[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/11] net: LTS-6.6 bugfix backport
net LTS-6.6 patches backport Dong Chenchen (1): Revert "netfilter: nft_objref: validate objref and objrefmap expressions" Eric Dumazet (2): ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust arp: do not assume dev_hard_header() does not change skb->head Fernando Fernandez Mancera (1): netfilter: nft_objref: validate objref and objrefmap expressions Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nf_tables: drop unused 3rd argument from validate callback ops netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible Gal Pressman (1): ethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query Slavin Liu (1): ipvs: fix ipv4 null-ptr-deref in route error path Tetsuo Handa (1): bpf: Fix reference count leak in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() Will Rosenberg (1): ipv6: BUG() in pskb_expand_head() as part of calipso_skbuff_setattr() Xiang Mei (1): net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix NULL deref when deactivating inactive aggregate in qfq_reset include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 37 ++++++++---- include/net/netfilter/nft_fib.h | 4 +- include/net/netfilter/nft_meta.h | 3 +- include/net/netfilter/nft_reject.h | 3 +- net/bpf/test_run.c | 7 ++- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_meta_bridge.c | 5 +- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 3 +- net/ethtool/ioctl.c | 30 ++++++++-- net/ipv4/arp.c | 7 ++- net/ipv6/calipso.c | 3 +- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 9 ++- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c | 3 + net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_fib.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_fwd_netdev.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_masq.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_objref.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_osf.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_queue.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_redir.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_reject.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_reject_netdev.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_rt.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_socket.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c | 3 +- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 2 +- 35 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1
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From: Will Rosenberg <whrosenb@asu.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit c53aa6a5086f03f19564096ee084a202a8c738c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 58fc7342b529803d3c221101102fe913df7adb83 ] There exists a kernel oops caused by a BUG_ON(nhead < 0) at net/core/skbuff.c:2232 in pskb_expand_head(). This bug is triggered as part of the calipso_skbuff_setattr() routine when skb_cow() is passed headroom > INT_MAX (i.e. (int)(skb_headroom(skb) + len_delta) < 0). The root cause of the bug is due to an implicit integer cast in __skb_cow(). The check (headroom > skb_headroom(skb)) is meant to ensure that delta = headroom - skb_headroom(skb) is never negative, otherwise we will trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head(). However, if headroom > INT_MAX and delta <= -NET_SKB_PAD, the check passes, delta becomes negative, and pskb_expand_head() is passed a negative value for nhead. Fix the trigger condition in calipso_skbuff_setattr(). Avoid passing "negative" headroom sizes to skb_cow() within calipso_skbuff_setattr() by only using skb_cow() to grow headroom. PoC: Using `netlabelctl` tool: netlabelctl map del default netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:7 netlabelctl map add default address:0::1/128 protocol:calipso,7 Then run the following PoC: int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); // setup msghdr int cmsg_size = 2; int cmsg_len = 0x60; struct msghdr msg; struct sockaddr_in6 dest_addr; struct cmsghdr * cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) calloc(1, sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + cmsg_len); msg.msg_name = &dest_addr; msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(dest_addr); msg.msg_iov = NULL; msg.msg_iovlen = 0; msg.msg_control = cmsg; msg.msg_controllen = cmsg_len; msg.msg_flags = 0; // setup sockaddr dest_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; dest_addr.sin6_port = htons(31337); dest_addr.sin6_flowinfo = htonl(31337); dest_addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback; dest_addr.sin6_scope_id = 31337; // setup cmsghdr cmsg->cmsg_len = cmsg_len; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IPV6; cmsg->cmsg_type = IPV6_HOPOPTS; char * hop_hdr = (char *)cmsg + sizeof(struct cmsghdr); hop_hdr[1] = 0x9; //set hop size - (0x9 + 1) * 8 = 80 sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); Fixes: 2917f57b6bc1 ("calipso: Allow the lsm to label the skbuff directly.") Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Will Rosenberg <whrosenb@asu.edu> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251219173637.797418-1-whrosenb@asu.edu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/calipso.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/calipso.c b/net/ipv6/calipso.c index 24666291c54a..72079ef2959b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/calipso.c +++ b/net/ipv6/calipso.c @@ -1345,7 +1345,8 @@ static int calipso_skbuff_setattr(struct sk_buff *skb, /* At this point new_end aligns to 4n, so (new_end & 4) pads to 8n */ pad = ((new_end & 4) + (end & 7)) & 7; len_delta = new_end - (int)end + pad; - ret_val = skb_cow(skb, skb_headroom(skb) + len_delta); + ret_val = skb_cow(skb, + skb_headroom(skb) + (len_delta > 0 ? len_delta : 0)); if (ret_val < 0) return ret_val; -- 2.25.1
From: Slavin Liu <slavin452@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 4729ff0581fbb7ad098b6153b76b6f5aac94618a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ad891bb3d079a46a821bf2b8867854645191bab0 ] The IPv4 code path in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls dst_link_failure() without ensuring skb->dev is set, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in fib_compute_spec_dst() when ipv4_link_failure() attempts to send ICMP destination unreachable messages. The issue emerged after commit ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") started calling __ip_options_compile() from ipv4_link_failure(). This code path eventually calls fib_compute_spec_dst() which dereferences skb->dev. An attempt was made to fix the NULL skb->dev dereference in commit 0113d9c9d1cc ("ipv4: fix null-deref in ipv4_link_failure"), but it only addressed the immediate dev_net(skb->dev) dereference by using a fallback device. The fix was incomplete because fib_compute_spec_dst() later in the call chain still accesses skb->dev directly, which remains NULL when IPVS calls dst_link_failure(). The crash occurs when: 1. IPVS processes a packet in NAT mode with a misconfigured destination 2. Route lookup fails in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() before establishing a route 3. The error path calls