From: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit dd87aa5f610be44f195cf5a99b7bc153faf30a3d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 150f17bfab37e981ba03b37440638138ff2aa9ec upstream. Replace inline assembly in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw with a call to __vmx_vcpu_run. The function is not performance critical, so (double) GPR save/restore in __vmx_vcpu_run can be tolerated, as far as performance effects are concerned. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> [sean: dropped versioning info from changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.2223707-5-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 32 +++----------------------------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 -- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index d2a0464e95c7..87269c731062 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "pmu.h" #include "sgx.h" #include "trace.h" +#include "vmx.h" #include "x86.h" static bool __read_mostly enable_shadow_vmcs = 1; @@ -3079,35 +3080,8 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4; } - asm( - "sub $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* temporarily adjust RSP for CALL */ - "cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t" - "je 1f \n\t" - __ex("vmwrite %%" _ASM_SP ", %[HOST_RSP]") "\n\t" - "mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t" - "1: \n\t" - "add $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* un-adjust RSP */ - - /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - "cmpb $0, %c[launched](%[loaded_vmcs])\n\t" - - /* - * VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME clear RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} on VM-Exit, set - * RFLAGS.CF on VM-Fail Invalid and set RFLAGS.ZF on VM-Fail - * Valid. vmx_vmenter() directly "returns" RFLAGS, and so the - * results of VM-Enter is captured via CC_{SET,OUT} to vm_fail. - */ - "call vmx_vmenter\n\t" - - CC_SET(be) - : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, CC_OUT(be) (vm_fail) - : [HOST_RSP]"r"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP), - [loaded_vmcs]"r"(vmx->loaded_vmcs), - [launched]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, launched)), - [host_state_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, host_state.rsp)), - [wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong)) - : "memory" - ); + vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, + vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr) vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index e85aa5faa22d..3a6461694fc2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ * they VM-Fail, whereas a successful VM-Enter + VM-Exit will jump * to vmx_vmexit. */ -SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmenter) +SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(vmx_vmenter) /* EFLAGS.ZF is set if VMCS.LAUNCHED == 0 */ je 2f diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index fad74e5faade..1753b112f630 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6817,8 +6817,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } } -bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched); - static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 1848fef1f96e..3cd2df2ddc09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -394,6 +394,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); +bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched); int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr); void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit e9197d768f976199a2356842400df947b4007377 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit b23cc71c62747f2e4c3e56138872cf47e1294f8a upstream. Create a new struct associated with each group of alternatives instructions. This will help with the removal of fake jumps, and more importantly with adding support for stack layout changes in alternatives. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ tools/objtool/check.h | 13 ++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 8932f41c387f..6143a0790aa4 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -1012,20 +1012,28 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *orig_insn, struct instruction **new_insn) { - static unsigned int alt_group_next_index = 1; struct instruction *last_orig_insn, *last_new_insn, *insn, *fake_jump = NULL; - unsigned int alt_group = alt_group_next_index++; + struct alt_group *orig_alt_group, *new_alt_group; unsigned long dest_off; + + orig_alt_group = malloc(sizeof(*orig_alt_group)); + if (!orig_alt_group) { + WARN("malloc failed"); + return -1; + } last_orig_insn = NULL; insn = orig_insn; sec_for_each_insn_from(file, insn) { if (insn->offset >= special_alt->orig_off + special_alt->orig_len) break; - insn->alt_group = alt_group; + insn->alt_group = orig_alt_group; last_orig_insn = insn; } + orig_alt_group->orig_group = NULL; + orig_alt_group->first_insn = orig_insn; + orig_alt_group->last_insn = last_orig_insn; if (next_insn_same_sec(file, last_orig_insn)) { fake_jump = malloc(sizeof(*fake_jump)); @@ -1056,8 +1064,13 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, return 0; } + new_alt_group = malloc(sizeof(*new_alt_group)); + if (!new_alt_group) { + WARN("malloc failed"); + return -1; + } + last_new_insn = NULL; - alt_group = alt_group_next_index++; insn = *new_insn; sec_for_each_insn_from(file, insn) { struct reloc *alt_reloc; @@ -1069,7 +1082,7 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, insn->ignore = orig_insn->ignore_alts; insn->func = orig_insn->func; - insn->alt_group = alt_group; + insn->alt_group = new_alt_group; /* * Since alternative replacement code is copy/pasted by the @@ -1118,6 +1131,10 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, return -1; } + new_alt_group->orig_group = orig_alt_group; + new_alt_group->first_insn = *new_insn; + new_alt_group->last_insn = last_new_insn; + if (fake_jump) list_add(&fake_jump->list, &last_new_insn->list); @@ -2440,7 +2457,7 @@ static int validate_return(struct symbol *func, struct instruction *insn, struct static void fill_alternative_cfi(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) { struct instruction *first_insn = insn; - int alt_group = insn->alt_group; + struct alt_group *alt_group = insn->alt_group; sec_for_each_insn_continue(file, insn) { if (insn->alt_group != alt_group) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/check.h index c280880f5eb4..dbf9f34622e8 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/check.h @@ -19,6 +19,17 @@ struct insn_state { s8 instr; }; +struct alt_group { + /* + * Pointer from a replacement group to the original group. NULL if it + * *is* the original group. + */ + struct alt_group *orig_group; + + /* First and last instructions in the group */ + struct instruction *first_insn, *last_insn; +}; + struct instruction { struct list_head list; struct hlist_node hash; @@ -34,7 +45,7 @@ struct instruction { s8 instr; u8 visited; u8 ret_offset; - int alt_group; + struct alt_group *alt_group; struct symbol *call_dest; struct instruction *jump_dest; struct instruction *first_jump_src; -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 3e674f26528931c6a0f1bc7aa29445b45fdfd62d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 31a7424bc58063a8e0466c3c10f31a52ec2be4f6 upstream. Objtool converts direct retpoline jumps to type INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC, since that's what they are semantically. That conversion doesn't work in vmlinux.o validation because the indirect thunk function is present in the object, so the intra-object jump check succeeds before the retpoline jump check gets a chance. Rearrange the checks: check for a retpoline jump before checking for an intra-object jump. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4302893513770dde68ddc22a9d6a2a04aca491dd.161126346... Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 32fdbd339ca9..4f8a760bffca 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -795,10 +795,6 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) } else if (reloc->sym->type == STT_SECTION) { dest_sec = reloc->sym->sec; dest_off = arch_dest_reloc_offset(reloc->addend); - } else if (reloc->sym->sec->idx) { - dest_sec = reloc->sym->sec; - dest_off = reloc->sym->sym.st_value + - arch_dest_reloc_offset(reloc->addend); } else if (!strncmp(reloc->sym->name, "__x86_indirect_thunk_", 21) || !strncmp(reloc->sym->name, "__x86_retpoline_", 16)) { /* @@ -812,6 +808,10 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) insn->retpoline_safe = true; continue; + } else if (reloc->sym->sec->idx) { + dest_sec = reloc->sym->sec; + dest_off = reloc->sym->sym.st_value + + arch_dest_reloc_offset(reloc->addend); } else { /* external sibling call */ insn->call_dest = reloc->sym; -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 3116dee2704bfb3713efa3637a9e65369d019cc4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit b735bd3e68824316655252a931a3353a6ebc036f upstream. The ORC metadata generated for UNWIND_HINT_FUNC isn't actually very func-like. With certain usages it can cause stack state mismatches because it doesn't set the return address (CFI_RA). Also, users of UNWIND_HINT_RET_OFFSET no longer need to set a custom return stack offset. Instead they just need to specify a func-like situation, so the current ret_offset code is hacky for no good reason. Solve both problems by simplifying the RET_OFFSET handling and converting it into a more useful UNWIND_HINT_FUNC. If we end up needing the old 'ret_offset' functionality again in the future, we should be able to support it pretty easily with the addition of a custom 'sp_offset' in UNWIND_HINT_FUNC. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/db9d1f5d79dddfbb3725ef6d8ec3477ad199948d.161126346... [bwh: Backported to 5.10: - Don't use bswap_if_needed() since we don't have any of the other fixes for mixed-endian cross-compilation - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 13 ++-------- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 2 +- include/linux/objtool.h | 5 +++- tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 5 +++- tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 4 ++-- tools/objtool/check.c | 37 ++++++++++++----------------- tools/objtool/check.h | 1 - 8 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h index 664d4610d700..8e574c0afef8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h @@ -48,17 +48,8 @@ UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=\base offset=\offset partial=1 .endm -.macro UNWIND_HINT_FUNC sp_offset=8 - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP sp_offset=\sp_offset type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL -.endm - -/* - * RET_OFFSET: Used on instructions that terminate a function; mostly RETURN - * and sibling calls. On these, sp_offset denotes the expected offset from - * initial_func_cfi. - */ -.macro UNWIND_HINT_RET_OFFSET sp_offset=8 - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RET_OFFSET sp_offset=\sp_offset +.macro UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP sp_offset=8 type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC .endm #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S index ac3d5f22fe64..ad1da5e85aeb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(ftrace_regs_caller_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) restore_mcount_regs 8 /* Restore flags */ popfq - UNWIND_HINT_RET_OFFSET + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC jmp ftrace_epilogue SYM_FUNC_END(ftrace_regs_caller) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index b4c43a9b1483..f6fb1d218dcc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(__x86_retpoline_\reg) jmp .Lspec_trap_\@ .Ldo_rop_\@: mov %\reg, (%_ASM_SP) - UNWIND_HINT_RET_OFFSET + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ret SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_retpoline_\reg) diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h index 577f51436cf9..8ed079c52c47 100644 --- a/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -29,11 +29,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL: Used in entry code to indicate that * sp_reg+sp_offset points to the iret return frame. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. + * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 -#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RET_OFFSET 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION diff --git a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h index 577f51436cf9..8ed079c52c47 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -29,11 +29,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL: Used in entry code to indicate that * sp_reg+sp_offset points to the iret return frame. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. + * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 -#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RET_OFFSET 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index cde9c36e40ae..6f5a45754ad8 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -563,8 +563,8 @@ void arch_initial_func_cfi_state(struct cfi_init_state *state) state->cfa.offset = 8; /* initial RA (return address) */ - state->regs[16].base = CFI_CFA; - state->regs[16].offset = -8; + state->regs[CFI_RA].base = CFI_CFA; + state->regs[CFI_RA].offset = -8; } const char *arch_nop_insn(int len) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 29e4fca80258..ed5e4b04f508 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -1423,13 +1423,20 @@ static int add_jump_table_alts(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; } +static void set_func_state(struct cfi_state *state) +{ + state->cfa = initial_func_cfi.cfa; + memcpy(&state->regs, &initial_func_cfi.regs, + CFI_NUM_REGS * sizeof(struct cfi_reg)); + state->stack_size = initial_func_cfi.cfa.offset; +} + static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) { struct section *sec, *relocsec; struct reloc *reloc; struct unwind_hint *hint; struct instruction *insn; - struct cfi_reg *cfa; int i; sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".discard.unwind_hints"); @@ -1464,22 +1471,20 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) return -1; } - cfa = &insn->cfi.cfa; + insn->hint = true; - if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RET_OFFSET) { - insn->ret_offset = hint->sp_offset; + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC) { + set_func_state(&insn->cfi); continue; } - insn->hint = true; - if (arch_decode_hint_reg(insn, hint->sp_reg)) { WARN_FUNC("unsupported unwind_hint sp base reg %d", insn->sec, insn->offset, hint->sp_reg); return -1; } - cfa->offset = hint->sp_offset; + insn->cfi.cfa.offset = hint->sp_offset; insn->cfi.type = hint->type; insn->cfi.end = hint->end; } @@ -1742,27 +1747,18 @@ static bool is_fentry_call(struct instruction *insn) static bool has_modified_stack_frame(struct instruction *insn, struct insn_state *state) { - u8 ret_offset = insn->ret_offset; struct cfi_state *cfi = &state->cfi; int i; if (cfi->cfa.base != initial_func_cfi.cfa.base || cfi->drap) return true; - if (cfi->cfa.offset != initial_func_cfi.cfa.offset + ret_offset) + if (cfi->cfa.offset != initial_func_cfi.cfa.offset) return true; - if (cfi->stack_size != initial_func_cfi.cfa.offset + ret_offset) + if (cfi->stack_size != initial_func_cfi.cfa.offset) return true; - /* - * If there is a ret offset hint then don't check registers - * because a callee-saved register might have been pushed on - * the stack. - */ - if (ret_offset) - return false; - for (i = 0; i < CFI_NUM_REGS; i++) { if (cfi->regs[i].base != initial_func_cfi.regs[i].base || cfi->regs[i].offset != initial_func_cfi.regs[i].offset) @@ -2863,10 +2859,7 @@ static int validate_section(struct objtool_file *file, struct section *sec) continue; init_insn_state(&state, sec); - state.cfi.cfa = initial_func_cfi.cfa; - memcpy(&state.cfi.regs, &initial_func_cfi.regs, - CFI_NUM_REGS * sizeof(struct cfi_reg)); - state.cfi.stack_size = initial_func_cfi.cfa.offset; + set_func_state(&state.cfi); warnings += validate_symbol(file, sec, func, &state); } diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/check.h index 995a0436d543..d255c43b134a 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/check.h @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ struct instruction { bool retpoline_safe; s8 instr; u8 visited; - u8 ret_offset; struct alt_group *alt_group; struct symbol *call_dest; struct instruction *jump_dest; -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 5f93d900b9d33b0d5f7e1a7e455f26aab86875c5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit f4b4bc10b0b85ec66f1a9bf5dddf475e6695b6d2 upstream. The Xen hypercall page is filled with zeros, causing objtool to fall through all the empty hypercall functions until it reaches a real function, resulting in a stack state mismatch. The build-time contents of the hypercall page don't matter because the page gets rewritten by the hypervisor. Make it more palatable to objtool by making each hypervisor function a true empty function, with nops and a return. Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0883bde1d7a1fb3b6a4c952bc0200e873752f609.161126346... Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S index 2d7c8f34f56c..cb6538ae2fe0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S @@ -68,8 +68,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(asm_cpu_bringup_and_idle) .balign PAGE_SIZE SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page) .rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - .skip 32 + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + .skip 31, 0x90 + ret .endr #define HYPERCALL(n) \ -- 2.20.1

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 0c4c698569962d32b76ea8ae13334c81ea647be0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit dda7bb76484978316bb412a353789ebc5901de36 upstream. Add support for alternative patching for the case a feature is not present on the current CPU. For users of ALTERNATIVE() and friends, an inverted feature is specified by applying the ALT_NOT() macro to it, e.g.: ALTERNATIVE(old, new, ALT_NOT(feature)); Committer note: The decision to encode the NOT-bit in the feature bit itself is because a future change which would make objtool generate such alternative calls, would keep the code in objtool itself fairly simple. Also, this allows for the alternative macros to support the NOT feature without having to change them. Finally, the u16 cpuid member encoding the X86_FEATURE_ flags is not an ABI so if more bits are needed, cpuid itself can be enlarged or a flags field can be added to struct alt_instr after having considered the size growth in either cases. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210311142319.4723-6-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h index aa5f246fdc07..c6690d1e1de6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/asm.h> +#define ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV (1 << 15) +#define ALT_NOT(feat) ((feat) | ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV) + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #include <linux/stddef.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 9cdaedbca776..df2a13d4e4f3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -388,21 +388,31 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, */ for (a = start; a < end; a++) { int insn_buff_sz = 0; + /* Mask away "NOT" flag bit for feature to test. */ + u16 feature = a->cpuid & ~ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV; instr = (u8 *)&a->instr_offset + a->instr_offset; replacement = (u8 *)&a->repl_offset + a->repl_offset; BUG_ON(a->instrlen > sizeof(insn_buff)); - BUG_ON(a->cpuid >= (NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS) * 32); - if (!boot_cpu_has(a->cpuid)) { + BUG_ON(feature >= (NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS) * 32); + + /* + * Patch if either: + * - feature is present + * - feature not present but ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV is set to mean, + * patch if feature is *NOT* present. + */ + if (!boot_cpu_has(feature) == !(a->cpuid & ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV)) { if (a->padlen > 1) optimize_nops(a, instr); continue; } - DPRINTK("feat: %d*32+%d, old: (%pS (%px) len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d), pad: %d", - a->cpuid >> 5, - a->cpuid & 0x1f, + DPRINTK("feat: %s%d*32+%d, old: (%pS (%px) len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d), pad: %d", + (a->cpuid & ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV) ? "!" : "", + feature >> 5, + feature & 0x1f, instr, instr, a->instrlen, replacement, a->replacementlen, a->padlen); -- 2.20.1

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit fd80da64cffe952cfd71c1c60085ad2bad7ecb63 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 2fe2a2c7a97c9bc32acc79154b75e754280f7867 upstream. _static_cpu_has() contains a completely open coded version of ALTERNATIVE_TERNARY(). Replace that with the macro instead. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210311142319.4723-8-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 41 +++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 59bf91c57aa8..b9490f462d01 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <asm/asm.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> enum cpuid_leafs { @@ -172,39 +173,15 @@ extern void clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int bit); */ static __always_inline bool _static_cpu_has(u16 bit) { - asm_volatile_goto("1: jmp 6f\n" - "2:\n" - ".skip -(((5f-4f) - (2b-1b)) > 0) * " - "((5f-4f) - (2b-1b)),0x90\n" - "3:\n" - ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" - " .long 1b - .\n" /* src offset */ - " .long 4f - .\n" /* repl offset */ - " .word %P[always]\n" /* always replace */ - " .byte 3b - 1b\n" /* src len */ - " .byte 5f - 4f\n" /* repl len */ - " .byte 3b - 2b\n" /* pad len */ - ".previous\n" - ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" - "4: jmp %l[t_no]\n" - "5:\n" - ".previous\n" - ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" - " .long 1b - .\n" /* src offset */ - " .long 0\n" /* no replacement */ - " .word %P[feature]\n" /* feature bit */ - " .byte 3b - 1b\n" /* src len */ - " .byte 0\n" /* repl len */ - " .byte 0\n" /* pad len */ - ".previous\n" - ".section .altinstr_aux,\"ax\"\n" - "6:\n" - " testb %[bitnum],%[cap_byte]\n" - " jnz %l[t_yes]\n" - " jmp %l[t_no]\n" - ".previous\n" + asm_volatile_goto( + ALTERNATIVE_TERNARY("jmp 6f", %P[feature], "", "jmp %l[t_no]") + ".section .altinstr_aux,\"ax\"\n" + "6:\n" + " testb %[bitnum],%[cap_byte]\n" + " jnz %l[t_yes]\n" + " jmp %l[t_no]\n" + ".previous\n" : : [feature] "i" (bit), - [always] "i" (X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS), [bitnum] "i" (1 << (bit & 7)), [cap_byte] "m" (((const char *)boot_cpu_data.x86_capability)[bit >> 3]) : : t_yes, t_no); -- 2.20.1

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 76c513c87f599bc013c582522323a1b117b8f501 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit d30c7b820be5c4777fe6c3b0c21f9d0064251e51 upstream. Add an explicit __ignore_sync_check__ marker which will be used to mark lines which are supposed to be ignored by file synchronization check scripts, its advantage being that it explicitly denotes such lines in the code. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210304174237.31945-4-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/inat.c | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/insn.c | 6 +++--- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h | 2 +- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h | 2 +- tools/arch/x86/lib/inat.c | 2 +- tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c | 6 +++--- tools/objtool/sync-check.sh | 17 +++++++++++++---- tools/perf/check-headers.sh | 15 +++++++++++---- 10 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h index 4cf2ad521f65..b56c5741581a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * * Written by Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> */ -#include <asm/inat_types.h> +#include <asm/inat_types.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ /* * Internal bits. Don't use bitmasks directly, because these bits are diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h index a8c3d284fa46..17c130f1ba57 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ */ /* insn_attr_t is defined in inat.h */ -#include <asm/inat.h> +#include <asm/inat.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ struct insn_field { union { diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/inat.c b/arch/x86/lib/inat.c index 12539fca75c4..b0f3b2a62ae2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/inat.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/inat.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * * Written by Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> */ -#include <asm/insn.h> +#include <asm/insn.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ /* Attribute tables are generated from opcode map */ #include "inat-tables.c" diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c index 404279563891..ce07af6ba5e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/insn.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn.c @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ #else #include <string.h> #endif -#include <asm/inat.h> -#include <asm/insn.h> +#include <asm/inat.h> /*__ignore_sync_check__ */ +#include <asm/insn.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ -#include <asm/emulate_prefix.h> +#include <asm/emulate_prefix.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ /* Verify next sizeof(t) bytes can be on the same instruction */ #define validate_next(t, insn, n) \ diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h index 877827b7c2c3..a61051400311 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * * Written by Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> */ -#include "inat_types.h" +#include "inat_types.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ /* * Internal bits. Don't use bitmasks directly, because these bits are diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h index 52c6262e6bfd..33d41982a5dd 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ */ /* insn_attr_t is defined in inat.h */ -#include "inat.h" +#include "inat.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ struct insn_field { union { diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/lib/inat.c b/tools/arch/x86/lib/inat.c index 4f5ed49e1b4e..dfbcc6405941 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/lib/inat.c +++ b/tools/arch/x86/lib/inat.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * * Written by Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> */ -#include "../include/asm/insn.h" +#include "../include/asm/insn.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ /* Attribute tables are generated from opcode map */ #include "inat-tables.c" diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c b/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c index 0151dfc6da61..6c82e3526127 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c +++ b/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ #else #include <string.h> #endif -#include "../include/asm/inat.h" -#include "../include/asm/insn.h" +#include "../include/asm/inat.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ +#include "../include/asm/insn.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ -#include "../include/asm/emulate_prefix.h" +#include "../include/asm/emulate_prefix.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ /* Verify next sizeof(t) bytes can be on the same instruction */ #define validate_next(t, insn, n) \ diff --git a/tools/objtool/sync-check.sh b/tools/objtool/sync-check.sh index 606a4b5e929f..4bbabaecab14 100755 --- a/tools/objtool/sync-check.sh +++ b/tools/objtool/sync-check.sh @@ -16,11 +16,14 @@ arch/x86/include/asm/emulate_prefix.h arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk include/linux/static_call_types.h -arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h -I '^#include [\"<]\(asm/\)*inat_types.h[\">]' -arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h -I '^#include [\"<]\(asm/\)*inat.h[\">]' -arch/x86/lib/inat.c -I '^#include [\"<]\(../include/\)*asm/insn.h[\">]' -arch/x86/lib/insn.c -I '^#include [\"<]\(../include/\)*asm/in\(at\|sn\).h[\">]' -I '^#include [\"<]\(../include/\)*asm/emulate_prefix.h[\">]' " + +SYNC_CHECK_FILES=' +arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h +arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h +arch/x86/lib/inat.c +arch/x86/lib/insn.c +' fi check_2 () { @@ -63,3 +66,9 @@ while read -r file_entry; do done <<EOF $FILES EOF + +if [ "$SRCARCH" = "x86" ]; then + for i in $SYNC_CHECK_FILES; do + check $i '-I "^.*\/\*.*__ignore_sync_check__.*\*\/.*$"' + done +fi diff --git a/tools/perf/check-headers.sh b/tools/perf/check-headers.sh index 15ecb1803fb9..9f085aa09c97 100755 --- a/tools/perf/check-headers.sh +++ b/tools/perf/check-headers.sh @@ -75,6 +75,13 @@ include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h ' +SYNC_CHECK_FILES=' +arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h +arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h +arch/x86/lib/inat.c +arch/x86/lib/insn.c +' + # These copies are under tools/perf/trace/beauty/ as they are not used to in # building object files only by scripts in tools/perf/trace/beauty/ to generate # tables that then gets included in .c files for things like id->string syscall @@ -129,6 +136,10 @@ for i in $FILES; do check $i -B done +for i in $SYNC_CHECK_FILES; do + check $i '-I "^.*\/\*.*__ignore_sync_check__.*\*\/.*$"' +done + # diff with extra ignore lines check arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S '-I "^EXPORT_SYMBOL" -I "^#include <asm/export.h>" -I"^SYM_FUNC_START\(_LOCAL\)*(memcpy_\(erms\|orig\))"' check arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S '-I "^EXPORT_SYMBOL" -I "^#include <asm/export.h>" -I"^SYM_FUNC_START\(_LOCAL\)*(memset_\(erms\|orig\))"' @@ -137,10 +148,6 @@ check include/uapi/linux/mman.h '-I "^#include <\(uapi/\)*asm/mman.h>"' check include/linux/build_bug.h '-I "^#\(ifndef\|endif\)\( \/\/\)* static_assert$"' check include/linux/ctype.h '-I "isdigit("' check lib/ctype.c '-I "^EXPORT_SYMBOL" -I "^#include <linux/export.h>" -B' -check arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h '-I "^#include [\"<]\(asm/\)*inat_types.h[\">]"' -check arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h '-I "^#include [\"<]\(asm/\)*inat.h[\">]"' -check arch/x86/lib/inat.c '-I "^#include [\"<]\(../include/\)*asm/insn.h[\">]"' -check arch/x86/lib/insn.c '-I "^#include [\"<]\(../include/\)*asm/in\(at\|sn\).h[\">]" -I "^#include [\"<]\(../include/\)*asm/emulate_prefix.h[\">]"' # diff non-symmetric files check_2 tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl -- 2.20.1

