From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.97 commit bc0819a25e04cd68ef3568cfa51b63118fea39a7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- syzbot reported use-after-free in vhci_flush() without repro. [0] From the splat, a thread close()d a vhci file descriptor while its device was being used by iotcl() on another thread. Once the last fd refcnt is released, vhci_release() calls hci_unregister_dev(), hci_free_dev(), and kfree() for struct vhci_data, which is set to hci_dev->dev->driver_data. The problem is that there is no synchronisation after unlinking hdev from hci_dev_list in hci_unregister_dev(). There might be another thread still accessing the hdev which was fetched before the unlink operation. We can use SRCU for such synchronisation. Let's run hci_dev_reset() under SRCU and wait for its completion in hci_unregister_dev(). Another option would be to restore hci_dev->destruct(), which was removed in commit 587ae086f6e4 ("Bluetooth: Remove unused hci-destruct cb"). However, this would not be a good solution, as we should not run hci_unregister_dev() while there are in-flight ioctl() requests, which could lead to another data-race KCSAN splat. Note that other drivers seem to have the same problem, for exmaple, virtbt_remove(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807cb8d858 by task syz.1.219/6718 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6718 Comm: syz.1.219 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00196-g08207f42d3ff #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline] print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634 skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline] skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937 skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3368 [inline] vhci_flush+0x44/0x50 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:69 hci_dev_do_reset net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:552 [inline] hci_dev_reset+0x420/0x5c0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:592 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1190 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1311 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fcf5b98e929 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fcf5c7b9038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fcf5bbb6160 RCX: 00007fcf5b98e929 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000400448cb RDI: 0000000000000009 RBP: 00007fcf5ba10b39 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcf5bbb6160 R15: 00007ffd6353d528 </TASK> Allocated by task 6535: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] vhci_open+0x57/0x360 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:635 misc_open+0x2bc/0x330 drivers/char/misc.c:161 chrdev_open+0x4c9/0x5e0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0xdf0/0x1970 fs/open.c:964 vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1094 do_open fs/namei.c:3887 [inline] path_openat+0x2ee5/0x3830 fs/namei.c:4046 do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4073 do_sys_openat2+0x121/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1452 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1468 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1463 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1463 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 6535: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842 vhci_release+0xbc/0xd0 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:671 __fput+0x44c/0xa70 fs/file_table.c:465 task_work_run+0x1d1/0x260 kernel/task_work.c:227 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0x6ad/0x22e0 kernel/exit.c:955 do_group_exit+0x21c/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1104 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1115 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1113 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1113 x64_sys_call+0x21ba/0x21c0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807cb8d800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88807cb8d800, ffff88807cb8dc00) Fixes: bf18c7118cf8 ("Bluetooth: vhci: Free driver_data on file release") Reported-by: syzbot+2faa4825e556199361f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f62d64848fc4c7c30cd6 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Acked-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Conflicts: include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h [commit 5b70b93fc768 has been merged] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 3c653208c911..afb4acf8b11b 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ struct adv_monitor { struct hci_dev { struct list_head list; + struct srcu_struct srcu; struct mutex lock; struct ida unset_handle_ida; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index fd05a43ab74b..f5294ee7094b 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static DEFINE_IDA(hci_index_ida); /* Get HCI device by index. * Device is held on return. */ -struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get(int index) +static struct hci_dev *__hci_dev_get(int index, int *srcu_index) { struct hci_dev *hdev = NULL, *d; @@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get(int