dst_link_failure(skb) with skb->dev == NULL 4. ipv4_link_failure() → ipv4_send_dest_unreach() → __ip_options_compile() → fib_compute_spec_dst() 5. fib_compute_spec_dst() dereferences NULL skb->dev Apply the same fix used for IPv6 in commit 326bf17ea5d4 ("ipvs: fix ipv6 route unreach panic"): set skb->dev from skb_dst(skb)->dev before calling dst_link_failure(). KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000328-0x000000000000032f] CPU: 1 PID: 12732 Comm: syz.1.3469 Not tainted 6.6.114 #2 RIP: 0010:__in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:233 RIP: 0010:fib_compute_spec_dst+0x17a/0x9f0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:285 Call Trace: <TASK> spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:232 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:229 __ip_options_compile+0x13a1/0x17d0 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:330 ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1252 ipv4_link_failure+0x702/0xb80 net/ipv4/route.c:1265 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:437 __ip_vs_get_out_rt+0x15fd/0x19e0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:412 ip_vs_nat_xmit+0x1d8/0xc80 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:764 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Slavin Liu <slavin452@gmail.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c index 0103c4a4d10a..2877706f0162 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c @@ -409,6 +409,9 @@ __ip_vs_get_out_rt(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int skb_af, struct sk_buff *skb, return -1; err_unreach: + if (!skb->dev) + skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev; + dst_link_failure(skb); return -1; } -- 2.25.1
From: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit ca9983bc3a1189bd72f9ae449d925a66b2616326 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7b07be1ff1cb6c49869910518650e8d0abc7d25f ] The ethtool -S command operates across three ioctl calls: ETHTOOL_GSSET_INFO for the size, ETHTOOL_GSTRINGS for the names, and ETHTOOL_GSTATS for the values. If the number of stats changes between these calls (e.g., due to device reconfiguration), userspace's buffer allocation will be incorrect, potentially leading to buffer overflow. Drivers are generally expected to maintain stable stat counts, but some drivers (e.g., mlx5, bnx2x, bna, ksz884x) use dynamic counters, making this scenario possible. Some drivers try to handle this internally: - bnad_get_ethtool_stats() returns early in case stats.n_stats is not equal to the driver's stats count. - micrel/ksz884x also makes sure not to write anything beyond stats.n_stats and overflow the buffer. However, both use stats.n_stats which is already assigned with the value returned from get_sset_count(), hence won't solve the issue described here. Change ethtool_get_strings(), ethtool_get_stats(), ethtool_get_phy_stats() to not return anything in case of a mismatch between userspace's size and get_sset_size(), to prevent buffer overflow. The returned n_stats value will be equal to zero, to reflect that nothing has been returned. This could result in one of two cases when using upstream ethtool, depending on when the size change is detected: 1. When detected in ethtool_get_strings(): # ethtool -S eth2 no stats available 2. When detected in get stats, all stats will be reported as zero. Both cases are presumably transient, and a subsequent ethtool call should succeed. Other than the overflow avoidance, these two cases are very evident (no output/cleared stats), which is arguably better than presenting incorrect/shifted stats. I also considered returning an error instead of a "silent" response, but that seems more destructive towards userspace apps. Notes: - This patch does not claim to fix the inherent race, it only makes sure that we do not overflow the userspace buffer, and makes for a more predictable behavior. - RTNL lock is held during each ioctl, the race window exists between the separate ioctl calls when the lock is released. - Userspace ethtool always fills stats.n_stats, but it is likely that these stats ioctls are implemented in other userspace applications which might not fill it. The added code checks that it's not zero, to prevent any regressions. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251208121901.3203692-1-gal@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/ethtool/ioctl.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c index 584358daa7e6..6258b4f1bc0d 100644 --- a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c +++ b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c @@ -1953,7 +1953,10 @@ static int ethtool_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr) return -ENOMEM; WARN_ON_ONCE(!ret); - gstrings.len = ret; + if (gstrings.len && gstrings.len != ret) + gstrings.len = 0; + else + gstrings.len = ret; if (gstrings.len) { data = vzalloc(array_size(gstrings.len, ETH_GSTRING_LEN)); @@ -2075,10 +2078,13 @@ static int ethtool_get_stats(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr) if (copy_from_user(&stats, useraddr, sizeof(stats))) return -EFAULT; - stats.n_stats = n_stats; + if (stats.n_stats && stats.n_stats != n_stats) + stats.n_stats = 0; + else + stats.n_stats = n_stats; - if (n_stats) { - data = vzalloc(array_size(n_stats, sizeof(u64))); + if (stats.n_stats) { + data = vzalloc(array_size(stats.n_stats, sizeof(u64))); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; ops->get_ethtool_stats(dev, &stats, data); @@ -2090,7 +2096,9 @@ static int ethtool_get_stats(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr) if (copy_to_user(useraddr, &stats, sizeof(stats))) goto out; useraddr += sizeof(stats); - if (n_stats && copy_to_user(useraddr, data, array_size(n_stats, sizeof(u64)))) + if (stats.n_stats && + copy_to_user(useraddr, data, + array_size(stats.n_stats, sizeof(u64)))) goto out; ret = 0; @@ -2126,6 +2134,10 @@ static int ethtool_get_phy_stats_phydev(struct phy_device *phydev, return -EOPNOTSUPP; n_stats = phy_ops->get_sset_count(phydev); + if (stats->n_stats && stats->n_stats != n_stats) { + stats->n_stats = 0; + return 0; + } ret = ethtool_vzalloc_stats_array(n_stats, data); if (ret) @@ -2146,6 +2158,10 @@ static int ethtool_get_phy_stats_ethtool(struct net_device *dev, return -EOPNOTSUPP; n_stats = ops->get_sset_count(dev, ETH_SS_PHY_STATS); + if (stats->n_stats && stats->n_stats != n_stats) { + stats->n_stats = 0; + return 0; + } ret = ethtool_vzalloc_stats_array(n_stats, data); if (ret) @@ -2182,7 +2198,9 @@ static int ethtool_get_phy_stats(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr) } useraddr += sizeof(stats); - if (copy_to_user(useraddr, data, array_size(stats.n_stats, sizeof(u64)))) + if (stats.n_stats && + copy_to_user(useraddr, data, + array_size(stats.n_stats, sizeof(u64)))) ret = -EFAULT; out: -- 2.25.1