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit d9cd21911498a9b423e2bdf728b283e4507e968e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 63c66cde7bbcc79aac14b25861c5b2495eede57b upstream. No functional changes, just simplification. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210304174237.31945-10-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index df2a13d4e4f3..2bc76137c4e7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -1284,15 +1284,15 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct text_poke_loc *tp, void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate) { struct insn insn; + int ret; memcpy((void *)tp->text, opcode, len); if (!emulate) emulate = opcode; - kernel_insn_init(&insn, emulate, MAX_INSN_SIZE); - insn_get_length(&insn); + ret = insn_decode(&insn, emulate, MAX_INSN_SIZE, INSN_MODE_KERN); - BUG_ON(!insn_complete(&insn)); + BUG_ON(ret < 0); BUG_ON(len != insn.length); tp->rel_addr = addr - (void *)_stext; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit e68db6f780c6e0ec777045ece0880f5764617394 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 23c1ad538f4f371bdb67d8a112314842d5db7e5a upstream. Currently, optimize_nops() scans to see if the alternative starts with NOPs. However, the emit pattern is: 141: \oldinstr 142: .skip (len-(142b-141b)), 0x90 That is, when 'oldinstr' is short, the tail is padded with NOPs. This case never gets optimized. Rewrite optimize_nops() to replace any trailing string of NOPs inside the alternative to larger NOPs. Also run it irrespective of patching, replacing NOPs in both the original and replaced code. A direct consequence is that 'padlen' becomes superfluous, so remove it. [ bp: - Adjust commit message - remove a stale comment about needing to pad - add a comment in optimize_nops() - exit early if the NOP verif. loop catches a mismatch - function should not not add NOPs in that case - fix the "optimized NOPs" offsets output ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210326151259.442992235@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 17 ++----- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 49 ++++++++++++------- tools/objtool/arch/x86/include/arch_special.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h index be29b927ff1e..9965638d184f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ struct alt_instr { u16 cpuid; /* cpuid bit set for replacement */ u8 instrlen; /* length of original instruction */ u8 replacementlen; /* length of new instruction */ - u8 padlen; /* length of build-time padding */ } __packed; /* @@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) #define alt_end_marker "663" #define alt_slen "662b-661b" -#define alt_pad_len alt_end_marker"b-662b" #define alt_total_slen alt_end_marker"b-661b" #define alt_rlen(num) e_replacement(num)"f-"b_replacement(num)"f" @@ -151,8 +149,7 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) " .long " b_replacement(num)"f - .\n" /* new instruction */ \ " .word " __stringify(feature) "\n" /* feature bit */ \ " .byte " alt_total_slen "\n" /* source len */ \ - " .byte " alt_rlen(num) "\n" /* replacement len */ \ - " .byte " alt_pad_len "\n" /* pad len */ + " .byte " alt_rlen(num) "\n" /* replacement len */ #define ALTINSTR_REPLACEMENT(newinstr, feature, num) /* replacement */ \ "# ALT: replacement " #num "\n" \ @@ -224,9 +221,6 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) * Peculiarities: * No memory clobber here. * Argument numbers start with 1. - * Best is to use constraints that are fixed size (like (%1) ... "r") - * If you use variable sized constraints like "m" or "g" in the - * replacement make sure to pad to the worst case length. * Leaving an unused argument 0 to keep API compatibility. */ #define alternative_input(oldinstr, newinstr, feature, input...) \ @@ -315,13 +309,12 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) * enough information for the alternatives patching code to patch an * instruction. See apply_alternatives(). */ -.macro altinstruction_entry orig alt feature orig_len alt_len pad_len +.macro altinstruction_entry orig alt feature orig_len alt_len .long \orig - . .long \alt - . .word \feature .byte \orig_len .byte \alt_len - .byte \pad_len .endm /* @@ -338,7 +331,7 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) 142: .pushsection .altinstructions,"a" - altinstruction_entry 140b,143f,\feature,142b-140b,144f-143f,142b-141b + altinstruction_entry 140b,143f,\feature,142b-140b,144f-143f .popsection .pushsection .altinstr_replacement,"ax" @@ -375,8 +368,8 @@ static inline int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end) 142: .pushsection .altinstructions,"a" - altinstruction_entry 140b,143f,\feature1,142b-140b,144f-143f,142b-141b - altinstruction_entry 140b,144f,\feature2,142b-140b,145f-144f,142b-141b + altinstruction_entry 140b,143f,\feature1,142b-140b,144f-143f + altinstruction_entry 140b,144f,\feature2,142b-140b,145f-144f .popsection .pushsection .altinstr_replacement,"ax" diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 198dfe0b8326..959916cf9461 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -344,19 +344,35 @@ recompute_jump(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *orig_insn, u8 *repl_insn, u8 *insn_buff) static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr) { unsigned long flags; - int i; + struct insn insn; + int nop, i = 0; + + /* + * Jump over the non-NOP insns, the remaining bytes must be single-byte + * NOPs, optimize them. + */ + for (;;) { + if (insn_decode_kernel(&insn, &instr[i])) + return; + + if (insn.length == 1 && insn.opcode.bytes[0] == 0x90) + break; + + if ((i += insn.length) >= a->instrlen) + return; + } - for (i = 0; i < a->padlen; i++) { - if (instr[i] != 0x90) + for (nop = i; i < a->instrlen; i++) { + if (WARN_ONCE(instr[i] != 0x90, "Not a NOP at 0x%px\n", &instr[i])) return; } local_irq_save(flags); - add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen); + add_nops(instr + nop, i - nop); local_irq_restore(flags); DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ", - instr, a->instrlen - a->padlen, a->padlen); + instr, nop, a->instrlen); } /* @@ -402,19 +418,15 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, * - feature not present but ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV is set to mean, * patch if feature is *NOT* present. */ - if (!boot_cpu_has(feature) == !(a->cpuid & ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV)) { - if (a->padlen > 1) - optimize_nops(a, instr); - - continue; - } + if (!boot_cpu_has(feature) == !(a->cpuid & ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV)) + goto next; - DPRINTK("feat: %s%d*32+%d, old: (%pS (%px) len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d), pad: %d", + DPRINTK("feat: %s%d*32+%d, old: (%pS (%px) len: %d), repl: (%px, len: %d)", (a->cpuid & ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV) ? "!" : "", feature >> 5, feature & 0x1f, instr, instr, a->instrlen, - replacement, a->replacementlen, a->padlen); + replacement, a->replacementlen); DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%px: old_insn: ", instr); DUMP_BYTES(replacement, a->replacementlen, "%px: rpl_insn: ", replacement); @@ -438,14 +450,15 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, if (a->replacementlen && is_jmp(replacement[0])) recompute_jump(a, instr, replacement, insn_buff); - if (a->instrlen > a->replacementlen) { - add_nops(insn_buff + a->replacementlen, - a->instrlen - a->replacementlen); - insn_buff_sz += a->instrlen - a->replacementlen; - } + for (; insn_buff_sz < a->instrlen; insn_buff_sz++) + insn_buff[insn_buff_sz] = 0x90; + DUMP_BYTES(insn_buff, insn_buff_sz, "%px: final_insn: ", instr); text_poke_early(instr, insn_buff, insn_buff_sz); + +next: + optimize_nops(a, instr); } } diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/include/arch_special.h b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/include/arch_special.h index d818b2bffa02..14271cca0c74 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/include/arch_special.h +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/include/arch_special.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ #define JUMP_ORIG_OFFSET 0 #define JUMP_NEW_OFFSET 4 -#define ALT_ENTRY_SIZE 13 +#define ALT_ENTRY_SIZE 12 #define ALT_ORIG_OFFSET 0 #define ALT_NEW_OFFSET 4 #define ALT_FEATURE_OFFSET 8 -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 6e95f8caffb3f10e48b100c47e753ca83042fe6f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit bcb1b6ff39da7e8a6a986eb08126fba2b5e13c32 upstream. Just like JMP handling, convert a direct CALL to a retpoline thunk into a retpoline safe indirect CALL. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210326151259.567568238@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 334781ee60f1..da78811ffda5 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -953,6 +953,18 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) dest_off); return -1; } + + } else if (!strncmp(reloc->sym->name, "__x86_indirect_thunk_", 21)) { + /* + * Retpoline calls are really dynamic calls in + * disguise, so convert them accordingly. + */ + insn->type = INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC; + insn->retpoline_safe = true; + + remove_insn_ops(insn); + continue; + } else insn->call_dest = reloc->sym; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit c9049cf4804ab6f2b73d4cc244c3e2f6e0a9f10e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 3a647607b57ad8346e659ddd3b951ac292c83690 upstream. Instead of manually calling elf_rebuild_reloc_section() on sections we've called elf_add_reloc() on, have elf_write() DTRT. This makes it easier to add random relocations in places without carefully tracking when we're done and need to flush what section. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210326151259.754213408@infradead.org [bwh: Backported to 5.10: drop changes in create_mcount_loc_sections()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 3 --- tools/objtool/elf.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ tools/objtool/elf.h | 1 - tools/objtool/orc_gen.c | 3 --- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 5e407ec95949..fb9be8ec893d 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -542,9 +542,6 @@ static int create_static_call_sections(struct objtool_file *file) idx++; } - if (elf_rebuild_reloc_section(file->elf, reloc_sec)) - return -1; - return 0; } diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.c b/tools/objtool/elf.c index d8421e1d06be..ce08aafa7da0 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.c +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c @@ -530,6 +530,8 @@ void elf_add_reloc(struct elf *elf, struct reloc *reloc) list_add_tail(&reloc->list, &sec->reloc_list); elf_hash_add(elf->reloc_hash, &reloc->hash, reloc_hash(reloc)); + + sec->changed = true; } static int read_rel_reloc(struct section *sec, int i, struct reloc *reloc, unsigned int *symndx) @@ -609,7 +611,9 @@ static int read_relocs(struct elf *elf) return -1; } - elf_add_reloc(elf, reloc); + list_add_tail(&reloc->list, &sec->reloc_list); + elf_hash_add(elf->reloc_hash, &reloc->hash, reloc_hash(reloc)); + nr_reloc++; } max_reloc = max(max_reloc, nr_reloc); @@ -920,14 +924,11 @@ static int elf_rebuild_rela_reloc_section(struct section *sec, int nr) return 0; } -int elf_rebuild_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec) +static int elf_rebuild_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec) { struct reloc *reloc; int nr; - sec->changed = true; - elf->changed = true; - nr = 0; list_for_each_entry(reloc, &sec->reloc_list, list) nr++; @@ -991,9 +992,15 @@ int elf_write(struct elf *elf) struct section *sec; Elf_Scn *s; - /* Update section headers for changed sections: */ + /* Update changed relocation sections and section headers: */ list_for_each_entry(sec, &elf->sections, list) { if (sec->changed) { + if (sec->base && + elf_rebuild_reloc_section(elf, sec)) { + WARN("elf_rebuild_reloc_section"); + return -1; + } + s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, sec->idx); if (!s) { WARN_ELF("elf_getscn"); @@ -1005,6 +1012,7 @@ int elf_write(struct elf *elf) } sec->changed = false; + elf->changed = true; } } diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/elf.h index e6890cc70a25..fc576edacfc4 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.h +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.h @@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ struct reloc *find_reloc_by_dest_range(const struct elf *elf, struct section *se struct symbol *find_func_containing(struct section *sec, unsigned long offset); void insn_to_reloc_sym_addend(struct section *sec, unsigned long offset, struct reloc *reloc); -int elf_rebuild_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec); #define for_each_sec(file, sec) \ list_for_each_entry(sec, &file->elf->sections, list) diff --git a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c index 0d62f958dbea..02e02fc49bbd 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c +++ b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c @@ -251,8 +251,5 @@ int orc_create(struct objtool_file *file) return -1; } - if (elf_rebuild_reloc_section(file->elf, ip_rsec)) - return -1; - return 0; } -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit b37c439250118f6fecfd6436d8b218a452ab6fa8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit d0c5c4cc73da0b05b0d9e5f833f2d859e1b45f8e upstream. Have elf_add_reloc() create the relocation section implicitly. Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210326151259.880174448@infradead.org [bwh: Backported to 5.10: drop changes in create_mcount_loc_sections()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 3 --- tools/objtool/elf.c | 9 ++++++++- tools/objtool/elf.h | 1 - tools/objtool/orc_gen.c | 2 -- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 76a63294d64e..2cb409859081 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -459,9 +459,6 @@ static int create_static_call_sections(struct objtool_file *file) if (!sec) return -1; - if (!elf_create_reloc_section(file->elf, sec, SHT_RELA)) - return -1; - idx = 0; list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->static_call_list, static_call_node) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.c b/tools/objtool/elf.c index 973f0c481bac..b76d687bc962 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.c +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c @@ -498,11 +498,18 @@ static int read_symbols(struct elf *elf) return -1; } +static struct section *elf_create_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, + struct section *base, + int reltype); + int elf_add_reloc(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec, unsigned long offset, unsigned int type, struct symbol *sym, int addend) { struct reloc *reloc; + if (!sec->reloc && !elf_create_reloc_section(elf, sec, SHT_RELA)) + return -1; + reloc = malloc(sizeof(*reloc)); if (!reloc) { perror("malloc"); @@ -880,7 +887,7 @@ static struct section *elf_create_rela_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, struct sec return sec; } -struct section *elf_create_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, +static struct section *elf_create_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, struct section *base, int reltype) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/elf.h index 825ad326201d..463f329f1c66 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.h +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.h @@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ static inline u32 reloc_hash(struct reloc *reloc) struct elf *elf_open_read(const char *name, int flags); struct section *elf_create_section(struct elf *elf, const char *name, unsigned int sh_flags, size_t entsize, int nr); -struct section *elf_create_reloc_section(struct elf *elf, struct section *base, int reltype); int elf_add_reloc(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec, unsigned long offset, unsigned int type, struct symbol *sym, int addend); diff --git a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c index 57de202c51b4..671f3b296c1a 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c +++ b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c @@ -222,8 +222,6 @@ int orc_create(struct objtool_file *file) sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".orc_unwind_ip", 0, sizeof(int), nr); if (!sec) return -1; - if (!elf_create_reloc_section(file->elf, sec, SHT_RELA)) - return -1; /* Write ORC entries to sections: */ list_for_each_entry(entry, &orc_list, list) { -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit b69e1b4b689faa1af25a0a76cd1ef8c612770608 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 9a7827b7789c630c1efdb121daa42c6e77dce97f upstream. Create a common helper to add symbols. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210326151300.003468981@infradead.org [bwh: Backported to 5.10: rb_add() parameter order is different] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/elf.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.c b/tools/objtool/elf.c index 07805b13abe0..74f4b3bb7961 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.c +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c @@ -341,12 +341,39 @@ static int read_sections(struct elf *elf) return 0; } +static void elf_add_symbol(struct elf *elf, struct symbol *sym) +{ + struct list_head *entry; + struct rb_node *pnode; + + sym->type = GELF_ST_TYPE(sym->sym.st_info); + sym->bind = GELF_ST_BIND(sym->sym.st_info); + + sym->offset = sym->sym.st_value; + sym->len = sym->sym.st_size; + + rb_add(&sym->sec->symbol_tree, &sym->node, symbol_to_offset); + pnode = rb_prev(&sym->node); + if (pnode) + entry = &rb_entry(pnode, struct symbol, node)->list; + else + entry = &sym->sec->symbol_list; + list_add(&sym->list, entry); + elf_hash_add(elf->symbol_hash, &sym->hash, sym->idx); + elf_hash_add(elf->symbol_name_hash, &sym->name_hash, str_hash(sym->name)); + + /* + * Don't store empty STT_NOTYPE symbols in the rbtree. They + * can exist within a function, confusing the sorting. + */ + if (!sym->len) + rb_erase(&sym->node, &sym->sec->symbol_tree); +} + static int read_symbols(struct elf *elf) { struct section *symtab, *symtab_shndx, *sec; struct symbol *sym, *pfunc; - struct list_head *entry; - struct rb_node *pnode; int symbols_nr, i; char *coldstr; Elf_Data *shndx_data = NULL; @@ -391,9 +418,6 @@ static int read_symbols(struct elf *elf) goto err; } - sym->type = GELF_ST_TYPE(sym->sym.st_info); - sym->bind = GELF_ST_BIND(sym->sym.st_info); - if ((sym->sym.st_shndx > SHN_UNDEF && sym->sym.st_shndx < SHN_LORESERVE) || (shndx_data && sym->sym.st_shndx == SHN_XINDEX)) { @@ -406,32 +430,14 @@ static int read_symbols(struct elf *elf) sym->name); goto err; } - if (sym->type == STT_SECTION) { + if (GELF_ST_TYPE(sym->sym.st_info) == STT_SECTION) { sym->name = sym->sec->name; sym->sec->sym = sym; } } else sym->sec = find_section_by_index(elf, 0); - sym->offset = sym->sym.st_value; - sym->len = sym->sym.st_size; - - rb_add(&sym->sec->symbol_tree, &sym->node, symbol_to_offset); - pnode = rb_prev(&sym->node); - if (pnode) - entry = &rb_entry(pnode, struct symbol, node)->list; - else - entry = &sym->sec->symbol_list; - list_add(&sym->list, entry); - elf_hash_add(elf->symbol_hash, &sym->hash, sym->idx); - elf_hash_add(elf->symbol_name_hash, &sym->name_hash, str_hash(sym->name)); - - /* - * Don't store empty STT_NOTYPE symbols in the rbtree. They - * can exist within a function, confusing the sorting. - */ - if (!sym->len) - rb_erase(&sym->node, &sym->sec->symbol_tree); + elf_add_symbol(elf, sym); } if (stats) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 33092b486686c31432c5354dbb18651e44200668 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 43d5430ad74ef5156353af7aec352426ec7a8e57 upstream. Provide infrastructure for architectures to rewrite/augment compiler generated retpoline calls. Similar to what we do for static_call()s, keep track of the instructions that are retpoline calls. Use the same list_head, since a retpoline call cannot also be a static_call. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210326151300.130805730@infradead.org [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/arch.h | 2 ++ tools/objtool/check.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- tools/objtool/check.h | 2 +- tools/objtool/objtool.c | 1 + tools/objtool/objtool.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch.h b/tools/objtool/arch.h index 82896d7615f5..8918de4f8189 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch.h +++ b/tools/objtool/arch.h @@ -88,4 +88,6 @@ int arch_decode_hint_reg(struct instruction *insn, u8 sp_reg); bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym); +int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file); + #endif /* _ARCH_H */ diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 2cb409859081..f87a8782c817 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int create_static_call_sections(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; idx = 0; - list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->static_call_list, static_call_node) + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->static_call_list, call_node) idx++; sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".static_call_sites", SHF_WRITE, @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int create_static_call_sections(struct objtool_file *file) return -1; idx = 0; - list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->static_call_list, static_call_node) { + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->static_call_list, call_node) { site = (struct static_call_site *)sec->data->d_buf + idx; memset(site, 0, sizeof(struct static_call_site)); @@ -786,13 +786,16 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) else insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL; + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, + &file->retpoline_call_list); + insn->retpoline_safe = true; continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */ insn->call_dest = reloc->sym; if (insn->call_dest->static_call_tramp) { - list_add_tail(&insn->static_call_node, + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->static_call_list); } continue; @@ -854,7 +857,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) /* internal sibling call (without reloc) */ insn->call_dest = insn->jump_dest->func; if (insn->call_dest->static_call_tramp) { - list_add_tail(&insn->static_call_node, + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->static_call_list); } } @@ -938,6 +941,9 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) insn->type = INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC; insn->retpoline_safe = true; + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, + &file->retpoline_call_list); + remove_insn_ops(insn); continue; @@ -945,7 +951,7 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) insn->call_dest = reloc->sym; if (insn->call_dest && insn->call_dest->static_call_tramp) { - list_add_tail(&insn->static_call_node, + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->static_call_list); } @@ -1655,6 +1661,11 @@ static void mark_rodata(struct objtool_file *file) file->rodata = found; } +__weak int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) { int ret; @@ -1683,6 +1694,10 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret) return ret; + /* + * Must be before add_special_section_alts() as that depends on + * jump_dest being set. + */ ret = add_jump_destinations(file); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1719,6 +1734,15 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret) return ret; + /* + * Must be after add_special_section_alts(), since this will emit + * alternatives. Must be after add_{jump,call}_destination(), since + * those create the call insn lists. + */ + ret = arch_rewrite_retpolines(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + return 0; } diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/check.h index d255c43b134a..e0ae2fc13e67 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/check.h @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct alt_group { struct instruction { struct list_head list; struct hlist_node hash; - struct list_head static_call_node; + struct list_head call_node; struct section *sec; unsigned long offset; unsigned int len; diff --git a/tools/objtool/objtool.c b/tools/objtool/objtool.c index 9df0cd86d310..c0b1f5a99df9 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/objtool.c +++ b/tools/objtool/objtool.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct objtool_file *objtool_open_read(const char *_objname) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.insn_list); hash_init(file.insn_hash); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.retpoline_call_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.static_call_list); file.c_file = !vmlinux && find_section_by_name(file.elf, ".comment"); file.ignore_unreachables = no_unreachable; diff --git a/tools/objtool/objtool.h b/tools/objtool/objtool.h index 5e58d3537e2f..0b57150ea0fe 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/objtool.h +++ b/tools/objtool/objtool.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct objtool_file { struct elf *elf; struct list_head insn_list; DECLARE_HASHTABLE(insn_hash, 20); + struct list_head retpoline_call_list; struct list_head static_call_list; bool ignore_unreachables, c_file, hints, rodata; }; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit ed7783dca5baff4103c214214abf0a3aeb27a79f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 50e7b4a1a1b264fc7df0698f2defb93cadf19a7b upstream. When the .altinstr_replacement is a retpoline, skip the alternative. We already special case retpolines anyway. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210326151300.259429287@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/special.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/special.c b/tools/objtool/special.c index 1a2420febd08..272e29cf8a0c 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/special.c +++ b/tools/objtool/special.c @@ -104,6 +104,14 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, return -1; } + /* + * Skip retpoline .altinstr_replacement... we already rewrite the + * instructions for retpolines anyway, see arch_is_retpoline() + * usage in add_{call,jump}_destinations(). + */ + if (arch_is_retpoline(new_reloc->sym)) + return 1; + alt->new_sec = new_reloc->sym->sec; alt->new_off = (unsigned int)new_reloc->addend; @@ -152,7 +160,9 @@ int special_get_alts(struct elf *elf, struct list_head *alts) memset(alt, 0, sizeof(*alt)); ret = get_alt_entry(elf, entry, sec, idx, alt); - if (ret) + if (ret > 0) + continue; + if (ret < 0) return ret; list_add_tail(&alt->list, alts); -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit f3fe1b141d2cd956ca59d142ef3b5f5cf4e5149c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 99033461e685b48549ec77608b4bda75ddf772ce upstream. Objtool detection of asm jump tables would normally just work, except for the fact that asm retpolines use alternatives. Objtool thinks the alternative code path (a jump to the retpoline) is a sibling call. Don't treat alternative indirect branches as sibling calls when the original instruction has a jump table. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/460cf4dc675d64e1124146562cabd2c05aa322e8.161418241... Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 6d62ad940fce..eb180c78f440 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -107,6 +107,18 @@ static struct instruction *prev_insn_same_sym(struct objtool_file *file, for (insn = next_insn_same_sec(file, insn); insn; \ insn = next_insn_same_sec(file, insn)) +static bool is_jump_table_jump(struct instruction *insn) +{ + struct alt_group *alt_group = insn->alt_group; + + if (insn->jump_table) + return true; + + /* Retpoline alternative for a jump table? */ + return alt_group && alt_group->orig_group && + alt_group->orig_group->first_insn->jump_table; +} + static bool is_sibling_call(struct instruction *insn) { /* @@ -119,7 +131,7 @@ static bool is_sibling_call(struct instruction *insn) /* An indirect jump is either a sibling call or a jump to a table. */ if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC) - return list_empty(&insn->alts); + return !is_jump_table_jump(insn); /* add_jump_destinations() sets insn->call_dest for sibling calls. */ return (is_static_jump(insn) && insn->call_dest); -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit a0319253825ebd8c5b19e31902c4f35f85e93285 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 584fd3b31889852d0d6f3dd1e3d8e9619b660d2c upstream. When an ELF object uses extended symbol section indexes (IOW it has a .symtab_shndx section), these must be kept in sync with the regular symbol table (.symtab). So for every new symbol we emit, make sure to also emit a .symtab_shndx value to keep the arrays of equal size. Note: since we're writing an UNDEF symbol, most GElf_Sym fields will be 0 and we can repurpose one (st_size) to host the 0 for the xshndx value. Fixes: 2f2f7e47f052 ("objtool: Add elf_create_undef_symbol()") Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YL3q1qFO9QIRL/BA@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/elf.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.c b/tools/objtool/elf.c index fff4c5587e3e..9c7d395f0db1 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.c +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c @@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static int elf_add_string(struct elf *elf, struct section *strtab, char *str) struct symbol *elf_create_undef_symbol(struct elf *elf, const char *name) { - struct section *symtab; + struct section *symtab, *symtab_shndx; struct symbol *sym; Elf_Data *data; Elf_Scn *s; @@ -819,6 +819,29 @@ struct symbol *elf_create_undef_symbol(struct elf *elf, const char *name) symtab->len += data->d_size; symtab->changed = true; + symtab_shndx = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab_shndx"); + if (symtab_shndx) { + s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, symtab_shndx->idx); + if (!s) { + WARN_ELF("elf_getscn"); + return NULL; + } + + data = elf_newdata(s); + if (!data) { + WARN_ELF("elf_newdata"); + return NULL; + } + + data->d_buf = &sym->sym.st_size; /* conveniently 0 */ + data->d_size = sizeof(Elf32_Word); + data->d_align = 4; + data->d_type = ELF_T_WORD; + + symtab_shndx->len += 4; + symtab_shndx->changed = true; + } + sym->sec = find_section_by_index(elf, 0); elf_add_symbol(elf, sym); -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit f231b2ee8533d79b93bd163e93caf578d991726b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 31197d3a0f1caeb60fb01f6755e28347e4f44037 upstream. Because the __x86_indirect_alt* symbols are just that, objtool will try and validate them as regular symbols, instead of the alternative replacements that they are. This goes sideways for FRAME_POINTER=y builds; which generate a fair amount of warnings. Fixes: 9bc0bb50727c ("objtool/x86: Rewrite retpoline thunk calls") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YNCgxwLBiK9wclYJ@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index fa30f2326547..5385d26af6e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -58,12 +58,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(__x86_indirect_alt_call_\reg) 2: .skip 5-(2b-1b), 0x90 SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_alt_call_\reg) +STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(__x86_indirect_alt_call_\reg) + SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(__x86_indirect_alt_jmp_\reg) ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE 1: jmp *%\reg 2: .skip 5-(2b-1b), 0x90 SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_indirect_alt_jmp_\reg) +STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(__x86_indirect_alt_jmp_\reg) + .endm /* -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 7ea073195745a8db3cd561faba5cd9870a862045 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 24ff652573754fe4c03213ebd26b17e86842feb3 upstream. Occasionally objtool encounters symbol (as opposed to section) relocations in .altinstructions. Typically they are the alternatives written by elf_add_alternative() as encountered on a noinstr validation run on vmlinux after having already ran objtool on the individual .o files. Basically this is the counterpart of commit 44f6a7c0755d ("objtool: Fix seg fault with Clang non-section symbols"), because when these new assemblers (binutils now also does this) strip the section symbols, elf_add_reloc_to_insn() is forced to emit symbol based relocations. As such, teach get_alt_entry() about different relocation types. Fixes: 9bc0bb50727c ("objtool/x86: Rewrite retpoline thunk calls") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YVWUvknIEVNkPvnP@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/special.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/special.c b/tools/objtool/special.c index 272e29cf8a0c..81d501613389 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/special.c +++ b/tools/objtool/special.c @@ -55,6 +55,24 @@ void __weak arch_handle_alternative(unsigned short feature, struct special_alt * { } +static bool reloc2sec_off(struct reloc *reloc, struct section **sec, unsigned long *off) +{ + switch (reloc->sym->type) { + case STT_FUNC: + *sec = reloc->sym->sec; + *off = reloc->sym->offset + reloc->addend; + return true; + + case STT_SECTION: + *sec = reloc->sym->sec; + *off = reloc->addend; + return true; + + default: + return false; + } +} + static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, struct section *sec, int idx, struct special_alt *alt) @@ -87,15 +105,12 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, WARN_FUNC("can't find orig reloc", sec, offset + entry->orig); return -1; } - if (orig_reloc->sym->type != STT_SECTION) { - WARN_FUNC("don't know how to handle non-section reloc symbol %s", + if (!reloc2sec_off(orig_reloc, &alt->orig_sec, &alt->orig_off)) { + WARN_FUNC("don't know how to handle reloc symbol type: %s", sec, offset + entry->orig, orig_reloc->sym->name); return -1; } - alt->orig_sec = orig_reloc->sym->sec; - alt->orig_off = orig_reloc->addend; - if (!entry->group || alt->new_len) { new_reloc = find_reloc_by_dest(elf, sec, offset + entry->new); if (!new_reloc) { @@ -112,8 +127,11 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, if (arch_is_retpoline(new_reloc->sym)) return 1; - alt->new_sec = new_reloc->sym->sec; - alt->new_off = (unsigned int)new_reloc->addend; + if (!reloc2sec_off(new_reloc, &alt->new_sec, &alt->new_off)) { + WARN_FUNC("don't know how to handle reloc symbol type: %s", + sec, offset + entry->new, new_reloc->sym->name); + return -1; + } /* _ASM_EXTABLE_EX hack */ if (alt->new_off >= 0x7ffffff0) -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 1afa44480b62ef3928cad4e7dea0fe076ae163c8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 4d8b35968bbf9e42b6b202eedb510e2c82ad8b38 upstream. Converting a special section's relocation reference to a symbol is straightforward. No need for objtool to complain that it doesn't know how to handle it. Just handle it. This fixes the following warning: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.o: warning: objtool: __ex_table+0x4: don't know how to handle reloc symbol type: kvm_fastop_exception Fixes: 24ff65257375 ("objtool: Teach get_alt_entry() about more relocation types") Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/feadbc3dfb3440d973580fad8d3db873cbfe1694.163336724... Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/special.c | 36 +++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/special.c b/tools/objtool/special.c index 5f6205fa19d6..99a3a35772a5 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/special.c +++ b/tools/objtool/special.c @@ -55,22 +55,11 @@ void __weak arch_handle_alternative(unsigned short feature, struct special_alt * { } -static bool reloc2sec_off(struct reloc *reloc, struct section **sec, unsigned long *off) +static void reloc_to_sec_off(struct reloc *reloc, struct section **sec, + unsigned long *off) { - switch (reloc->sym->type) { - case STT_FUNC: - *sec = reloc->sym->sec; - *off = reloc->sym->offset + reloc->addend; - return true; - - case STT_SECTION: - *sec = reloc->sym->sec; - *off = reloc->addend; - return true; - - default: - return false; - } + *sec = reloc->sym->sec; + *off = reloc->sym->offset + reloc->addend; } static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, @@ -105,13 +94,8 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, WARN_FUNC("can't find orig reloc", sec, offset + entry->orig); return -1; } - if (!reloc2sec_off(orig_reloc, &alt->orig_sec, &alt->orig_off)) { - WARN_FUNC("don't know how to handle reloc symbol type %d: %s", - sec, offset + entry->orig, - orig_reloc->sym->type, - orig_reloc->sym->name); - return -1; - } + + reloc_to_sec_off(orig_reloc, &alt->orig_sec, &alt->orig_off); if (!entry->group || alt->new_len) { new_reloc = find_reloc_by_dest(elf, sec, offset + entry->new); @@ -129,13 +113,7 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, if (arch_is_retpoline(new_reloc->sym)) return 1; - if (!reloc2sec_off(new_reloc, &alt->new_sec, &alt->new_off)) { - WARN_FUNC("don't know how to handle reloc symbol type %d: %s", - sec, offset + entry->new, - new_reloc->sym->type, - new_reloc->sym->name); - return -1; - } + reloc_to_sec_off(new_reloc, &alt->new_sec, &alt->new_off); /* _ASM_EXTABLE_EX hack */ if (alt->new_off >= 0x7ffffff0) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 9d7ec2418a3a6669a69d96927bf9ce8f2efea444 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 8b946cc38e063f0f7bb67789478c38f6d7d457c9 upstream. Andi reported that objtool on vmlinux.o consumes more memory than his system has, leading to horrific performance. This is in part because we keep a struct instruction for every instruction in the file in-memory. Shrink struct instruction by removing the CFI state (which includes full register state) from it and demand allocating it. Given most instructions don't actually change CFI state, there's lots of repetition there, so add a hash table to find previous CFI instances. Reduces memory consumption (and runtime) for processing an x86_64-allyesconfig: pre: 4:40.84 real, 143.99 user, 44.18 sys, 30624988 mem post: 2:14.61 real, 108.58 user, 25.04 sys, 16396184 mem Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095147.756759107@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: - Don't use bswap_if_needed() since we don't have any of the other fixes for mixed-endian cross-compilation - Since we don't have "objtool: Rewrite hashtable sizing", make cfi_hash_alloc() set the number of bits similarly to elf_hash_bits() - objtool doesn't have any mcount handling - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/arch.h | 2 +- tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 20 ++--- tools/objtool/cfi.h | 2 + tools/objtool/check.c | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- tools/objtool/check.h | 2 +- tools/objtool/orc_gen.c | 15 +++- 6 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch.h b/tools/objtool/arch.h index 8918de4f8189..35e3f94413eb 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch.h +++ b/tools/objtool/arch.h @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ unsigned long arch_dest_reloc_offset(int addend); const char *arch_nop_insn(int len); -int arch_decode_hint_reg(struct instruction *insn, u8 sp_reg); +int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base); bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym); diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index 99b47720dce9..5005a4811157 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -706,34 +706,32 @@ int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; } -int arch_decode_hint_reg(struct instruction *insn, u8 sp_reg) +int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base) { - struct cfi_reg *cfa = &insn->cfi.cfa; - switch (sp_reg) { case ORC_REG_UNDEFINED: - cfa->base = CFI_UNDEFINED; + *base = CFI_UNDEFINED; break; case ORC_REG_SP: - cfa->base = CFI_SP; + *base = CFI_SP; break; case ORC_REG_BP: - cfa->base = CFI_BP; + *base = CFI_BP; break; case ORC_REG_SP_INDIRECT: - cfa->base = CFI_SP_INDIRECT; + *base = CFI_SP_INDIRECT; break; case ORC_REG_R10: - cfa->base = CFI_R10; + *base = CFI_R10; break; case ORC_REG_R13: - cfa->base = CFI_R13; + *base = CFI_R13; break; case ORC_REG_DI: - cfa->base = CFI_DI; + *base = CFI_DI; break; case ORC_REG_DX: - cfa->base = CFI_DX; + *base = CFI_DX; break; default: return -1; diff --git a/tools/objtool/cfi.h b/tools/objtool/cfi.h index c7c59c6a44ee..f579802d7ec2 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/cfi.h +++ b/tools/objtool/cfi.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #define _OBJTOOL_CFI_H #include "cfi_regs.h" +#include <linux/list.h> #define CFI_UNDEFINED -1 #define CFI_CFA -2 @@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ struct cfi_init_state { }; struct cfi_state { + struct hlist_node hash; /* must be first, cficmp() */ struct cfi_reg regs[CFI_NUM_REGS]; struct cfi_reg vals[CFI_NUM_REGS]; struct cfi_reg cfa; diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index eb180c78f440..b6c56c7bb837 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> #include "builtin.h" #include "cfi.h" @@ -25,7 +26,11 @@ struct alternative { bool skip_orig; }; -struct cfi_init_state initial_func_cfi; +static unsigned long nr_cfi, nr_cfi_reused, nr_cfi_cache; + +static struct cfi_init_state initial_func_cfi; +static struct cfi_state init_cfi; +static struct cfi_state func_cfi; struct instruction *find_insn(struct objtool_file *file, struct section *sec, unsigned long offset) @@ -265,6 +270,78 @@ static void init_insn_state(struct insn_state *state, struct section *sec) state->noinstr = sec->noinstr; } +static struct cfi_state *cfi_alloc(void) +{ + struct cfi_state *cfi = calloc(sizeof(struct cfi_state), 1); + if (!cfi) { + WARN("calloc failed"); + exit(1); + } + nr_cfi++; + return cfi; +} + +static int cfi_bits; +static struct hlist_head *cfi_hash; + +static inline bool cficmp(struct cfi_state *cfi1, struct cfi_state *cfi2) +{ + return memcmp((void *)cfi1 + sizeof(cfi1->hash), + (void *)cfi2 + sizeof(cfi2->hash), + sizeof(struct cfi_state) - sizeof(struct hlist_node)); +} + +static inline u32 cfi_key(struct cfi_state *cfi) +{ + return jhash((void *)cfi + sizeof(cfi->hash), + sizeof(*cfi) - sizeof(cfi->hash), 0); +} + +static struct cfi_state *cfi_hash_find_or_add(struct cfi_state *cfi) +{ + struct hlist_head *head = &cfi_hash[hash_min(cfi_key(cfi), cfi_bits)]; + struct cfi_state *obj; + + hlist_for_each_entry(obj, head, hash) { + if (!cficmp(cfi, obj)) { + nr_cfi_cache++; + return obj; + } + } + + obj = cfi_alloc(); + *obj = *cfi; + hlist_add_head(&obj->hash, head); + + return obj; +} + +static void cfi_hash_add(struct cfi_state *cfi) +{ + struct hlist_head *head = &cfi_hash[hash_min(cfi_key(cfi), cfi_bits)]; + + hlist_add_head(&cfi->hash, head); +} + +static void *cfi_hash_alloc(void) +{ + cfi_bits = vmlinux ? ELF_HASH_BITS - 3 : 13; + cfi_hash = mmap(NULL, sizeof(struct hlist_head) << cfi_bits, + PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON, -1, 0); + if (cfi_hash == (void *)-1L) { + WARN("mmap fail cfi_hash"); + cfi_hash = NULL; + } else if (stats) { + printf("cfi_bits: %d\n", cfi_bits); + } + + return cfi_hash; +} + +static unsigned long nr_insns; +static unsigned long nr_insns_visited; + /* * Call the arch-specific instruction decoder for all the instructions and add * them to the global instruction list. @@ -275,7 +352,6 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct objtool_file *file) struct symbol *func; unsigned long offset; struct instruction *insn; - unsigned long nr_insns = 0; int ret; for_each_sec(file, sec) { @@ -301,7 +377,6 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct objtool_file *file) memset(insn, 0, sizeof(*insn)); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&insn->alts); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&insn->stack_ops); - init_cfi_state(&insn->cfi); insn->sec = sec; insn->offset = offset; @@ -1077,7 +1152,6 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file, memset(nop, 0, sizeof(*nop)); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nop->alts); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nop->stack_ops); - init_cfi_state(&nop->cfi); nop->sec = special_alt->new_sec; nop->offset = special_alt->new_off + special_alt->new_len; @@ -1454,10 +1528,11 @@ static void set_func_state(struct cfi_state *state) static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) { + struct cfi_state cfi = init_cfi; struct section *sec, *relocsec; - struct reloc *reloc; struct unwind_hint *hint; struct instruction *insn; + struct reloc *reloc; int i; sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".discard.unwind_hints"); @@ -1495,19 +1570,24 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) insn->hint = true; if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC) { - set_func_state(&insn->cfi); + insn->cfi = &func_cfi; continue; } - if (arch_decode_hint_reg(insn, hint->sp_reg)) { + if (insn->cfi) + cfi = *(insn->cfi); + + if (arch_decode_hint_reg(hint->sp_reg, &cfi.cfa.base)) { WARN_FUNC("unsupported unwind_hint sp base reg %d", insn->sec, insn->offset, hint->sp_reg); return -1; } - insn->cfi.cfa.offset = hint->sp_offset; - insn->cfi.type = hint->type; - insn->cfi.end = hint->end; + cfi.cfa.offset = hint->sp_offset; + cfi.type = hint->type; + cfi.end = hint->end; + + insn->cfi = cfi_hash_find_or_add(&cfi); } return 0; @@ -2283,13 +2363,18 @@ static int propagate_alt_cfi(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn if (!insn->alt_group) return 0; + if (!insn->cfi) { + WARN("CFI missing"); + return -1; + } + alt_cfi = insn->alt_group->cfi; group_off = insn->offset - insn->alt_group->first_insn->offset; if (!alt_cfi[group_off]) { - alt_cfi[group_off] = &insn->cfi; + alt_cfi[group_off] = insn->cfi; } else { - if (memcmp(alt_cfi[group_off], &insn->cfi, sizeof(struct cfi_state))) { + if (cficmp(alt_cfi[group_off], insn->cfi)) { WARN_FUNC("stack layout conflict in alternatives", insn->sec, insn->offset); return -1; @@ -2335,9 +2420,14 @@ static int handle_insn_ops(struct instruction *insn, struct insn_state *state) static bool insn_cfi_match(struct instruction *insn, struct cfi_state *cfi2) { - struct cfi_state *cfi1 = &insn->cfi; + struct cfi_state *cfi1 = insn->cfi; int i; + if (!cfi1) { + WARN("CFI missing"); + return false; + } + if (memcmp(&cfi1->cfa, &cfi2->cfa, sizeof(cfi1->cfa))) { WARN_FUNC("stack state mismatch: cfa1=%d%+d cfa2=%d%+d", @@ -2522,7 +2612,7 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, struct instruction *insn, struct insn_state state) { struct alternative *alt; - struct instruction *next_insn; + struct instruction *next_insn, *prev_insn = NULL; struct section *sec; u8 visited; int ret; @@ -2551,15 +2641,25 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, if (insn->visited & visited) return 0; + } else { + nr_insns_visited++; } if (state.noinstr) state.instr += insn->instr; - if (insn->hint) - state.cfi = insn->cfi; - else - insn->cfi = state.cfi; + if (insn->hint) { + state.cfi = *insn->cfi; + } else { + /* XXX track if we actually changed state.cfi */ + + if (prev_insn && !cficmp(prev_insn->cfi, &state.cfi)) { + insn->cfi = prev_insn->cfi; + nr_cfi_reused++; + } else { + insn->cfi = cfi_hash_find_or_add(&state.cfi); + } + } insn->visited |= visited; @@ -2709,6 +2809,7 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, return 1; } + prev_insn = insn; insn = next_insn; } @@ -2964,10 +3065,20 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) int ret, warnings = 0; arch_initial_func_cfi_state(&initial_func_cfi); + init_cfi_state(&init_cfi); + init_cfi_state(&func_cfi); + set_func_state(&func_cfi); + + if (!cfi_hash_alloc()) + goto out; + + cfi_hash_add(&init_cfi); + cfi_hash_add(&func_cfi); ret = decode_sections(file); if (ret < 0) goto out; + warnings += ret; if (list_empty(&file->insn_list)) @@ -3011,6 +3122,13 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) goto out; warnings += ret; + if (stats) { + printf("nr_insns_visited: %ld\n", nr_insns_visited); + printf("nr_cfi: %ld\n", nr_cfi); + printf("nr_cfi_reused: %ld\n", nr_cfi_reused); + printf("nr_cfi_cache: %ld\n", nr_cfi_cache); + } + out: /* * For now, don't fail the kernel build on fatal warnings. These diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/check.h index ca3259eebac8..508f712deba1 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/check.h @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct instruction { struct list_head alts; struct symbol *func; struct list_head stack_ops; - struct cfi_state cfi; + struct cfi_state *cfi; }; static inline bool is_static_jump(struct instruction *insn) diff --git a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c index 671f3b296c1a..812b33ed9f65 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c +++ b/tools/objtool/orc_gen.c @@ -12,13 +12,19 @@ #include "check.h" #include "warn.h" -static int init_orc_entry(struct orc_entry *orc, struct cfi_state *cfi) +static int init_orc_entry(struct orc_entry *orc, struct cfi_state *cfi, + struct instruction *insn) { - struct instruction *insn = container_of(cfi, struct instruction, cfi); struct cfi_reg *bp = &cfi->regs[CFI_BP]; memset(orc, 0, sizeof(*orc)); + if (!cfi) { + orc->end = 0; + orc->sp_reg = ORC_REG_UNDEFINED; + return 0; + } + orc->end = cfi->end; if (cfi->cfa.base == CFI_UNDEFINED) { @@ -159,7 +165,7 @@ int orc_create(struct objtool_file *file) int i; if (!alt_group) { - if (init_orc_entry(&orc, &insn->cfi)) + if (init_orc_entry(&orc, insn->cfi, insn)) return -1; if (!memcmp(&prev_orc, &orc, sizeof(orc))) continue; @@ -183,7 +189,8 @@ int orc_create(struct objtool_file *file) struct cfi_state *cfi = alt_group->cfi[i]; if (!cfi) continue; - if (init_orc_entry(&orc, cfi)) + /* errors are reported on the original insn */ + if (init_orc_entry(&orc, cfi, insn)) return -1; if (!memcmp(&prev_orc, &orc, sizeof(orc))) continue; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 6e4676f438f8a454d85c12ffa2abf613f9a8f75c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 1739c66eb7bd5f27f1b69a5a26e10e8327d1e136 upstream. In order to avoid calling str*cmp() on symbol names, over and over, do them all once upfront and store the result. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.658539311@infradead.org [cascardo: no pv_target on struct symbol, because of missing db2b0c5d7b6f19b3c2cab08c531b65342eb5252b] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: objtool doesn't have any mcount handling] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- tools/objtool/elf.h | 7 +++++-- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index b397868aa6f2..01b064b6182d 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -889,8 +889,7 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn, * so they need a little help, NOP out any KCOV calls from noinstr * text. */ - if (insn->sec->noinstr && - !strncmp(insn->call_dest->name, "__sanitizer_cov_", 16)) { + if (insn->sec->noinstr && insn->call_dest->kcov) { if (reloc) { reloc->type = R_NONE; elf_write_reloc(file->elf, reloc); @@ -935,7 +934,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) } else if (reloc->sym->type == STT_SECTION) { dest_sec = reloc->sym->sec; dest_off = arch_dest_reloc_offset(reloc->addend); - } else if (arch_is_retpoline(reloc->sym)) { + } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) { /* * Retpoline jumps are really dynamic jumps in * disguise, so convert them accordingly. @@ -1076,7 +1075,7 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) add_call_dest(file, insn, dest, false); - } else if (arch_is_retpoline(reloc->sym)) { + } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) { /* * Retpoline calls are really dynamic calls in * disguise, so convert them accordingly. @@ -1733,17 +1732,28 @@ static int read_intra_function_calls(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; } -static int read_static_call_tramps(struct objtool_file *file) +static int classify_symbols(struct objtool_file *file) { struct section *sec; struct symbol *func; for_each_sec(file, sec) { list_for_each_entry(func, &sec->symbol_list, list) { - if (func->bind == STB_GLOBAL && - !strncmp(func->name, STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_PREFIX_STR, + if (func->bind != STB_GLOBAL) + continue; + + if (!strncmp(func->name, STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_PREFIX_STR, strlen(STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_PREFIX_STR))) func->static_call_tramp = true; + + if (arch_is_retpoline(func)) + func->retpoline_thunk = true; + + if (!strcmp(func->name, "__fentry__")) + func->fentry = true; + + if (!strncmp(func->name, "__sanitizer_cov_", 16)) + func->kcov = true; } } @@ -1805,7 +1815,7 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) /* * Must be before add_{jump_call}_destination. */ - ret = read_static_call_tramps(file); + ret = classify_symbols(file); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1863,9 +1873,9 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) static bool is_fentry_call(struct instruction *insn) { - if (insn->type == INSN_CALL && insn->call_dest && - insn->call_dest->type == STT_NOTYPE && - !strcmp(insn->call_dest->name, "__fentry__")) + if (insn->type == INSN_CALL && + insn->call_dest && + insn->call_dest->fentry) return true; return false; diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/elf.h index 45e5ede363b0..b51e35825dad 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.h +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.h @@ -55,8 +55,11 @@ struct symbol { unsigned long offset; unsigned int len; struct symbol *pfunc, *cfunc, *alias; - bool uaccess_safe; - bool static_call_tramp; + u8 uaccess_safe : 1; + u8 static_call_tramp : 1; + u8 retpoline_thunk : 1; + u8 fentry : 1; + u8 kcov : 1; }; struct reloc { -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 908bd980a80ea23ff834c3fff828c3d37ada6cc2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 134ab5bd1883312d7a4b3033b05c6b5a1bb8889b upstream. Instead of writing complete alternatives, simply provide a list of all the retpoline thunk calls. Then the kernel is free to do with them as it pleases. Simpler code all-round. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.850007165@infradead.org [cascardo: fixed conflict because of missing 8b946cc38e063f0f7bb67789478c38f6d7d457c9] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: deleted functions had slightly different code] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 14 ++++ tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 120 ----------------------------- tools/objtool/check.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- tools/objtool/elf.c | 83 -------------------- tools/objtool/elf.h | 1 - tools/objtool/special.c | 8 -- 6 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index bf9e0adb5b7e..d7085a94cfed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -272,6 +272,20 @@ SECTIONS __parainstructions_end = .; } +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + /* + * List of instructions that call/jmp/jcc to retpoline thunks + * __x86_indirect_thunk_*(). These instructions can be patched along + * with alternatives, after which the section can be freed. + */ + . = ALIGN(8); + .retpoline_sites : AT(ADDR(.retpoline_sites) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __retpoline_sites = .; + *(.retpoline_sites) + __retpoline_sites_end = .; + } +#endif + /* * struct alt_inst entries. From the header (alternative.h): * "Alternative instructions for different CPU types or capabilities" diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index 4fb50239b82a..32a810429306 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -606,126 +606,6 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len) return ret[len-1]; } -/* asm/alternative.h ? */ - -#define ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV (1 << 15) -#define ALT_NOT(feat) ((feat) | ALTINSTR_FLAG_INV) - -struct alt_instr { - s32 instr_offset; /* original instruction */ - s32 repl_offset; /* offset to replacement instruction */ - u16 cpuid; /* cpuid bit set for replacement */ - u8 instrlen; /* length of original instruction */ - u8 replacementlen; /* length of new instruction */ -} __packed; - -static int elf_add_alternative(struct elf *elf, - struct instruction *orig, struct symbol *sym, - int cpuid, u8 orig_len, u8 repl_len) -{ - const int size = sizeof(struct alt_instr); - struct alt_instr *alt; - struct section *sec; - Elf_Scn *s; - - sec = find_section_by_name(elf, ".altinstructions"); - if (!sec) { - sec = elf_create_section(elf, ".altinstructions", - SHF_ALLOC, 0, 0); - - if (!sec) { - WARN_ELF("elf_create_section"); - return -1; - } - } - - s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, sec->idx); - if (!s) { - WARN_ELF("elf_getscn"); - return -1; - } - - sec->data = elf_newdata(s); - if (!sec->data) { - WARN_ELF("elf_newdata"); - return -1; - } - - sec->data->d_size = size; - sec->data->d_align = 1; - - alt = sec->data->d_buf = malloc(size); - if (!sec->data->d_buf) { - perror("malloc"); - return -1; - } - memset(sec->data->d_buf, 0, size); - - if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(elf, sec, sec->sh.sh_size, - R_X86_64_PC32, orig->sec, orig->offset)) { - WARN("elf_create_reloc: alt_instr::instr_offset"); - return -1; - } - - if (elf_add_reloc(elf, sec, sec->sh.sh_size + 4, - R_X86_64_PC32, sym, 0)) { - WARN("elf_create_reloc: alt_instr::repl_offset"); - return -1; - } - - alt->cpuid = cpuid; - alt->instrlen = orig_len; - alt->replacementlen = repl_len; - - sec->sh.sh_size += size; - sec->changed = true; - - return 0; -} - -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) - -int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file) -{ - struct instruction *insn; - struct reloc *reloc; - struct symbol *sym; - char name[32] = ""; - - list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->retpoline_call_list, call_node) { - - if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) - continue; - - if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".text.__x86.indirect_thunk")) - continue; - - reloc = insn->reloc; - - sprintf(name, "__x86_indirect_alt_%s_%s", - insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jmp" : "call", - reloc->sym->name + 21); - - sym = find_symbol_by_name(file->elf, name); - if (!sym) { - sym = elf_create_undef_symbol(file->elf, name); - if (!sym) { - WARN("elf_create_undef_symbol"); - return -1; - } - } - - if (elf_add_alternative(file->elf, insn, sym, - ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE), 5, 5)) { - WARN("elf_add_alternative"); - return -1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base) { switch (sp_reg) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index a70f3811918b..09e7807f83ee 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -606,6 +606,52 @@ static int create_static_call_sections(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; } +static int create_retpoline_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct instruction *insn; + struct section *sec; + int idx; + + sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".retpoline_sites"); + if (sec) { + WARN("file already has .retpoline_sites, skipping"); + return 0; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->retpoline_call_list, call_node) + idx++; + + if (!idx) + return 0; + + sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".retpoline_sites", 0, + sizeof(int), idx); + if (!sec) { + WARN("elf_create_section: .retpoline_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->retpoline_call_list, call_node) { + + int *site = (int *)sec->data->d_buf + idx; + *site = 0; + + if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(file->elf, sec, + idx * sizeof(int), + R_X86_64_PC32, + insn->sec, insn->offset)) { + WARN("elf_add_reloc_to_insn: .retpoline_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx++; + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Warnings shouldn't be reported for ignored functions. */ @@ -893,6 +939,11 @@ static void annotate_call_site(struct objtool_file *file, return; } + if (sym->retpoline_thunk) { + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->retpoline_call_list); + return; + } + /* * Many compilers cannot disable KCOV with a function attribute * so they need a little help, NOP out any KCOV calls from noinstr @@ -933,6 +984,39 @@ static void add_call_dest(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn, annotate_call_site(file, insn, sibling); } +static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +{ + /* + * Retpoline calls/jumps are really dynamic calls/jumps in disguise, + * so convert them accordingly. + */ + switch (insn->type) { + case INSN_CALL: + insn->type = INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC; + break; + case INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL: + insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC; + break; + case INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL: + insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL; + break; + default: + return; + } + + insn->retpoline_safe = true; + + /* + * Whatever stack impact regular CALLs have, should be undone + * by the RETURN of the called function. + * + * Annotated intra-function calls retain the stack_ops but + * are converted to JUMP, see read_intra_function_calls(). + */ + remove_insn_ops(insn); + + annotate_call_site(file, insn, false); +} /* * Find the destination instructions for all jumps. */ @@ -955,19 +1039,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) dest_sec = reloc->sym->sec; dest_off = arch_dest_reloc_offset(reloc->addend); } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) { - /* - * Retpoline jumps are really dynamic jumps in - * disguise, so convert them accordingly. - */ - if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL) - insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC; - else - insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL; - - list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, - &file->retpoline_call_list); - - insn->retpoline_safe = true; + add_retpoline_call(file, insn); continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */ @@ -1096,18 +1168,7 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) add_call_dest(file, insn, dest, false); } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) { - /* - * Retpoline calls are really dynamic calls in - * disguise, so convert them accordingly. - */ - insn->type = INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC; - insn->retpoline_safe = true; - - list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, - &file->retpoline_call_list); - - remove_insn_ops(insn); - continue; + add_retpoline_call(file, insn); } else add_call_dest(file, insn, reloc->sym, false); @@ -1806,11 +1867,6 @@ static void mark_rodata(struct objtool_file *file) file->rodata = found; } -__weak int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) { int ret; @@ -1879,15 +1935,6 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret) return ret; - /* - * Must be after add_special_section_alts(), since this will emit - * alternatives. Must be after add_{jump,call}_destination(), since - * those create the call insn lists. - */ - ret = arch_rewrite_retpolines(file); - if (ret) - return ret; - return 0; } @@ -3159,6 +3206,13 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) goto out; warnings += ret; + if (retpoline) { + ret = create_retpoline_sites_sections(file); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + warnings += ret; + } + if (stats) { printf("nr_insns_visited: %ld\n", nr_insns_visited); printf("nr_cfi: %ld\n", nr_cfi); diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.c b/tools/objtool/elf.c index 9c7d395f0db1..74f4b3bb7961 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.c +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c @@ -766,89 +766,6 @@ static int elf_add_string(struct elf *elf, struct section *strtab, char *str) return len; } -struct symbol *elf_create_undef_symbol(struct elf *elf, const char *name) -{ - struct section *symtab, *symtab_shndx; - struct symbol *sym; - Elf_Data *data; - Elf_Scn *s; - - sym = malloc(sizeof(*sym)); - if (!sym) { - perror("malloc"); - return NULL; - } - memset(sym, 0, sizeof(*sym)); - - sym->name = strdup(name); - - sym->sym.st_name = elf_add_string(elf, NULL, sym->name); - if (sym->sym.st_name == -1) - return NULL; - - sym->sym.st_info = GELF_ST_INFO(STB_GLOBAL, STT_NOTYPE); - // st_other 0 - // st_shndx 0 - // st_value 0 - // st_size 0 - - symtab = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab"); - if (!symtab) { - WARN("can't find .symtab"); - return NULL; - } - - s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, symtab->idx); - if (!s) { - WARN_ELF("elf_getscn"); - return NULL; - } - - data = elf_newdata(s); - if (!data) { - WARN_ELF("elf_newdata"); - return NULL; - } - - data->d_buf = &sym->sym; - data->d_size = sizeof(sym->sym); - data->d_align = 1; - - sym->idx = symtab->len / sizeof(sym->sym); - - symtab->len += data->d_size; - symtab->changed = true; - - symtab_shndx = find_section_by_name(elf, ".symtab_shndx"); - if (symtab_shndx) { - s = elf_getscn(elf->elf, symtab_shndx->idx); - if (!s) { - WARN_ELF("elf_getscn"); - return NULL; - } - - data = elf_newdata(s); - if (!data) { - WARN_ELF("elf_newdata"); - return NULL; - } - - data->d_buf = &sym->sym.st_size; /* conveniently 0 */ - data->d_size = sizeof(Elf32_Word); - data->d_align = 4; - data->d_type = ELF_T_WORD; - - symtab_shndx->len += 4; - symtab_shndx->changed = true; - } - - sym->sec = find_section_by_index(elf, 0); - - elf_add_symbol(elf, sym); - - return sym; -} - struct section *elf_create_section(struct elf *elf, const char *name, unsigned int sh_flags, size_t entsize, int nr) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/elf.h index b51e35825dad..de00cac9aede 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.h +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.h @@ -136,7 +136,6 @@ int elf_write_insn(struct elf *elf, struct section *sec, unsigned long offset, unsigned int len, const char *insn); int elf_write_reloc(struct elf *elf, struct reloc *reloc); -struct symbol *elf_create_undef_symbol(struct elf *elf, const char *name); int elf_write(struct elf *elf); void elf_close(struct elf *elf); diff --git a/tools/objtool/special.c b/tools/objtool/special.c index 99a3a35772a5..aff0cee7bac1 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/special.c +++ b/tools/objtool/special.c @@ -105,14 +105,6 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf, struct special_entry *entry, return -1; } - /* - * Skip retpoline .altinstr_replacement... we already rewrite the - * instructions for retpolines anyway, see arch_is_retpoline() - * usage in add_{call,jump}_destinations(). - */ - if (arch_is_retpoline(new_reloc->sym)) - return 1; - reloc_to_sec_off(new_reloc, &alt->new_sec, &alt->new_off); /* _ASM_EXTABLE_EX hack */ -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 8ef808b3f406ed920adea8ffc949f63c059bf3a7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit a92ede2d584a2e070def59c7e47e6b6f6341c55c upstream. Ensure the register order is correct; this allows for easy translation between register number and trampoline and vice-versa. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.978573921@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h index 1b07fb102c4e..07949102a08d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * These are in machine order; things rely on that. + */ #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT GEN(rax) -GEN(rbx) GEN(rcx) GEN(rdx) +GEN(rbx) +GEN(rsp) +GEN(rbp) GEN(rsi) GEN(rdi) -GEN(rbp) GEN(r8) GEN(r9) GEN(r10) @@ -16,10 +21,11 @@ GEN(r14) GEN(r15) #else GEN(eax) -GEN(ebx) GEN(ecx) GEN(edx) +GEN(ebx) +GEN(esp) +GEN(ebp) GEN(esi) GEN(edi) -GEN(ebp) #endif -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 0de47ad5b9d57e52b81c3ce0faa91c8b7749affe category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 6fda8a38865607db739be3e567a2387376222dbd upstream. Because it makes no sense to split the retpoline gunk over multiple headers. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.106290934@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 8 -------- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index a2bed09d3c11..8f80de627c60 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -17,11 +17,3 @@ extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void); #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - -#define GEN(reg) \ - extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg (void); -#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h> -#undef GEN - -#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 838c15e1b775..08ea9888fb5b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> +#include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> @@ -118,6 +119,12 @@ ".popsection\n\t" #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + +#define GEN(reg) \ + extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg (void); +#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h> +#undef GEN + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index a0a7ead52698..a3e453d20f00 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/text-patching.h> -#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> static u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len) { -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 381fd04c97b469106d83a48343512c5312347155 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 7508500900814d14e2e085cdc4e28142721abbdf upstream. Rewrite retpoline thunk call sites to be indirect calls for spectre_v2=off. This ensures spectre_v2=off is as near to a RETPOLINE=n build as possible. This is the replacement for objtool writing alternative entries to ensure the same and achieves feature-parity with the previous approach. One noteworthy feature is that it relies on the thunks to be in machine order to compute the register index. Specifically, this does not yet address the Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_* calls generated by clang, a future patch will add this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.232495794@infradead.org [cascardo: small conflict fixup at arch/x86/kernel/module.c] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: - Use hex literal instead of BYTES_NOP1 - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 9 +- 4 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c index 76b37297b7d4..2676ac322146 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c @@ -358,6 +358,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) os_check_bugs(); } +void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) +{ +} + void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end) { } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h index 9965638d184f..3ac7460933af 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ extern int alternatives_patched; extern void alternative_instructions(void); extern void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end); +extern void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end); struct module; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 5d43499562e0..fe466b8abf44 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> +#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> int __read_mostly alternatives_patched; @@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ static void __init_or_module add_nops(void *insns, unsigned int len) } } +extern s32 __retpoline_sites[], __retpoline_sites_end[]; extern struct alt_instr __alt_instructions[], __alt_instructions_end[]; extern s32 __smp_locks[], __smp_locks_end[]; void text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len); @@ -376,7 +378,7 @@ static __always_inline int optimize_nops_range(u8 *instr, u8 instrlen, int off) * "noinline" to cause control flow change and thus invalidate I$ and * cause refetch after modification. */ -static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr) +static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(u8 *instr, size_t len) { struct insn insn; int i = 0; @@ -394,11 +396,11 @@ static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *ins * optimized. */ if (insn.length == 1 && insn.opcode.bytes[0] == 0x90) - i += optimize_nops_range(instr, a->instrlen, i); + i += optimize_nops_range(instr, len, i); else i += insn.length; - if (i >= a->instrlen) + if (i >= len) return; } } @@ -486,10 +488,135 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, text_poke_early(instr, insn_buff, insn_buff_sz); next: - optimize_nops(a, instr); + optimize_nops(instr, a->instrlen); } } +#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION) + +/* + * CALL/JMP *%\reg + */ +static int emit_indirect(int op, int reg, u8 *bytes) +{ + int i = 0; + u8 modrm; + + switch (op) { + case CALL_INSN_OPCODE: + modrm = 0x10; /* Reg = 2; CALL r/m */ + break; + + case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE: + modrm = 0x20; /* Reg = 4; JMP r/m */ + break; + + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return -1; + } + + if (reg >= 8) { + bytes[i++] = 0x41; /* REX.B prefix */ + reg -= 8; + } + + modrm |= 0xc0; /* Mod = 3 */ + modrm += reg; + + bytes[i++] = 0xff; /* opcode */ + bytes[i++] = modrm; + + return i; +} + +/* + * Rewrite the compiler generated retpoline thunk calls. + * + * For spectre_v2=off (!X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE), rewrite them into immediate + * indirect instructions, avoiding the extra indirection. + * + * For example, convert: + * + * CALL __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg + * + * into: + * + * CALL *%\reg + * + */ +static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes) +{ + retpoline_thunk_t *target; + int reg, i = 0; + + target = addr + insn->length + insn->immediate.value; + reg = target - __x86_indirect_thunk_array; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg & ~0xf)) + return -1; + + /* If anyone ever does: CALL/JMP *%rsp, we're in deep trouble. */ + BUG_ON(reg == 4); + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) + return -1; + + i = emit_indirect(insn->opcode.bytes[0], reg, bytes); + if (i < 0) + return i; + + for (; i < insn->length;) + bytes[i++] = 0x90; + + return i; +} + +/* + * Generated by 'objtool --retpoline'. + */ +void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) +{ + s32 *s; + + for (s = start; s < end; s++) { + void *addr = (void *)s + *s; + struct insn insn; + int len, ret; + u8 bytes[16]; + u8 op1, op2; + + ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0)) + continue; + + op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; + op2 = insn.opcode.bytes[1]; + + switch (op1) { + case CALL_INSN_OPCODE: + case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE: + break; + + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + continue; + } + + len = patch_retpoline(addr, &insn, bytes); + if (len == insn.length) { + optimize_nops(bytes, len); + text_poke_early(addr, bytes, len); + } + } +} + +#else /* !RETPOLINES || !CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */ + +void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } + +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */ + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP static void alternatives_smp_lock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end, u8 *text, u8 *text_end) @@ -774,6 +901,12 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void) * patching. */ + /* + * Rewrite the retpolines, must be done before alternatives since + * those can rewrite the retpoline thunks. + */ + apply_retpolines(__retpoline_sites, __retpoline_sites_end); + apply_alternatives(__alt_instructions, __alt_instructions_end); #ifdef CONFIG_SMP diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c index a1eadaa41a95..dd1d8378f255 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c @@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, struct module *me) { const Elf_Shdr *s, *text = NULL, *alt = NULL, *locks = NULL, - *para = NULL, *orc = NULL, *orc_ip = NULL; + *para = NULL, *orc = NULL, *orc_ip = NULL, + *retpolines = NULL; char *secstrings = (void *)hdr + sechdrs[hdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset; for (s = sechdrs; s < sechdrs + hdr->e_shnum; s++) { @@ -267,8 +268,14 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, orc = s; if (!strcmp(".orc_unwind_ip", secstrings + s->sh_name)) orc_ip = s; + if (!strcmp(".retpoline_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name)) + retpolines = s; } + if (retpolines) { + void *rseg = (void *)retpolines->sh_addr; + apply_retpolines(rseg, rseg + retpolines->sh_size); + } if (alt) { /* patch .altinstructions */ void *aseg = (void *)alt->sh_addr; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit c2746d567dcda6df41b1c3c1e930f51429f5a364 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 87c87ecd00c54ecd677798cb49ef27329e0fab41 upstream. Current BPF codegen doesn't respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* flags and unconditionally emits a thunk call, this is sub-optimal and doesn't match the regular, compiler generated, code. Update the i386 JIT to emit code equal to what the compiler emits for the regular kernel text (IOW. a plain THUNK call). Update the x86_64 JIT to emit code similar to the result of compiler and kernel rewrites as according to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* flags. Inlining RETPOLINE_AMD (lfence; jmp *%reg) and !RETPOLINE (jmp *%reg), while doing a THUNK call for RETPOLINE. This removes the hard-coded retpoline thunks and shrinks the generated code. Leaving a single retpoline thunk definition in the kernel. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.614772675@infradead.org [cascardo: RETPOLINE_AMD was renamed to RETPOLINE_LFENCE] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: add the necessary cnt variable to emit_indirect_jump()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 59 ---------------------------- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 49 +++++++++++------------ arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 22 +++++++++-- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 01ced200bcd9..e791fe7e9de5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -325,63 +325,4 @@ static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void) #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -/* - * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence - * for the following assembly: - * - * With retpolines configured: - * - * callq do_rop - * spec_trap: - * pause - * lfence - * jmp spec_trap - * do_rop: - * mov %rcx,(%rsp) for x86_64 - * mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32 - * retq - * - * Without retpolines configured: - * - * jmp *%rcx for x86_64 - * jmp *%edx for x86_32 - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE -# ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17 -# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT() \ -do { \ - EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \ - /* spec_trap: */ \ - EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \ - EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \ - EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \ - /* do_rop: */ \ - EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x0C, 0x24); /* mov %rcx,(%rsp) */ \ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */ \ -} while (0) -# else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ -# define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \ -do { \ - EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* call do_rop */ \ - /* spec_trap: */ \ - EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \ - EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \ - EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \ - /* do_rop: */ \ - EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */ \ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ \ -} while (0) -# endif -#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ -# ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2 -# define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT() \ - EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE1); /* jmp *%rcx */ -# else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ -# define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \ - EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2) /* jmp *%edx */ -# endif -#endif - #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 4c539a41d2b0..75358b63d9e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -379,6 +379,26 @@ int bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t, return __bpf_arch_text_poke(ip, t, old_addr, new_addr, true); } +#define EMIT_LFENCE() EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8) + +static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip) +{ + u8 *prog = *pprog; + int cnt = 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) { + EMIT_LFENCE(); + EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); + } else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) { + emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip); + } else +#endif + EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); + + *pprog = prog; +} + /* * Generate the following code: * @@ -460,7 +480,7 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect(u8 **pprog, bool *callee_regs_used, * rdi == ctx (1st arg) * rcx == prog->bpf_func + X86_TAIL_CALL_OFFSET */ - RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT(); + emit_indirect_jump(&prog, 1 /* rcx */, ip + (prog - start)); /* out: */ ctx->tail_call_indirect_label = prog - start; @@ -1099,8 +1119,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, /* speculation barrier */ case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC: if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) - /* Emit 'lfence' */ - EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); + EMIT_LFENCE(); break; /* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */ @@ -1877,26 +1896,6 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i return ret; } -static int emit_fallback_jump(u8 **pprog) -{ - u8 *prog = *pprog; - int err = 0; - -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - /* Note that this assumes the the compiler uses external - * thunks for indirect calls. Both clang and GCC use the same - * naming convention for external thunks. - */ - err = emit_jump(&prog, __x86_indirect_thunk_rdx, prog); -#else - int cnt = 0; - - EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2); /* jmp rdx */ -#endif - *pprog = prog; - return err; -} - static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs) { u8 *jg_reloc, *prog = *pprog; @@ -1918,9 +1917,7 @@ static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs) if (err) return err; - err = emit_fallback_jump(&prog); /* jmp thunk/indirect */ - if (err) - return err; + emit_indirect_jump(&prog, 2 /* rdx */, prog); *pprog = prog; return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c index 4bd0f98df700..622af951220c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> /* @@ -1267,6 +1268,21 @@ static void emit_epilogue(u8 **pprog, u32 stack_depth) *pprog = prog; } +static int emit_jmp_edx(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip) +{ + u8 *prog = *pprog; + int cnt = 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + EMIT1_off32(0xE9, (u8 *)__x86_indirect_thunk_edx - (ip + 5)); +#else + EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2); +#endif + *pprog = prog; + + return cnt; +} + /* * Generate the following code: * ... bpf_tail_call(void *ctx, struct bpf_array *array, u64 index) ... @@ -1280,7 +1296,7 @@ static void emit_epilogue(u8 **pprog, u32 stack_depth) * goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_size); * out: */ -static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog) +static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip) { u8 *prog = *pprog; int cnt = 0; @@ -1362,7 +1378,7 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog) * eax == ctx (1st arg) * edx == prog->bpf_func + prologue_size */ - RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT(); + cnt += emit_jmp_edx(&prog, ip + cnt); if (jmp_label1 == -1) jmp_label1 = cnt; @@ -1929,7 +1945,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, break; } case BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL: - emit_bpf_tail_call(&prog); + emit_bpf_tail_call(&prog, image + addrs[i - 1]); break; /* cond jump */ -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 3c91e2257622c169bf74d587e48b96923285ed74 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit f94909ceb1ed4bfdb2ada72f93236305e6d6951f upstream. Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without RET defined. find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file do sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org [bwh: Backported to 5.10: ran the above command] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_thunk_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 4 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 4 +- arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-asm.S | 48 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/crypto/aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 52 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S | 40 +++++++-------- arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S | 4 +- arch/x86/crypto/blowfish-x86_64-asm_64.S | 12 ++--- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 18 +++---- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 18 +++---- arch/x86/crypto/camellia-x86_64-asm_64.S | 12 ++--- arch/x86/crypto/cast5-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S | 12 ++--- arch/x86/crypto/cast6-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S | 16 +++--- arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S | 8 +-- arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pcl-asm_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/des3_ede-asm_64.S | 4 +- arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S | 16 +++--- arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx2-asm_64.S | 16 +++--- arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-i586-asm_32.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-x86_64-asm_64.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/crypto/sha1_avx2_x86_64_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ni_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha256-ssse3-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/twofish-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S | 16 +++--- arch/x86/crypto/twofish-i586-asm_32.S | 4 +- arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64.S | 4 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 12 ++--- arch/x86/entry/thunk_32.S | 2 +- arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 2 +- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S | 10 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/irqflags.S | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S | 10 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 10 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/verify_cpu.S | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 14 +++--- arch/x86/lib/atomic64_386_32.S | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/atomic64_cx8_32.S | 16 +++--- arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 8 +-- arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg16b_emu.S | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg8b_emu.S | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S | 10 ++-- arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 22 ++++----- arch/x86/lib/hweight.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S | 12 ++--- arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/lib/msr-reg.S | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/div_Xsig.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/div_small.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/mul_Xsig.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/math-emu/polynom_Xsig.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/reg_norm.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/math-emu/reg_round.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_add.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_div.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_mul.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_sub.S | 2 +- arch/x86/math-emu/round_Xsig.S | 4 +- arch/x86/math-emu/shr_Xsig.S | 8 +-- arch/x86/math-emu/wm_shrx.S | 16 +++--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 4 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_32.S | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/olpc/xo1-wakeup.S | 6 +-- arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S | 4 +- arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S | 4 +- arch/x86/um/checksum_32.S | 4 +- arch/x86/um/setjmp_32.S | 2 +- arch/x86/um/setjmp_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 14 +++--- arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 2 +- 103 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 352 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_thunk_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_thunk_64.S index c4bb0f9363f5..c8052a141b08 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_thunk_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_thunk_64.S @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__efi64_thunk) pop %rbx pop %rbp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__efi64_thunk) .code32 diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index 72f655c238cf..b55e2007b30c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S @@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_pe_entry) 2: popl %edi // restore callee-save registers popl %ebx leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(efi32_pe_entry) .section ".rodata" @@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit) popl %ebx popl %eax #endif - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S index a6dea4e8a082..484a9c06f41d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(get_sev_encryption_bit) #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(get_sev_encryption_bit) .code64 @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(set_sev_encryption_mask) #endif xor %rax, %rax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(set_sev_encryption_mask) .data diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-asm.S index 51d46d93efbc..b48ddebb4748 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-asm.S @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__load_partial) pxor T0, MSG .Lld_partial_8: - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__load_partial) /* @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__store_partial) mov %r10b, (%r9) .Lst_partial_1: - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__store_partial) /* @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_init) movdqu STATE4, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_init) /* @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_ad) movdqu STATE3, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE4, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lad_out_1: movdqu STATE4, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_ad) movdqu STATE2, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE3, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lad_out_2: movdqu STATE3, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_ad) movdqu STATE1, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE2, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lad_out_3: movdqu STATE2, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_ad) movdqu STATE0, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE1, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lad_out_4: movdqu STATE1, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -373,11 +373,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_ad) movdqu STATE4, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE0, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lad_out: FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_ad) .macro encrypt_block a s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 i @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc) movdqu STATE2, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE3, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lenc_out_1: movdqu STATE3, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc) movdqu STATE1, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE2, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lenc_out_2: movdqu STATE2, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc) movdqu STATE0, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE1, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lenc_out_3: movdqu STATE1, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc) movdqu STATE4, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE0, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lenc_out_4: movdqu STATE0, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -488,11 +488,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc) movdqu STATE3, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE4, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lenc_out: FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc) /* @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc_tail) movdqu STATE3, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_enc_tail) .macro decrypt_block a s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 i @@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec) movdqu STATE2, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE3, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Ldec_out_1: movdqu STATE3, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec) movdqu STATE1, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE2, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Ldec_out_2: movdqu STATE2, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec) movdqu STATE0, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE1, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Ldec_out_3: movdqu STATE1, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec) movdqu STATE4, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE0, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Ldec_out_4: movdqu STATE0, 0x00(STATEP) @@ -642,11 +642,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec) movdqu STATE3, 0x30(STATEP) movdqu STATE4, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET .Ldec_out: FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec) /* @@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec_tail) movdqu STATE3, 0x40(STATEP) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec_tail) /* @@ -743,5 +743,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_final) movdqu MSG, (%rsi) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_final) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.S index 3f0fc7dd87d7..c799838242a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.S @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ ddq_add_8: /* return updated IV */ vpshufb xbyteswap, xcounter, xcounter vmovdqu xcounter, (p_iv) - ret + RET .endm /* diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S index 57aef3f5a81e..69c7c0dc22ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S @@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec) GCM_ENC_DEC dec GCM_COMPLETE arg10, arg11 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec) @@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc) GCM_COMPLETE arg10, arg11 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc) /***************************************************************************** @@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_init) FUNC_SAVE GCM_INIT %arg3, %arg4,%arg5, %arg6 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_init) /***************************************************************************** @@ -1720,7 +1720,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc_update) FUNC_SAVE GCM_ENC_DEC enc FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc_update) /***************************************************************************** @@ -1735,7 +1735,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec_update) FUNC_SAVE GCM_ENC_DEC dec FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec_update) /***************************************************************************** @@ -1750,7 +1750,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_finalize) FUNC_SAVE GCM_COMPLETE %arg3 %arg4 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_finalize) #endif @@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_256a) pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 movaps %xmm0, (TKEYP) add $0x10, TKEYP - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_key_expansion_256a) SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(_key_expansion_128) @@ -1791,7 +1791,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_192a) shufps $0b01001110, %xmm2, %xmm1 movaps %xmm1, 0x10(TKEYP) add $0x20, TKEYP - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_key_expansion_192a) SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_192b) @@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_192b) movaps %xmm0, (TKEYP) add $0x10, TKEYP - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_key_expansion_192b) SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_256b) @@ -1822,7 +1822,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_256b) pxor %xmm1, %xmm2 movaps %xmm2, (TKEYP) add $0x10, TKEYP - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_key_expansion_256b) /* @@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_set_key) popl KEYP #endif FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_set_key) /* @@ -1961,7 +1961,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_enc) popl KEYP #endif FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_enc) /* @@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_aesni_enc1) aesenc KEY, STATE movaps 0x70(TKEYP), KEY aesenclast KEY, STATE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_aesni_enc1) /* @@ -2126,7 +2126,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_aesni_enc4) aesenclast KEY, STATE2 aesenclast KEY, STATE3 aesenclast KEY, STATE4 - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_aesni_enc4) /* @@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_dec) popl KEYP #endif FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_dec) /* @@ -2208,7 +2208,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_aesni_dec1) aesdec KEY, STATE movaps 0x70(TKEYP), KEY aesdeclast KEY, STATE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_aesni_dec1) /* @@ -2316,7 +2316,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_aesni_dec4) aesdeclast KEY, STATE2 aesdeclast KEY, STATE3 aesdeclast KEY, STATE4 - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_aesni_dec4) /* @@ -2376,7 +2376,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_ecb_enc) popl LEN #endif FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_ecb_enc) /* @@ -2437,7 +2437,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_ecb_dec) popl LEN #endif FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_ecb_dec) /* @@ -2481,7 +2481,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_cbc_enc) popl IVP #endif FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_cbc_enc) /* @@ -2574,7 +2574,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_cbc_dec) popl IVP #endif FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_cbc_dec) #ifdef __x86_64__ @@ -2602,7 +2602,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_aesni_inc_init) mov $1, TCTR_LOW movq TCTR_LOW, INC movq CTR, TCTR_LOW - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_aesni_inc_init) /* @@ -2630,7 +2630,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_aesni_inc) .Linc_low: movaps CTR, IV pshufb BSWAP_MASK, IV - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(_aesni_inc) /* @@ -2693,7 +2693,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_ctr_enc) movups IV, (IVP) .Lctr_enc_just_ret: FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_ctr_enc) /* @@ -2778,7 +2778,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_encrypt) movups IV, (IVP) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_encrypt) /* @@ -2846,7 +2846,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_decrypt) movups IV, (IVP) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_decrypt) #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S index 2cf8e94d986a..4d9b2f887064 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S @@ -1777,7 +1777,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2) FUNC_SAVE INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX, PRECOMPUTE_AVX FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2) ############################################################################### @@ -1798,15 +1798,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2) # must be 192 GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 11 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_128_enc_update: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 9 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_256_enc_update: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 13 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2) ############################################################################### @@ -1827,15 +1827,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2) # must be 192 GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 11 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_128_dec_update: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 9 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_256_dec_update: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 13 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2) ############################################################################### @@ -1856,15 +1856,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2) # must be 192 GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 11, arg3, arg4 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_128_finalize: GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 9, arg3, arg4 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_256_finalize: GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 13, arg3, arg4 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2) ############################################################################### @@ -2745,7 +2745,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4) FUNC_SAVE INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX2, PRECOMPUTE_AVX2 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4) ############################################################################### @@ -2766,15 +2766,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4) # must be 192 GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 11 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_128_enc_update4: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 9 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_256_enc_update4: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 13 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4) ############################################################################### @@ -2795,15 +2795,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4) # must be 192 GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 11 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_128_dec_update4: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 9 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_256_dec_update4: GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 13 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4) ############################################################################### @@ -2824,13 +2824,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4) # must be 192 GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 11, arg3, arg4 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_128_finalize4: GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 9, arg3, arg4 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET key_256_finalize4: GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 13, arg3, arg4 FUNC_RESTORE - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S index 2ca79974f819..b50b35ff1fdb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-core.S @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(blake2s_compress_ssse3) movdqu %xmm1,0x10(%rdi) movdqu %xmm14,0x20(%rdi) .Lendofloop: - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(blake2s_compress_ssse3) #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX512 @@ -251,6 +251,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(blake2s_compress_avx512) vmovdqu %xmm1,0x10(%rdi) vmovdqu %xmm4,0x20(%rdi) vzeroupper - retq + RET SYM_FUNC_END(blake2s_compress_avx512) #endif /* CONFIG_AS_AVX512 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/blowfish-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/blowfish-x86_64-asm_64.S index 4222ac6d6584..802d71582689 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/blowfish-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blowfish-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__blowfish_enc_blk) jnz .L__enc_xor; write_block(); - ret; + RET; .L__enc_xor: xor_block(); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__blowfish_enc_blk) SYM_FUNC_START(blowfish_dec_blk) @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(blowfish_dec_blk) movq %r11, %r12; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(blowfish_dec_blk) /********************************************************************** @@ -322,14 +322,14 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__blowfish_enc_blk_4way) popq %rbx; popq %r12; - ret; + RET; .L__enc_xor4: xor_block4(); popq %rbx; popq %r12; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__blowfish_enc_blk_4way) SYM_FUNC_START(blowfish_dec_blk_4way) @@ -364,5 +364,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(blowfish_dec_blk_4way) popq %rbx; popq %r12; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(blowfish_dec_blk_4way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S index ecc0a9a905c4..297b1a7ed2bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(roundsm16_x0_x1_x2_x3_x4_x5_x6_x7_y0_y1_y2_y3_y4_y5_y6_y7_c roundsm16(%xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm8, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %rcx, (%r9)); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(roundsm16_x0_x1_x2_x3_x4_x5_x6_x7_y0_y1_y2_y3_y4_y5_y6_y7_cd) .align 8 @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(roundsm16_x4_x5_x6_x7_x0_x1_x2_x3_y4_y5_y6_y7_y0_y1_y2_y3_a roundsm16(%xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm6, %xmm7, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm12, %xmm13, %xmm14, %xmm15, %xmm8, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %rax, (%r9)); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(roundsm16_x4_x5_x6_x7_x0_x1_x2_x3_y4_y5_y6_y7_y0_y1_y2_y3_ab) /* @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__camellia_enc_blk16) %xmm15, (key_table)(CTX, %r8, 8), (%rax), 1 * 16(%rax)); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; .align 8 .Lenc_max32: @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__camellia_dec_blk16) %xmm15, (key_table)(CTX), (%rax), 1 * 16(%rax)); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; .align 8 .Ldec_max32: @@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ecb_enc_16way) %xmm8, %rsi); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_ecb_enc_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ecb_dec_16way) @@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ecb_dec_16way) %xmm8, %rsi); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_ecb_dec_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_cbc_dec_16way) @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_cbc_dec_16way) %xmm8, %rsi); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_cbc_dec_16way) #define inc_le128(x, minus_one, tmp) \ @@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ctr_16way) %xmm8, %rsi); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_ctr_16way) #define gf128mul_x_ble(iv, mask, tmp) \ @@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(camellia_xts_crypt_16way) %xmm8, %rsi); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_xts_crypt_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_xts_enc_16way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S index 0907243c501c..288cd246da20 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(roundsm32_x0_x1_x2_x3_x4_x5_x6_x7_y0_y1_y2_y3_y4_y5_y6_y7_c roundsm32(%ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm2, %ymm3, %ymm4, %ymm5, %ymm6, %ymm7, %ymm8, %ymm9, %ymm10, %ymm11, %ymm12, %ymm13, %ymm14, %ymm15, %rcx, (%r9)); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(roundsm32_x0_x1_x2_x3_x4_x5_x6_x7_y0_y1_y2_y3_y4_y5_y6_y7_cd) .align 8 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(roundsm32_x4_x5_x6_x7_x0_x1_x2_x3_y4_y5_y6_y7_y0_y1_y2_y3_a roundsm32(%ymm4, %ymm5, %ymm6, %ymm7, %ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm2, %ymm3, %ymm12, %ymm13, %ymm14, %ymm15, %ymm8, %ymm9, %ymm10, %ymm11, %rax, (%r9)); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(roundsm32_x4_x5_x6_x7_x0_x1_x2_x3_y4_y5_y6_y7_y0_y1_y2_y3_ab) /* @@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__camellia_enc_blk32) %ymm15, (key_table)(CTX, %r8, 8), (%rax), 1 * 32(%rax)); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; .align 8 .Lenc_max32: @@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__camellia_dec_blk32) %ymm15, (key_table)(CTX), (%rax), 1 * 32(%rax)); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; .align 8 .Ldec_max32: @@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ecb_enc_32way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_ecb_enc_32way) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ecb_dec_32way) @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ecb_dec_32way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_ecb_dec_32way) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_cbc_dec_32way) @@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_cbc_dec_32way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_cbc_dec_32way) #define inc_le128(x, minus_one, tmp) \ @@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_ctr_32way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_ctr_32way) #define gf128mul_x_ble(iv, mask, tmp) \ @@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(camellia_xts_crypt_32way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_xts_crypt_32way) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_xts_enc_32way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-x86_64-asm_64.S index 1372e6408850..347c059f5940 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -213,13 +213,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__camellia_enc_blk) enc_outunpack(mov, RT1); movq RR12, %r12; - ret; + RET; .L__enc_xor: enc_outunpack(xor, RT1); movq RR12, %r12; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__camellia_enc_blk) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_dec_blk) @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_dec_blk) dec_outunpack(); movq RR12, %r12; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_dec_blk) /********************************************************************** @@ -448,14 +448,14 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__camellia_enc_blk_2way) movq RR12, %r12; popq %rbx; - ret; + RET; .L__enc2_xor: enc_outunpack2(xor, RT2); movq RR12, %r12; popq %rbx; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__camellia_enc_blk_2way) SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_dec_blk_2way) @@ -495,5 +495,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(camellia_dec_blk_2way) movq RR12, %r12; movq RXOR, %rbx; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(camellia_dec_blk_2way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/cast5-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/cast5-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S index 8a6181b08b59..b258af420c92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/cast5-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/cast5-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__cast5_enc_blk16) outunpack_blocks(RR3, RL3, RTMP, RX, RKM); outunpack_blocks(RR4, RL4, RTMP, RX, RKM); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__cast5_enc_blk16) .align 16 @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__cast5_dec_blk16) outunpack_blocks(RR3, RL3, RTMP, RX, RKM); outunpack_blocks(RR4, RL4, RTMP, RX, RKM); - ret; + RET; .L__skip_dec: vpsrldq $4, RKR, RKR; @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast5_ecb_enc_16way) popq %r15; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast5_ecb_enc_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast5_ecb_dec_16way) @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast5_ecb_dec_16way) popq %r15; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast5_ecb_dec_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast5_cbc_dec_16way) @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast5_cbc_dec_16way) popq %r15; popq %r12; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast5_cbc_dec_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast5_ctr_16way) @@ -559,5 +559,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast5_ctr_16way) popq %r15; popq %r12; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast5_ctr_16way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/cast6-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/cast6-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S index 932a3ce32a88..6eccaf1fb4c6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/cast6-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/cast6-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__cast6_enc_blk8) outunpack_blocks(RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RTMP, RX, RKRF, RKM); outunpack_blocks(RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2, RTMP, RX, RKRF, RKM); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__cast6_enc_blk8) .align 8 @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__cast6_dec_blk8) outunpack_blocks(RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RTMP, RX, RKRF, RKM); outunpack_blocks(RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2, RTMP, RX, RKRF, RKM); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__cast6_dec_blk8) SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_ecb_enc_8way) @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_ecb_enc_8way) popq %r15; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast6_ecb_enc_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_ecb_dec_8way) @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_ecb_dec_8way) popq %r15; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast6_ecb_dec_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_cbc_dec_8way) @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_cbc_dec_8way) popq %r15; popq %r12; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast6_cbc_dec_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_ctr_8way) @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_ctr_8way) popq %r15; popq %r12; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast6_ctr_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_xts_enc_8way) @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_xts_enc_8way) popq %r15; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast6_xts_enc_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_xts_dec_8way) @@ -492,5 +492,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cast6_xts_dec_8way) popq %r15; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(cast6_xts_dec_8way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S index ee9a40ab4109..f3d8fc018249 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx2-x86_64.S @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_2block_xor_avx2) .Ldone2: vzeroupper - ret + RET .Lxorpart2: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_4block_xor_avx2) .Ldone4: vzeroupper - ret + RET .Lxorpart4: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output @@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_8block_xor_avx2) .Ldone8: vzeroupper lea -8(%r10),%rsp - ret + RET .Lxorpart8: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S index 8713c16c2501..259383e1ad44 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.S @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_2block_xor_avx512vl) .Ldone2: vzeroupper - ret + RET .Lxorpart2: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl) .Ldone4: vzeroupper - ret + RET .Lxorpart4: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output @@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl) .Ldone8: vzeroupper - ret + RET .Lxorpart8: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S index ca1788bfee16..7111949cd5b9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(chacha_permute) sub $2,%r8d jnz .Ldoubleround - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(chacha_permute) SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_block_xor_ssse3) @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_block_xor_ssse3) .Ldone: FRAME_END - ret + RET .Lxorpart: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(hchacha_block_ssse3) movdqu %xmm3,0x10(%rsi) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(hchacha_block_ssse3) SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_4block_xor_ssse3) @@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_4block_xor_ssse3) .Ldone4: lea -8(%r10),%rsp - ret + RET .Lxorpart4: # xor remaining bytes from partial register into output diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_asm.S index 6e7d4c4d3208..c392a6edbfff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32-pclmul_asm.S @@ -236,5 +236,5 @@ fold_64: pxor %xmm2, %xmm1 pextrd $0x01, %xmm1, %eax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crc32_pclmul_le_16) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S index 884dc767b051..f6e3568fbd63 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ do_return: popq %rsi popq %rdi popq %rbx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(crc_pcl) .section .rodata, "a", @progbits diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pcl-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pcl-asm_64.S index b2533d63030e..721474abfb71 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pcl-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pcl-asm_64.S @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crc_t10dif_pcl) # Final CRC value (x^16 * M(x)) mod G(x) is in low 16 bits of xmm0. pextrw $0, %xmm0, %eax - ret + RET .align 16 .Lless_than_256_bytes: diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/des3_ede-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/des3_ede-asm_64.S index fac0fdc3f25d..f4c760f4cade 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/des3_ede-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/des3_ede-asm_64.S @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(des3_ede_x86_64_crypt_blk) popq %r12; popq %rbx; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(des3_ede_x86_64_crypt_blk) /*********************************************************************** @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(des3_ede_x86_64_crypt_blk_3way) popq %r12; popq %rbx; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(des3_ede_x86_64_crypt_blk_3way) .section .rodata, "a", @progbits diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S index 99ac25e18e09..2bf871899920 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__clmul_gf128mul_ble) psrlq $1, T2 pxor T2, T1 pxor T1, DATA - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__clmul_gf128mul_ble) /* void clmul_ghash_mul(char *dst, const u128 *shash) */ @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clmul_ghash_mul) pshufb BSWAP, DATA movups DATA, (%rdi) FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(clmul_ghash_mul) /* @@ -128,5 +128,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clmul_ghash_update) movups DATA, (%rdi) .Lupdate_just_ret: FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(clmul_ghash_update) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S index b22c7b936272..6a0b15e7196a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S @@ -153,5 +153,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(nh_avx2) vpaddq T1, T0, T0 vpaddq T4, T0, T0 vmovdqu T0, (HASH) - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(nh_avx2) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S index d7ae22dd6683..34c567bbcb4f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-sse2-x86_64.S @@ -119,5 +119,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(nh_sse2) paddq PASS2_SUMS, T1 movdqu T0, 0x00(HASH) movdqu T1, 0x10(HASH) - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(nh_sse2) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S index ba9e4c1e7f5c..c985bc15304b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__serpent_enc_blk8_avx) write_blocks(RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RK0, RK1, RK2); write_blocks(RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2, RK0, RK1, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__serpent_enc_blk8_avx) .align 8 @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__serpent_dec_blk8_avx) write_blocks(RC1, RD1, RB1, RE1, RK0, RK1, RK2); write_blocks(RC2, RD2, RB2, RE2, RK0, RK1, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__serpent_dec_blk8_avx) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx) @@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx) store_8way(%rsi, RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_ecb_enc_8way_avx) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx) @@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx) store_8way(%rsi, RC1, RD1, RB1, RE1, RC2, RD2, RB2, RE2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx) @@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx) store_cbc_8way(%rdx, %rsi, RC1, RD1, RB1, RE1, RC2, RD2, RB2, RE2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_cbc_dec_8way_avx) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ctr_8way_avx) @@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ctr_8way_avx) store_ctr_8way(%rdx, %rsi, RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_ctr_8way_avx) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx) @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx) store_xts_8way(%rsi, RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_xts_enc_8way_avx) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx) @@ -777,5 +777,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx) store_xts_8way(%rsi, RC1, RD1, RB1, RE1, RC2, RD2, RB2, RE2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_xts_dec_8way_avx) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx2-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx2-asm_64.S index c9648aeae705..ca18948964f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx2-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-avx2-asm_64.S @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__serpent_enc_blk16) write_blocks(RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RK0, RK1, RK2); write_blocks(RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2, RK0, RK1, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__serpent_enc_blk16) .align 8 @@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__serpent_dec_blk16) write_blocks(RC1, RD1, RB1, RE1, RK0, RK1, RK2); write_blocks(RC2, RD2, RB2, RE2, RK0, RK1, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__serpent_dec_blk16) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_enc_16way) @@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_enc_16way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_ecb_enc_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_dec_16way) @@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ecb_dec_16way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_ecb_dec_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_cbc_dec_16way) @@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_cbc_dec_16way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_cbc_dec_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ctr_16way) @@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_ctr_16way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_ctr_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_enc_16way) @@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_enc_16way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_xts_enc_16way) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_dec_16way) @@ -809,5 +809,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_xts_dec_16way) vzeroupper; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_xts_dec_16way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-i586-asm_32.S b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-i586-asm_32.S index 6379b99cb722..8ccb03ad7cef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-i586-asm_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-i586-asm_32.S @@ -553,12 +553,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__serpent_enc_blk_4way) write_blocks(%eax, RA, RB, RC, RD, RT0, RT1, RE); - ret; + RET; .L__enc_xor4: xor_blocks(%eax, RA, RB, RC, RD, RT0, RT1, RE); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__serpent_enc_blk_4way) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_dec_blk_4way) @@ -612,5 +612,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_dec_blk_4way) movl arg_dst(%esp), %eax; write_blocks(%eax, RC, RD, RB, RE, RT0, RT1, RA); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_dec_blk_4way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-x86_64-asm_64.S index efb6dc17dc90..e0998a011d1d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/serpent-sse2-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -675,13 +675,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__serpent_enc_blk_8way) write_blocks(%rsi, RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RK0, RK1, RK2); write_blocks(%rax, RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2, RK0, RK1, RK2); - ret; + RET; .L__enc_xor8: xor_blocks(%rsi, RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RK0, RK1, RK2); xor_blocks(%rax, RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2, RK0, RK1, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__serpent_enc_blk_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_dec_blk_8way) @@ -735,5 +735,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(serpent_dec_blk_8way) write_blocks(%rsi, RC1, RD1, RB1, RE1, RK0, RK1, RK2); write_blocks(%rax, RC2, RD2, RB2, RE2, RK0, RK1, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(serpent_dec_blk_8way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_avx2_x86_64_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_avx2_x86_64_asm.S index 1e594d60afa5..6fa622652bfc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_avx2_x86_64_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_avx2_x86_64_asm.S @@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ _loop3: pop %r12 pop %rbx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(\name) .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ni_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ni_asm.S index 11efe3a45a1f..b59f3ca62837 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ni_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ni_asm.S @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sha1_ni_transform) .Ldone_hash: mov RSPSAVE, %rsp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha1_ni_transform) .section .rodata.cst16.PSHUFFLE_BYTE_FLIP_MASK, "aM", @progbits, 16 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_asm.S index d25668d2a1e9..263f916362e0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_asm.S @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ pop %rbp pop %r12 pop %rbx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(\name) .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx-asm.S index 4739cd31b9db..3baa1ec39097 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx-asm.S @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ done_hash: popq %r13 popq %r12 popq %rbx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha256_transform_avx) .section .rodata.cst256.K256, "aM", @progbits, 256 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S index 11ff60c29c8b..3439aaf4295d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S @@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ done_hash: popq %r13 popq %r12 popq %rbx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha256_transform_rorx) .section .rodata.cst512.K256, "aM", @progbits, 512 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-ssse3-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-ssse3-asm.S index ddfa863b4ee3..c4a5db612c32 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-ssse3-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-ssse3-asm.S @@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ done_hash: popq %r12 popq %rbx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha256_transform_ssse3) .section .rodata.cst256.K256, "aM", @progbits, 256 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S index 7abade04a3a3..94d50dd27cb5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sha256_ni_transform) .Ldone_hash: - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha256_ni_transform) .section .rodata.cst256.K256, "aM", @progbits, 256 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S index 63470fd6ae32..34fc71c3524e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ updateblock: mov frame_RSPSAVE(%rsp), %rsp nowork: - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha512_transform_avx) ######################################################################## diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S index 3a44bdcfd583..399fa74ab3d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ done_hash: # Restore Stack Pointer mov frame_RSPSAVE(%rsp), %rsp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha512_transform_rorx) ######################################################################## diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S index 7946a1bee85b..e9b460a54503 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ updateblock: mov frame_RSPSAVE(%rsp), %rsp nowork: - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha512_transform_ssse3) ######################################################################## diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S index a5151393bb2f..c3707a71ef72 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__twofish_enc_blk8) outunpack_blocks(RC1, RD1, RA1, RB1, RK1, RX0, RY0, RK2); outunpack_blocks(RC2, RD2, RA2, RB2, RK1, RX0, RY0, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__twofish_enc_blk8) .align 8 @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__twofish_dec_blk8) outunpack_blocks(RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RK1, RX0, RY0, RK2); outunpack_blocks(RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2, RK1, RX0, RY0, RK2); - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__twofish_dec_blk8) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_ecb_enc_8way) @@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_ecb_enc_8way) store_8way(%r11, RC1, RD1, RA1, RB1, RC2, RD2, RA2, RB2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_ecb_enc_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_ecb_dec_8way) @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_ecb_dec_8way) store_8way(%r11, RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_ecb_dec_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_cbc_dec_8way) @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_cbc_dec_8way) popq %r12; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_cbc_dec_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_ctr_8way) @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_ctr_8way) popq %r12; FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_ctr_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_xts_enc_8way) @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_xts_enc_8way) store_xts_8way(%r11, RC1, RD1, RA1, RB1, RC2, RD2, RA2, RB2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_xts_enc_8way) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_xts_dec_8way) @@ -452,5 +452,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_xts_dec_8way) store_xts_8way(%r11, RA1, RB1, RC1, RD1, RA2, RB2, RC2, RD2); FRAME_END - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_xts_dec_8way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-i586-asm_32.S b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-i586-asm_32.S index a6f09e4f2e46..3abcad661884 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-i586-asm_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-i586-asm_32.S @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_enc_blk) pop %ebx pop %ebp mov $1, %eax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_enc_blk) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_dec_blk) @@ -317,5 +317,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_dec_blk) pop %ebx pop %ebp mov $1, %eax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_dec_blk) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S index fc23552afe37..b12d916f08d6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64-3way.S @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__twofish_enc_blk_3way) popq %rbx; popq %r12; popq %r13; - ret; + RET; .L__enc_xor3: outunpack_enc3(xor); @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__twofish_enc_blk_3way) popq %rbx; popq %r12; popq %r13; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(__twofish_enc_blk_3way) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_dec_blk_3way) @@ -301,5 +301,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_dec_blk_3way) popq %rbx; popq %r12; popq %r13; - ret; + RET; SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_dec_blk_3way) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64.S index d2e56232494a..775af290cd19 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/twofish-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_enc_blk) popq R1 movl $1,%eax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_enc_blk) SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_dec_blk) @@ -304,5 +304,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(twofish_dec_blk) popq R1 movl $1,%eax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(twofish_dec_blk) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 4e079f250962..4a4896ba4db3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(schedule_tail_wrapper) popl %eax FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(schedule_tail_wrapper) .popsection diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index a24ce5905ab8..cb9f63b5ba77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(asm_load_gs_index) 2: ALTERNATIVE "", "mfence", X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE swapgs FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(asm_load_gs_index) EXPORT_SYMBOL(asm_load_gs_index) @@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(asm_call_irq_on_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Restore the previous stack pointer from RBP. */ leaveq - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(asm_call_on_stack) #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * is needed here. */ SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx - ret + RET .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs: /* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */ @@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) .Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase: FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) /* @@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) movq %rax, %rsp /* switch stack */ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER pushq %r12 - ret + RET /* * There are two places in the kernel that can potentially fault with @@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) */ .Lerror_entry_done_lfence: FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY - ret + RET .Lbstep_iret: /* Fix truncated RIP */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/thunk_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/thunk_32.S index f1f96d4d8cd6..7591bab060f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/thunk_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/thunk_32.S @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(\name) popl %edx popl %ecx popl %eax - ret + RET _ASM_NOKPROBE(\name) SYM_CODE_END(\name) .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S index c9a9fbf1655f..1b5044ad8cd0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(__thunk_restore) popq %rsi popq %rdi popq %rbp - ret + RET _ASM_NOKPROBE(__thunk_restore) SYM_CODE_END(__thunk_restore) #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S index d6a6080bade0..c92a8fef2ed2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(int80_landing_pad, SYM_L_GLOBAL) popl %ecx CFI_RESTORE ecx CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4 - ret + RET CFI_ENDPROC .size __kernel_vsyscall,.-__kernel_vsyscall diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S index 2e203f3a25a7..15e35159ebb6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S @@ -19,17 +19,17 @@ __vsyscall_page: mov $__NR_gettimeofday, %rax syscall - ret + RET .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_time, %rax syscall - ret + RET .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_getcpu, %rax syscall - ret + RET .balign 4096, 0xcc diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S index daf88f8143c5..cf69081073b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ save_registers: popl saved_context_eflags movl $ret_point, saved_eip - ret + RET restore_registers: @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ restore_registers: movl saved_context_edi, %edi pushl saved_context_eflags popfl - ret + RET SYM_CODE_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) call save_processor_state @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(do_suspend_lowlevel) ret_point: call restore_registers call restore_processor_state - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(do_suspend_lowlevel) .data diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S index e405fe1a8bf4..a0ed0e4a2c0c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #endif SYM_FUNC_START(__fentry__) - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__fentry__) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fentry__) @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ ftrace_graph_call: /* This is weak to keep gas from relaxing the jumps */ SYM_INNER_LABEL_ALIGN(ftrace_stub, SYM_L_WEAK) - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(ftrace_caller) SYM_CODE_START(ftrace_regs_caller) @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(ftrace_graph_caller) popl %edx popl %ecx popl %eax - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(ftrace_graph_caller) .globl return_to_handler diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S index ad1da5e85aeb..b656c11521a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE SYM_FUNC_START(__fentry__) - retq + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__fentry__) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fentry__) @@ -170,10 +170,10 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(ftrace_graph_call, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* * This is weak to keep gas from relaxing the jumps. - * It is also used to copy the retq for trampolines. + * It is also used to copy the RET for trampolines. */ SYM_INNER_LABEL_ALIGN(ftrace_stub, SYM_L_WEAK) - retq + RET SYM_FUNC_END(ftrace_epilogue) SYM_FUNC_START(ftrace_regs_caller) @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ fgraph_trace: #endif SYM_INNER_LABEL(ftrace_stub, SYM_L_GLOBAL) - retq + RET trace: /* save_mcount_regs fills in first two parameters */ @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(ftrace_graph_caller) restore_mcount_regs - retq + RET SYM_FUNC_END(ftrace_graph_caller) SYM_CODE_START(return_to_handler) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S index 7ed84c282233..9b2b1ac7e8c9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ setup_once: #endif andl $0,setup_once_ref /* Once is enough, thanks */ - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_START(early_idt_handler_array) # 36(%esp) %eflags diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irqflags.S b/arch/x86/kernel/irqflags.S index 0db0375235b4..a9c36400bdf8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irqflags.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irqflags.S @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(native_save_fl) pushf pop %_ASM_AX - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(native_save_fl) EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_save_fl) @@ -21,6 +21,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_save_fl) SYM_FUNC_START(native_restore_fl) push %_ASM_ARG1 popf - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(native_restore_fl) EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_restore_fl) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S index 94b33885f8d2..8190136cc63a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel) movl %edi, %eax addl $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax pushl %eax - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) xorl %edx, %edx xorl %esi, %esi xorl %ebp, %ebp - ret + RET 1: popl %edx movl CP_PA_SWAP_PAGE(%edi), %esp @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) movl %edi, %eax addl $(virtual_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax pushl %eax - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) popl %edi popl %esi popl %ebx - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped) /* Do the copies */ @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages) popl %edi popl %ebx popl %ebp - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages) .globl kexec_control_code_size diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S index a4d9a261425b..a0ae167b1aeb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel) /* jump to identity mapped page */ addq $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %r8 pushq %r8 - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) xorl %r14d, %r14d xorl %r15d, %r15d - ret + RET 1: popq %rdx @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) call swap_pages movq $virtual_mapped, %rax pushq %rax - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) popq %r12 popq %rbp popq %rbx - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped) /* Do the copies */ @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages) lea PAGE_SIZE(%rax), %rsi jmp 0b 3: - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages) .globl kexec_control_code_size diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S index ee04941a6546..3355e27c69eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S @@ -85,5 +85,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sev_verify_cbit) #endif /* Return page-table pointer */ movq %rdi, %rax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sev_verify_cbit) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/verify_cpu.S b/arch/x86/kernel/verify_cpu.S index 641f0fe1e5b4..1258a5872d12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/verify_cpu.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/verify_cpu.S @@ -132,9 +132,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(verify_cpu) .Lverify_cpu_no_longmode: popf # Restore caller passed flags movl $1,%eax - ret + RET .Lverify_cpu_sse_ok: popf # Restore caller passed flags xorl %eax, %eax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(verify_cpu) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index 1ec1ac40e328..6df5950d6967 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S @@ -166,5 +166,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) pop %edi #endif pop %_ASM_BP - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__svm_vcpu_run) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 3a6461694fc2..435c187927c4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -49,14 +49,14 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(vmx_vmenter) je 2f 1: vmresume - ret + RET 2: vmlaunch - ret + RET 3: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting je 4f - ret + RET 4: ud2 _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit) pop %_ASM_AX .Lvmexit_skip_rsb: #endif - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit) /** @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) pop %edi #endif pop %_ASM_BP - ret + RET /* VM-Fail. Out-of-line to avoid a taken Jcc after VM-Exit. */ 2: mov $1, %eax @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmread_error_trampoline) pop %_ASM_AX pop %_ASM_BP - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(vmread_error_trampoline) SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff) @@ -326,5 +326,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff) */ mov %_ASM_BP, %_ASM_SP pop %_ASM_BP - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_386_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_386_32.S index 4ad6b97fdb6f..e768815e58ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_386_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_386_32.S @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_##op##_386); \ #define RET_IRQ_RESTORE \ IRQ_RESTORE v; \ - ret + RET #define v %ecx BEGIN_IRQ_SAVE(read) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_cx8_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_cx8_32.S index ce6935690766..90afb488b396 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_cx8_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/atomic64_cx8_32.S @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_read_cx8) read64 %ecx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(atomic64_read_cx8) SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_set_cx8) @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_set_cx8) cmpxchg8b (%esi) jne 1b - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(atomic64_set_cx8) SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_xchg_cx8) @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_xchg_cx8) cmpxchg8b (%esi) jne 1b - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(atomic64_xchg_cx8) .macro addsub_return func ins insc @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_\func\()_return_cx8) popl %esi popl %ebx popl %ebp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(atomic64_\func\()_return_cx8) .endm @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_\func\()_return_cx8) movl %ebx, %eax movl %ecx, %edx popl %ebx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(atomic64_\func\()_return_cx8) .endm @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_dec_if_positive_cx8) movl %ebx, %eax movl %ecx, %edx popl %ebx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(atomic64_dec_if_positive_cx8) SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_add_unless_cx8) @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_add_unless_cx8) addl $8, %esp popl %ebx popl %ebp - ret + RET 4: cmpl %edx, 4(%esp) jne 2b @@ -176,5 +176,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(atomic64_inc_not_zero_cx8) movl $1, %eax 3: popl %ebx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(atomic64_inc_not_zero_cx8) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S index 4304320e51f4..929ad1747dea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(csum_partial) 8: popl %ebx popl %esi - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(csum_partial) #else @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(csum_partial) 90: popl %ebx popl %esi - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(csum_partial) #endif @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ EXC( movb %cl, (%edi) ) popl %esi popl %edi popl %ecx # equivalent to addl $4,%esp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(csum_partial_copy_generic) #else @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ EXC( movb %dl, (%edi) ) popl %esi popl %edi popl %ebx - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(csum_partial_copy_generic) #undef ROUND diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S index c4c7dd115953..fe59b8ac4fcc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clear_page_rep) movl $4096/8,%ecx xorl %eax,%eax rep stosq - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(clear_page_rep) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_page_rep) @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clear_page_orig) leaq 64(%rdi),%rdi jnz .Lloop nop - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(clear_page_orig) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_page_orig) @@ -47,6 +47,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clear_page_erms) movl $4096,%ecx xorl %eax,%eax rep stosb - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(clear_page_erms) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_page_erms) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg16b_emu.S b/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg16b_emu.S index 3542502faa3b..33c70c0160ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg16b_emu.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg16b_emu.S @@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(this_cpu_cmpxchg16b_emu) popfq mov $1, %al - ret + RET .Lnot_same: popfq xor %al,%al - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(this_cpu_cmpxchg16b_emu) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg8b_emu.S b/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg8b_emu.S index ca01ed6029f4..6a912d58fecc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg8b_emu.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/cmpxchg8b_emu.S @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cmpxchg8b_emu) movl %ecx, 4(%esi) popfl - ret + RET .Lnot_same: movl (%esi), %eax @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cmpxchg8b_emu) movl 4(%esi), %edx popfl - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(cmpxchg8b_emu) EXPORT_SYMBOL(cmpxchg8b_emu) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S index 892d8915f609..fdd1929b1f9d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_mc_fragile) .L_done_memcpy_trap: xorl %eax, %eax .L_done: - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(copy_mc_fragile) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_mc_fragile) @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string) rep movsb /* Copy successful. Return zero */ xorl %eax, %eax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string) .section .fixup, "ax" @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string) * user-copy routines. */ movq %rcx, %rax - ret + RET .previous diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S index 0751592089e9..c31a9a79b18e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_page) ALTERNATIVE "jmp copy_page_regs", "", X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD movl $4096/8, %ecx rep movsq - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(copy_page) EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_page) @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(copy_page_regs) movq (%rsp), %rbx movq 1*8(%rsp), %r12 addq $2*8, %rsp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(copy_page_regs) SYM_FUNC_START(copy_page_nocache) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S index e73b76e5bc09..e7a4e401d7e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_user_generic_unrolled) jnz 21b 23: xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET .section .fixup,"ax" 30: shll $6,%ecx @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_user_generic_string) movsb xorl %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET .section .fixup,"ax" 11: leal (%rdx,%rcx,8),%ecx @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_user_enhanced_fast_string) movsb xorl %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET .section .fixup,"ax" 12: movl %ecx,%edx /* ecx is zerorest also */ @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(.Lcopy_user_handle_tail) 1: rep movsb 2: mov %ecx,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET 3: movl %edx,%eax @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__copy_user_nocache) xorl %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC sfence - ret + RET .section .fixup,"ax" .L_fixup_4x8b_copy: diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S index 1fbd8ee9642d..d9e16a2cf285 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(csum_partial_copy_generic) movq 3*8(%rsp), %r13 movq 4*8(%rsp), %r15 addq $5*8, %rsp - ret + RET .Lshort: movl %ecx, %r10d jmp .L1 diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S index fa1bc2104b32..b70d98d79a9d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_1) 1: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_1) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_1) @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_2) 2: movzwl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_2) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_2) @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_4) 3: movl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_4) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_4) @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_8) 4: movq (%_ASM_AX),%rdx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET #else LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(7) cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_8) 5: movl 4(%_ASM_AX),%ecx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET #endif SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_8) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_8) @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_nocheck_1) 6: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_nocheck_1) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_nocheck_1) @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_nocheck_2) 7: movzwl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_nocheck_2) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_nocheck_2) @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_nocheck_4) 8: movl (%_ASM_AX),%edx xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_nocheck_4) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_nocheck_4) @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_nocheck_8) #endif xor %eax,%eax ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_nocheck_8) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_nocheck_8) @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(.Lbad_get_user_clac) bad_get_user: xor %edx,%edx mov $(-EFAULT),%_ASM_AX - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(.Lbad_get_user_clac) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ bad_get_user_8: xor %edx,%edx xor %ecx,%ecx mov $(-EFAULT),%_ASM_AX - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(.Lbad_get_user_8_clac) #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S b/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S index dbf8cc97b7f5..12c16c6aa44a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__sw_hweight32) imull $0x01010101, %eax, %eax # w_tmp *= 0x01010101 shrl $24, %eax # w = w_tmp >> 24 __ASM_SIZE(pop,) %__ASM_REG(dx) - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__sw_hweight32) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight32) @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__sw_hweight64) popq %rdx popq %rdi - ret + RET #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ /* We're getting an u64 arg in (%eax,%edx): unsigned long hweight64(__u64 w) */ pushl %ecx @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__sw_hweight64) addl %ecx, %eax # result popl %ecx - ret + RET #endif SYM_FUNC_END(__sw_hweight64) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight64) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S index cb5a1964506b..a1f9416bf67a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S @@ -11,5 +11,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__iowrite32_copy) movl %edx,%ecx rep movsd - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__iowrite32_copy) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S index 1cc9da6e29c7..59cf2343f3d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memcpy) rep movsq movl %edx, %ecx rep movsb - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memcpy) SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(__memcpy) EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy) @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_erms) movq %rdi, %rax movq %rdx, %rcx rep movsb - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memcpy_erms) SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movq %r9, 1*8(%rdi) movq %r10, -2*8(%rdi, %rdx) movq %r11, -1*8(%rdi, %rdx) - retq + RET .p2align 4 .Lless_16bytes: cmpl $8, %edx @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movq -1*8(%rsi, %rdx), %r9 movq %r8, 0*8(%rdi) movq %r9, -1*8(%rdi, %rdx) - retq + RET .p2align 4 .Lless_8bytes: cmpl $4, %edx @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movl -4(%rsi, %rdx), %r8d movl %ecx, (%rdi) movl %r8d, -4(%rdi, %rdx) - retq + RET .p2align 4 .Lless_3bytes: subl $1, %edx @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movb %cl, (%rdi) .Lend: - retq + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memcpy_orig) .popsection diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S index 64801010d312..e84d649620c4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) /* FSRM implies ERMS => no length checks, do the copy directly */ .Lmemmove_begin_forward: ALTERNATIVE "cmp $0x20, %rdx; jb 1f", "", X86_FEATURE_FSRM - ALTERNATIVE "", "movq %rdx, %rcx; rep movsb; retq", X86_FEATURE_ERMS + ALTERNATIVE "", "movq %rdx, %rcx; rep movsb; RET", X86_FEATURE_ERMS /* * movsq instruction have many startup latency @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) movb (%rsi), %r11b movb %r11b, (%rdi) 13: - retq + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__memmove) SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(memmove) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__memmove) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S index 9827ae267f96..d624f2bc42f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memset) movl %edx,%ecx rep stosb movq %r9,%rax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__memset) SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(memset) EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset) @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memset_erms) movq %rdx,%rcx rep stosb movq %r9,%rax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memset_erms) SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memset_orig) @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memset_orig) .Lende: movq %r10,%rax - ret + RET .Lbad_alignment: cmpq $7,%rdx diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/msr-reg.S b/arch/x86/lib/msr-reg.S index a2b9caa5274c..ebd259f31496 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/msr-reg.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/msr-reg.S @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(\op\()_safe_regs) movl %edi, 28(%r10) popq %r12 popq %rbx - ret + RET 3: movl $-EIO, %r11d jmp 2b @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(\op\()_safe_regs) popl %esi popl %ebp popl %ebx - ret + RET 3: movl $-EIO, 4(%esp) jmp 2b diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S index 0ea344c5ea43..ecb2049c1273 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(__put_user_nocheck_1, SYM_L_GLOBAL) 1: movb %al,(%_ASM_CX) xor %ecx,%ecx ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_1) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_1) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_1) @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(__put_user_nocheck_2, SYM_L_GLOBAL) 2: movw %ax,(%_ASM_CX) xor %ecx,%ecx ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_2) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_2) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_2) @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(__put_user_nocheck_4, SYM_L_GLOBAL) 3: movl %eax,(%_ASM_CX) xor %ecx,%ecx ASM_CLAC - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__put_user_4) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_4) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_4) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 6565c6f86160..8904c076a1df 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ .Ldo_rop_\@: mov %\reg, (%_ASM_SP) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC - ret + RET .endm .macro THUNK reg diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/div_Xsig.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/div_Xsig.S index 951da2ad54bb..8c270ab415be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/div_Xsig.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/div_Xsig.S @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ L_exit: popl %esi leave - ret + RET #ifdef PARANOID diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/div_small.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/div_small.S index d047d1816abe..637439bfefa4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/div_small.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/div_small.S @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(FPU_div_small) popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_div_small) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/mul_Xsig.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/mul_Xsig.S index 4afc7b1fa6e9..54a031b66142 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/mul_Xsig.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/mul_Xsig.S @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(mul32_Xsig) popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(mul32_Xsig) @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(mul64_Xsig) popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(mul64_Xsig) @@ -175,5 +175,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(mul_Xsig_Xsig) popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(mul_Xsig_Xsig) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/polynom_Xsig.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/polynom_Xsig.S index 702315eecb86..35fd723fc0df 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/polynom_Xsig.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/polynom_Xsig.S @@ -133,5 +133,5 @@ L_accum_done: popl %edi popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(polynomial_Xsig) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_norm.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_norm.S index cad1d60b1e84..594936eeed67 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_norm.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_norm.S @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ L_exit_valid: L_exit: popl %ebx leave - ret + RET L_zero: @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ L_exit_nuo_valid: popl %ebx leave - ret + RET L_exit_nuo_zero: movl TAG_Zero,%eax @@ -146,5 +146,5 @@ L_exit_nuo_zero: popl %ebx leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_normalize_nuo) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_round.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_round.S index 11a1f798451b..8bdbdcee7456 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_round.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_round.S @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ fpu_Arith_exit: popl %edi popl %esi leave - ret + RET /* diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_add.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_add.S index 9c9e2c810afe..07247287a3af 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_add.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_add.S @@ -164,6 +164,6 @@ L_exit: popl %edi popl %esi leave - ret + RET #endif /* PARANOID */ SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_u_add) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_div.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_div.S index e2fb5c2644c5..b5a41e2fc484 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_div.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_div.S @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ L_exit: popl %esi leave - ret + RET #endif /* PARANOID */ SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_u_div) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_mul.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_mul.S index 0c779c87ac5b..e2588b24b8c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_mul.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_mul.S @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ L_exit: popl %edi popl %esi leave - ret + RET #endif /* PARANOID */ SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_u_mul) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_sub.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_sub.S index e9bb7c248649..4c900c29e4ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_sub.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/reg_u_sub.S @@ -270,5 +270,5 @@ L_exit: popl %edi popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_u_sub) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/round_Xsig.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/round_Xsig.S index d9d7de8dbd7b..126c40473bad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/round_Xsig.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/round_Xsig.S @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ L_exit: popl %esi popl %ebx leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(round_Xsig) @@ -138,5 +138,5 @@ L_n_exit: popl %esi popl %ebx leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(norm_Xsig) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/shr_Xsig.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/shr_Xsig.S index 726af985f758..f726bf6f6396 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/shr_Xsig.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/shr_Xsig.S @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(shr_Xsig) popl %ebx popl %esi leave - ret + RET L_more_than_31: cmpl $64,%ecx @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ L_more_than_31: movl $0,8(%esi) popl %esi leave - ret + RET L_more_than_63: cmpl $96,%ecx @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ L_more_than_63: movl %edx,8(%esi) popl %esi leave - ret + RET L_more_than_95: xorl %eax,%eax @@ -85,5 +85,5 @@ L_more_than_95: movl %eax,8(%esi) popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(shr_Xsig) diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_shrx.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_shrx.S index 4fc89174caf0..f608a28a4c43 100644 --- a/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_shrx.S +++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_shrx.S @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(FPU_shrx) popl %ebx popl %esi leave - ret + RET L_more_than_31: cmpl $64,%ecx @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ L_more_than_31: movl $0,4(%esi) popl %esi leave - ret + RET L_more_than_63: cmpl $96,%ecx @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ L_more_than_63: movl %edx,4(%esi) popl %esi leave - ret + RET L_more_than_95: xorl %eax,%eax @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ L_more_than_95: movl %eax,4(%esi) popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_shrx) @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(FPU_shrxs) popl %ebx popl %esi leave - ret + RET /* Shift by [0..31] bits */ Ls_less_than_32: @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ Ls_less_than_32: popl %ebx popl %esi leave - ret + RET /* Shift by [64..95] bits */ Ls_more_than_63: @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ Ls_more_than_63: popl %ebx popl %esi leave - ret + RET Ls_more_than_95: /* Shift by [96..inf) bits */ @@ -203,5 +203,5 @@ Ls_more_than_95: popl %ebx popl %esi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(FPU_shrxs) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index 7a84fc8bc5c3..3c2bc5562fc2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */ pop %rbp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) @@ -151,6 +151,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) pop %r12 pop %r15 - ret + RET .L__enc_copy_end: SYM_FUNC_END(__enc_copy) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_32.S b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_32.S index 09ec84f6ef51..f3cfdb1c9a35 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_32.S @@ -56,5 +56,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(efi_call_svam) movl 16(%esp), %ebx leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(efi_call_svam) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S index 90380a17ab23..2206b8bc47b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S @@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__efi_call) mov %rsi, %rcx CALL_NOSPEC rdi leave - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__efi_call) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S index 26f0da238c1c..063eb27c0a12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__efi64_thunk) 1: movq 24(%rsp), %rsp pop %rbx pop %rbp - retq + RET .code32 2: pushl $__KERNEL_CS diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/xo1-wakeup.S b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/xo1-wakeup.S index 75f4faff8468..3a5abffe5660 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/xo1-wakeup.S +++ b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/xo1-wakeup.S @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ save_registers: pushfl popl saved_context_eflags - ret + RET restore_registers: movl saved_context_ebp, %ebp @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ restore_registers: pushl saved_context_eflags popfl - ret + RET SYM_CODE_START(do_olpc_suspend_lowlevel) call save_processor_state @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ ret_point: call restore_registers call restore_processor_state - ret + RET SYM_CODE_END(do_olpc_suspend_lowlevel) .data diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S index 8786653ad3c0..5606a15cf9a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_32.S @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(swsusp_arch_suspend) FRAME_BEGIN call swsusp_save FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(swsusp_arch_suspend) SYM_CODE_START(restore_image) @@ -108,5 +108,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(restore_registers) /* tell the hibernation core that we've just restored the memory */ movl %eax, in_suspend - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(restore_registers) diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S index 7918b8415f13..3ae7a3d7d61e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(swsusp_arch_suspend) FRAME_BEGIN call swsusp_save FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(swsusp_arch_suspend) SYM_CODE_START(restore_image) @@ -143,5 +143,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(restore_registers) /* tell the hibernation core that we've just restored the memory */ movq %rax, in_suspend(%rip) - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(restore_registers) diff --git a/arch/x86/um/checksum_32.S b/arch/x86/um/checksum_32.S index 13f118dec74f..aed782ab7721 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/checksum_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/um/checksum_32.S @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ csum_partial: 7: popl %ebx popl %esi - ret + RET #else @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ csum_partial: 80: popl %ebx popl %esi - ret + RET #endif EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_partial) diff --git a/arch/x86/um/setjmp_32.S b/arch/x86/um/setjmp_32.S index 62eaf8c80e04..2d991ddbcca5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/setjmp_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/um/setjmp_32.S @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ kernel_setjmp: movl %esi,12(%edx) movl %edi,16(%edx) movl %ecx,20(%edx) # Return address - ret + RET .size kernel_setjmp,.-kernel_setjmp diff --git a/arch/x86/um/setjmp_64.S b/arch/x86/um/setjmp_64.S index 1b5d40d4ff46..b46acb6a8ebd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/setjmp_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/um/setjmp_64.S @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ kernel_setjmp: movq %r14,40(%rdi) movq %r15,48(%rdi) movq %rsi,56(%rdi) # Return address - ret + RET .size kernel_setjmp,.-kernel_setjmp diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index e75f60a06056..e8854f3b9a9f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(xen_irq_enable_direct) call check_events 1: FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(xen_irq_enable_direct) @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(xen_irq_enable_direct) */ SYM_FUNC_START(xen_irq_disable_direct) movb $1, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_mask - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(xen_irq_disable_direct) /* @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(xen_save_fl_direct) testb $0xff, PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_mask setz %ah addb %ah, %ah - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(xen_save_fl_direct) @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(xen_restore_fl_direct) call check_events 1: FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(xen_restore_fl_direct) @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(check_events) pop %rcx pop %rax FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(check_events) SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2) @@ -136,14 +136,14 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2) _ASM_MOV PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu), %_ASM_AX _ASM_MOV XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2); SYM_FUNC_START(xen_read_cr2_direct) FRAME_BEGIN _ASM_MOV PER_CPU_VAR(xen_vcpu_info) + XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2, %_ASM_AX FRAME_END - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct); .macro xen_pv_trap name diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S index cb6538ae2fe0..565062932ef1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page) .rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC .skip 31, 0x90 - ret + RET .endr #define HYPERCALL(n) \ -- 2.20.1

