[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] CVEs
CVEs Michael Bommarito (1): RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing Shuvam Pandey (1): Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in SSP passkey handlers hkbinbin (1): RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 14 +++++++++++++- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1
From: Shuvam Pandey <shuvampandey1@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 85fa3512048793076eef658f66489112dcc91993 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15298 CVE: CVE-2026-46056 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... ----------------------------------------- hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in hci_user_passkey_notify_evt() and hci_keypress_notify_evt(), otherwise the connection can be freed concurrently. Extend the hci_dev_lock critical section to cover all conn usage in both handlers. Keep the existing keypress notification behavior unchanged by routing the early exits through a common unlock path. Fixes: 92a25256f142 ("Bluetooth: mgmt: Implement support for passkey notification") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shuvam Pandey <shuvampandey1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Conflicts: net/bluetooth/hci_event.c [cherry-pick applied cleanly without conflicts, but the patch context differs.] Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284@huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 8fe811cc6e17..863e2f5a6569 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4844,9 +4844,11 @@ static void hci_user_passkey_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, &ev->bdaddr); if (!conn) - return; + goto unlock; conn->passkey_notify = __le32_to_cpu(ev->passkey); conn->passkey_entered = 0; @@ -4855,6 +4857,9 @@ static void hci_user_passkey_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->type, conn->dst_type, conn->passkey_notify, conn->passkey_entered); + +unlock: + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); } static void hci_keypress_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -4864,14 +4869,16 @@ static void hci_keypress_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ACL_LINK, &ev->bdaddr); if (!conn) - return; + goto unlock; switch (ev->type) { case HCI_KEYPRESS_STARTED: conn->passkey_entered = 0; - return; + goto unlock; case HCI_KEYPRESS_ENTERED: conn->passkey_entered++; @@ -4886,13 +4893,16 @@ static void hci_keypress_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) break; case HCI_KEYPRESS_COMPLETED: - return; + goto unlock; } if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_MGMT)) mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->type, conn->dst_type, conn->passkey_notify, conn->passkey_entered); + +unlock: + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); } static void hci_simple_pair_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, -- 2.34.1
From: hkbinbin <hkbinbinbin@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15307 CVE: CVE-2026-46043 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260401121907.1468366-1-hkbinbinbin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: hkbinbin <hkbinbinbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284@huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c index cb69a125e280..71a56c4b721a 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c @@ -364,7 +364,8 @@ void rxe_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) pkt->qp = NULL; pkt->mask |= rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].mask; - if (unlikely(skb->len < header_size(pkt))) + if (unlikely(pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + + RXE_ICRC_SIZE)) goto drop; err = hdr_check(pkt); -- 2.34.1
From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc3 commit 4c6f86d85d03cdb33addce86aa69aa795ca6c47a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15307 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver. The check added there reads pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so length == 0 and the check degenerates to pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(), causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload. Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0 A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170 Read of size 1 at addr ... The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 704-byte region Call Trace: crc32_le+0x115/0x170 rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300 rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0 rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0 rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0 Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no QP, no connection, and no authentication. Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry, detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic runs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260414111555.3386793-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.... Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284@huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c index 71a56c4b721a..592e351ccec5 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c @@ -364,6 +364,17 @@ void rxe_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) pkt->qp = NULL; pkt->mask |= rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].mask; + /* + * Unknown opcodes have a zero-initialized rxe_opcode[] entry, so + * both mask and length are 0. Reject them before any length math: + * rxe_icrc_hdr() would otherwise compute length - RXE_BTH_BYTES + * and pass the underflowed value to rxe_crc32(), producing an + * out-of-bounds read. + */ + if (unlikely(!rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].mask || + !rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length)) + goto drop; + if (unlikely(pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE)) goto drop; -- 2.34.1
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