From: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 11bf9134613f6c71fc0ff36c5d8d33856f6ae3bb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c1d73b1480235731e35c81df70b08f4714a7d095 ] `qfq_class->leaf_qdisc->q.qlen > 0` does not imply that the class itself is active. Two qfq_class objects may point to the same leaf_qdisc. This happens when: 1. one QFQ qdisc is attached to the dev as the root qdisc, and 2. another QFQ qdisc is temporarily referenced (e.g., via qdisc_get() / qdisc_put()) and is pending to be destroyed, as in function tc_new_tfilter. When packets are enqueued through the root QFQ qdisc, the shared leaf_qdisc->q.qlen increases. At the same time, the second QFQ qdisc triggers qdisc_put and qdisc_destroy: the qdisc enters qfq_reset() with its own q->q.qlen == 0, but its class's leaf qdisc->q.qlen > 0. Therefore, the qfq_reset would wrongly deactivate an inactive aggregate and trigger a null-deref in qfq_deactivate_agg: [ 0.903172] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 0.903571] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 0.903860] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 0.904177] PGD 10299b067 P4D 10299b067 PUD 10299c067 PMD 0 [ 0.904502] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 0.904737] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 135 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #2 NONE [ 0.905157] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 0.905754] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.906046] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 je 0x153 6: 48 89 70 18 mov %rsi,0x18(%rax) a: 8b 4b 10 mov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx d: 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx 14: 48 8b 78 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%rdi 18: 48 d3 e2 shl %cl,%rdx 1b: 48 21 f2 and %rsi,%rdx 1e: 48 2b 13 sub (%rbx),%rdx 21: 48 8b 30 mov (%rax),%rsi 24: 48 d3 ea shr %cl,%rdx 27: 8b 4b 18 mov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx ... [ 0.907095] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 0.907368] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.907723] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908100] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908451] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000 [ 0.908804] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880 [ 0.909179] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.909572] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.909857] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 0.910247] PKRU: 55555554 [ 0.910391] Call Trace: [ 0.910527] <TASK> [ 0.910638] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1485) [ 0.910826] qdisc_reset (include/linux/skbuff.h:2195 include/linux/skbuff.h:2501 include/linux/skbuff.h:3424 include/linux/skbuff.h:3430 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 0.911040] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1076) [ 0.911236] tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2447) [ 0.911447] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) [ 0.911663] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6861) [ 0.911894] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) [ 0.912100] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) [ 0.912296] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:706) [ 0.912484] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) [ 0.912682] sock_write_iter (net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:742 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1195 (discriminator 1)) [ 0.912880] vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:593 fs/read_write.c:686) [ 0.913077] ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:738) [ 0.913252] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) [ 0.913438] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131) [ 0.913687] RIP: 0033:0x424c34 [ 0.913844] Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 2d 44 09 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 9 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 89 02 mov %eax,(%rdx) 2: 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rax 9: eb bd jmp 0xffffffffffffffc8 b: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 12: 00 00 00 15: 90 nop 16: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64 1a: 80 3d 2d 44 09 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x9442d(%rip) # 0x9444e 21: 74 13 je 0x36 23: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax 28: 0f 05 syscall 2a: 09 .byte 0x9 [ 0.914807] RSP: 002b:00007ffea1938b78 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 0.915197] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000424c34 [ 0.915556] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 000000002af378c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 0.915912] RBP: 00007ffea1938bc0 R08: 00000000004b8820 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.916297] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffea1938d28 [ 0.916652] R13: 00007ffea1938d38 R14: 00000000004b3828 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 0.917039] </TASK> [ 0.917158] Modules linked in: [ 0.917316] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 0.917484] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.917717] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.917978] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 je 0x153 6: 48 89 70 18 mov %rsi,0x18(%rax) a: 8b 4b 10 mov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx d: 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx 14: 48 8b 78 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%rdi 18: 48 d3 e2 shl %cl,%rdx 1b: 48 21 f2 and %rsi,%rdx 1e: 48 2b 13 sub (%rbx),%rdx 21: 48 8b 30 mov (%rax),%rsi 24: 48 d3 ea shr %cl,%rdx 27: 8b 4b 18 mov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx ... [ 0.918902] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 0.919198] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.919559] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.919908] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.920289] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000 [ 0.920648] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880 [ 0.921014] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.921424] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.921710] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 0.922097] PKRU: 55555554 [ 0.922240] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 0.922590] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: 0545a3037773 ("pkt_sched: QFQ - quick fair queue scheduler") Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260106034100.1780779-1-xmei5@asu.edu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c index a9db57d29739..2e91207dabf0 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c @@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ static void qfq_reset_qdisc(struct Qdisc *sch) for (i = 0; i < q->clhash.hashsize; i++) { hlist_for_each_entry(cl, &q->clhash.hash[i], common.hnode) { - if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen > 0) + if (cl_is_active(cl)) qfq_deactivate_class(q, cl); qdisc_reset(cl->qdisc); -- 2.25.1