From: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 -------------------------------- fix these build warning arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.o: warning: objtool: copy_page_nocache()+0xdf: 'naked' return found in RETHUNK build arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.o: warning: objtool: copy_page_nocache_barrir()+0x3: 'naked' return found in RETHUNK build The reference 5.10-stable branch patches are as follows: 3c91e2257622 x86: Prepare asm files for straight-line-speculation Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S index c31a9a79b18e..71c9c91e20b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S @@ -153,10 +153,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_page_nocache) movq (%rsp), %rbx movq 1*8(%rsp), %r12 addq $2*8, %rsp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(copy_page_nocache) SYM_FUNC_START(copy_page_nocache_barrir) ALTERNATIVE "", "sfence", X86_FEATURE_XMM2 - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(copy_page_nocache_barrir) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 0f8532c2837793acdaa07c6b47fda0bf1fa61f40 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 1cc1e4c8aab4213bd4e6353dec2620476a233d6d upstream. Teach objtool to validate the straight-line-speculation constraints: - speculation trap after indirect calls - speculation trap after RET Notable: when an instruction is annotated RETPOLINE_SAFE, indicating speculation isn't a problem, also don't care about sls for that instruction. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134908.023037659@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/arch.h | 1 + tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 13 +++++++++---- tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 4 +++- tools/objtool/builtin.h | 3 ++- tools/objtool/check.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch.h b/tools/objtool/arch.h index 0031a27b6ad0..e15f6e932b4f 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch.h +++ b/tools/objtool/arch.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum insn_type { INSN_CLAC, INSN_STD, INSN_CLD, + INSN_TRAP, INSN_OTHER, }; diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index 32a810429306..f7154241a2a5 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -456,6 +456,11 @@ int arch_decode_instruction(const struct elf *elf, const struct section *sec, break; + case 0xcc: + /* int3 */ + *type = INSN_TRAP; + break; + case 0xe3: /* jecxz/jrcxz */ *type = INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL; @@ -592,10 +597,10 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len) { static const char ret[5][5] = { { BYTE_RET }, - { BYTE_RET, 0x90 }, - { BYTE_RET, 0x66, 0x90 }, - { BYTE_RET, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x00 }, - { BYTE_RET, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x00 }, + { BYTE_RET, 0xcc }, + { BYTE_RET, 0xcc, 0x90 }, + { BYTE_RET, 0xcc, 0x66, 0x90 }, + { BYTE_RET, 0xcc, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x00 }, }; if (len < 1 || len > 5) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c index c6d199bfd0ae..758baf918d83 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ #include "builtin.h" #include "objtool.h" -bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, validate_dup, vmlinux; +bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, + validate_dup, vmlinux, sls; static const char * const check_usage[] = { "objtool check [<options>] file.o", @@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = { OPT_BOOLEAN('s', "stats", &stats, "print statistics"), OPT_BOOLEAN('d', "duplicate", &validate_dup, "duplicate validation for vmlinux.o"), OPT_BOOLEAN('l', "vmlinux", &vmlinux, "vmlinux.o validation"), + OPT_BOOLEAN('S', "sls", &sls, "validate straight-line-speculation"), OPT_END(), }; diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin.h b/tools/objtool/builtin.h index 85c979caa367..33043fcb16db 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin.h +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin.h @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ #include <subcmd/parse-options.h> extern const struct option check_options[]; -extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, validate_dup, vmlinux; +extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, + validate_dup, vmlinux, sls; extern int cmd_check(int argc, const char **argv); extern int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv); diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 09e7807f83ee..9943987b24a9 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2775,6 +2775,12 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, switch (insn->type) { case INSN_RETURN: + if (next_insn && next_insn->type == INSN_TRAP) { + next_insn->ignore = true; + } else if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe) { + WARN_FUNC("missing int3 after ret", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } return validate_return(func, insn, &state); case INSN_CALL: @@ -2818,6 +2824,14 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, break; case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC: + if (next_insn && next_insn->type == INSN_TRAP) { + next_insn->ignore = true; + } else if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe) { + WARN_FUNC("missing int3 after indirect jump", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } + + /* fallthrough */ case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL: if (is_sibling_call(insn)) { ret = validate_sibling_call(insn, &state); -- 2.20.1

