[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2023-52735
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Jakub Sitnicki (2): bpf, sockmap: Don't let sock_map_{close,destroy,unhash} call itself bpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener include/linux/util_macros.h | 12 ++++++++ net/core/sock_map.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 4 +-- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1
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From: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc7 commit 5b4a79ba65a1ab479903fff2e604865d229b70a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4KX CVE: CVE-2023-52735 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- sock_map proto callbacks should never call themselves by design. Protect against bugs like [1] and break out of the recursive loop to avoid a stack overflow in favor of a resource leak. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230113-sockmap-fix-v2-1-1e0ee7ac2f90@cloudflare.... Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Conflicts: net/core/sock_map.c Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com> --- net/core/sock_map.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 9cee55321ef2..83e3ef655684 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -1561,15 +1561,16 @@ void sock_map_unhash(struct sock *sk) psock = sk_psock(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) { rcu_read_unlock(); - if (sk->sk_prot->unhash) - sk->sk_prot->unhash(sk); - return; + saved_unhash = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->unhash; + } else { + saved_unhash = psock->saved_unhash; + sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); + rcu_read_unlock(); } - - saved_unhash = psock->saved_unhash; - sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - saved_unhash(sk); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_unhash == sock_map_unhash)) + return; + if (saved_unhash) + saved_unhash(sk); } void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk) @@ -1581,17 +1582,18 @@ void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk) psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) { rcu_read_unlock(); - if (sk->sk_prot->destroy) - sk->sk_prot->destroy(sk); - return; + saved_destroy = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->destroy; + } else { + saved_destroy = psock->saved_destroy; + sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + sk_psock_stop(psock, false); + sk_psock_put(sk, psock); } - - saved_destroy = psock->saved_destroy; - sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - sk_psock_stop(psock, false); - sk_psock_put(sk, psock); - saved_destroy(sk); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_destroy == sock_map_destroy)) + return; + if (saved_destroy) + saved_destroy(sk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_map_destroy); @@ -1606,15 +1608,20 @@ void sock_map_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) if (unlikely(!psock)) { rcu_read_unlock(); release_sock(sk); - return sk->sk_prot->close(sk, timeout); + saved_close = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->close; + } else { + saved_close = psock->saved_close; + sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + sk_psock_stop(psock, true); + sk_psock_put(sk, psock); + release_sock(sk); } - - saved_close = psock->saved_close; - sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - sk_psock_stop(psock, true); - sk_psock_put(sk, psock); - release_sock(sk); + /* Make sure we do not recurse. This is a bug. + * Leak the socket instead of crashing on a stack overflow. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_close == sock_map_close)) + return; saved_close(sk, timeout); } -- 2.34.1
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From: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.168 commit 9bd6074e1872d22190a8da30e796cbf937d334f0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4KX CVE: CVE-2023-52735 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ddce1e091757d0259107c6c0c7262df201de2b66 ] A listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It points to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant depends on the socket's family and which sockmap programs are attached. A child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot. But before cloning is finished, we restore the child's proto to the listener's original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in tcp_create_openreq_child -> tcp_bpf_clone. Today, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child's proto should be restored by checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not correct. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to to any variant in tcp_bpf_prots. If the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then the child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by tcp_bpf_clone. This leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the child state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations. Adjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants. Note that it wouldn't be sufficient to check the socket state when overriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the TCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage") it is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already linked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -> insert into map -> connect(AF_UNSPEC) -> listen(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/ Fixes: e80251555f0b ("tcp_bpf: Don't let child socket inherit parent protocol ops on copy") Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230113-sockmap-fix-v2-2-1e0ee7ac2f90@cloudflare.... Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com> --- include/linux/util_macros.h | 12 ++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/util_macros.h b/include/linux/util_macros.h index 72299f261b25..43db6e47503c 100644 --- a/include/linux/util_macros.h +++ b/include/linux/util_macros.h @@ -38,4 +38,16 @@ */ #define find_closest_descending(x, a, as) __find_closest(x, a, as, >=) +/** + * is_insidevar - check if the @ptr points inside the @var memory range. + * @ptr: the pointer to a memory address. + * @var: the variable which address and size identify the memory range. + * + * Evaluates to true if the address in @ptr lies within the memory + * range allocated to @var. + */ +#define is_insidevar(ptr, var) \ + ((uintptr_t)(ptr) >= (uintptr_t)(var) && \ + (uintptr_t)(ptr) < (uintptr_t)(var) + sizeof(var)) + #endif diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index 438992e28efe..cd214291290c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/bpf.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/wait.h> +#include <linux/util_macros.h> #include <net/inet_common.h> #include <net/tls.h> @@ -719,10 +720,9 @@ struct proto *tcp_bpf_get_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock) */ void tcp_bpf_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - int family = sk->sk_family == AF_INET6 ? TCP_BPF_IPV6 : TCP_BPF_IPV4; struct proto *prot = newsk->sk_prot; - if (prot == &tcp_bpf_prots[family][TCP_BPF_BASE]) + if (is_insidevar(prot, tcp_bpf_prots)) newsk->sk_prot = sk->sk_prot_creator; } #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_STREAM_PARSER */ -- 2.34.1
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