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 98676ee71fd4eafeb8be63c7f3f1905d40e03101 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ec69daabe45256f98ac86c651b8ad1b2574489a7 ] syzbot is reporting unregister_netdevice: waiting for sit0 to become free. Usage count = 2 problem. A debug printk() patch found that a refcount is obtained at xdp_convert_md_to_buff() from bpf_prog_test_run_xdp(). According to commit ec94670fcb3b ("bpf: Support specifying ingress via xdp_md context in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN"), the refcount obtained by xdp_convert_md_to_buff() will be released by xdp_convert_buff_to_md(). Therefore, we can consider that the error handling path introduced by commit 1c1949982524 ("bpf: introduce frags support to bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()") forgot to call xdp_convert_buff_to_md(). Reported-by: syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=881d65229ca4f9ae8c84 Fixes: 1c1949982524 ("bpf: introduce frags support to bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()") Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/af090e53-9d9b-4412-8acb-957733b3975c@I-love.SAKURA... Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/bpf/test_run.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c index 5394313c04ef..e218bb7ab483 100644 --- a/net/bpf/test_run.c +++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c @@ -1231,13 +1231,13 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_xdp(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr, if (sinfo->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; + goto out_put_dev; } page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; + goto out_put_dev; } frag = &sinfo->frags[sinfo->nr_frags++]; @@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_xdp(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr, if (copy_from_user(page_address(page), data_in + size, data_len)) { ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; + goto out_put_dev; } sinfo->xdp_frags_size += data_len; size += data_len; @@ -1264,6 +1264,7 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_xdp(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr, ret = bpf_test_run_xdp_live(prog, &xdp, repeat, batch_size, &duration); else ret = bpf_test_run(prog, &xdp, repeat, &retval, &duration, true); +out_put_dev: /* We convert the xdp_buff back to an xdp_md before checking the return * code so the reference count of any held netdevice will be decremented * even if the test run failed. -- 2.25.1
hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 -------------------------------- This reverts commit f2fcff436024b99d78578964d09a3b50b459bdde. Rolling back this patch again to resolve previous conflicts Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_objref.c | 41 -------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c b/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c index 2e024f4dd603..509011b1ef59 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c @@ -22,36 +22,6 @@ void nft_objref_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, obj->ops->eval(obj, regs, pkt); } -static int nft_objref_validate_obj_type(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, u32 type) -{ - unsigned int hooks; - - switch (type) { - case NFT_OBJECT_SYNPROXY: - if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && - ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && - ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - hooks = (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD); - - return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, hooks); - default: - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int nft_objref_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) -{ - struct nft_object *obj = nft_objref_priv(expr); - - return nft_objref_validate_obj_type(ctx, obj->ops->type->type); -} - static int nft_objref_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, const struct nlattr * const tb[]) @@ -123,7 +93,6 @@ static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_ops = { .activate = nft_objref_activate, .deactivate = nft_objref_deactivate, .dump = nft_objref_dump, - .validate = nft_objref_validate, .reduce = NFT_REDUCE_READONLY, }; @@ -229,15 +198,6 @@ static void nft_objref_map_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, nf_tables_destroy_set(ctx, priv->set); } -static int nft_objref_map_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) -{ - const struct nft_objref_map *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); - - return nft_objref_validate_obj_type(ctx, priv->set->objtype); -} - static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_map_ops = { .type = &nft_objref_type, .size = NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_objref_map)), @@ -247,7 +207,6 @@ static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_map_ops = { .deactivate = nft_objref_map_deactivate, .destroy = nft_objref_map_destroy, .dump = nft_objref_map_dump, - .validate = nft_objref_map_validate, .reduce = NFT_REDUCE_READONLY, }; -- 2.25.1
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.113 commit df0ffc4b51e9ab5bd57d8fa1c4b8b34cc76bc766 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit eaf9b2c875ece22768b78aa38da8b232e5de021b ] Since commit a654de8fdc18 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain dependency validation") the validate() callback no longer needs the return pointer argument. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Stable-dep-of: f359b809d54c ("netfilter: nft_objref: validate objref and objrefmap expressions") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 3 +-- include/net/netfilter/nft_fib.h | 4 +--- include/net/netfilter/nft_meta.h | 3 +-- include/net/netfilter/nft_reject.h | 3 +-- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_meta_bridge.c | 5 ++--- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 6 ++---- net/netfilter/nft_fib.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_fwd_netdev.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_masq.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 6 ++---- net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_osf.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_queue.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_redir.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_reject.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_reject_netdev.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_rt.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_socket.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c | 3 +-- 27 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h index c0f4b91e4f5e..32606d543060 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h @@ -955,8 +955,7 @@ struct nft_expr_ops { const struct nft_expr *expr, bool reset); int (*validate)(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data); + const struct nft_expr *expr); bool (*reduce)(struct nft_regs_track *track, const struct nft_expr *expr); bool (*gc)(struct net *net, diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nft_fib.h b/include/net/netfilter/nft_fib.h index 167640b843ef..38cae7113de4 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nft_fib.