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 494ed76c1446b67621b1c55b8b2dceb5c6dfee64 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 35cb8c713a496e8c114eed5e2a5a30b359876df2 upstream. To bring in the change made in this cset: f94909ceb1ed4bfd ("x86: Prepare asm files for straight-line-speculation") It silences these perf tools build warnings, no change in the tools: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S' diff -u tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S' diff -u tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S The code generated was checked before and after using 'objdump -d /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o', no changes. Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S | 12 ++++++------ tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S b/tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S index 1e299ac73c86..644da05e5e71 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S +++ b/tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memcpy) rep movsq movl %edx, %ecx rep movsb - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memcpy) SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(__memcpy) EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy) @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_erms) movq %rdi, %rax movq %rdx, %rcx rep movsb - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memcpy_erms) SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movq %r9, 1*8(%rdi) movq %r10, -2*8(%rdi, %rdx) movq %r11, -1*8(%rdi, %rdx) - retq + RET .p2align 4 .Lless_16bytes: cmpl $8, %edx @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movq -1*8(%rsi, %rdx), %r9 movq %r8, 0*8(%rdi) movq %r9, -1*8(%rdi, %rdx) - retq + RET .p2align 4 .Lless_8bytes: cmpl $4, %edx @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movl -4(%rsi, %rdx), %r8d movl %ecx, (%rdi) movl %r8d, -4(%rdi, %rdx) - retq + RET .p2align 4 .Lless_3bytes: subl $1, %edx @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy_orig) movb %cl, (%rdi) .Lend: - retq + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memcpy_orig) .popsection diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S b/tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S index 0bfd26e4ca9e..4d793ff820e2 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S +++ b/tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memset) movl %edx,%ecx rep stosb movq %r9,%rax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__memset) SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(memset) EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset) @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memset_erms) movq %rdx,%rcx rep stosb movq %r9,%rax - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(memset_erms) SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memset_orig) @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memset_orig) .Lende: movq %r10,%rax - ret + RET .Lbad_alignment: cmpq $7,%rdx -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 03c5c33e043e77a1a848c52f37c512efb412f2c3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 1ffbe4e935f9b7308615c75be990aec07464d1e7 upstream. Ignore all INT3 instructions for unreachable code warnings, similar to NOP. This allows using INT3 for various paddings instead of NOPs. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154317.343312938@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 9943987b24a9..fdf96eef6e00 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2775,9 +2775,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, switch (insn->type) { case INSN_RETURN: - if (next_insn && next_insn->type == INSN_TRAP) { - next_insn->ignore = true; - } else if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe) { + if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe && + next_insn && next_insn->type != INSN_TRAP) { WARN_FUNC("missing int3 after ret", insn->sec, insn->offset); } @@ -2824,9 +2823,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, break; case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC: - if (next_insn && next_insn->type == INSN_TRAP) { - next_insn->ignore = true; - } else if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe) { + if (sls && !insn->retpoline_safe && + next_insn && next_insn->type != INSN_TRAP) { WARN_FUNC("missing int3 after indirect jump", insn->sec, insn->offset); } @@ -2997,7 +2995,7 @@ static bool ignore_unreachable_insn(struct objtool_file *file, struct instructio int i; struct instruction *prev_insn; - if (insn->ignore || insn->type == INSN_NOP) + if (insn->ignore || insn->type == INSN_NOP || insn->type == INSN_TRAP) return true; /* -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 831d5c07b7e7c6eab9df64ae328bacb5a6a0313a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 7a53f408902d913cd541b4f8ad7dbcd4961f5b82 upstream. Since not all compilers have a function attribute to disable KCOV instrumentation, objtool can rewrite KCOV instrumentation in noinstr functions as per commit: f56dae88a81f ("objtool: Handle __sanitize_cov*() tail calls") However, this has subtle interaction with the SLS validation from commit: 1cc1e4c8aab4 ("objtool: Add straight-line-speculation validation") In that when a tail-call instrucion is replaced with a RET an additional INT3 instruction is also written, but is not represented in the decoded instruction stream. This then leads to false positive missing INT3 objtool warnings in noinstr code. Instead of adding additional struct instruction objects, mark the RET instruction with retpoline_safe to suppress the warning (since we know there really is an INT3). Fixes: 1cc1e4c8aab4 ("objtool: Add straight-line-speculation validation") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220323230712.GA8939@worktop.programming.kicks-as... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/check.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index fdf96eef6e00..0ca4a3c2d86b 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -961,6 +961,17 @@ static void annotate_call_site(struct objtool_file *file, : arch_nop_insn(insn->len)); insn->type = sibling ? INSN_RETURN : INSN_NOP; + + if (sibling) { + /* + * We've replaced the tail-call JMP insn by two new + * insn: RET; INT3, except we only have a single struct + * insn here. Mark it retpoline_safe to avoid the SLS + * warning, instead of adding another insn. + */ + insn->retpoline_safe = true; + } + return; } } -- 2.20.1