index) list_for_each_entry(d, &hci_dev_list, list) { if (d->id == index) { hdev = hci_dev_hold(d); + if (srcu_index) + *srcu_index = srcu_read_lock(&d->srcu); break; } } @@ -85,6 +87,22 @@ struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get(int index) return hdev; } +struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get(int index) +{ + return __hci_dev_get(index, NULL); +} + +static struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get_srcu(int index, int *srcu_index) +{ + return __hci_dev_get(index, srcu_index); +} + +static void hci_dev_put_srcu(struct hci_dev *hdev, int srcu_index) +{ + srcu_read_unlock(&hdev->srcu, srcu_index); + hci_dev_put(hdev); +} + /* ---- Inquiry support ---- */ bool hci_discovery_active(struct hci_dev *hdev) @@ -590,9 +608,9 @@ static int hci_dev_do_reset(struct hci_dev *hdev) int hci_dev_reset(__u16 dev) { struct hci_dev *hdev; - int err; + int err, srcu_index; - hdev = hci_dev_get(dev); + hdev = hci_dev_get_srcu(dev, &srcu_index); if (!hdev) return -ENODEV; @@ -614,7 +632,7 @@ int hci_dev_reset(__u16 dev) err = hci_dev_do_reset(hdev); done: - hci_dev_put(hdev); + hci_dev_put_srcu(hdev, srcu_index); return err; } @@ -2424,6 +2442,11 @@ struct hci_dev *hci_alloc_dev_priv(int sizeof_priv) if (!hdev) return NULL; + if (init_srcu_struct(&hdev->srcu)) { + kfree(hdev); + return NULL; + } + hdev->pkt_type = (HCI_DM1 | HCI_DH1 | HCI_HV1); hdev->esco_type = (ESCO_HV1); hdev->link_mode = (HCI_LM_ACCEPT); @@ -2670,6 +2693,9 @@ void hci_unregister_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev) list_del(&hdev->list); write_unlock(&hci_dev_list_lock); + synchronize_srcu(&hdev->srcu); + cleanup_srcu_struct(&hdev->srcu); + disable_work_sync(&hdev->rx_work); disable_work_sync(&hdev->cmd_work); disable_work_sync(&hdev->tx_work); -- 2.25.1

From: Maher Azzouzi <maherazz04@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.102 commit 39491e859fd494d0b51adc5c7d54c8a7dcf1d198 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ffd2dc4c6c49ff4f1e5d34e454a6a55608104c17 ] TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX is validated using NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U32, TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE), which allows the value TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE (16). This leads to a 4-byte out-of-bounds stack write in the fp[] array, which only has room for 16 elements (0–15). Fix this by changing the policy to allow only up to TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE - 1. Fixes: f62af20bed2d ("net/sched: mqprio: allow per-TC user input of FP adminStatus") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maher Azzouzi <maherazz04@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250802001857.2702497-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c index 793009f445c0..a0e3f3bae536 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int mqprio_parse_opt(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_mqprio_qopt *qopt, static const struct nla_policy mqprio_tc_entry_policy[TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_MAX + 1] = { [TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX] = NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U32, - TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE), + TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE - 1), [TCA_MQPRIO_TC_ENTRY_FP] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, TC_FP_EXPRESS, TC_FP_PREEMPTIBLE), -- 2.25.1

From: Aakash Kumar S <saakashkumar@marvell.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit 3d8090bb53424432fa788fe9a49e8ceca74f0544 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 94f39804d891cffe4ce17737d295f3b195bc7299 ] The issue originates when Strongswan initiates an XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI Netlink message, which triggers the kernel function xfrm_alloc_spi(). This function is expected to ensure uniqueness of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) for inbound Security Associations (SAs). However, it can return success even when the requested SPI is already in use, leading to duplicate SPIs assigned to multiple inbound SAs, differentiated only by their destination addresses. This behavior causes inconsistencies during SPI lookups for inbound packets. Since the lookup may return an arbitrary SA among those with the same SPI, packet processing can fail, resulting in packet drops. According to RFC 4301 section 4.4.2 , for inbound processing a unicast SA is uniquely identified by the SPI and optionally protocol. Reproducing the Issue Reliably: To consistently reproduce the problem, restrict the available SPI range in charon.conf : spi_min = 0x10000000 spi_max = 0x10000002 This limits the system to only 2 usable SPI values. Next, create more than 2 Child SA. each using unique pair of src/dst address. As soon as the 3rd Child SA is initiated, it will be assigned a duplicate SPI, since the SPI pool is already exhausted. With a narrow SPI range, the issue is consistently reproducible. With a broader/default range, it becomes rare and unpredictable. Current implementation: xfrm_spi_hash() lookup function computes hash using daddr, proto, and family. So if two SAs have the same SPI but different destination addresses, then they will: a. Hash into different buckets b. Be stored in different linked lists (byspi + h) c. Not be seen in the same hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() iteration. As a result, the lookup will result in NULL and kernel allows that Duplicate SPI Proposed Change: xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto() does a truly global search - across all states, regardless of hash bucket and matches SPI and proto. Signed-off-by: Aakash Kumar S <saakashkumar@marvell.