[PATCH OLK-5.10] [Backport] ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()
From: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 1ef06004ed4bd6d3ed8c840d9d1a376b66d4935b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16110 CVE: CVE-2026-53390 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them. CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header, so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid() result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read. A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr() into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs. Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl(). Fixes: d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c index 692d063ef9be..bc54184e9216 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c @@ -1299,11 +1299,13 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct path *path, ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) break; aces_size -= ace_size; - if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) + if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES || + ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + + sizeof(__le32) * ace->sid.num_subauth) break; if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) || !compare_sids(&sid_unix_NFS_mode, &ace->sid)) { found = 1; -- 2.52.0
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16616 CVE: CVE-2026-64320 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains. Fixes: a07b4970f464 ("nvmet: add a generic NVMe target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c [drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c: Replaced NVME_STATUS_DNR with NVME_SC_DNR, which is the existing status flag in this tree; added copy_len declaration and the offset validation/copy-length capping logic.] Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c index 5b8ee824b100..4d7e62989488 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c @@ -163,10 +163,11 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page(struct nvmet_req *req) struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl; struct nvmf_disc_rsp_page_hdr *hdr; u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); size_t alloc_len; + size_t copy_len; struct nvmet_subsys_link *p; struct nvmet_port *r; u32 numrec = 0; u16 status = 0; void *buffer; @@ -231,11 +232,31 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page(struct nvmet_req *req) nvmet_clear_aen_bit(req, NVME_AEN_BIT_DISC_CHANGE); up_read(&nvmet_config_sem); - status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); + /* + * Validate the host-supplied log page offset before copying out. + * Without this check, the host controls a 64-bit byte offset into + * a small kzalloc'd buffer: a value past the log page lets the + * subsequent memcpy read adjacent kernel heap, and a value aimed + * at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel copy and crashes + * the target host. The Discovery controller is unauthenticated, + * so the bug is reachable from any reachable fabric peer. + */ + if (offset > alloc_len) { + req->error_loc = + offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lpo); + status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR; + goto out_free_buffer; + } + + copy_len = min_t(size_t, data_len, alloc_len - offset); + status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, copy_len); + if (!status && copy_len < data_len) + status = nvmet_zero_sgl(req, copy_len, data_len - copy_len); +out_free_buffer: kfree(buffer); out: nvmet_req_complete(req, status); } -- 2.52.0
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From: Shivam Kumar <kumar.shivam43666@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.261 commit 22ec7a9fe9153d2737ee9b2fa6d2e43a1491decf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16831 CVE: CVE-2026-64534 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 4606467a75cfc16721937272ed29462a750b60c8 upstream. In nvmet_tcp_try_recv_ddgst(), when a data digest mismatch is detected, nvmet_req_uninit() is called unconditionally. However, if the command arrived via the nvmet_tcp_handle_req_failure() path, nvmet_req_init() had returned false and percpu_ref_tryget_live() was never executed. The unconditional percpu_ref_put() inside nvmet_req_uninit() then causes a refcount underflow, leading to a WARNING in percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu, a use-after-free diagnostic, and eventually a permanent workqueue deadlock. Check cmd->flags & NVMET_TCP_F_INIT_FAILED before calling nvmet_req_uninit(), matching the existing pattern in nvmet_tcp_execute_request(). Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Shivam Kumar <kumar.shivam43666@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> [shivam: inlined nvmet_tcp_finish_cmd() at the fix site for 5.10.y] Signed-off-by: Shivam Kumar <kumar.shivam43666@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c index 1f048ad19f6a..a2f6e75fd1bf 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c @@ -1217,11 +1217,13 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_ddgst(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) if (queue->data_digest && cmd->exp_ddgst != cmd->recv_ddgst) { pr_err("queue %d: cmd %d pdu (%d) data digest error: recv %#x expected %#x\n", queue->idx, cmd->req.cmd->common.command_id, queue->pdu.cmd.hdr.type, le32_to_cpu(cmd->recv_ddgst), le32_to_cpu(cmd->exp_ddgst)); - nvmet_tcp_finish_cmd(cmd); + if (!(cmd->flags & NVMET_TCP_F_INIT_FAILED)) + nvmet_req_uninit(&cmd->req); + nvmet_tcp_free_cmd_buffers(cmd); nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(queue); ret = -EPROTO; goto out; } -- 2.52.0
From: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.260 commit 336340a0f8a141df8a4eb21a5a86f8ffb87769f6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16127 CVE: CVE-2026-63796 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 9bd541e09dffff27e5bec0f9f45b0228173a5375 upstream. ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run past bg_bitmap. Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor is used. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?) _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?) ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375) ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457) ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86) ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786) ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886) get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?) lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?) do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?) kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?) __bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?) get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?) ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96) sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?) check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?) __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497) check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?) rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?) check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?) ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?) ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?) ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043) ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?) ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) __mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?) inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?) balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?) generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?) mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?) file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?) ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?) ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?) apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?) read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?) lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260524111248.1429884-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c index 4f48003e4327..6f80784a7467 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c @@ -201,19 +201,41 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(struct super_block *sb, struct ocfs2_dinode *di, struct buffer_head *bh, int resize) { unsigned int max_bits; + unsigned int max_bitmap_bits; + unsigned int max_bitmap_size; + int suballocator; struct ocfs2_group_desc *gd = (struct ocfs2_group_desc *)bh->b_data; + suballocator = le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno) != OCFS2_SB(sb)->bitmap_blkno; + max_bitmap_size = ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(sb, suballocator, + OCFS2_SB(sb)->s_feature_incompat); + max_bitmap_bits = max_bitmap_size * 8; + if (di->i_blkno != gd->bg_parent_dinode) { do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bad parent pointer (%llu, expected %llu)\n", (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(gd->bg_parent_dinode), (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno)); } + if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size) > max_bitmap_size) { + do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bitmap size %u but physical max of %u\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size), + max_bitmap_size); + } + + if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bitmap_bits) { + do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count %u but physical max of %u\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits), + max_bitmap_bits); + } + max_bits = le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_cpg) * le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_bpc); if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bits) { do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count of %u\n", (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits)); -- 2.52.0
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From: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.261 commit 171605aed68380c2fa75dff9b3a1ed427c50065b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16675 CVE: CVE-2026-64380 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7ad2bcf2441430bb2e918fb3ef9a90d775a6e422 ] posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count, but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely. Fixes: 349e13ad30b4 ("cifs: add smb2 POSIX info level") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index ffc9ac29f40e..c20a6e7c8b5c 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -4545,11 +4545,11 @@ SMB2_write(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_io_parms *io_parms, int posix_info_sid_size(const void *beg, const void *end) { size_t subauth; int total; - if (beg + 1 > end) + if (beg + 2 > end) return -1; subauth = *(u8 *)(beg+1); if (subauth < 1 || subauth > 15) return -1; -- 2.52.0
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From: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.261 commit 5f6f2241034f189c69d4d0b5f8fe24a0c25b0c14 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16674 CVE: CVE-2026-64379 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e3d9c7160d483fc8f9e225aafad8ecbbc43f3151 ] When modefromsid is active, parse_dacl() applies the server-provided sub_auth[2] value from the NFS mode SID to cf_mode without masking to 07777. Apply the correct masking, same as in the read path. Fixes: e2f8fbfb8d09c ("cifs: get mode bits from special sid on stat") Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de> Assisted-by: Kiro:claude-opus-4.6 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c index 472a110158ec..c8a0a2edc650 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c @@ -765,11 +765,11 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, * 07777 = S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | * S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO */ fattr->cf_mode &= ~07777; fattr->cf_mode |= - le32_to_cpu(ppace[i]->sid.sub_auth[2]); + le32_to_cpu(ppace[i]->sid.sub_auth[2]) & 07777; break; } else if (compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid), pownersid) == 0) access_flags_to_mode(ppace[i]->access_req, ppace[i]->type, &fattr->cf_mode, -- 2.52.0
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From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.258 commit 832ab4a882dc9b3c0155490d9993642ef545fd22 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16090 CVE: CVE-2026-53369 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 55d41b0a20128e86b9e960dd2e3f0a2d69a18df7 upstream. udf_read_tagged() skips CRC verification when descCRCLength + sizeof(struct tag) exceeds the block size. A crafted UDF image can set descCRCLength to an oversized value to bypass CRC validation entirely; the descriptor is then accepted based solely on the 8-bit tag checksum, which is trivially recomputable. Reject such descriptors instead of silently accepting them. A legitimate single-block descriptor should never have a CRC length that exceeds the block. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413211240.853662-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- fs/udf/misc.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/udf/misc.c b/fs/udf/misc.c index 1614d308d0f0..dee9a1f3cb3f 100644 --- a/fs/udf/misc.c +++ b/fs/udf/misc.c @@ -248,12 +248,16 @@ struct buffer_head *udf_read_tagged(struct super_block *sb, uint32_t block, le16_to_cpu(tag_p->descVersion), block); goto error_out; } /* Verify the descriptor CRC */ - if (le16_to_cpu(tag_p->descCRCLength) + sizeof(struct tag) > sb->s_blocksize || - le16_to_cpu(tag_p->descCRC) == crc_itu_t(0, + if (le16_to_cpu(tag_p->descCRCLength) + sizeof(struct tag) > sb->s_blocksize) { + udf_err(sb, "block %u: CRC length %u exceeds block size\n", + block, le16_to_cpu(tag_p->descCRCLength)); + goto error_out; + } + if (le16_to_cpu(tag_p->descCRC) == crc_itu_t(0, bh->b_data + sizeof(struct tag), le16_to_cpu(tag_p->descCRCLength))) return bh; udf_debug("Crc failure block %u: crc = %u, crclen = %u\n", block, -- 2.52.0
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From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.261 commit eeb0f3e193f8e523d03e4c9e084f6b4875f50e8e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16618 CVE: CVE-2026-64322 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 3ec997bd5508e9b25210b5bbec89031629cdb093 upstream. udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte sparingEntry elements: for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) { struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i]; ... entry->origLocation ... } in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds write. Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with struct_size(). Fixes: 1df2ae31c724 ("udf: Fortify loading of sparing table") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-91780c4e-v1-1-f15112ff6882@proton.... Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Chentao <luchentao1@huawei.com> --- fs/udf/super.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c index aa50c6d0e1df..f14fe6cac643 100644 --- a/fs/udf/super.c +++ b/fs/udf/super.c @@ -1387,11 +1387,12 @@ static int udf_load_sparable_map(struct super_block *sb, st = (struct sparingTable *)bh->b_data; if (ident != 0 || strncmp(st->sparingIdent.ident, UDF_ID_SPARING, strlen(UDF_ID_SPARING)) || - sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > + struct_size(st, mapEntry, + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen)) > sb->s_blocksize) { brelse(bh); continue; } -- 2.52.0
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