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit accb8cfd506da1e218a0cd56a11f37885dc32adf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- Commit 156ff4a544ae ("x86/ibt: Base IBT bits") added this option when building realmode in order to disable IBT there. This is also needed in order to disable return thunks. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 05f5d28b75eb..1f796050c6dd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ endif CODE16GCC_CFLAGS := -m32 -Wa,$(srctree)/arch/x86/boot/code16gcc.h M16_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option, -m16, $(CODE16GCC_CFLAGS)) -REALMODE_CFLAGS := $(M16_CFLAGS) -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ +REALMODE_CFLAGS := $(M16_CFLAGS) -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS \ -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -march=i386 -mregparm=3 \ -fno-strict-aliasing -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-pic \ -mno-mmx -mno-sse $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit feec5277d5aa9780d4814084262b98af2b1a2242 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit a883d624aed463c84c22596006e5a96f5b44db31 upstream. In order to extend the RETPOLINE features to 4, move them to word 11 where there is still room. This mostly keeps DISABLE_RETPOLINE simple. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: bits 8 and 9 of word 11 are also free here, so comment them accordingly] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index dd5db37217ac..a09c08f1aa10 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ @@ -293,6 +293,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+10) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 3e519ed8d509f5f2e1c67984f3cdf079b725e724 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 00e1533325fd1fb5459229fe37f235462649f668 upstream. Put the actual retpoline thunk as the original code so that it can become more complicated. Specifically, it allows RET to be a JMP, which can't be .altinstr_replacement since that doesn't do relocations (except for the very first instruction). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index afbdda539b80..c013241d9188 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg, SYM_L_GLOBAL) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \ - __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ - __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), \ + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, \ + __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) .endm -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 270de63cf4a380fe9942d3e0da599c0e966fad78 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 0b53c374b9eff2255a386f1f1cfb9a928e52a5ae upstream. Utilize -mfunction-return=thunk-extern when available to have the compiler replace RET instructions with direct JMPs to the symbol __x86_return_thunk. This does not affect assembler (.S) sources, only C sources. -mfunction-return=thunk-extern has been available since gcc 7.3 and clang 15. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: RETPOLINE_CFLAGS is at Makefile] [cascardo: remove ANNOTATE_NOENDBR from __x86_return_thunk] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index ebb503a59db2..963734589fe6 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -672,11 +672,13 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register) endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) endif export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index e791fe7e9de5..6eedd835613c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" +extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); + #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index c013241d9188..01667ea9da02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -66,3 +66,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) #define GEN(reg) EXPORT_THUNK(reg) #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h> #undef GEN + +/* + * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern + * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. + */ +SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk) + UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + ret + int3 +SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) + +__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 8bdb25f7aee312450e9c9ac21ae209d9cf0602e5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit d9e9d2300681d68a775c28de6aa6e5290ae17796 upstream. Find all the return-thunk sites and record them in a .return_sites section such that the kernel can undo this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: conflict fixup because of functions added to support IBT] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/arch.h | 1 + tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 5 +++ tools/objtool/check.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/objtool/elf.h | 1 + tools/objtool/objtool.c | 1 + tools/objtool/objtool.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 84 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch.h b/tools/objtool/arch.h index e15f6e932b4f..580ce1857585 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch.h +++ b/tools/objtool/arch.h @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len); int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base); bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym); +bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym); int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file); diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index f7154241a2a5..d8f47704fd85 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -649,3 +649,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym) { return !strncmp(sym->name, "__x86_indirect_", 15); } + +bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) +{ + return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk"); +} diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 0ca4a3c2d86b..c0dcc8e95b76 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -652,6 +652,52 @@ static int create_retpoline_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; } +static int create_return_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct instruction *insn; + struct section *sec; + int idx; + + sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".return_sites"); + if (sec) { + WARN("file already has .return_sites, skipping"); + return 0; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node) + idx++; + + if (!idx) + return 0; + + sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".return_sites", 0, + sizeof(int), idx); + if (!sec) { + WARN("elf_create_section: .return_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node) { + + int *site = (int *)sec->data->d_buf + idx; + *site = 0; + + if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(file->elf, sec, + idx * sizeof(int), + R_X86_64_PC32, + insn->sec, insn->offset)) { + WARN("elf_add_reloc_to_insn: .return_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx++; + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Warnings shouldn't be reported for ignored functions. */ @@ -887,6 +933,11 @@ __weak bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym) return false; } +__weak bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) +{ + return false; +} + #define NEGATIVE_RELOC ((void *)-1L) static struct reloc *insn_reloc(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) @@ -1028,6 +1079,19 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *in annotate_call_site(file, insn, false); } + +static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +{ + /* + * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise, + * so convert them accordingly. + */ + insn->type = INSN_RETURN; + insn->retpoline_safe = true; + + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); +} + /* * Find the destination instructions for all jumps. */ @@ -1052,6 +1116,9 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) { add_retpoline_call(file, insn); continue; + } else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) { + add_return_call(file, insn); + continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */ add_call_dest(file, insn, reloc->sym, true); @@ -1841,6 +1908,9 @@ static int classify_symbols(struct objtool_file *file) if (arch_is_retpoline(func)) func->retpoline_thunk = true; + if (arch_is_rethunk(func)) + func->return_thunk = true; + if (!strcmp(func->name, "__fentry__")) func->fentry = true; @@ -3234,6 +3304,11 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret < 0) goto out; warnings += ret; + + ret = create_return_sites_sections(file); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + warnings += ret; } if (stats) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/elf.h index de00cac9aede..c68f11b71562 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.h +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.h @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct symbol { u8 uaccess_safe : 1; u8 static_call_tramp : 1; u8 retpoline_thunk : 1; + u8 return_thunk : 1; u8 fentry : 1; u8 kcov : 1; }; diff --git a/tools/objtool/objtool.c b/tools/objtool/objtool.c index c0b1f5a99df9..cb2c6acd9667 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/objtool.c +++ b/tools/objtool/objtool.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct objtool_file *objtool_open_read(const char *_objname) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.insn_list); hash_init(file.insn_hash); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.retpoline_call_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.return_thunk_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.static_call_list); file.c_file = !vmlinux && find_section_by_name(file.elf, ".comment"); file.ignore_unreachables = no_unreachable; diff --git a/tools/objtool/objtool.h b/tools/objtool/objtool.h index 0b57150ea0fe..bf64946e749b 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/objtool.h +++ b/tools/objtool/objtool.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct objtool_file { struct list_head insn_list; DECLARE_HASHTABLE(insn_hash, 20); struct list_head retpoline_call_list; + struct list_head return_thunk_list; struct list_head static_call_list; bool ignore_unreachables, c_file, hints, rodata; }; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 7723edf5edfdfdabd8234e45142be86598a04cad category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit ee88d363d15617ff50ac24fab0ffec11113b2aeb upstream. In addition to teaching static_call about the new way to spell 'RET', there is an added complication in that static_call() is allowed to rewrite text before it is known which particular spelling is required. In order to deal with this; have a static_call specific fixup in the apply_return() 'alternative' patching routine that will rewrite the static_call trampoline to match the definite sequence. This in turn creates the problem of uniquely identifying static call trampolines. Currently trampolines are 8 bytes, the first 5 being the jmp.d32/ret sequence and the final 3 a byte sequence that spells out 'SCT'. This sequence is used in __static_call_validate() to ensure it is patching a trampoline and not a random other jmp.d32. That is, false-positives shouldn't be plenty, but aren't a big concern. OTOH the new __static_call_fixup() must not have false-positives, and 'SCT' decodes to the somewhat weird but semi plausible sequence: push %rbx rex.XB push %r12 Additionally, there are SLS concerns with immediate jumps. Combined it seems like a good moment to change the signature to a single 3 byte trap instruction that is unique to this usage and will not ever get generated by accident. As such, change the signature to: '0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc', which decodes to: ud1 %esp, %ecx Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: skip validation as introduced by 2105a92748e8 ("static_call,x86: Robustify trampoline patching")] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 17 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 12 ++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h index 343234569392..7efce22d6355 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h @@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ * relative displacement across sections. */ +/* + * The trampoline is 8 bytes and of the general form: + * + * jmp.d32 \func + * ud1 %esp, %ecx + * + * That trailing #UD provides both a speculation stop and serves as a unique + * 3 byte signature identifying static call trampolines. Also see tramp_ud[] + * and __static_call_fixup(). + */ #define __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, insns) \ asm(".pushsection .static_call.text, \"ax\" \n" \ ".align 4 \n" \ @@ -34,8 +44,13 @@ #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)") +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ + __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk") +#else #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "ret; int3; nop; nop; nop") +#endif #define ARCH_ADD_TRAMP_KEY(name) \ @@ -44,4 +59,6 @@ ".long " STATIC_CALL_KEY_STR(name) " - . \n" \ ".popsection \n") +extern bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest); + #endif /* _ASM_STATIC_CALL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 75caf244e88b..1ba8f4006a50 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -643,18 +643,22 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) s32 *s; for (s = start; s < end; s++) { - void *addr = (void *)s + *s; + void *dest = NULL, *addr = (void *)s + *s; struct insn insn; int len, ret; u8 bytes[16]; - u8 op1; + u8 op; ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0)) continue; - op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE)) + op = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; + if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE) + dest = addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value; + + if (__static_call_fixup(addr, op, dest) || + WARN_ON_ONCE(dest != &__x86_return_thunk)) continue; DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS", diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c index ae9b858c996a..8d7b1da5d82f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c @@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ enum insn_type { */ static const u8 xor5rax[] = { 0x66, 0x66, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0 }; +/* + * ud1 %esp, %ecx - a 3 byte #UD that is unique to trampolines, chosen such + * that there is no false-positive trampoline identification while also being a + * speculation stop. + */ +static const u8 tramp_ud[] = { 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc }; + static const u8 retinsn[] = { RET_INSN_OPCODE, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc }; static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, void *func) @@ -44,7 +51,10 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, void break; case RET: - code = &retinsn; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + code = text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, insn, &__x86_return_thunk); + else + code = &retinsn; break; } @@ -110,3 +120,29 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail) mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform); + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +/* + * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines, + * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as + * having a return trampoline. + * + * The problem is that static_call() is available before determining + * X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK and, by implication, running alternatives. + * + * This means that __static_call_transform() above can have overwritten the + * return trampoline and we now need to fix things up to be consistent. + */ +bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest) +{ + if (memcmp(tramp+5, tramp_ud, 3)) { + /* Not a trampoline site, not our problem. */ + return false; + } + + if (op == RET_INSN_OPCODE || dest == &__x86_return_thunk) + __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL); + + return true; +} +#endif -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit e0e06a922706204df43d50032c05af75d8e75f8e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit d77cfe594ad50e0bf95d457e02ccd578791b2a15 upstream. Use the return thunk in eBPF generated code, if needed. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: add the necessary cnt variable to emit_return()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 75358b63d9e4..573b8301c8e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -399,6 +399,22 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip) *pprog = prog; } +static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip) +{ + u8 *prog = *pprog; + int cnt = 0; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) { + emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_return_thunk, ip); + } else { + EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) + EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */ + } + + *pprog = prog; +} + /* * Generate the following code: * @@ -1442,7 +1458,7 @@ xadd: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) ctx->cleanup_addr = proglen; pop_callee_regs(&prog, callee_regs_used); EMIT1(0xC9); /* leave */ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + emit_return(&prog, image + addrs[i - 1] + (prog - temp)); break; default: @@ -1883,7 +1899,7 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i if (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME) /* skip our return address and return to parent */ EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 8); /* add rsp, 8 */ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + emit_return(&prog, prog); /* Make sure the trampoline generation logic doesn't overflow */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(prog > (u8 *)image_end - BPF_INSN_SAFETY)) { ret = -EFAULT; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit d6eb50e9b7245a238872a9a969f84993339780a5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 15583e514eb16744b80be85dea0774ece153177d upstream. This is userspace code and doesn't play by the normal kernel rules. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S index 15e35159ebb6..ef2dd1827243 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S @@ -19,17 +19,20 @@ __vsyscall_page: mov $__NR_gettimeofday, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_time, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_getcpu, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 4096, 0xcc -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit c9eb5dcdc8f4a848b45b97725f5a2b8d324bb31a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit aa3d480315ba6c3025a60958e1981072ea37c3df upstream. Use the return thunk in asm code. If the thunk isn't needed, it will get patched into a RET instruction during boot by apply_returns(). Since alternatives can't handle relocations outside of the first instruction, putting a 'jmp __x86_return_thunk' in one is not valid, therefore carve out the memmove ERMS path into a separate label and jump to it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: no RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index 02e3e42f380b..1faa6be405b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ endif endif $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) +$(vobjs): KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DBUILD_VDSO # # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h index 030907922bd0..d04e61c2f863 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h @@ -18,19 +18,27 @@ #define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN) #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk +#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS #define RET ret; int3 #else #define RET ret #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t" +#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS #define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t" #else #define ASM_RET "ret\n\t" #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S index 50ea390df712..4b8ee3a2fcc3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) /* FSRM implies ERMS => no length checks, do the copy directly */ .Lmemmove_begin_forward: ALTERNATIVE "cmp $0x20, %rdx; jb 1f", "", X86_FEATURE_FSRM - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(movq %rdx, %rcx; rep movsb; RET), X86_FEATURE_ERMS + ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lmemmove_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS /* * movsq instruction have many startup latency @@ -206,6 +206,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) movb %r11b, (%rdi) 13: RET + +.Lmemmove_erms: + movq %rdx, %rcx + rep movsb + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__memmove) SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS(memmove) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__memmove) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit df748593c55389892902aecb8691080ad5e8cff5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit a149180fbcf336e97ce4eb2cdc13672727feb94d upstream. Note: needs to be in a section distinct from Retpolines such that the Retpoline RET substitution cannot possibly use immediate jumps. ORC unwinding for zen_untrain_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() is a little tricky but works due to the fact that zen_untrain_ret() doesn't have any stack ops and as such will emit a single ORC entry at the start (+0x3f). Meanwhile, unwinding an IP, including the __x86_return_thunk() one (+0x40) will search for the largest ORC entry smaller or equal to the IP, these will find the one ORC entry (+0x3f) and all works. [ Alexandre: SVM part. ] [ bp: Build fix, massages. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: conflicts at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S] [cascardo: there is no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR] [cascardo: objtool commit 34c861e806478ac2ea4032721defbf1d6967df08 missing] [cascardo: conflict fixup] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: SEV-ES is not supported, so drop the change in arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 +++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 4 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 17 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 9 ++++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/check.c | 20 ++++++-- 9 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index c7fe5631fe16..be5558c82ea7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -674,6 +675,7 @@ native_irq_return_ldt: pushq %rdi /* Stash user RDI */ swapgs /* to kernel GS */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi /* to kernel CR3 */ + UNTRAIN_RET movq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_waddr), %rdi movq %rax, (0*8)(%rdi) /* user RAX */ @@ -909,6 +911,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * be retrieved from a kernel internal table. */ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 + UNTRAIN_RET /* * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE. @@ -1021,6 +1024,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + UNTRAIN_RET .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: /* Put us onto the real thread stack. */ @@ -1076,6 +1080,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) SWAPGS FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + UNTRAIN_RET /* * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs @@ -1170,6 +1175,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) movq %rsp, %rdx movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8 + UNTRAIN_RET pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */ pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 0051cf5c792d..007f3a1fbf1a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <asm/irqflags.h> #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/smap.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <linux/err.h> @@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + UNTRAIN_RET /* * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that @@ -211,6 +213,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -377,6 +380,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */ .Lint80_keep_stack: + UNTRAIN_RET pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */ xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */ pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index cecb48f91262..71d435475e81 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ +#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 326cfa051078..6e2720bd50f3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))) #endif /* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 6eedd835613c..9dcb3e37a408 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -112,6 +112,22 @@ #endif .endm +/* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the + * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD + * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). + * + * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack. + * + * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point + * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. + */ +.macro UNTRAIN_RET +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET +#endif +.endm + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ @@ -121,6 +137,7 @@ ".popsection\n\t" extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); +extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index b6c4dbaf668d..a21cd2381fa8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ SECTIONS #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE __indirect_thunk_start = .; - *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk) + *(.text.__x86.*) __indirect_thunk_end = .; #endif } :text =0xcccc diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index 6df5950d6967..c18d812d00cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S @@ -128,6 +128,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif + /* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be + * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the + * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts + * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize 'ret' if the return is + * from the kernel. + */ + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 01667ea9da02..807f674fd59e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -71,10 +71,67 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. */ -SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk + +/* + * Safety details here pertain to the AMD Zen{1,2} microarchitecture: + * 1) The RET at __x86_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for + * alignment within the BTB. + * 2) The instruction at zen_untrain_ret must contain, and not + * end with, the 0xc3 byte of the RET. + * 3) STIBP must be enabled, or SMT disabled, to prevent the sibling thread + * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction. + */ + .align 64 + .skip 63, 0xcc +SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(zen_untrain_ret); + + /* + * As executed from zen_untrain_ret, this is: + * + * TEST $0xcc, %bl + * LFENCE + * JMP __x86_return_thunk + * + * Executing the TEST instruction has a side effect of evicting any BTB + * prediction (potentially attacker controlled) attached to the RET, as + * __x86_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment. + */ + .byte 0xf6 + + /* + * As executed from __x86_return_thunk, this is a plain RET. + * + * As part of the TEST above, RET is the ModRM byte, and INT3 the imm8. + * + * We subsequently jump backwards and architecturally execute the RET. + * This creates a correct BTB prediction (type=ret), but in the + * meantime we suffer Straight Line Speculation (because the type was + * no branch) which is halted by the INT3. + * + * With SMT enabled and STIBP active, a sibling thread cannot poison + * RET's prediction to a type of its choice, but can evict the + * prediction due to competitive sharing. If the prediction is + * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation + * which will be contained safely by the INT3. + */ +SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ret int3 SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) -__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk) + /* + * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete. + */ + lfence + + /* + * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction. + * INT3 is for SLS protection. + */ + jmp __x86_return_thunk + int3 +SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) +__EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 082059654322..a484df42255f 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *in annotate_call_site(file, insn, false); } -static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn, bool add) { /* * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise, @@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) insn->retpoline_safe = true; /* Skip the non-text sections, specially .discard ones */ - if (insn->sec->text) + if (add && insn->sec->text) list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); } @@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) add_retpoline_call(file, insn); continue; } else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) { - add_return_call(file, insn); + add_return_call(file, insn, true); continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */ @@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) insn->jump_dest = find_insn(file, dest_sec, dest_off); if (!insn->jump_dest) { + struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(dest_sec, dest_off); /* * This is a special case where an alt instruction @@ -1146,6 +1147,19 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".altinstr_replacement")) continue; + /* + * This is a special case for zen_untrain_ret(). + * It jumps to __x86_return_thunk(), but objtool + * can't find the thunk's starting RET + * instruction, because the RET is also in the + * middle of another instruction. Objtool only + * knows about the outer instruction. + */ + if (sym && sym->return_thunk) { + add_return_call(file, insn, false); + continue; + } + WARN_FUNC("can't find jump dest instruction at %s+0x%lx", insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_sec->name, dest_off); -- 2.20.1