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index e9f36cdfd111..b36eedad21f1 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1450,6 +1450,26 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_byspi(struct net *net, __be32 spi, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_byspi); +static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto(struct net *net, __be32 spi, u8 proto) +{ + struct xfrm_state *x; + unsigned int i; + + rcu_read_lock(); + for (i = 0; i <= net->xfrm.state_hmask; i++) { + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, &net->xfrm.state_byspi[i], byspi) { + if (x->id.spi == spi && x->id.proto == proto) { + if (!xfrm_state_hold_rcu(x)) + continue; + rcu_read_unlock(); + return x; + } + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + return NULL; +} + static void __xfrm_state_insert(struct xfrm_state *x) { struct net *net = xs_net(x); @@ -2250,10 +2270,8 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high, unsigned int h; struct xfrm_state *x0; int err = -ENOENT; - __be32 minspi = htonl(low); - __be32 maxspi = htonl(high); + u32 range = high - low + 1; __be32 newspi = 0; - u32 mark = x->mark.v & x->mark.m; spin_lock_bh(&x->lock); if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_DEAD) { @@ -2267,38 +2285,34 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high, err = -ENOENT; - if (minspi == maxspi) { - x0 = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &x->id.daddr, minspi, x->id.proto, x->props.family); - if (x0) { - NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Requested SPI is already in use"); - xfrm_state_put(x0); + for (h = 0; h < range; h++) { + u32 spi = (low == high) ? low : get_random_u32_inclusive(low, high); + newspi = htonl(spi); + + spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock); + x0 = xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto(net, newspi, x->id.proto); + if (!x0) { + x->id.spi = newspi; + h = xfrm_spi_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, newspi, x->id.proto, x->props.family); + XFRM_STATE_INSERT(byspi, &x->byspi, net->xfrm.state_byspi + h, x->xso.type); + spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock); + err = 0; goto unlock; } - newspi = minspi; - } else { - u32 spi = 0; - for (h = 0; h < high-low+1; h++) { - spi = get_random_u32_inclusive(low, high); - x0 = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &x->id.daddr, htonl(spi), x->id.proto, x->props.family); - if (x0 == NULL) { - newspi = htonl(spi); - break; - } - xfrm_state_put(x0); + xfrm_state_put(x0); + spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock); + + if (signal_pending(current)) { + err = -ERESTARTSYS; + goto unlock; } + + if (low == high) + break; } - if (newspi) { - spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock); - x->id.spi = newspi; - h = xfrm_spi_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, x->id.spi, x->id.proto, x->props.family); - XFRM_STATE_INSERT(byspi, &x->byspi, net->xfrm.state_byspi + h, - x->xso.type); - spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock); - err = 0; - } else { + if (err) NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "No SPI available in the requested range"); - } unlock: spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); -- 2.25.1

From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.108 commit 4cefe5be73886f383639fe0850bb72d5b568a7b9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0aeb54ac4cd5cf8f60131b4d9ec0b6dc9c27b20d ] Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space. Constructing a scenario in which we're under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send. Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there's really no way to recover. Reported-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser") Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917002814.1743558-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/tls/tls.h | 1 + net/tls/tls_strp.c | 14 +++++++++----- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls.h b/net/tls/tls.h index 5dc61c85c076..a3c5c5a59fda 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls.h +++ b/net/tls/tls.h @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ void update_sk_prot(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx); int wait_on_pending_writer(struct sock *sk, long *timeo); void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err); +void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err); int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx); void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx); diff --git a/net/tls/tls_strp.c b/net/tls/tls_strp.c index 6ce64a6e4495..ae723cd6af39 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_strp.