From: Diego Oliva <diego@bynar.io> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc3 commit 5be5bdda5863eacc964b609ba927764f253431b3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/20155 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- The SMB1 synchronous read helper CIFSSMBRead() validates the server's DataLength against CIFSMaxBufSize and the caller's count, but never validates DataOffset. The copy source is formed as &pSMBr->hdr.Protocol + le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset) and memcpy()'d for DataLength bytes with no check that the [DataOffset, DataOffset + DataLength) range lies within the response actually received from the server. A malicious or compromised SMB1 server can return a response carrying an in-range DataLength and a large DataOffset, driving the source pointer past the end of the response buffer. The memcpy() then copies adjacent kernel heap into the caller's read buffer (information disclosure), or reads unmapped memory and oopses (denial of service). SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount. Both DataOffset and the received response length recorded in rsp_iov.iov_len are relative to the start of the SMB header, so reject the response unless DataOffset + DataLength fits within that length, using overflow-safe arithmetic, before forming the source pointer. The response length has been validated by the previous patch, so the DataOffset and DataLength fields can be read safely here. While here, make data_length unsigned. It holds a length derived from unsigned on-the-wire fields and is only ever compared against unsigned quantities; print it with %u accordingly, and add __func__ to the cifs_dbg() calls in this function. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.19.x Assisted-by: Bynario AI Signed-off-by: Diego Oliva <diego@bynar.io> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org> Conflicts: fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c fs/smb/client/trace.h [Context differences.] Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4@huawei.com> --- fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c b/fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c index 60f333f6fa02..4c0a2d410f9a 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c @@ -1456,7 +1456,8 @@ CIFSSMBRead(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_io_parms *io_parms, rc = -EIO; *nbytes = 0; } else { - int data_length = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataLengthHigh); + unsigned int data_length = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataLengthHigh); + __u16 data_offset = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset); data_length = data_length << 16; data_length += le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataLength); *nbytes = data_length; @@ -1464,13 +1465,19 @@ CIFSSMBRead(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_io_parms *io_parms, /*check that DataLength would not go beyond end of SMB */ if ((data_length > CIFSMaxBufSize) || (data_length > count)) { - cifs_dbg(FYI, "bad length %d for count %d\n", - data_length, count); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: bad length %u for count %u\n", + __func__, data_length, count); + rc = -EIO; + *nbytes = 0; + } else if (4 + data_offset < sizeof(*pSMBr) || + 4 + (size_t)data_offset + data_length > rsp_iov.iov_len) { + /* check that the data lies within the received response */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: bad data offset %u length %u for response of %zu\n", + __func__, data_offset, data_length, rsp_iov.iov_len); rc = -EIO; *nbytes = 0; } else { - pReadData = (char *) (&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol) + - le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset); + pReadData = (char *) (&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol) + data_offset; /* if (rc = copy_to_user(buf, pReadData, data_length)) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "Faulting on read rc = %d\n",rc); rc = -EFAULT; -- 2.52.0