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nft_fib.h @@ -21,9 +21,7 @@ nft_fib_is_loopback(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in) int nft_fib_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nft_expr *expr, bool reset); int nft_fib_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, const struct nlattr * const tb[]); -int nft_fib_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data); - +int nft_fib_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr); void nft_fib4_eval_type(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs, const struct nft_pktinfo *pkt); diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nft_meta.h b/include/net/netfilter/nft_meta.h index ba1238f12a48..d602263590fe 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nft_meta.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nft_meta.h @@ -41,8 +41,7 @@ void nft_meta_set_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr); int nft_meta_set_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data); + const struct nft_expr *expr); bool nft_meta_get_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track, const struct nft_expr *expr); diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nft_reject.h b/include/net/netfilter/nft_reject.h index 6d9ba62efd75..19060212988a 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nft_reject.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nft_reject.h @@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ struct nft_reject { extern const struct nla_policy nft_reject_policy[]; int nft_reject_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data); + const struct nft_expr *expr); int nft_reject_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_meta_bridge.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_meta_bridge.c index bd4d1b4d745f..affb740c8685 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_meta_bridge.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_meta_bridge.c @@ -168,8 +168,7 @@ static bool nft_meta_bridge_set_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track, } static int nft_meta_bridge_set_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { struct nft_meta *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); unsigned int hooks; @@ -179,7 +178,7 @@ static int nft_meta_bridge_set_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, hooks = 1 << NF_BR_PRE_ROUTING; break; default: - return nft_meta_set_validate(ctx, expr, data); + return nft_meta_set_validate(ctx, expr); } return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, hooks); diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c index 71b54fed7263..1cb5c16e97b7 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c @@ -170,8 +170,7 @@ static void nft_reject_bridge_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } static int nft_reject_bridge_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_BR_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << NF_BR_LOCAL_IN)); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 4ffb5ef79ca1..5ca1d775e976 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -3793,7 +3793,6 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_release(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_rule *r int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain) { struct nft_expr *expr, *last; - const struct nft_data *data; struct nft_rule *rule; int err; @@ -3814,7 +3813,7 @@ int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain) /* This may call nft_chain_validate() recursively, * callers that do so must increment ctx->level. */ - err = expr->ops->validate(ctx, expr, &data); + err = expr->ops->validate(ctx, expr); if (err < 0) return err; } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c index d3d11dede545..52cdfee17f73 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c @@ -350,8 +350,7 @@ static int nft_target_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int nft_target_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { struct xt_target *target = expr->ops->data; unsigned int hook_mask = 0; @@ -611,8 +610,7 @@ static int nft_match_large_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int nft_match_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { struct xt_match *match = expr->ops->data; unsigned int hook_mask = 0; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_fib.c b/net/netfilter/nft_fib.c index bf825f6cb974..507b7eba9bcd 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_fib.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_fib.c @@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ const struct nla_policy nft_fib_policy[NFTA_FIB_MAX + 1] = { }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(nft_fib_policy); -int nft_fib_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) +int nft_fib_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr) { const struct nft_fib *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); unsigned int hooks; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c index 5a3d68542042..1894032a7971 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c @@ -385,8 +385,7 @@ static void nft_flow_offload_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } static int nft_flow_offload_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { unsigned int hook_mask = (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_fwd_netdev.c b/net/netfilter/nft_fwd_netdev.c index a5268e6dd32f..fa9e4ae00b16 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_fwd_netdev.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_fwd_netdev.c @@ -204,8 +204,7 @@ static int nft_fwd_neigh_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int nft_fwd_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_NETDEV_INGRESS) | (1 << NF_NETDEV_EGRESS)); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c b/net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c index ac2422c215e5..02ee5fb69871 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c @@ -244,8 +244,7 @@ static int nft_immediate_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int nft_immediate_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **d) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { const struct nft_immediate_expr *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); struct nft_ctx *pctx = (struct nft_ctx *)ctx; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c index 1b9edf2b3393..dd5441f92fdb 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c @@ -206,8 +206,7 @@ static int nft_lookup_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int nft_lookup_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **d) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { const struct nft_lookup *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); struct nft_set_iter iter; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_masq.c b/net/netfilter/nft_masq.c index 8a14aaca93bb..eee05394c533 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_masq.