From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 3f29791d56d32a610a2b57a9b700b1bc1912e41f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 upstream. Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret" (JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto". Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on Intel). [peterz: rebase; add hygon] [jpoimboe: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 2cd9a4fc0b49..b0399139dd35 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4831,6 +4831,21 @@ retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction + retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary + Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) + vulnerability. + + off - unconditionally disable + auto - automatically select a migitation + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD Zen {1,2} + based systems. + + Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run + time according to the CPU. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto. + rfkill.default_state= 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, etc. communication is blocked by default. diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index d01fc9c761e5..8efdc414d307 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ config RETPOLINE config CC_HAS_SLS def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) +config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + config SLS bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 56757e1b7301..7cf0f1d2bcb0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include "cpu.h" static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); @@ -112,6 +113,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + retbleed_select_mitigation(); + /* + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is + * forced for UNRET. + */ spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); @@ -708,6 +715,100 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt + +enum retbleed_mitigation { + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, +}; + +enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { + RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, + RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET, +}; + +const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", +}; + +static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; +static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + +static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + else + pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); + +#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" + +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + + switch (retbleed_cmd) { + case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF: + return; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: + default: + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) + break; + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + } + + switch (retbleed_mitigation) { + case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET: + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { + pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; + break; + } + + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt @@ -1919,7 +2020,12 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET && + (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 9e727e0d9486121de5c21cbb65fcc0c907834b17 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit caa0ff24d5d0e02abce5e65c3d2b7f20a6617be5 upstream. Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value reflecting the current task's MSR content. [jpoimboe: rename] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 9dcb3e37a408..391aba0fb82f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 619565986048..35642e47e005 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -48,11 +48,29 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); -/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ +/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + +/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); +/* + * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ + * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). + */ +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val) +{ + if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) + return; + + this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); +} + /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in * x86_spec_ctrl_base. @@ -1235,7 +1253,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } switch (mode) { @@ -1290,7 +1308,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1533,7 +1551,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } } @@ -1751,7 +1769,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index ca588a3ac01b..be9501924da2 100755 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } if (updmsr) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr); } static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 6d7e13ccc4d73e5c88cc015bc0154b7d08f65038 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit c779bc1a9002fa474175b80e72b85c9bf628abb0 upstream. When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled. This avoids an MSR write during context switch. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 391aba0fb82f..1a044c65e484 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; -extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val); +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 35642e47e005..8572cac3ca98 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -62,13 +62,19 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). */ -void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val) +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force) { if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) return; this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); + + /* + * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless + * forced the update can be delayed until that time. + */ + if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); } /* @@ -1253,7 +1259,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } switch (mode) { @@ -1308,7 +1314,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1551,7 +1557,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } } @@ -1769,7 +1775,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index be9501924da2..c180f83c0bc0 100755 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } if (updmsr) - write_spec_ctrl_current(msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false); } static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit a0f8ef71d762501769df69e35c4c4e7496866d90 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 166115c08a9b0b846b783088808a27d739be6e8d upstream. retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on retbleed. Break this cycle. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 483c5d5afc9f..58f48f93e8cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ #include "cpu.h" static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); -static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); @@ -137,13 +138,19 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + /* + * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about + * spectre_v2=ibrs. + */ retbleed_select_mitigation(); /* - * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is * forced for UNRET. */ - spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); md_clear_select_mitigation(); @@ -969,13 +976,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason); } +static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd; + static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init -spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; int ret, i; - switch (v2_cmd) { + switch (spectre_v2_cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: @@ -1010,7 +1019,7 @@ static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) } static void __init -spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); @@ -1023,7 +1032,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED) smt_possible = false; - cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); + cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(); switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; @@ -1347,7 +1356,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) } /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ - spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd); + spectre_v2_cmd = cmd; } static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 55bba093fd91a76971134e3a4e3576e536c08f5c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f upstream. Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency. Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed for them by virtue of their short target residency. Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue. Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't disable IBRS, benchmarking needed. Suggested-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: no CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++ drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 152ca4372e06..fd8ab72d826b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); +extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index a2423d4ed293..1d16d194f6ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); } +u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) +{ + return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current); + /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in * x86_spec_ctrl_base. diff --git a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c index 47551ab73ca8..cb7dc21709ca 100644 --- a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c +++ b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c @@ -47,11 +47,13 @@ #include <linux/tick.h> #include <trace/events/power.h> #include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/smt.h> #include <linux/notifier.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/mwait.h> #include <asm/msr.h> @@ -105,6 +107,12 @@ static unsigned int mwait_substates __initdata; */ #define CPUIDLE_FLAG_ALWAYS_ENABLE BIT(15) +/* + * Disable IBRS across idle (when KERNEL_IBRS), is exclusive vs IRQ_ENABLE + * above. + */ +#define CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS BIT(16) + /* * MWAIT takes an 8-bit "hint" in EAX "suggesting" * the C-state (top nibble) and sub-state (bottom nibble) @@ -144,6 +152,24 @@ static __cpuidle int intel_idle(struct cpuidle_device *dev, return index; } +static __cpuidle int intel_idle_ibrs(struct cpuidle_device *dev, + struct cpuidle_driver *drv, int index) +{ + bool smt_active = sched_smt_active(); + u64 spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl_current(); + int ret; + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + + ret = intel_idle(dev, drv, index); + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, spec_ctrl); + + return ret; +} + /** * intel_idle_s2idle - Ask the processor to enter the given idle state. * @dev: cpuidle device of the target CPU. @@ -665,7 +691,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 85, .target_residency = 200, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -673,7 +699,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C7s", .desc = "MWAIT 0x33", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 124, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -681,7 +707,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C8", .desc = "MWAIT 0x40", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 200, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -689,7 +715,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C9", .desc = "MWAIT 0x50", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 480, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -697,7 +723,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C10", .desc = "MWAIT 0x60", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 890, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -726,7 +752,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skx_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 133, .target_residency = 600, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -1668,6 +1694,11 @@ static void __init intel_idle_init_cstates_icpu(struct cpuidle_driver *drv) /* Structure copy. */ drv->states[drv->state_count] = cpuidle_state_table[cstate]; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) && + cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS) { + drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_ibrs; + } + if ((disabled_states_mask & BIT(drv->state_count)) || ((icpu->use_acpi || force_use_acpi) && intel_idle_off_by_default(mwait_hint) && -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit f728eff26339d85825e588d461f0e55267bc6c3f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 upstream. Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are named consistently. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 20 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c index 8bfc10330107..1f80dd3a2dd4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c @@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature)) return; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat); if(ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature); } @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) { int ret; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64); if (ret != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret); /* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other @@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) { ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32, - xen_syscall32_target); + xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat); if (ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32); } diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index e8854f3b9a9f..70d3b21008e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) */ /* Normal 64-bit system call target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -290,12 +290,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /* 32-bit compat syscall target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -309,10 +309,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY /* * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means @@ -330,18 +330,18 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) #else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax pushq $0 jmp hypercall_iret -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) #endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h index 9546c3384c75..8695809b88f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ /* These are code, but not functions. Defined in entry.S */ extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[]; -void xen_sysenter_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -void xen_syscall_target(void); -void xen_syscall32_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void); #endif extern void *xen_initial_gdt; -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit fbab1c94eb1a3139d7ac0620dc6d7d6a33f3b255 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 0fe4aeea9c01baabecc8c3afc7889c809d939bc2 upstream. When booting with retbleed=auto, if the kernel wasn't built with CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK, the mitigation falls back to IBPB. Make sure a warning is printed in that case. The IBPB fallback check is done twice, but it really only needs to be done once. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 +++++---------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 0e25b0a66621..8205834dd11e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -847,18 +847,13 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; - else - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; - } + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; /* - * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in - * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). + * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). 'retbleed_mitigation' will + * be set accordingly below. */ break; -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit ea1aa926f423a8cf1b2416bb909bfbea37d12b11 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit d7caac991feeef1b871ee6988fd2c9725df09039 upstream. Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting. Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index cce1b36a1498..535e241a303a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -510,6 +510,9 @@ /* Fam 17h MSRs */ #define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9 +#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3 +#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1) + /* Fam 16h MSRs */ #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230 #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index acea05eed27d..f1f52e67e361 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -914,6 +914,26 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c); } +void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 value; + + /* + * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation. + * + * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it + * suppresses non-branch predictions. + * + * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H + */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) { + if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) { + value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT; + wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); + } + } +} + static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); @@ -959,7 +979,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break; case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break; case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break; - case 0x17: fallthrough; + case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c); + fallthrough; case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 093f5fc860e3..91df90abc1d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ extern void tsx_disable(void); static inline void tsx_init(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */ +extern void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index b78c471ec344..774ca6bfda9f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -318,6 +318,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */ c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id(); + /* + * XXX someone from Hygon needs to confirm this DTRT + * + init_spectral_chicken(c); + */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit d29c07912a49fce965228f73a293e2c899bc7e35 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit e6aa13622ea8283cc699cac5d018cc40a2ba2010 upstream. The firmware entry code may accidentally clear STIBP or SSBD. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index b42f8d7fd52b..bb419c5b4867 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -293,18 +293,16 @@ extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); */ #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \ - \ preempt_disable(); \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ } while (0) #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \ - \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current(), \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ preempt_enable(); \ } while (0) -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit ce11f91b21c25dda8b06988817115bef1c636434 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit bbb69e8bee1bd882784947095ffb2bfe0f7c9470 upstream. There's no need to recalculate the host value for every entry/exit. Just use the cached value in spec_ctrl_current(). Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +----------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 33af6f9ab241..6af379b69b82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base; + u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ @@ -212,15 +212,6 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) - hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - - /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */ - if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) - hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -1353,7 +1344,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { - /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit df93717a32f57e1b033dbfa2a78809d7d4000648 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 8faea26e611189e933ea2281975ff4dc7c1106b6 upstream. Commit c536ed2fffd5 ("objtool: Remove SAVE/RESTORE hints") removed the save/restore unwind hints because they were no longer needed. Now they're going to be needed again so re-add them. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 12 +++++++-- include/linux/objtool.h | 6 +++-- tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 6 +++-- tools/objtool/check.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/objtool/check.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h index 9cd8214175b5..56664b31b6da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ .macro UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 .endm .macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 .endm .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0 @@ -56,6 +56,14 @@ UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP sp_offset=8 type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC .endm +.macro UNWIND_HINT_SAVE + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE +.endm + +.macro UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE +.endm + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_UNWIND_HINTS_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h index b2855f7fce53..662f19374bd9 100644 --- a/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION @@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { * the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any * inconsistencies. */ -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@: .pushsection .discard.unwind_hints /* struct unwind_hint */ @@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(func) #else #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .endm #endif diff --git a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h index b2855f7fce53..662f19374bd9 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION @@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { * the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any * inconsistencies. */ -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@: .pushsection .discard.unwind_hints /* struct unwind_hint */ @@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(func) #else #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .endm #endif diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 2075a1617887..7b99412bd83c 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -1751,6 +1751,17 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) insn->hint = true; + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE) { + insn->hint = false; + insn->save = true; + continue; + } + + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE) { + insn->restore = true; + continue; + } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset); @@ -2846,6 +2857,35 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, state.instr += insn->instr; if (insn->hint) { + if (insn->restore) { + struct instruction *save_insn, *i; + + i = insn; + save_insn = NULL; + + sym_for_each_insn_continue_reverse(file, func, i) { + if (i->save) { + save_insn = i; + break; + } + } + + if (!save_insn) { + WARN_FUNC("no corresponding CFI save for CFI restore", + sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + } + + if (!save_insn->visited) { + WARN_FUNC("objtool isn't smart enough to handle this CFI save/restore combo", + sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + } + + insn->cfi = save_insn->cfi; + nr_cfi_reused++; + } + state.cfi = *insn->cfi; } else { /* XXX track if we actually changed state.cfi */ diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/check.h index e8fa948c053f..7f34a7f9ca52 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/check.h @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct instruction { unsigned long immediate; bool dead_end, ignore, ignore_alts; bool hint; + bool save, restore; bool retpoline_safe; bool entry; s8 instr; -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 84061fff2ad98a7809f00e88a54f584f84830388 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit bb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 upstream. Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which will need another flag. This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would have to be pushed on the stack. Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr critical section because it will soon start calling potentially traceable functions. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 9 +++++---- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 5 ++++- 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 87269c731062..e9f6de5839ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -3081,7 +3081,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, - vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); + __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr) vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..57f4c664ea9c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H +#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H + +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index cd1cd516ec3d..95d3a47b157d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/segment.h> +#include "run_flags.h" #define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) @@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers) - * @launched: %true if the VMCS has been launched + * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH * * Returns: * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail @@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) */ push %_ASM_ARG2 - /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ + /* Copy @flags to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - testb %bl, %bl + testb $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %bl /* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */ mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX @@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */ - je .Lvmlaunch + jz .Lvmlaunch /* * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 4417ae3bed5c..684b3570970f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -945,6 +945,16 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) return true; } +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + unsigned int flags = 0; + + if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched) + flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME; + + return flags; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -6818,7 +6828,8 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned long flags) { /* * VMENTER enables interrupts (host state), but the kernel state is @@ -6855,7 +6866,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2); vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, - vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); + flags); vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2(); @@ -6956,7 +6967,7 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ - vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx); + vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); /* * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 3cd2df2ddc09..ecb4a739fe8e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmx_ops.h" #include "cpuid.h" +#include "run_flags.h" extern const u32 vmx_msr_index[]; @@ -394,7 +395,9 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); -bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched); +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); +bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, + unsigned int flags); int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr); void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, -- 2.20.1

