From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> mainline inclusion form mainline-v5.16-rc6 commit f08adf5add9a071160c68bb2a61d697f39ab0758 bugzilla: 185937 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-39685 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Szymon rightly pointed out that the previous check for the endpoint direction in bRequestType was not looking at only the bit involved, but rather the whole value. Normally this is ok, but for some request types, bits other than bit 8 could be set and the check for the endpoint length could not stall correctly. Fix that up by only checking the single bit. Fixes: 153a2d7e3350 ("USB: gadget: detect too-big endpoint 0 requests") Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Reported-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211214184621.385828-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c | 6 +++--- drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/dbgp.c | 6 +++--- drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c index 426132988512..8bec0cbf844e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c @@ -1649,14 +1649,14 @@ composite_setup(struct usb_gadget *gadget, const struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl) u8 endp; if (w_length > USB_COMP_EP0_BUFSIZ) { - if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_OUT) { - goto done; - } else { + if (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) { /* Cast away the const, we are going to overwrite on purpose. */ __le16 *temp = (__le16 *)&ctrl->wLength; *temp = cpu_to_le16(USB_COMP_EP0_BUFSIZ); w_length = USB_COMP_EP0_BUFSIZ; + } else { + goto done; } } diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/dbgp.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/dbgp.c index e567afcb2794..ffe58d44b2cb 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/dbgp.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/dbgp.c @@ -346,14 +346,14 @@ static int dbgp_setup(struct usb_gadget *gadget, u16 len = 0; if (length > DBGP_REQ_LEN) { - if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_OUT) { - return err; - } else { + if (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) { /* Cast away the const, we are going to overwrite on purpose. */ __le16 *temp = (__le16 *)&ctrl->wLength; *temp = cpu_to_le16(DBGP_REQ_LEN); length = DBGP_REQ_LEN; + } else { + return err; } } diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c index 04b9c4f5f129..217d2b66fa51 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c @@ -1336,14 +1336,14 @@ gadgetfs_setup (struct usb_gadget *gadget, const struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl) u16 w_length = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wLength); if (w_length > RBUF_SIZE) { - if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_OUT) { - return value; - } else { + if (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) { /* Cast away the const, we are going to overwrite on purpose. */ __le16 *temp = (__le16 *)&ctrl->wLength; *temp = cpu_to_le16(RBUF_SIZE); w_length = RBUF_SIZE; + } else { + return value; } } -- 2.20.1

From: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc6 commit bcd0f93353326954817a4f9fa55ec57fb38acbb0 category: bugfix bugzilla: 185940 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-45095 Reference: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20211209082839.33985-1-... ------------------------------------------------------------------- sock_hold(sk) is invoked in pep_sock_accept(), but __sock_put(sk) is not invoked in subsequent failure branches(pep_accept_conn() != 0). Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209082839.33985-1-hbh25y@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Huang Guobin <huangguobin4@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- net/phonet/pep.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/phonet/pep.c b/net/phonet/pep.c index a1525916885a..b4f90afb0638 100644 --- a/net/phonet/pep.c +++ b/net/phonet/pep.c @@ -868,6 +868,7 @@ static struct sock *pep_sock_accept(struct sock *sk, int flags, int *errp, err = pep_accept_conn(newsk, skb); if (err) { + __sock_put(sk); sock_put(newsk); newsk = NULL; goto drop; -- 2.20.1