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_masq.c @@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_masq_policy[NFTA_MASQ_MAX + 1] = { }; static int nft_masq_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { int err; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c index 9139ce38ea7b..dec76d28a0ac 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c @@ -581,8 +581,7 @@ static int nft_meta_get_validate_xfrm(const struct nft_ctx *ctx) } static int nft_meta_get_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { const struct nft_meta *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); @@ -600,8 +599,7 @@ static int nft_meta_get_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, } int nft_meta_set_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { struct nft_meta *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); unsigned int hooks; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c index 808f5802c270..3d3e639a7a83 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c @@ -137,8 +137,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_nat_policy[NFTA_NAT_MAX + 1] = { }; static int nft_nat_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { struct nft_nat *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); int err; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_osf.c b/net/netfilter/nft_osf.c index 7f61506e5b44..123b4f47ccef 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_osf.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_osf.c @@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ static int nft_osf_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int nft_osf_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { unsigned int hooks; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nft_queue.c index b2b8127c8d43..b8ebb187814f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_queue.c @@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ static void nft_queue_sreg_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } static int nft_queue_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { static const unsigned int supported_hooks = ((1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_redir.c b/net/netfilter/nft_redir.c index a58bd8d291ff..9051863509f3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_redir.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_redir.c @@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_redir_policy[NFTA_REDIR_MAX + 1] = { }; static int nft_redir_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { int err; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c b/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c index ed2e668474d6..196a92c7ea09 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c @@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ const struct nla_policy nft_reject_policy[NFTA_REJECT_MAX + 1] = { EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nft_reject_policy); int nft_reject_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c b/net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c index 973fa31a9dd6..49020e67304a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c @@ -61,8 +61,7 @@ static void nft_reject_inet_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } static int nft_reject_inet_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_reject_netdev.c b/net/netfilter/nft_reject_netdev.c index 7865cd8b11bb..2558ce1505d9 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_reject_netdev.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_reject_netdev.c @@ -145,8 +145,7 @@ static void nft_reject_netdev_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } static int nft_reject_netdev_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_NETDEV_INGRESS)); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c b/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c index 2434c624aafd..9525f1e02a7d 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c @@ -160,8 +160,7 @@ static int nft_rt_get_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, return -1; } -static int nft_rt_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) +static int nft_rt_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr) { const struct nft_rt *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); unsigned int hooks; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c b/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c index 187b667bad6c..35d0409b0095 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c @@ -275,8 +275,7 @@ static bool nft_socket_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track, } static int nft_socket_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c index 1d737f89dfc1..5d3e51825985 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c @@ -248,8 +248,7 @@ static void nft_synproxy_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } static int nft_synproxy_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c b/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c index 71412adb73d4..ed344af2a439 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c @@ -313,8 +313,7 @@ static int nft_tproxy_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int nft_tproxy_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) + const struct nft_expr *expr) { if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c index 1c866757db55..8a07b46cc8fb 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c @@ -229,8 +229,7 @@ static int nft_xfrm_get_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, return 0; } -static int nft_xfrm_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, - const struct nft_data **data) +static int nft_xfrm_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr) { const struct nft_xfrm *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); unsigned int hooks; -- 2.25.1
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 53de1e6cde8f9b791d9cf61aa0e7b02cf5bbe8b1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8e1a1bc4f5a42747c08130b8242ebebd1210b32f ] Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in nft_chain_validate(): watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547] [..] RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables] [..] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables] nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables] nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables] nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables] nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables] [..] Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths (chain jumps). But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation. Consider: 1 input -> j2 -> j3 2 input -> j2 -> j3 3 input -> j1 -> j2 -> j3 Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3, because this was already checked during validation of the first rule. We need to validate it only for rule 3. This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump might now exceed the allowed stack size. We also need to update all reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth. Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from invalid base chains. For example, the masquerade expression can only be called from NAT postrouting base chains. Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type, hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different hook location. Reported-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20251118221735.GA5477@linuxonhyperv3... Tested-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 34 +++++++++++---- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h index 32606d543060..e1c4d903f39b 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h @@ -1077,6 +1077,29 @@ struct nft_rule_blob { __attribute__((aligned(__alignof__(struct nft_rule_dp)))); }; +enum nft_chain_types { + NFT_CHAIN_T_DEFAULT = 0, + NFT_CHAIN_T_ROUTE, + NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT, + NFT_CHAIN_T_MAX +}; + +/** + * struct nft_chain_validate_state - validation state + * + * If a chain is encountered again during table validation it is + * possible to avoid revalidation provided the calling context is + * compatible. This structure stores relevant calling context of + * previous validations. + * + * @hook_mask: the hook numbers and locations the chain is linked to + * @depth: the deepest call chain level the chain is linked to + */ +struct nft_chain_validate_state { + u8 hook_mask[NFT_CHAIN_T_MAX]; + u8 depth; +}; + /** * struct nft_chain - nf_tables chain * @@ -1095,6 +1118,7 @@ struct nft_rule_blob { * @udlen: user data length * @udata: user data in the chain * @blob_next: rule blob pointer to the next in the chain + * @vstate: validation state */ struct nft_chain { struct nft_rule_blob __rcu *blob_gen_0; @@ -1114,9 +1138,10 @@ struct nft_chain { /* Only used during control plane commit phase: */ struct nft_rule_blob *blob_next; + struct nft_chain_validate_state vstate; }; -int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain); +int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_chain *chain); int nft_setelem_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, const struct nft_set_iter *iter, struct nft_set_elem *elem); @@ -1124,13 +1149,6 @@ int nft_set_catchall_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set); int nf_tables_bind_chain(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_chain *chain); void nf_tables_unbind_chain(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_chain *chain); -enum nft_chain_types { - NFT_CHAIN_T_DEFAULT = 0, - NFT_CHAIN_T_ROUTE, - NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT, - NFT_CHAIN_T_MAX -}; - /** * struct nft_chain_type - nf_tables chain type info * diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 5ca1d775e976..bde344972554 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -121,6 +121,29 @@ static void nft_validate_state_update(struct nft_table *table, u8 new_validate_s table->validate_state = new_validate_state; } + +static bool nft_chain_vstate_valid(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + const struct nft_chain *chain) +{ + const struct nft_base_chain *base_chain; + enum nft_chain_types type; + u8 hooknum; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain))) + return false; + + base_chain = nft_base_chain(ctx->chain); + hooknum = base_chain->ops.hooknum; + type = base_chain->type->type; + + /* chain is already validated for this call depth */ + if (chain->vstate.depth >= ctx->level && + chain->vstate.hook_mask[type] & BIT(hooknum)) + return true; + + return false; +} + static void nf_tables_trans_destroy_work(struct work_struct *w); static DECLARE_WORK(trans_destroy_work, nf_tables_trans_destroy_work); @@ -3781,6 +3804,29 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_release(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_rule *r nf_tables_rule_destroy(ctx, rule); } +static void nft_chain_vstate_update(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_chain *chain) +{ + const struct nft_base_chain *base_chain; + enum nft_chain_types type; + u8 hooknum; + + /* ctx->chain must hold the calling base chain. */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain))) { + memset(&chain->vstate, 0, sizeof(chain->vstate)); + return; + } + + base_chain = nft_base_chain(ctx->chain); + hooknum = base_chain->ops.hooknum; + type = base_chain->type->type; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(BIT(NF_INET_NUMHOOKS) > U8_MAX); + + chain->vstate.hook_mask[type] |= BIT(hooknum); + if (chain->vstate.depth < ctx->level) + chain->vstate.depth = ctx->level; +} + /** nft_chain_validate - loop detection and hook validation * * @ctx: context containing call depth and base chain @@ -3790,15 +3836,25 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_release(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_rule *r * and set lookups until either the jump limit is hit or all reachable * chains have been validated. */ -int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain) +int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_chain *chain) { struct nft_expr *expr, *last; struct nft_rule *rule; int err; + BUILD_BUG_ON(NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE > 255); if (ctx->level == NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE) return -EMLINK; + if (ctx->level > 0) { + /* jumps to base chains are not allowed. */ + if (nft_is_base_chain(chain)) + return -ELOOP; + + if (nft_chain_vstate_valid(ctx, chain)) + return 0; + } + list_for_each_entry(rule, &chain->rules, list) { if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) return -EINTR; @@ -3819,6 +3875,7 @@ int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain) } } + nft_chain_vstate_update(ctx, chain); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nft_chain_validate); @@ -3830,7 +3887,7 @@ static int nft_table_validate(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table) .net = net, .family = table->family, }; - int err; + int err = 0; list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { if (!nft_is_base_chain(chain)) @@ -3839,12 +3896,16 @@ static int nft_table_validate(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table) ctx.chain = chain; err = nft_chain_validate(&ctx, chain); if (err < 0) - return err; + goto err; cond_resched(); } - return 0; +err: + list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) + memset(&chain->vstate, 0, sizeof(chain->vstate)); + + return err; } int nft_setelem_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, -- 2.25.1
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 1717357007db150c2d703f13f5695460e960f26c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit db5b4e39c4e63700c68a7e65fc4e1f1375273476 ] Over the years, syzbot found many ways to crash the kernel in ip6gre_header() [1]. This involves team or bonding drivers ability to dynamically change their dev->needed_headroom and/or dev->hard_header_len In this particular crash mld_newpack() allocated an skb with a too small reserve/headroom, and by the time mld_sendpack() was called, syzbot managed to attach an ip6gre device. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a1d69a8 len:136 put:40 head:ffff888059bc7000 data:ffff888059bc6fe8 tail:0x70 end:0x6c0 dev:team0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:213 ! <TASK> skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:223 [inline] skb_push+0xc3/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2641 ip6gre_header+0xc8/0x790 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1371 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3436 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x286/0x460 net/core/neighbour.c:1618 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:556 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0xfb3/0x1480 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:136 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:-1 [inline] ip6_finish_output+0x234/0x7d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:220 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247 NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318 mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline] mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693 Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Reported-by: syzbot+43a2ebcf2a64b1102d64@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/693b002c.a70a0220.33cd7b.0033.GAE@google.com/... Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251211173550.2032674-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c index 289b83347d9d..63ac4a8e095b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c @@ -1382,9 +1382,16 @@ static int ip6gre_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, { struct ip6_tnl *t = netdev_priv(dev); struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h; + int needed; __be16 *p; - ipv6h = skb_push(skb, t->hlen + sizeof(*ipv6h)); + needed = t->hlen + sizeof(*ipv6h); + if (skb_headroom(skb) < needed && + pskb_expand_head(skb, HH_DATA_ALIGN(needed - skb_headroom(skb)), + 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) + return -needed; + + ipv6h = skb_push(skb, needed); ip6_flow_hdr(ipv6h, 0, ip6_make_flowlabel(dev_net(dev), skb, t->fl.u.ip6.flowlabel, true, &t->fl.u.ip6)); -- 2.25.1
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 029935507d0af6553c45380fbf6feecf756fd226 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c92510f5e3f82ba11c95991824a41e59a9c5ed81 ] arp_create() is the only dev_hard_header() caller making assumption about skb->head being unchanged. A recent commit broke this assumption. Initialize @arp pointer after dev_hard_header() call. Fixes: db5b4e39c4e6 ("ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust") Reported-by: syzbot+58b44a770a1585795351@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260107212250.384552-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/arp.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/arp.c b/net/ipv4/arp.c index 784dc8b37be5..4ea5987e06b6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/arp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/arp.c @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ struct sk_buff *arp_create(int type, int ptype, __be32 dest_ip, skb_reserve(skb, hlen); skb_reset_network_header(skb); - arp = skb_put(skb, arp_hdr_len(dev)); + skb_put(skb, arp_hdr_len(dev)); skb->dev = dev; skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_ARP); if (!src_hw) @@ -571,12 +571,13 @@ struct sk_buff *arp_create(int type, int ptype, __be32 dest_ip, if (!dest_hw) dest_hw = dev->broadcast; - /* - * Fill the device header for the ARP frame + /* Fill the device header for the ARP frame. + * Note: skb->head can be changed. */ if (dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ptype, dest_hw, src_hw, skb->len) < 0) goto out; + arp = arp_hdr(skb); /* * Fill out the arp protocol part. * -- 2.25.1
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera@suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.113 commit 0028e0134c64d9ed21728341a74fcfc59cd0f944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f359b809d54c6e3dd1d039b97e0b68390b0e53e4 ] Referencing a synproxy stateful object from OUTPUT hook causes kernel crash due to infinite recursive calls: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 000000008bda5b8c (stack is 000000003ab1c4a5..00000000494d8b12) [...] Call Trace: __find_rr_leaf+0x99/0x230 fib6_table_lookup+0x13b/0x2d0 ip6_pol_route+0xa4/0x400 fib6_rule_lookup+0x156/0x240 ip6_route_output_flags+0xc6/0x150 __nf_ip6_route+0x23/0x50 synproxy_send_tcp_ipv6+0x106/0x200 synproxy_send_client_synack_ipv6+0x1aa/0x1f0 nft_synproxy_do_eval+0x263/0x310 nft_do_chain+0x5a8/0x5f0 [nf_tables nft_do_chain_inet+0x98/0x110 nf_hook_slow+0x43/0xc0 __ip6_local_out+0xf0/0x170 ip6_local_out+0x17/0x70 synproxy_send_tcp_ipv6+0x1a2/0x200 synproxy_send_client_synack_ipv6+0x1aa/0x1f0 [...] Implement objref and objrefmap expression validate functions. Currently, only NFT_OBJECT_SYNPROXY object type requires validation. This will also handle a jump to a chain using a synproxy object from the OUTPUT hook. Now when trying to reference a synproxy object in the OUTPUT hook, nft will produce the following error: synproxy_crash.nft: Error: Could not process rule: Operation not supported synproxy name mysynproxy ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Fixes: ee394f96ad75 ("netfilter: nft_synproxy: add synproxy stateful object support") Reported-by: Georg Pfuetzenreuter <georg.pfuetzenreuter@suse.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.suse.com/1250237 Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_objref.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c b/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c index 509011b1ef59..08a27433e2f5 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c @@ -22,6 +22,35 @@ void nft_objref_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, obj->ops->eval(obj, regs, pkt); } +static int nft_objref_validate_obj_type(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, u32 type) +{ + unsigned int hooks; + + switch (type) { + case NFT_OBJECT_SYNPROXY: + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + hooks = (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD); + + return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, hooks); + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int nft_objref_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + const struct nft_expr *expr) +{ + struct nft_object *obj = nft_objref_priv(expr); + + return nft_objref_validate_obj_type(ctx, obj->ops->type->type); +} + static int nft_objref_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, const struct nlattr * const tb[]) @@ -93,6 +122,7 @@ static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_ops = { .activate = nft_objref_activate, .deactivate = nft_objref_deactivate, .dump = nft_objref_dump, + .validate = nft_objref_validate, .reduce = NFT_REDUCE_READONLY, }; @@ -198,6 +228,14 @@ static void nft_objref_map_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, nf_tables_destroy_set(ctx, priv->set); } +static int nft_objref_map_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + const struct nft_expr *expr) +{ + const struct nft_objref_map *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); + + return nft_objref_validate_obj_type(ctx, priv->set->objtype); +} + static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_map_ops = { .type = &nft_objref_type, .size = NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_objref_map)), @@ -207,6 +245,7 @@ static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_map_ops = { .deactivate = nft_objref_map_deactivate, .destroy = nft_objref_map_destroy, .dump = nft_objref_map_dump, + .validate = nft_objref_map_validate, .reduce = NFT_REDUCE_READONLY, }; -- 2.25.1
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