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 47ae76fb27398e867980d63789058ff7c4f12a35 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit bea7e31a5caccb6fe8ed989c065072354f0ecb52 upstream. For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written after vmexit, even if it's already on. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index b03f72c2f3c8..31dbc24ec04a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6834,8 +6834,13 @@ void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, /* * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + * + * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after + * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of + * whether the guest/host values differ. */ - if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) || + vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); barrier_nospec(); -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit a74f5d23e68d9687ed06bd462d344867824707d8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 upstream. The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get rid of all that and simply use ANY. If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 515d1769720a..b481dac125de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1119,32 +1119,27 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | - BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit b24fdd0f1c3328cf8ee0c518b93a7187f8cee097 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit f43b9876e857c739d407bc56df288b0ebe1a9164 upstream. Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts. NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: there is no CONFIG_OBJTOOL] [cascardo: objtool calling and option parsing has changed] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: - In scripts/Makefile.build, add the objtool option with an ifdef block, same as for other options - Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- Makefile | 8 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 106 ++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++- arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 42 +++++---- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 + scripts/Makefile.build | 3 + scripts/link-vmlinux.sh | 2 +- security/Kconfig | 11 --- tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 3 +- tools/objtool/builtin.h | 2 +- tools/objtool/check.c | 9 +- 19 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 963734589fe6..4827e18383dc 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -672,14 +672,18 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) -RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register) endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline -RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) endif + +ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +RETHUNK_CFLAGS := -mfunction-return=thunk-extern +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS) +endif + export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 8efdc414d307..fe46499cd6ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -461,30 +461,6 @@ config GOLDFISH def_bool y depends on X86_GOLDFISH -config RETPOLINE - bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" - default y - help - Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against - kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect - branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern - support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. - -config CC_HAS_SLS - def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) - -config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK - def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) - -config SLS - bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" - depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 - default n - help - Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard - against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly - larger. - config X86_CPU_RESCTRL bool "x86 CPU resource control support" depends on X86 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD) @@ -2471,6 +2447,88 @@ source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig" endmenu +config CC_HAS_SLS + def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) + +config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + +menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities" + default y + help + Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for + speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities. + + If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really + should know what you are doing to say so. + +if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + +config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" + default y + depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) + help + This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by + ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped + into userspace. + + See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details. + +config RETPOLINE + bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" + default y + help + Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against + kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect + branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config RETHUNK + bool "Enable return-thunks" + depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + default y + help + Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard + against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation. + Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY + bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation. + +config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation. + +config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation. + This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to + performance. + +config SLS + bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" + depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 + default n + help + Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard + against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly + larger. + +endif + config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES def_bool y depends on X86_64 && ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index c3c68e97a404..a4b357e5bbfe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set. */ .macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx @@ -343,6 +344,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with shr $32, %rdx wrmsr .Lend_\@: +#endif .endm /* @@ -350,6 +352,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * regs. Must be called after the last RET. */ .macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx @@ -364,6 +367,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with shr $32, %rdx wrmsr .Lend_\@: +#endif .endm /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 6e2720bd50f3..83a4a21c6a24 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -60,9 +60,19 @@ # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY +# define DISABLE_UNRET 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)) #endif /* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */ @@ -88,7 +98,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK8 0 #define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE) +#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET) #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h index d04e61c2f863..5000cf59bdf5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ #define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN) #endif -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) #define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) #define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t" #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 530e8ca4f74c..4c5ddbb8739d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ .Lskip_rsb_\@: .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY +#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "call zen_untrain_ret" +#else +#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "" +#endif + /* * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD @@ -139,10 +145,10 @@ * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ - "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h index 7efce22d6355..491aadfac611 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)") -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk") #else diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 1ba8f4006a50..965d63ca8839 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK /* * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls. * @@ -673,6 +674,10 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } } +#else +void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ + #else /* !RETPOLINES || !CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index a2a7f0275e36..8b9e3277a6ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -916,6 +916,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY u64 value; /* @@ -932,6 +933,7 @@ void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); } } +#endif } static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 5e88663591bb..e96d33675229 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -798,7 +798,6 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" -#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n" #define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) @@ -813,18 +812,33 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) return; case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET: - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) { + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } break; case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } break; +do_cmd_auto: case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } /* * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in @@ -837,14 +851,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) switch (retbleed_mitigation) { case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET: - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || - !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { - pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; - goto retbleed_force_ibpb; - } - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); @@ -856,7 +862,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: -retbleed_force_ibpb: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); mitigate_smt = true; break; @@ -1227,6 +1232,12 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); @@ -1284,7 +1295,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c index 8d7b1da5d82f..9e5cc3cb6524 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform); -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK /* * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines, * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 1f953f230ad5..59e5d79f5c34 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -435,10 +435,10 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); * Depending on .config the SETcc functions look like: * * SETcc %al [3 bytes] - * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE] + * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK] * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] */ -#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \ +#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) #define SETCC_LENGTH (3 + RET_LENGTH) #define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1)) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 807f674fd59e..1221bb099afb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk /* @@ -135,3 +137,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) + +#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.build b/scripts/Makefile.build index bea7e54b2ab9..17e8b2065900 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.build +++ b/scripts/Makefile.build @@ -227,6 +227,9 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE objtool_args += --retpoline endif +ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK + objtool_args += --rethunk +endif ifdef CONFIG_X86_SMAP objtool_args += --uaccess endif diff --git a/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh b/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh index a7c72eb5a624..d0b44bee9286 100755 --- a/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh +++ b/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ objtool_link() if [ -n "${CONFIG_VMLINUX_VALIDATION}" ]; then objtoolopt="check" - if [ -n "${CONFIG_RETPOLINE}" ]; then + if [ -n "${CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY}" ]; then objtoolopt="${objtoolopt} --unret" fi if [ -z "${CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER}" ]; then diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e0e425411e49..d60c92a45c13 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -54,17 +54,6 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK implement socket and networking access controls. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION - bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" - default y - depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML - help - This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by - ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped - into userspace. - - See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details. - config SECURITY_INFINIBAND bool "Infiniband Security Hooks" depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c index d04eab7e77ae..447a49c03abb 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include "objtool.h" bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, - validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret; + validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret, rethunk; static const char * const check_usage[] = { "objtool check [<options>] file.o", @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = { OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"), OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"), OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"), + OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "rethunk", &rethunk, "validate and annotate rethunk usage"), OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &unret, "validate entry unret placement"), OPT_BOOLEAN('m', "module", &module, "Indicates the object will be part of a kernel module"), OPT_BOOLEAN('b', "backtrace", &backtrace, "unwind on error"), diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin.h b/tools/objtool/builtin.h index b6b486e28d54..61d8d49dbc65 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin.h +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin.h @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ extern const struct option check_options[]; extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, - validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret; + validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret, rethunk; extern int cmd_check(int argc, const char **argv); extern int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv); diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 7b99412bd83c..c7b6e6b8f23a 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -3261,8 +3261,11 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) continue; if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) { - WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build", - insn->sec, insn->offset); + if (rethunk) { + WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETHUNK build", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } else + continue; } else { WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", insn->sec, insn->offset, @@ -3532,7 +3535,9 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret < 0) goto out; warnings += ret; + } + if (rethunk) { ret = create_return_sites_sections(file); if (ret < 0) goto out; -- 2.20.1

