e678070f57c17c868e4bfa2441a5c61ad2b ] bpf_get_btf_vmlinux() lazily parses the vmlinux BTF under the bpf_verifier_lock, but publishes the result through a plain store and re-checks it through a plain lockless load. Nothing orders the stores initializing the struct btf inside btf_parse_vmlinux() against the store publishing the pointer: On a weakly ordered arch, a concurrent first-time caller taking the lockless fast path could in principle observe the pointer before the parsed contents are visible. The mutex_unlock() does not help such a reader given it only synchronizes with a later acquisition of the same lock. Thus, publish the pointer with smp_store_release() and read it on the fast path with smp_load_acquire(). Acquire semantics are needed rather than a dependency-ordered READ_ONCE(): btf_parse_vmlinux() also populates globals outside the returned object (e.g. bpf_ctx_convert.t). An address dependency would only order accesses performed through the pointer and not cover other globals. Fixes: 8580ac9404f6 ("bpf: Process in-kernel BTF") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708211537.371874-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2@huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 2fb5692fed7d..d75b3aa76dfc 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -12874,13 +12874,25 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) { - if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { + /* Pairs with the smp_store_release() on the parse path below. */ + struct btf *btf = smp_load_acquire(&btf_vmlinux); + + if (!btf && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); - if (!btf_vmlinux) - btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); + btf = btf_vmlinux; + if (!btf) { + btf = btf_parse_vmlinux(); + /* + * Order the parsed BTF contents and the globals the + * parse populated (e.g. bpf_ctx_convert.t) before + * the pointer publication. Pairs with the acquire + * on the lockless fast path above. + */ + smp_store_release(&btf_vmlinux, btf); + } mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); } - return btf_vmlinux; + return btf; } int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, -- 2.34.1
From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit b4706722ed3ea72882b3c986a19b4a1ba66384c4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19430 CVE: CVE-2026-90414 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 957f92ea4022fb6af4618271615a2a21a7b5bef9 ] isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS (ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) - out of the fixed-size descriptor: isert_handle_iscsi_dataout(): sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc), unsol_data_len); isert_handle_scsi_cmd(): sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len); Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of the receive buffer. Nothing upstream of isert closes this door: - __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter, used here for the inbound check. - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength; and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively raises its own ceiling. - isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and the descriptor size are unrelated. The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was demonstrated. Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment length exceeds what was received. With KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25 Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work Call Trace: sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390 __ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390 ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150 isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout() (ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode(). Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short. Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no length check at all. isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data() returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly [ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything further, and cannot cause a false reject: a PDU carrying an AHS is longer, not shorter. This is a memory-safety fix that verifies the bytes that were actually received; it does not touch RFC 7145 length negotiation and is not the MaxXmitDataSegmentLength negotiation redesign raised in the 2017 "[Query] iSER-Target: QP errors observed on increasing MaxXmitDataSegmentLength" discussion. That redesign is explicitly out of scope here. The patched kernel rejects the malformed DataOut PDU and both immediate-data variants with "PDU declares ... bytes were received" and continues to pass normal traffic with no regression. Reproduced with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) and a raw rdma_cm/ibv initiator; no kernel-side test hooks were needed. Fixes: b8d26b3be8b3 ("iser-target: Add iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target