From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-26 commit 13e91fd076306f5d0cdfa14f53d69e37274723c4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15871 CVE: CVE-2026-53186 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commi... -------------------------------- srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len, where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received (wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded. A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults. Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them. Fixes: aef9ec39c47f ("IB: Add SCSI RDMA Protocol (SRP) initiator") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260602220457.2542840-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2@huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c index ec54cd687ef1..3b427008ce7e 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c @@ -2052,7 +2052,8 @@ static int srp_post_recv(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_iu *iu) return ib_post_recv(ch->qp, &wr, NULL); } -static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp) +static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp, + u32 byte_len) { struct srp_target_port *target = ch->target; struct srp_request *req; @@ -2095,10 +2096,27 @@ static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp) scmnd->result = rsp->status; if (rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID) { - memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer, rsp->data + - be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len), - min_t(int, be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len), - SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE)); + u32 resp_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len); + u32 sense_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len); + + /* + * The sense data starts resp_data_len bytes past the + * response data area; both lengths come from the + * target-controlled response. Copy the sense data + * only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if + * the full sense region fits within the bytes actually + * received. Otherwise the copy source would run past + * the receive buffer (sized to the target-chosen + * max_ti_iu_len), reading out of bounds. + */ + if (sizeof(*rsp) + (u64)resp_len + sense_len <= byte_len) + memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer, + rsp->data + resp_len, + min(sense_len, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE)); + else + shost_printk(KERN_ERR, target->scsi_host, + "dropping truncated sense data (resp_data_len %u sense_data_len %u, %u bytes received)\n", + resp_len, sense_len, byte_len); } if (unlikely(rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_DIUNDER)) @@ -2212,7 +2230,7 @@ static void srp_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) switch (opcode) { case SRP_RSP: - srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf); + srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf, wc->byte_len); break; case SRP_CRED_REQ: -- 2.34.1