From: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.14-rc1 commit 7118fc2906e2925d7edb5ed9c8a57f2a5f23b849 category: bugfix bugzilla:171843 ----------------------------------------------- In [1], Jann Horn points out a possible race between prep_compound_gigantic_page and __page_cache_add_speculative. The root cause of the possible race is prep_compound_gigantic_page uncondittionally setting the ref count of pages to zero. It does this because prep_compound_gigantic_page is handed a 'group' of pages from an allocator and needs to convert that group of pages to a compound page. The ref count of each page in this 'group' is one as set by the allocator. However, the ref count of compound page tail pages must be zero. The potential race comes about when ref counted pages are returned from the allocator. When this happens, other mm code could also take a reference on the page. __page_cache_add_speculative is one such example. Therefore, prep_compound_gigantic_page can not just set the ref count of pages to zero as it does today. Doing so would lose the reference taken by any other code. This would lead to BUGs in code checking ref counts and could possibly even lead to memory corruption. There are two possible ways to address this issue. 1) Make all allocators of gigantic groups of pages be able to return a properly constructed compound page. 2) Make prep_compound_gigantic_page be more careful when constructing a compound page. This patch takes approach 2. In prep_compound_gigantic_page, use cmpxchg to only set ref count to zero if it is one. If the cmpxchg fails, call synchronize_rcu() in the hope that the extra ref count will be driopped during a rcu grace period. This is not a performance critical code path and the wait should be accceptable. If the ref count is still inflated after the grace period, then undo any modifications made and return an error. Currently prep_compound_gigantic_page is type void and does not return errors. Modify the two callers to check for and handle error returns. On error, the caller must free the 'group' of pages as they can not be used to form a gigantic page. After freeing pages, the runtime caller (alloc_fresh_huge_page) will retry the allocation once. Boot time allocations can not be retried. The routine prep_compound_page also unconditionally sets the ref count of compound page tail pages to zero. However, in this case the buddy allocator is constructing a compound page from freshly allocated pages. The ref count on those freshly allocated pages is already zero, so the set_page_count(p, 0) is unnecessary and could lead to confusion. Just remove it. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAG48ez23q0Jy9cuVnwAe7t_fdhMk2S7N5Hdi-GLcCe... Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210622021423.154662-3-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Fixes: 58a84aa92723 ("thp: set compound tail page _count to zero") Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Huang <chenhuang5@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chen Wandun <chenwandun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- mm/hugetlb.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ mm/page_alloc.c | 1 - 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c index e553e959bda8..c9b6f063fde1 100644 --- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -1632,9 +1632,9 @@ static void prep_new_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page, int nid) spin_unlock_irq(&hugetlb_lock); } -static void prep_compound_gigantic_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order) +static bool prep_compound_gigantic_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order) { - int i; + int i, j; int nr_pages = 1 << order; struct page *p = page + 1; @@ -1656,11 +1656,48 @@ static void prep_compound_gigantic_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order) * after get_user_pages(). */ __ClearPageReserved(p); + /* + * Subtle and very unlikely + * + * Gigantic 'page allocators' such as memblock or cma will + * return a set of pages with each page ref counted. We need + * to turn this set of pages into a compound page with tail + * page ref counts set to zero. Code such as speculative page + * cache adding could take a ref on a 'to be' tail page. + * We need to respect any increased ref count, and only set + * the ref count to zero if count is currently 1. If count + * is not 1, we call synchronize_rcu in the hope that a rcu + * grace period will cause ref count to drop and then retry. + * If count is still inflated on retry we return an error and + * must discard the pages. + */ + if (!page_ref_freeze(p, 1)) { + pr_info("HugeTLB unexpected inflated ref count on freshly allocated page\n"); + synchronize_rcu(); + if (!page_ref_freeze(p, 1)) + goto out_error; + } set_page_count(p, 0); set_compound_head(p, page); } atomic_set(compound_mapcount_ptr(page), -1); atomic_set(compound_pincount_ptr(page), 0); + return true; + +out_error: + /* undo tail page modifications made above */ + p = page + 1; + for (j = 1; j < i; j++, p = mem_map_next(p, page, j)) { + clear_compound_head(p); + set_page_refcounted(p); + } + /* need