driver") Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260726163931.971063-2-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3@huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c index 9f8d6113efb4..29d79b51aa1f 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c @@ -1338,6 +1338,21 @@ isert_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) ib_dma_sync_single_for_cpu(ib_dev, rx_desc->dma_addr, ISER_RX_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + /* + * The data segment length declared in the BHS is attacker controlled + * and is used further down to read that many bytes out of the fixed + * size receive descriptor, so it has to be checked against the number + * of bytes that were actually received. Comparing without subtracting + * also rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which + * would otherwise be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. + */ + if (unlikely(wc->byte_len < ISER_HEADERS_LEN + ntoh24(hdr->dlength))) { + isert_err("PDU declares %u data bytes but only %u bytes were received\n", + ntoh24(hdr->dlength), wc->byte_len); + iscsit_cause_connection_reinstatement(isert_conn->conn, 0); + return; + } + isert_dbg("DMA: 0x%llx, iSCSI opcode: 0x%02x, ITT: 0x%08x, flags: 0x%02x dlen: %d\n", rx_desc->dma_addr, hdr->opcode, hdr->itt, hdr->flags, (int)(wc->byte_len - ISER_HEADERS_LEN)); -- 2.34.1
From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit b1f3313e7b3e396e4985fea5c709477387e0a065 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19431 CVE: CVE-2026-90413 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2488b5b4827e5415768afc8daf097e8eb83c98df ] isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login PDU's BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login->req_buf, and the login code then reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in iscsi_target_locate_portal(), payload_length = ntoh24(login_req->dlength); tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login->req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL); and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from iscsi_target_do_login(). login->req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it, before authentication and with the length under its control: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350 Allocated by task 167: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 allocated 8192-byte region Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the same buffer: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff888104d10000 by task kworker/1:1/50 Workqueue: isert_login_wq iscsi_target_do_login_rx __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_decode_text_input+0xc6/0x11c0 iscsi_target_do_login+0x261/0x1470 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x51d/0x7d0 iscsit over TCP is not exposed: iscsit_get_login_rx() validates the declared length with iscsi_target_check_login_request() and then reads exactly that many bytes off the socket, so the declared length governs how much arrives rather than how much is copied out of an already-filled buffer. isert does not call iscsi_target_check_login_request() at all. Reject a login PDU whose declared DataSegmentLength exceeds what was received, in both paths that reach isert_rx_login_req(): isert_get_login_rx() for the first login PDU and isert_login_recv_done() for the ones after it. dlength <= login_req_len is allowed because the received count can include up to three bytes of iSCSI padding. Once the check is in place the copy out can no longer exceed the copy in: the posted login SGE is ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so login_req_len cannot exceed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the min() in isert_rx_login_req() is login_req_len. Like the existing short-PDU check added by 29e7b925ae6d, the reject in isert_login_recv_done() returns without completing login_req_comp, so a malformed subsequent PDU leaves the login to be torn down by the login timer rather than failing immediately. The first-PDU path returns an error and fails straight away. Reproduced on 7.2.0-rc4 with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) under KASAN, using an initiator that sends the real key=value payload while declaring 8193 in the BHS, on the first login PDU and on the second in separate runs. The reported read size tracks the declared value exactly; 16384 and 61440 behave the same. Unpatched 3 of 3 runs report on each of the two paths, patched 0 of 3 on both, run alternately in a single session, and a normal login still completes on the patched build. Fixes: b8d26b3be8b3 ("iser-target: Add iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target driver") Suggested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260726163931.971063-3-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3@huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c index 9f8d6113efb4..6145611f963b 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c @@ -975,6 +975,21 @@ isert_put_login_tx(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_login *login, return 0; } +static int +isert_check_login_req(struct isert_conn *isert_conn) +{ + struct iscsi_hdr *hdr = isert_get_iscsi_hdr(isert_conn->login_desc); + u32 dlength = ntoh24(hdr->dlength); + + if (unlikely(dlength > (u32)isert_conn->login_req_len)) { + isert_dbg("login PDU declares %u data bytes but only %d were received\n", + dlength, isert_conn->login_req_len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static void isert_rx_login_req(struct isert_conn *isert_conn) { @@ -1399,8 +1414,12 @@ isert_login_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) if (isert_conn->conn) { struct iscsi_login *login = isert_conn->conn->conn_login; - if (login && !login->first_request) + if (login && !login->first_request) { + if (isert_check_login_req(isert_conn)) + return; + isert_rx_login_req(isert_conn); + } } mutex_lock(&isert_conn->mutex); @@ -2355,6 +2374,10 @@ isert_get_login_rx(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_login *login) if (!login->first_request) return 0; + ret = isert_check_login_req(isert_conn); + if (ret) + return ret; + isert_rx_login_req(isert_conn); isert_info("before login_comp conn: %p\n", conn); -- 2.34.1
From: Xingrui Li <baka9@bakabaka9.tech> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 1c0463f0f028801a933f090cd2695f132635b374 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18767 CVE: CVE-2026-89765 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit c92693f3ed099401d0383ef35ca1fe1e6ba033de upstream. sensor_hub_get_feature() clamps its return value to the caller's buffer size, but the copy loop still copies field->report_size / 8 bytes for each report value. A malicious HID descriptor can advertise a large feature field size while an IIO caller supplies a small stack buffer, such as a single s32, causing an out-of-bounds write. HID core stores parsed report values in __s32 slots and clamps extracted values to 32 bits. Reject feature fields that require more than one slot per value, guard the total byte count calculation, and clamp each per-value copy to the remaining caller buffer. Fixes: 5459ada2b3cd69 ("HID: sensor-hub: Fix packing of result buffer for feature report") Cc: stable@kernel.org Assisted-by: OpenAI:GPT-5.5-Cyber Signed-off-by: Xingrui Li <baka9@bakabaka9.tech> Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3@huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c index f9983145d4e7..5b72b453191c 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c @@ -240,12 +240,17 @@ int sensor_hub_get_feature(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, u32 report_id, u32 field_index, int buffer_size, void *buffer) { struct hid_report *report; + struct hid_field *field; struct sensor_hub_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hsdev->hdev); - int report_size; + size_t field_size; + size_t report_size; + size_t copied = 0; + size_t to_copy; int ret = 0; - u8 *val_ptr; - int buffer_index = 0; - int i; + unsigned int i; + + if (!buffer || buffer_size <= 0) + return -EINVAL; memset(buffer, 0, buffer_size); @@ -259,26 +264,29 @@ int sensor_hub_get_feature(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, u32 report_id, hid_hw_request(hsdev->hdev, report, HID_REQ_GET_REPORT); hid_hw_wait(hsdev->hdev); + field = report->field[field_index]; + /* calculate number of bytes required to read this field */ - report_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(report->field[field_index]->report_size, - 8) * - report->field[field_index]->report_count; - if (!report_size) { + field_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(field->report_size, 8); + /* HID core stores each parsed report value in a __s32 slot. */ + if (!field_size || field_size > sizeof(field->value[0])) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto done_proc; + } + if (field->report_count > SIZE_MAX / field_size) { ret = -EINVAL; goto done_proc; } - ret = min(report_size, buffer_size); - val_ptr = (u8 *)report->field[field_index]->value; - for (i = 0; i < report->field[field_index]->report_count; ++i) { - if (buffer_index >= ret) - break; + report_size = field_size * field->report_count; + report_size = min_t(size_t, report_size, buffer_size); - memcpy(&((u8 *)buffer)[buffer_index], val_ptr, - report->field[field_index]->report_size / 8); - val_ptr += sizeof(__s32); - buffer_index += (report->field[field_index]->report_size / 8); + for (i = 0; i < field->report_count && copied < report_size; ++i) { + to_copy = min(field_size, report_size - copied); + memcpy(&((u8 *)buffer)[copied], &field->value[i], to_copy); + copied += to_copy; } + ret = copied; done_proc: mutex_unlock(&data->mutex); -- 2.34.1