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 51552b6b52fc865f37ef3ddacd27d807a36695ac category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 2259da159fbe5dba8ac00b560cf00b6a6537fa18 upstream. There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going to be killed and kernel is going to panic. If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also, do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported. Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index e96d33675229..bb5a5069fad9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -821,7 +821,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); @@ -836,7 +839,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; - else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; } -- 2.20.1

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit eb38964b6ff864b8bdf87c9cf6221d0b0611a990 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream. Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI. Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines, eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target may get influenced by branch history. A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2). For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [bwh: Backported to 5.15: adjust context in scattered.c] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> conflict: arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index d0c0921bfdad..d943aafbf27a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ #define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */ -/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 535e241a303a..eff86bbfdf55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -139,6 +141,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index bb5a5069fad9..62a07bac906e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1274,6 +1274,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; } +/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ +static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL)) + return; + + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S; + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); + } +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1368,6 +1384,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + /* + * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and + * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET + * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk. + */ + if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) + spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index 839b54a08e09..0018abccd15b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit { static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 }, diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 7b9259868243..cde626fcb82f 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -138,6 +140,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* -- 2.20.1

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 844947eee36c8ab21005883d6626e713a678c868 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 0705ef64d1ff52b817e278ca6e28095585ff31e1 upstream. Building perf on ppc causes: In file included from util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-insn-decoder.c:15: util/intel-pt-decoder/../../../arch/x86/lib/insn.c:14:10: fatal error: asm/inat.h: No such file or directory 14 | #include <asm/inat.h> /*__ignore_sync_check__ */ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~ Restore the relative include paths so that the compiler can find the headers. Fixes: 93281c4a9657 ("x86/insn: Add an insn_decode() API") Reported-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Tested-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210317150858.02b1bbc8@canb.auug.org.au Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c b/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c index 819c82529fe8..f24cc0f618e4 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c +++ b/tools/arch/x86/lib/insn.c @@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ #else #include <string.h> #endif -#include <asm/inat.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ -#include <asm/insn.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ +#include "../include/asm/inat.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ +#include "../include/asm/insn.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/kconfig.h> -#include <asm/emulate_prefix.h> /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ +#include "../include/asm/emulate_prefix.h" /* __ignore_sync_check__ */ /* Verify next sizeof(t) bytes can be on the same instruction */ #define validate_next(t, insn, n) \ -- 2.20.1

From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 668cb1ddf0ae7fcffcfc2ac1cfec9f770c8191fc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- The hypercall_page is special and the RETs there should not be changed into rethunk calls (but can have SLS mitigation). Change the initial instructions to ret + int3 padding, as was done in upstream commit 5b2fc51576ef "x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBR". Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S index 38b73e7e54ba..2a3ef5fcba34 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S @@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(asm_cpu_bringup_and_idle) SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page) .rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC - .skip 31, 0x90 ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE - RET + ret + .skip 31, 0xcc .endr #define HYPERCALL(n) \ -- 2.20.1

From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit abf88ff13414f3991b35c295c4b564c31e3cb2b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit db886979683a8360ced9b24ab1125ad0c4d2cf76 upstream. Clang warns: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:58:21: error: section attribute is specified on redeclared variable [-Werror,-Wsection] DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); ^ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:283:12: note: previous declaration is here extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; ^ 1 error generated. The declaration should be using DECLARE_PER_CPU instead so all attributes stay in sync. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fc02735b14ff ("KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 4c5ddbb8739d..32e25cac72b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> #include <asm/unwind_hints.h> +#include <asm/percpu.h> #define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE 32 @@ -288,7 +289,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; -extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; +DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); -- 2.20.1

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 8e31dfd6306e7c6bb3758a459c2a6067be807886 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 84e7051c0bc1f2a13101553959b3a9d9a8e24939 upstream. The return thunk call makes the fastop functions larger, just like IBT does. Consider a 16-byte FASTOP_SIZE when CONFIG_RETHUNK is enabled. Otherwise, functions will be incorrectly aligned and when computing their position for differently sized operators, they will executed in the middle or end of a function, which may as well be an int3, leading to a crash like: [ 36.091116] int3: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 36.091119] CPU: 3 PID: 1371 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 5.15.0-41-generic #44 [ 36.091120] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 36.091121] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm] [ 36.091185] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc [ 36.091186] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 36.091188] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091188] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200 [ 36.091189] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 36.091190] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70 [ 36.091190] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091191] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 36.091192] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 36.091192] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0 [ 36.091195] PKRU: 55555554 [ 36.091195] Call Trace: [ 36.091197] <TASK> [ 36.091198] ? fastop+0x5a/0xa0 [kvm] [ 36.091222] x86_emulate_insn+0x7b8/0xe90 [kvm] [ 36.091244] x86_emulate_instruction+0x2f4/0x630 [kvm] [ 36.091263] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x7c/0x230 [kvm] [ 36.091283] ? vmx_prepare_switch_to_host+0xf7/0x190 [kvm_intel] [ 36.091290] complete_emulated_mmio+0x297/0x320 [kvm] [ 36.091310] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x32f/0x550 [kvm] [ 36.091330] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x29e/0x6d0 [kvm] [ 36.091344] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x120/0x6d0 [kvm] [ 36.091357] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0 [ 36.091362] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0 [ 36.091363] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xd0 [ 36.091366] do_syscall_64+0x59/0xc0 [ 36.091369] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50 [ 36.091370] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091371] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50 [ 36.091372] ? __x64_sys_writev+0x1c/0x30 [ 36.091374] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091374] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0 [ 36.091378] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50 [ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091380] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091381] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091381] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb [ 36.091384] RIP: 0033:0x7efdfe6d1aff [ 36.091390] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 36.091391] RSP: 002b:00007efdfce8c460 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 36.091393] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000ae80 RCX: 00007efdfe6d1aff [ 36.091393] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 000000000000000c [ 36.091394] RBP: 0000558f1609e220 R08: 0000558f13fb8190 R09: 00000000ffffffff [ 36.091394] R10: 0000558f16b5e950 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091394] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091396] </TASK> [ 36.091397] Modules linked in: isofs nls_iso8859_1 kvm_intel joydev kvm input_leds serio_raw sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler drm msr ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel virtio_net net_failover crypto_simd ahci xhci_pci cryptd psmouse virtio_blk libahci xhci_pci_renesas failover [ 36.123271] ---[ end trace db3c0ab5a48fabcc ]--- [ 36.123272] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm] [ 36.123319] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc [ 36.123320] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 36.123321] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 36.123321] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200 [ 36.123322] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 36.123322] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70 [ 36.123323] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 36.123323] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 36.123324] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 36.123325] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0 [ 36.123327] PKRU: 55555554 [ 36.123328] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 36.123410] Kernel Offset: 0x1400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 36.135305] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20220713171241.184026-1-cascardo@canonical.com> Tested-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> [Backport] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 2ef1b06ceacfc6f96f6792126e107e75c0d7bd5d category: bugfix bugzilla: 187378 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 79629181607e801c0b41b8790ac4ee2eb5d7bc3e upstream. Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines (which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into an asm statement), just hardcode to 16. It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has the advantage of being really simple. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 84e7051c0bc1: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 59e5d79f5c34..a1765658f002 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -188,9 +188,6 @@ #define X8(x...) X4(x), X4(x) #define X16(x...) X8(x), X8(x) -#define NR_FASTOP (ilog2(sizeof(ulong)) + 1) -#define FASTOP_SIZE 8 - struct opcode { u64 flags : 56; u64 intercept : 8; @@ -304,9 +301,15 @@ static void invalidate_registers(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) * Moreover, they are all exactly FASTOP_SIZE bytes long, so functions for * different operand sizes can be reached by calculation, rather than a jump * table (which would be bigger than the code). + * + * The 16 byte alignment, considering 5 bytes for the RET thunk, 3 for ENDBR + * and 1 for the straight line speculation INT3, leaves 7 bytes for the + * body of the function. Currently none is larger than 4. */ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); +#define FASTOP_SIZE 16 + #define __FOP_FUNC(name) \ ".align " __stringify(FASTOP_SIZE) " \n\t" \ ".type " name ", @function \n\t" \ @@ -438,11 +441,7 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK] * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] */ -#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \ - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) -#define SETCC_LENGTH (3 + RET_LENGTH) -#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1)) -static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN); +#define SETCC_ALIGN 16 #define FOP_SETCC(op) \ ".align " __stringify(SETCC_ALIGN) " \n\t" \ -- 2.20.1

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 81604506c26aef661bc460609981e01b706cf025 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit f098addbdb44c8a565367f5162f3ab170ed9404a upstream. To pick the changes from: f43b9876e857c739 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs") a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk") 15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage") 369ae6ffc41a3c11 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery") 4ad3278df6fe2b08 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior 26aae8ccbc197223 x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO 9756bba28470722d x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS 3ebc170068885b6f x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb 2dbb887e875b1de3 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation 6b80b59b35557065 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability a149180fbcf336e9 x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk 15e67227c49a5783 x86: Undo return-thunk damage a883d624aed463c8 x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 51802186158c74a0 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt: CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o And addresses this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 12 +++++++++-- .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index a7b5c5efcf3b..54ba20492ad1 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCEs for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ @@ -290,6 +290,12 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL (11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT (11*32+ 6) /* #AC for split lock */ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ +#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ @@ -308,6 +314,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ @@ -418,5 +425,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ +#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 5861d34f9771..d109c5ec967c 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -56,6 +56,25 @@ # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY +# define DISABLE_UNRET 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)) +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT # define DISABLE_ENQCMD 0 #else @@ -76,7 +95,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK8 0 #define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK11 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET) #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 -- 2.20.1

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 8e2774270aa319f552fab969bc4500e412d2566b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 564d998106397394b6aad260f219b882b3347e62 upstream. Implement apply_returns() stub for UM, just like all the other patching routines. Fixes: 15e67227c49a ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org) Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Ys%2Ft45l%2FgarIrD0u@worktop.programming.kicks-ass... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c index 2676ac322146..26af24b5d900 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c @@ -362,6 +362,10 @@ void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } +void apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) +{ +} + void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end) { } -- 2.20.1

From: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit fbf60f83e241f0ef967644ca06455f37fcea064b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 46c7405df7de8deb97229eacebcee96d61415f3f upstream. Currently x86 cross-compilation fails on big endian system with: x86_64-cross-ld: init/main.o: invalid string offset 488112128 >= 6229 for section `.strtab' Mark new ELF data in elf_create_undef_symbol() as symbol, so that libelf does endianness handling correctly. Fixes: 2f2f7e47f052 ("objtool: Add elf_create_undef_symbol()") Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/patch-1.thread-6c9df9.git-d39264656387.your-ad-her... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/objtool/elf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/objtool/elf.c b/tools/objtool/elf.c index 74f4b3bb7961..de6e42040d75 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/elf.c +++ b/tools/objtool/elf.c @@ -758,6 +758,7 @@ static int elf_add_string(struct elf *elf, struct section *strtab, char *str) data->d_buf = str; data->d_size = strlen(str) + 1; data->d_align = 1; + data->d_type = ELF_T_SYM; len = strtab->len; strtab->len += data->d_size; -- 2.20.1

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 2fc7f18ba2f98d15f174ce8e25a5afa46926eb55 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit fa2c02e5798c17c89cbb3135940086ebe07e5c9f upstream. The linux/kconfig.h file was copied from the kernel but the line where with the generated/autoconf.h include from where the CONFIG_ entries would come from was deleted, as tools/ build system don't create that file, so we ended up always defining just __LITTLE_ENDIAN as CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN was nowhere to be found. This in turn ended up breaking the build in some systems where __LITTLE_ENDIAN was already defined, such as the androind NDK. So just ditch that block that depends on the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN define. The kconfig.h file was copied just to get IS_ENABLED() and a 'make -C tools/all' doesn't breaks with this removal. Fixes: 93281c4a96572a34 ("x86/insn: Add an insn_decode() API") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YO8hK7lqJcIWuBzx@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- tools/include/linux/kconfig.h | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/include/linux/kconfig.h b/tools/include/linux/kconfig.h index 1555a0c4f345..13b86bd3b746 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/kconfig.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/kconfig.h @@ -4,12 +4,6 @@ /* CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT (Do not delete this comment. See help in Kconfig) */ -#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN -#define __BIG_ENDIAN 4321 -#else -#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 -#endif - #define __ARG_PLACEHOLDER_1 0, #define __take_second_arg(__ignored, val, ...) val -- 2.20.1