to clear PG_reserved on remaining tail pages */ + for (; j < nr_pages; j++, p = mem_map_next(p, page, j)) + __ClearPageReserved(p); + set_compound_order(page, 0); + page[1].compound_nr = 0; + __ClearPageHead(page); + return false; } /* @@ -1780,7 +1817,9 @@ static struct page *alloc_fresh_huge_page(struct hstate *h, nodemask_t *node_alloc_noretry) { struct page *page; + bool retry = false; +retry: if (hstate_is_gigantic(h)) page = alloc_gigantic_page(h, gfp_mask, nid, nmask); else @@ -1789,8 +1828,21 @@ static struct page *alloc_fresh_huge_page(struct hstate *h, if (!page) return NULL; - if (hstate_is_gigantic(h)) - prep_compound_gigantic_page(page, huge_page_order(h)); + if (hstate_is_gigantic(h)) { + if (!prep_compound_gigantic_page(page, huge_page_order(h))) { + /* + * Rare failure to convert pages to compound page. + * Free pages and try again - ONCE! + */ + free_gigantic_page(page, huge_page_order(h)); + if (!retry) { + retry = true; + goto retry; + } + pr_warn("HugeTLB page can not be used due to unexpected inflated ref count\n"); + return NULL; + } + } prep_new_huge_page(h, page, page_to_nid(page)); return page; @@ -2586,10 +2638,14 @@ static void __init gather_bootmem_prealloc(void) VM_BUG_ON(!hstate_is_gigantic(h)); WARN_ON(page_count(page) != 1); - prep_compound_gigantic_page(page, huge_page_order(h)); - WARN_ON(PageReserved(page)); - prep_new_huge_page(h, page, page_to_nid(page)); - put_page(page); /* free it into the hugepage allocator */ + if (prep_compound_gigantic_page(page, huge_page_order(h))) { + WARN_ON(PageReserved(page)); + prep_new_huge_page(h, page, page_to_nid(page)); + put_page(page); /* add to the hugepage allocator */ + } else { + free_gigantic_page(page, huge_page_order(h)); + pr_warn("HugeTLB page can not be used due to unexpected inflated ref count\n"); + } /* * We need to restore the 'stolen' pages to totalram_pages diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 22f6824b1714..988051bf6795 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -703,7 +703,6 @@ void prep_compound_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order) __SetPageHead(page); for (i = 1; i < nr_pages; i++) { struct page *p = page + i; - set_page_count(p, 0); p->mapping = TAIL_MAPPING; set_compound_head(p, page); } -- 2.20.1

From: Haimin Zhang <tcs.kernel@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc6 commit 481221775d53d6215a6e5e9ce1cce6d2b4ab9a46 category: bugfix bugzilla: 185973 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-4135 Reference: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211215111530.72103-1-tcs.kernel@gmail.com/ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Zero-initialize memory for new map's value in function nsim_bpf_map_alloc since it may cause a potential kernel information leak issue, as follows: 1. nsim_bpf_map_alloc calls nsim_map_alloc_elem to allocate elements for a new map. 2. nsim_map_alloc_elem uses kmalloc to allocate map's value, but doesn't zero it. 3. A user application can use IOCTL BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM to get specific element's information in the map. 4. The kernel function map_lookup_elem will call bpf_map_copy_value to get the information allocated at step-2, then use copy_to_user to copy to the user buffer. This can only leak information for an array map. Fixes: 395cacb5f1a0 ("netdevsim: bpf: support fake map offload") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Haimin Zhang <tcs.kernel@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215111530.72103-1-tcs.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: He Fengqing <hefengqing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- drivers/net/netdevsim/bpf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/netdevsim/bpf.c b/drivers/net/netdevsim/bpf.c index 90aafb56f140..a43820212932 100644 --- a/drivers/net/netdevsim/bpf.c +++ b/drivers/net/netdevsim/bpf.c @@ -514,6 +514,7 @@ nsim_bpf_map_alloc(struct netdevsim *ns, struct bpf_offloaded_map *offmap) goto err_free; key = nmap->entry[i].key; *key = i; + memset(nmap->entry[i].value, 0, offmap->map.value_size); } } -- 2.20.1

