[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - the aead algorithm of sec2 is fixed.
From: JiangShui Yang <yangjiangshui@h-partners.com> Weili Qian (2): crypto: hisilicon/qm - disable error report before flr crypto: hisilicon/trng - support to obtain random numbers from soft algorithm Wenkai Lin (2): crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - fix for aead icv error crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - fix for aead invalid authsize drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c | 49 ++++--- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h | 3 +- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c | 161 ++++++++++----------- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.h | 11 -- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c | 52 ++++++- 6 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0
driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBATCK CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Before function level reset, driver first disable device error report and then waits for the device reset to complete. However, when the error is recovered, the error bits will be enabled again, resulting in invalid disable. It is modified to detect that there is no error before disable error report, and then do FLR. In addition, the device cache is triggered to write back to memory to prevent residual data in the device. Fixes: 7ce396fa12a9 ("crypto: hisilicon - add FLR support") Signed-off-by: Weili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: JiangShui Yang <yangjiangshui@h-partners.com> --- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c index b3bd4aece611..ed5a99d94936 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/qm.c @@ -4670,22 +4670,30 @@ void hisi_qm_reset_prepare(struct pci_dev *pdev) u32 delay = 0; int ret; - hisi_qm_dev_err_uninit(pf_qm); - - /* - * Check whether there is an ECC mbit error, If it occurs, need to - * wait for soft reset to fix it. - */ - while (qm_check_dev_error(pf_qm)) { - msleep(++delay); - if (delay > QM_RESET_WAIT_TIMEOUT) + while (true) { + ret = qm_reset_prepare_ready(qm); + if (ret) { + pci_err(pdev, "FLR not ready!\n"); return; - } + } - ret = qm_reset_prepare_ready(qm); - if (ret) { - pci_err(pdev, "FLR not ready!\n"); - return; + hisi_qm_dev_err_uninit(pf_qm); + /* + * Check whether there is an ECC mbit error, + * If it occurs, need to wait for soft reset + * to fix it. + */ + if (qm_check_dev_error(qm)) { + qm_reset_bit_clear(qm); + if (delay > QM_RESET_WAIT_TIMEOUT) { + pci_err(pdev, "the hardware error was not recovered!\n"); + return; + } + + msleep(++delay); + } else { + break; + } } /* PF obtains the information of VF by querying the register. */ @@ -4699,16 +4707,23 @@ void hisi_qm_reset_prepare(struct pci_dev *pdev) ret = hisi_qm_stop(qm, QM_DOWN); if (ret) { pci_err(pdev, "Failed to stop QM, ret = %d.\n", ret); - hisi_qm_set_hw_reset(qm, QM_RESET_STOP_TX_OFFSET); - hisi_qm_set_hw_reset(qm, QM_RESET_STOP_RX_OFFSET); - return; + goto err_prepare; } ret = qm_wait_vf_prepare_finish(qm); if (ret) pci_err(pdev, "failed to stop by vfs in FLR!\n"); + hisi_qm_cache_wb(qm); pci_info(pdev, "FLR resetting...\n"); + return; + +err_prepare: + pci_info(pdev, "FLR resetting prepare failed!\n"); + hisi_qm_set_hw_reset(qm, QM_RESET_STOP_TX_OFFSET); + hisi_qm_set_hw_reset(qm, QM_RESET_STOP_RX_OFFSET); + atomic_set(&qm->status.flags, QM_STOP); + hisi_qm_cache_wb(qm); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hisi_qm_reset_prepare); -- 2.43.0
From: Wenkai Lin <linwenkai6@hisilicon.com> driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBATCK CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- When the AEAD algorithm is used for encryption or decryption, the input authentication length varies, the hardware needs to obtain the input length to pass the integrity check verification. Currently, the driver uses a fixed authentication length,which causes decryption failure, so the length configuration is modified. In addition, the step of setting the auth length is unnecessary, so it was deleted from the setkey function. Fixes: 2f072d75d1ab ("crypto: hisilicon - Add aead support on SEC2") Signed-off-by: Wenkai Lin <linwenkai6@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: JiangShui Yang <yangjiangshui@h-partners.com> --- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h | 1 - drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c | 101 +++++++++------------ drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.h | 11 --- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h index 02a377f55291..3ad4399e6b65 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h @@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ struct sec_auth_ctx { dma_addr_t a_key_dma; u8 *a_key; u8 a_key_len; - u8 mac_len; u8 a_alg; bool fallback; struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c index faeb63b4c0cc..eedbfd16260c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c @@ -947,15 +947,14 @@ static int sec_aead_mac_init(struct sec_aead_req *req) struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req; struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req); size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); - u8 *mac_out = req->out_mac; struct scatterlist *sgl = aead_req->src; + u8 *mac_out = req->out_mac; size_t copy_size; off_t skip_size; /* Copy input mac */ skip_size = aead_req->assoclen + aead_req->cryptlen - authsize; - copy_size = sg_pcopy_to_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), mac_out, - authsize, skip_size); + copy_size = sg_pcopy_to_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), mac_out, authsize, skip_size); if (unlikely(copy_size != authsize)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1138,7 +1137,6 @@ static int sec_aead_fallback_setkey(struct sec_auth_ctx *a_ctx, static int sec_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, const u32 keylen, const enum sec_hash_alg a_alg, const enum sec_calg c_alg, - const enum sec_mac_len mac_len, const enum sec_cmode c_mode) { struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); @@ -1150,7 +1148,6 @@ static int sec_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, ctx->a_ctx.a_alg = a_alg; ctx->c_ctx.c_alg = c_alg; - ctx->a_ctx.mac_len = mac_len; c_ctx->c_mode = c_mode; if (c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CCM || c_mode == SEC_CMODE_GCM) { @@ -1186,10 +1183,9 @@ static int sec_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, goto bad_key; } - if ((ctx->a_ctx.mac_len & SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE_MASK) || - (ctx->a_ctx.a_key_len & SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE_MASK)) { + if (ctx->a_ctx.a_key_len & SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE_MASK) { ret = -EINVAL; - dev_err(dev, "MAC or AUTH key length error!\n"); + dev_err(dev, "AUTH key length error!\n"); goto bad_key; } @@ -1201,27 +1197,19 @@ static int sec_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, } -#define GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(name, aalg, calg, maclen, cmode) \ -static int sec_setkey_##name(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, \ - u32 keylen) \ -{ \ - return sec_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, aalg, calg, maclen, cmode);\ -} - -GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha1, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA1, - SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_HMAC_SHA1_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CBC) -GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha256, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA256, - SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_HMAC_SHA256_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CBC) -GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha512, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA512, - SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_HMAC_SHA512_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CBC) -GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_ccm, 0, SEC_CALG_AES, - SEC_HMAC_CCM_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CCM) -GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_gcm, 0, SEC_CALG_AES, - SEC_HMAC_GCM_MAC, SEC_CMODE_GCM) -GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_ccm, 0, SEC_CALG_SM4, - SEC_HMAC_CCM_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CCM) -GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_gcm, 0, SEC_CALG_SM4, - SEC_HMAC_GCM_MAC, SEC_CMODE_GCM) +#define GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(name, aalg, calg, cmode) \ +static int sec_setkey_##name(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, u32 keylen) \ +{ \ + return sec_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, aalg, calg, cmode); \ +} + +GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha1, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA1, SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_CMODE_CBC) +GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha256, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA256, SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_CMODE_CBC) +GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha512, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA512, SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_CMODE_CBC) +GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_ccm, 0, SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_CMODE_CCM) +GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_gcm, 0, SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_CMODE_GCM) +GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_ccm, 0, SEC_CALG_SM4, SEC_CMODE_CCM) +GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_gcm, 0, SEC_CALG_SM4, SEC_CMODE_GCM) static int sec_aead_sgl_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) { @@ -1443,9 +1431,10 @@ static void sec_skcipher_callback(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req, static void set_aead_auth_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) { struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; - struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req); + size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req; - size_t authsize = ctx->a_ctx.mac_len; + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; u32 data_size = aead_req->cryptlen; u8 flage = 0; u8 cm, cl; @@ -1486,10 +1475,8 @@ static void set_aead_auth_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) static void sec_aead_set_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) { struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; - struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req); - size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); - struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req; + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; memcpy(c_req->c_ivin, aead_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize); @@ -1497,15 +1484,11 @@ static void sec_aead_set_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) /* * CCM 16Byte Cipher_IV: {1B_Flage,13B_IV,2B_counter}, * the counter must set to 0x01 + * CCM 16Byte Auth_IV: {1B_AFlage,13B_IV,2B_Ptext_length} */ - ctx->a_ctx.mac_len = authsize; - /* CCM 16Byte Auth_IV: {1B_AFlage,13B_IV,2B_Ptext_length} */ set_aead_auth_iv(ctx, req); - } - - /* GCM 12Byte Cipher_IV == Auth_IV */ - if (ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_GCM) { - ctx->a_ctx.mac_len = authsize; + } else if (ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_GCM) { + /* GCM 12Byte Cipher_IV == Auth_IV */ memcpy(a_req->a_ivin, c_req->c_ivin, SEC_AIV_SIZE); } } @@ -1515,9 +1498,11 @@ static void sec_auth_bd_fill_xcm(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir, { struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req; struct aead_request *aq = a_req->aead_req; + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aq); + size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); /* C_ICV_Len is MAC size, 0x4 ~ 0x10 */ - sec_sqe->type2.icvw_kmode |= cpu_to_le16((u16)ctx->mac_len); + sec_sqe->type2.icvw_kmode |= cpu_to_le16((u16)authsize); /* mode set to CCM/GCM, don't set {A_Alg, AKey_Len, MAC_Len} */ sec_sqe->type2.a_key_addr = sec_sqe->type2.c_key_addr; @@ -1541,9 +1526,11 @@ static void sec_auth_bd_fill_xcm_v3(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir, { struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req; struct aead_request *aq = a_req->aead_req; + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aq); + size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); /* C_ICV_Len is MAC size, 0x4 ~ 0x10 */ - sqe3->c_icv_key |= cpu_to_le16((u16)ctx->mac_len << SEC_MAC_OFFSET_V3); + sqe3->c_icv_key |= cpu_to_le16((u16)authsize << SEC_MAC_OFFSET_V3); /* mode set to CCM/GCM, don't set {A_Alg, AKey_Len, MAC_Len} */ sqe3->a_key_addr = sqe3->c_key_addr; @@ -1567,11 +1554,12 @@ static void sec_auth_bd_fill_ex(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir, struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req; struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; struct aead_request *aq = a_req->aead_req; + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aq); + size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); sec_sqe->type2.a_key_addr = cpu_to_le64(ctx->a_key_dma); - sec_sqe->type2.mac_key_alg = - cpu_to_le32(ctx->mac_len / SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE); + sec_sqe->type2.mac_key_alg = cpu_to_le32(authsize / SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE); sec_sqe->type2.mac_key_alg |= cpu_to_le32((u32)((ctx->a_key_len) / @@ -1621,11 +1609,13 @@ static void sec_auth_bd_fill_ex_v3(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir, struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req; struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; struct aead_request *aq = a_req->aead_req; + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aq); + size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); sqe3->a_key_addr = cpu_to_le64(ctx->a_key_dma); sqe3->auth_mac_key |= - cpu_to_le32((u32)(ctx->mac_len / + cpu_to_le32((u32)(authsize / SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE) << SEC_MAC_OFFSET_V3); sqe3->auth_mac_key |= @@ -1676,9 +1666,9 @@ static void sec_aead_callback(struct sec_ctx *c, struct sec_req *req, int err) { struct aead_request *a_req = req->aead_req.aead_req; struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(a_req); + size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); struct sec_aead_req *aead_req = &req->aead_req; struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; - size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); size_t sz; if (!err && c->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && c_req->encrypt) @@ -1688,10 +1678,8 @@ static void sec_aead_callback(struct sec_ctx *c, struct sec_req *req, int err) if (!err && c_req->encrypt) { struct scatterlist *sgl = a_req->dst; - sz = sg_pcopy_from_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), - aead_req->out_mac, - authsize, a_req->cryptlen + - a_req->assoclen); + sz = sg_pcopy_from_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), aead_req->out_mac, + authsize, a_req->cryptlen + a_req->assoclen); if (unlikely(sz != authsize)) { dev_err(c->dev, "copy out mac err!\n"); err = -EINVAL; @@ -2199,7 +2187,7 @@ static int sec_aead_spec_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) { struct aead_request *req = sreq->aead_req.aead_req; struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); - size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + size_t sz = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); u8 c_mode = ctx->c_ctx.c_mode; struct device *dev = ctx->dev; int ret; @@ -2210,9 +2198,8 @@ static int sec_aead_spec_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) return -EINVAL; } - if (unlikely((c_mode == SEC_CMODE_GCM && authsize < DES_BLOCK_SIZE) || - (c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CCM && (authsize < MIN_MAC_LEN || - authsize & MAC_LEN_MASK)))) { + if (unlikely((c_mode == SEC_CMODE_GCM && sz < DES_BLOCK_SIZE) || + (c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CCM && (sz < MIN_MAC_LEN || sz & MAC_LEN_MASK)))) { dev_err(dev, "aead input mac length error!\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -2232,7 +2219,7 @@ static int sec_aead_spec_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) if (sreq->c_req.encrypt) sreq->c_req.c_len = req->cryptlen; else - sreq->c_req.c_len = req->cryptlen - authsize; + sreq->c_req.c_len = req->cryptlen - sz; if (c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC) { if (unlikely(sreq->c_req.c_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))) { dev_err(dev, "aead crypto length error!\n"); @@ -2258,7 +2245,7 @@ static int sec_aead_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) if (ctx->sec->qm.ver == QM_HW_V2) { if (unlikely(!req->cryptlen || (!sreq->c_req.encrypt && - req->cryptlen <= authsize))) { + req->cryptlen <= authsize))) { ctx->a_ctx.fallback = true; return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.h b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.h index 27a0ee5ad913..04725b514382 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.h @@ -23,17 +23,6 @@ enum sec_hash_alg { SEC_A_HMAC_SHA512 = 0x15, }; -enum sec_mac_len { - SEC_HMAC_CCM_MAC = 16, - SEC_HMAC_GCM_MAC = 16, - SEC_SM3_MAC = 32, - SEC_HMAC_SM3_MAC = 32, - SEC_HMAC_MD5_MAC = 16, - SEC_HMAC_SHA1_MAC = 20, - SEC_HMAC_SHA256_MAC = 32, - SEC_HMAC_SHA512_MAC = 64, -}; - enum sec_cmode { SEC_CMODE_ECB = 0x0, SEC_CMODE_CBC = 0x1, -- 2.43.0
From: Wenkai Lin <linwenkai6@hisilicon.com> driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBATCK CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- When the digest alg is HMAC-SHAx or another, the authsize may be less than 4 bytes and mac_len of the BD is set to zero, the hardware considers it a BD configuration error and reports a ras error, so the sec driver needs to switch to software calculation in this case, this patch add a check for it and remove unnecessary check that has been done by crypto. Fixes: 2f072d75d1ab ("crypto: hisilicon - Add aead support on SEC2") Signed-off-by: Wenkai Lin <linwenkai6@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: JiangShui Yang <yangjiangshui@h-partners.com> --- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h | 2 +- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c | 64 +++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h index 3ad4399e6b65..ef6d1e011403 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct sec_aead_req { u8 *a_ivin; dma_addr_t