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_strp.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *tls_strp_wq; -static void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err) +void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err) { if (strp->stopped) return; @@ -210,11 +210,17 @@ static int tls_strp_copyin_frag(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff *in_skb, unsigned int offset, size_t in_len) { + unsigned int nfrag = skb->len / PAGE_SIZE; size_t len, chunk; skb_frag_t *frag; int sz; - frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[skb->len / PAGE_SIZE]; + if (unlikely(nfrag >= skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags)) { + DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return -EMSGSIZE; + } + + frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[nfrag]; len = in_len; /* First make sure we got the header */ @@ -519,10 +525,8 @@ static int tls_strp_read_sock(struct tls_strparser *strp) tls_strp_load_anchor_with_queue(strp, inq); if (!strp->stm.full_len) { sz = tls_rx_msg_size(strp, strp->anchor); - if (sz < 0) { - tls_strp_abort_strp(strp, sz); + if (sz < 0) return sz; - } strp->stm.full_len = sz; diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 8915f2eedd09..2a6026b6f1fc 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -2438,8 +2438,7 @@ int tls_rx_msg_size(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE; read_failure: - tls_err_abort(strp->sk, ret); - + tls_strp_abort_strp(strp, ret); return ret; } -- 2.25.1

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 3b60ce334c1ce8b3fad7e02dcd5ed9f6646477c8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8dca36978aa80bab9d4da130c211db75c9e00048 ] syzbot reported[1] a use-after-free when deleting an expired fdb. It is due to a race condition between learning still happening and a port being deleted, after all its fdbs have been flushed. The port's state has been toggled to disabled so no learning should happen at that time, but if we have MST enabled, it will bypass the port's state, that together with VLAN filtering disabled can lead to fdb learning at a time when it shouldn't happen while the port is being deleted. VLAN filtering must be disabled because we flush the port VLANs when it's being deleted which will stop learning. This fix adds a check for the port's vlan group which is initialized to NULL when the port is getting deleted, that avoids the port state bypass. When MST is enabled there would be a minimal new overhead in the fast-path because the port's vlan group pointer is cache-hot. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dd280197f0f7ab3917be Fixes: ec7328b59176 ("net: bridge: mst: Multiple Spanning Tree (MST) mode") Reported-by: syzbot+dd280197f0f7ab3917be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/69088ffa.050a0220.29fc44.003d.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251105111919.1499702-2-razor@blackwall.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/bridge/br_forward.c | 2 +- net/bridge/br_input.c | 4 ++-- net/bridge/br_private.h | 8 +++++--- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_forward.c b/net/bridge/br_forward.c index e19b583ff2c6..193520321804 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_forward.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_forward.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static inline int should_deliver(const struct net_bridge_port *p, vg = nbp_vlan_group_rcu(p); return ((p->flags & BR_HAIRPIN_MODE) || skb->dev != p->dev) && - (br_mst_is_enabled(p->br) || p->state == BR_STATE_FORWARDING) && + (br_mst_is_enabled(p) || p->state == BR_STATE_FORWARDING) && br_allowed_egress(vg, skb) && nbp_switchdev_allowed_egress(p, skb) && !br_skb_isolated(p, skb); } diff --git a/net/bridge/br_input.c b/net/bridge/br_input.c index e09000e38d07..951330c1a813 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_input.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_input.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb br = p->br; - if (br_mst_is_enabled(br)) { + if (br_mst_is_enabled(p)) { state = BR_STATE_FORWARDING; } else { if (p->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED) @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t br_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) return RX_HANDLER_PASS; forward: - if (br_mst_is_enabled(p->br)) + if (br_mst_is_enabled(p)) goto defer_stp_filtering; switch (p->state) { diff --git a/net/bridge/br_private.h b/net/bridge/br_private.h index ebb12f37be94..b468c36fd6d3 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_private.h +++ b/net/bridge/br_private.h @@ -1879,10 +1879,12 @@ static inline bool br_vlan_state_allowed(u8 state, bool learn_allow) /* br_mst.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_BRIDGE_VLAN_FILTERING DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(br_mst_used); -static inline bool br_mst_is_enabled(struct net_bridge *br) +static inline bool br_mst_is_enabled(const struct net_bridge_port *p) { + /* check the port's vlan group to avoid racing with port deletion */ return static_branch_unlikely(&br_mst_used) && - br_opt_get(br, BROPT_MST_ENABLED); + br_opt_get(p->br, BROPT_MST_ENABLED) && + rcu_access_pointer(p->vlgrp); } int br_mst_set_state(struct net_bridge_port *p, u16 msti, u8 state, @@ -1897,7 +1899,7 @@ int br_mst_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, int br_mst_process(struct net_bridge_port *p, const struct nlattr *mst_attr, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); #else -static inline bool br_mst_is_enabled(struct net_bridge *br) +static inline bool br_mst_is_enabled(const struct net_bridge_port *p) { return false; } -- 2.25.1