From: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 185988 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL -------------------------------- When we mount a jffs2 image, assume that the first few blocks of the image are normal and contain at least one xattr-related inode, but the next block is abnormal. As a result, an error is returned in jffs2_scan_eraseblock(). jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() is then called in jffs2_build_filesystem() and then again in jffs2_do_fill_super(). Finally we can observe the following report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0x95/0x6ac Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881243384e0 by task mount/719 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x115/0x16b jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0x95/0x6ac jffs2_do_fill_super+0x84f/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 mtd_get_sb+0x254/0x400 mtd_get_sb_by_nr+0x4f/0xd0 get_tree_mtd+0x498/0x840 jffs2_get_tree+0x25/0x30 vfs_get_tree+0x8d/0x2e0 path_mount+0x50f/0x1e50 do_mount+0x107/0x130 __se_sys_mount+0x1c5/0x2f0 __x64_sys_mount+0xc7/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Allocated by task 719: kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x60 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x10b/0x120 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c0/0x870 jffs2_alloc_xattr_ref+0x2f/0xa0 jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x3713/0x4794 jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0xa7/0x2253 jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] Freed by task 719: kmem_cache_free+0xcc/0x7b0 jffs2_free_xattr_ref+0x78/0x98 jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0xa1/0x6ac jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0x5e6/0x2253 jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881243384b8 which belongs to the cache jffs2_xattr_ref of size 48 The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of 48-byte region [ffff8881243384b8, ffff8881243384e8) [...] ================================================================== The triggering of the BUG is shown in the following stack: ----------------------------------------------------------- jffs2_fill_super jffs2_do_fill_super jffs2_do_mount_fs jffs2_build_filesystem jffs2_scan_medium jffs2_scan_eraseblock <--- ERROR jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem <--- free jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem <--- free again ----------------------------------------------------------- An error is returned in jffs2_do_mount_fs(). If the error is returned by jffs2_sum_init(), the jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() does not need to be executed. If the error is returned by jffs2_build_filesystem(), the jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() also does not need to be executed again. So move jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() from 'out_inohash' to 'out_root' to fix this UAF problem. Fixes: aa98d7cf59b5 ("[JFFS2][XATTR] XATTR support on JFFS2 (version. 5)") Reported-by: Chengsong Ke <kechengsong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- fs/jffs2/fs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/fs.c b/fs/jffs2/fs.c index 29c9c3809fd1..6ac76ed9dbd4 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/fs.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/fs.c @@ -600,8 +600,8 @@ int jffs2_do_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) jffs2_free_ino_caches(c); jffs2_free_raw_node_refs(c); kvfree(c->blocks); - out_inohash: jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem(c); + out_inohash: kfree(c->inocache_list); out_wbuf: jffs2_flash_cleanup(c); -- 2.20.1

From: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 185988 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL -------------------------------- If an error is returned in jffs2_scan_eraseblock() and some memory has been added to the jffs2_summary *s, we can observe the following kmemleak report: -------------------------------------------- unreferenced object 0xffff88812b889c40 (size 64): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838325 (age 34.288s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 40 48 b5 14 81 88 ff ff 01 e0 31 00 00 00 50 00 @H........1...P. 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 09 08 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffffae93a3a3>] __kmalloc+0x613/0x910 [<ffffffffaf423b9c>] jffs2_sum_add_dirent_mem+0x5c/0xa0 [<ffffffffb0f3afa8>] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x36e5/0x4794 [<ffffffffb0f3dbe1>] jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0xa7/0x2267 [<ffffffffaf40acf3>] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 [<ffffffffaf40c00a>] jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [<ffffffffb0315d64>] mtd_get_sb+0x254/0x400 [<ffffffffb0315f5f>] mtd_get_sb_by_nr+0x4f/0xd0 [<ffffffffb0316478>] get_tree_mtd+0x498/0x840 [<ffffffffaf40bd15>] jffs2_get_tree+0x25/0x30 [<ffffffffae9f358d>] vfs_get_tree+0x8d/0x2e0 [<ffffffffaea7a98f>] path_mount+0x50f/0x1e50 [<ffffffffaea7c3d7>] do_mount+0x107/0x130 [<ffffffffaea7c5c5>] __se_sys_mount+0x1c5/0x2f0 [<ffffffffaea7c917>] __x64_sys_mount+0xc7/0x160 [<ffffffffb10142f5>] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70 unreferenced object 0xffff888114b54840 (size 32): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838325 (age 34.288s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): c0 75 b5 14 81 88 ff ff 02 e0 02 00 00 00 02 00 .u.............. 00 00 84 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 ......D...kkkkk. backtrace: [<ffffffffae93be24>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x584/0x880 [<ffffffffaf423b04>] jffs2_sum_add_inode_mem+0x54/0x90 [<ffffffffb0f3bd44>] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x4481/0x4794 [...] unreferenced object 0xffff888114b57280 (size 32): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838393 (age 34.357s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 10 d5 6c 11 81 88 ff ff 08 e0 05 00 00 00 01 00 ..l............. 00 00 38 02 00 00 28 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 ..8...(...kkkkk. backtrace: [<ffffffffae93be24>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x584/0x880 [<ffffffffaf423c34>] jffs2_sum_add_xattr_mem+0x54/0x90 [<ffffffffb0f3a24f>] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x298c/0x4794 [...] unreferenced object 0xffff8881116cd510 (size 16): comm "mount", pid 692, jiffies 4294838395 (age 34.355s) hex dump (first 16 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 e0 60 02 00 00 6b a5 ..........`...k. backtrace: [<ffffffffae93be24>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x584/0x880 [<ffffffffaf423cc4>] jffs2_sum_add_xref_mem+0x54/0x90 [<ffffffffb0f3b2e3>] jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x3a20/0x4794 [...] -------------------------------------------- Therefore, when processing errors, it is necessary to determine whether s->sum_list_head is NULL. If not, call jffs2_sum_reset_collected(s) to release the memory added in s. Fixes: e631ddba5887 ("[JFFS2] Add erase block summary support (mount time improvement)") Co-developed-with: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- fs/jffs2/scan.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/scan.c b/fs/jffs2/scan.c index b676056826be..49b0637fb36e 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/scan.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/scan.c @@ -281,6 +281,8 @@ int jffs2_scan_medium(struct jffs2_sb_info *c) else mtd_unpoint(c->mtd, 0, c->mtd->size); #endif + if (s->sum_list_head) + jffs2_sum_reset_collected(s); kfree(s); return ret; } -- 2.20.1

From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 186017 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL -------------------------------- virt_addr_valid() could be insufficient to validate the virt addr on some architecture, which could lead to potential BUG which has been found on arm64/powerpc64. Let's add WARN_ON to check if the virt addr is passed virt_addr_valid() but is a vmalloc/module address. Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yuanzheng Song <songyuanzheng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- mm/usercopy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c index b3de3c4eefba..ce83e0b137dd 100644 --- a/mm/usercopy.c +++ b/mm/usercopy.c @@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr)) return; + WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(ptr)); + /* * When CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y, kmap_to_page() will give either the * highmem page or fallback to virt_to_page(). The following -- 2.20.1

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 185909 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL -------------------------------- The unwind directives can't handle nested function entries, so only the outermost function __loop_udelay is annotated, and the inner nested entries share the same unwind info with __loop_udelay. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> --- arch/arm/lib/delay-loop.S | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/delay-loop.S b/arch/arm/lib/delay-loop.S index 3ccade0f8130..f0a076f9abc5 100644 --- a/arch/arm/lib/delay-loop.S +++ b/arch/arm/lib/delay-loop.S @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/delay.h> +#include <asm/unwind.h> .text @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ */ ENTRY(__loop_udelay) +UNWIND(.fnstart) ldr r2, .LC1 mul r0, r2, r0 @ r0 = delay_us * UDELAY_MULT ENTRY(__loop_const_udelay) @ 0 <= r0 <= 0xfffffaf0 @@ -54,6 +56,7 @@ ENTRY(__loop_delay) #endif bhi __loop_delay ret lr -ENDPROC(__loop_udelay) -ENDPROC(__loop_const_udelay) ENDPROC(__loop_delay) +ENDPROC(__loop_const_udelay) +UNWIND(.fnend) +ENDPROC(__loop_udelay) -- 2.20.1