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit b03e713a400aeb5f969bab4daf47a7402d0df814 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19484 CVE: CVE-2026-90329 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 66ef47faa90d838cda131fe1f7776456cc3b59f2 ] It was found that unloading 'hid_hyperv' module results in a devres complaint: ... hv_vmbus: unregistering driver hid_hyperv ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3983 at drivers/base/devres.c:691 devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0 ? __warn+0xd1/0x1c0 ? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0 ? report_bug+0x32a/0x3c0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0 ? devres_release_group+0x90/0x2c0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? __pfx_devres_release_group+0x10/0x10 hid_device_remove+0xf5/0x220 device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540 ? klist_put+0xf3/0x170 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x33f/0x8c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 ? cleanup_srcu_struct+0x337/0x500 hid_destroy_device+0xc8/0x130 mousevsc_remove+0xd2/0x1d0 [hid_hyperv] device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540 driver_detach+0xc5/0x180 bus_remove_driver+0x11e/0x2a0 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x160/0x5e0 vmbus_driver_unregister+0x62/0x2b0 [hv_vmbus] ... And the issue seems to be that the corresponding devres group is not allocated. Normally, devres_open_group() is called from __hid_device_probe() but Hyper-V HID driver overrides 'hid_dev->driver' with 'mousevsc_hid_driver' stub and basically re-implements __hid_device_probe() by calling hid_parse() and hid_hw_start() but not devres_open_group(). hid_device_probe() does not call __hid_device_probe() for it. Later, when the driver is removed, hid_device_remove() calls devres_release_group() as it doesn't check whether hdev->driver was initially overridden or not. The issue seems to be related to the commit 62c68e7cee33 ("HID: ensure timely release of driver-allocated resources") but the commit itself seems to be correct. Fix the issue by dropping the 'hid_dev->driver' override and using hid_register_driver()/hid_unregister_driver() instead. Alternatively, it would have been possible to rely on the default handling but HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT implies HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW and it doesn't seem to work for mousevsc as-is. Fixes: 62c68e7cee33 ("HID: ensure timely release of driver-allocated resources") Suggested-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Tested-by: Saurabh Sengar <ssengar@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c [ Context conflicts. ] Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3@huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c b/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c index bf77cfb723d5..2d7619428f6b 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c @@ -435,6 +435,25 @@ static int mousevsc_hid_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid, return 0; } +static int mousevsc_hid_probe(struct hid_device *hid_dev, const struct hid_device_id *id) +{ + int ret; + + ret = hid_parse(hid_dev); + if (ret) { + hid_err(hid_dev, "parse failed\n"); + return ret; + } + + ret = hid_hw_start(hid_dev, HID_CONNECT_HIDINPUT | HID_CONNECT_HIDDEV); + if (ret) { + hid_err(hid_dev, "hw start failed\n"); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct hid_ll_driver mousevsc_ll_driver = { .parse = mousevsc_hid_parse, .open = mousevsc_hid_open, @@ -444,7 +463,16 @@ static struct hid_ll_driver mousevsc_ll_driver = { .raw_request = mousevsc_hid_raw_request, }; -static struct hid_driver mousevsc_hid_driver; +static const struct hid_device_id mousevsc_devices[] = { + { HID_DEVICE(BUS_VIRTUAL, HID_GROUP_ANY, 0x045E, 0x0621) }, + { } +}; + +static struct hid_driver mousevsc_hid_driver = { + .name = "hid-hyperv", + .id_table = mousevsc_devices, + .probe = mousevsc_hid_probe, +}; static int mousevsc_probe(struct hv_device *device, const struct hv_vmbus_device_id *dev_id) @@ -486,7 +514,6 @@ static int mousevsc_probe(struct hv_device *device, } hid_dev->ll_driver = &mousevsc_ll_driver; - hid_dev->driver = &mousevsc_hid_driver; hid_dev->bus = BUS_VIRTUAL; hid_dev->vendor = input_dev->hid_dev_info.vendor; hid_dev->product = input_dev->hid_dev_info.product; @@ -501,20 +528,6 @@ static int mousevsc_probe(struct hv_device *device, if (ret) goto probe_err2; - - ret = hid_parse(hid_dev); - if (ret) { - hid_err(hid_dev, "parse failed\n"); - goto probe_err2; - } - - ret = hid_hw_start(hid_dev, HID_CONNECT_HIDINPUT | HID_CONNECT_HIDDEV); - - if (ret) { - hid_err(hid_dev, "hw start failed\n"); - goto probe_err2; - } - device_init_wakeup(&device->device, true); input_dev->connected = true; @@ -594,12 +607,23 @@ static struct hv_driver mousevsc_drv = { static int __init mousevsc_init(void) { - return vmbus_driver_register(&mousevsc_drv); + int ret; + + ret = hid_register_driver(&mousevsc_hid_driver); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = vmbus_driver_register(&mousevsc_drv); + if (ret) + hid_unregister_driver(&mousevsc_hid_driver); + + return ret; } static void __exit mousevsc_exit(void) { vmbus_driver_unregister(&mousevsc_drv); + hid_unregister_driver(&mousevsc_hid_driver); } MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- 2.34.1
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