From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 7613c06ffa89c1e2266fb532e23ef7dfdf269d73 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f3b52167a0cb23b27414452fbc1278da2ee884fc ] Driver authors often forget to add GFP_NOWARN for page allocation from the datapath. This is annoying to users as OOMs are a fact of life, and we pretty much expect network Rx to hit page allocation failures during OOM. Make page pool add GFP_NOWARN for ATOMIC allocations by default. Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250912161703.361272-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/core/page_pool.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/page_pool.c b/net/core/page_pool.c index cb7238043a33..c7aa2ff9aa88 100644 --- a/net/core/page_pool.c +++ b/net/core/page_pool.c @@ -422,6 +422,12 @@ static struct page *__page_pool_alloc_pages_slow(struct page_pool *pool, struct page *page; int i, nr_pages; + /* Unconditionally set NOWARN if allocating from NAPI. + * Drivers forget to set it, and OOM reports on packet Rx are useless. + */ + if ((gfp & GFP_ATOMIC) == GFP_ATOMIC) + gfp |= __GFP_NOWARN; + /* Don't support bulk alloc for high-order pages */ if (unlikely(pp_order)) return __page_pool_alloc_page_order(pool, gfp); -- 2.25.1

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit a0a3ace2a57887dac1e7c9a724846040c3e31868 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13525 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 91a79b792204313153e1bdbbe5acbfc28903b3a5 ] recent patches to add a WARN() when replacing skb dst entry found an old bug: WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 skb_dst_check_unset include/linux/skbuff.h:1164 [inline] WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 skb_dst_set include/linux/skbuff.h:1210 [inline] WARNING: include/linux/skbuff.h:1165 nf_reject_fill_skb_dst+0x2a4/0x330 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c:234 [..] Call Trace: nf_send_unreach+0x17b/0x6e0 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c:325 nft_reject_inet_eval+0x4bc/0x690 net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c:27 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:237 [inline] .. This is because blamed commit forgot about loopback packets. Such packets already have a dst_entry attached, even at PRE_ROUTING stage. Instead of checking hook just check if the skb already has a route attached to it. Fixes: f53b9b0bdc59 ("netfilter: introduce support for reject at prerouting stage") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250820123707.10671-1-fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 6 ++---- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c index 675b5bbed638..2d663fe50f87 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c @@ -247,8 +247,7 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb, if (!oth) return; - if ((hook == NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING || hook == NF_INET_INGRESS) && - nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(oldskb) < 0) + if (!skb_dst(oldskb) && nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(oldskb) < 0) return; if (skb_rtable(oldskb)->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST)) @@ -321,8 +320,7 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook) if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET)) return; - if ((hook == NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING || hook == NF_INET_INGRESS) && - nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) + if (!skb_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) return; if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) || diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c index e4776bd2ed89..f3579bccf0a5 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ void nf_send_reset6(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb, fl6.fl6_sport = otcph->dest; fl6.fl6_dport = otcph->source; - if (hook == NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING || hook == NF_INET_INGRESS) { + if (!skb_dst(oldskb)) { nf_ip6_route(net, &dst, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6), false); if (!dst) return; @@ -397,8 +397,7 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in, if (hooknum == NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev == NULL) skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev; - if ((hooknum == NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING || hooknum == NF_INET_INGRESS) && - nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) + if (!skb_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) return; icmpv6_send(skb_in, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0); -- 2.25.1