a_ivin_dma; struct aead_request *aead_req; + bool fallback; }; /* SEC request of Crypto */ @@ -90,7 +91,6 @@ struct sec_auth_ctx { u8 *a_key; u8 a_key_len; u8 a_alg; - bool fallback; struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; struct crypto_aead *fallback_aead_tfm; }; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c index eedbfd16260c..3e96bcff05dd 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c @@ -1118,10 +1118,7 @@ static int sec_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *aead, unsigned int authsize) struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct sec_auth_ctx *a_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx; - if (unlikely(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm)) - return crypto_aead_setauthsize(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm, authsize); - - return 0; + return crypto_aead_setauthsize(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm, authsize); } static int sec_aead_fallback_setkey(struct sec_auth_ctx *a_ctx, @@ -1158,13 +1155,7 @@ static int sec_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, } memcpy(c_ctx->c_key, key, keylen); - if (unlikely(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm)) { - ret = sec_aead_fallback_setkey(a_ctx, tfm, key, keylen); - if (ret) - return ret; - } - - return 0; + return sec_aead_fallback_setkey(a_ctx, tfm, key, keylen); } ret = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen); @@ -1189,6 +1180,12 @@ static int sec_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, goto bad_key; } + ret = sec_aead_fallback_setkey(a_ctx, tfm, key, keylen); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "set sec fallback key err!\n"); + goto bad_key; + } + return 0; bad_key: @@ -1882,8 +1879,10 @@ static void sec_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm) static int sec_aead_ctx_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const char *hash_name) { + struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(tfm); struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); - struct sec_auth_ctx *auth_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx; + struct sec_auth_ctx *a_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx; + const char *aead_name = alg->base.cra_name; int ret; ret = sec_aead_init(tfm); @@ -1892,11 +1891,20 @@ static int sec_aead_ctx_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const char *hash_name) return ret; } - auth_ctx->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(auth_ctx->hash_tfm)) { + a_ctx->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(a_ctx->hash_tfm)) { dev_err(ctx->dev, "aead alloc shash error!\n"); sec_aead_exit(tfm); - return PTR_ERR(auth_ctx->hash_tfm); + return PTR_ERR(a_ctx->hash_tfm); + } + + a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(aead_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm)) { + dev_err(ctx->dev, "aead driver alloc fallback tfm error!\n"); + crypto_free_shash(ctx->a_ctx.hash_tfm); + sec_aead_exit(tfm); + return PTR_ERR(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm); } return 0; @@ -1906,6 +1914,7 @@ static void sec_aead_ctx_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm) { struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); + crypto_free_aead(ctx->a_ctx.fallback_aead_tfm); crypto_free_shash(ctx->a_ctx.hash_tfm); sec_aead_exit(tfm); } @@ -1932,7 +1941,6 @@ static int sec_aead_xcm_ctx_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm) sec_aead_exit(tfm); return PTR_ERR(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm); } - a_ctx->fallback = false; return 0; } @@ -2192,15 +2200,15 @@ static int sec_aead_spec_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) struct device *dev = ctx->dev; int ret; - if (unlikely(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen > MAX_INPUT_DATA_LEN || - req->assoclen > SEC_MAX_AAD_LEN)) { - dev_err(dev, "aead input spec error!\n"); + /* Hardware does not handle cases where authsize is less than 4 bytes */ + if (unlikely(sz < MIN_MAC_LEN)) { + sreq->aead_req.fallback = true; return -EINVAL; } - if (unlikely((c_mode == SEC_CMODE_GCM && sz < DES_BLOCK_SIZE) || - (c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CCM && (sz < MIN_MAC_LEN || sz & MAC_LEN_MASK)))) { - dev_err(dev, "aead input mac length error!\n"); + if (unlikely(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen > MAX_INPUT_DATA_LEN || + req->assoclen > SEC_MAX_AAD_LEN)) { + dev_err(dev, "aead input spec error!\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -2246,7 +2254,7 @@ static int sec_aead_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq) if (ctx->sec->qm.ver == QM_HW_V2) { if (unlikely(!req->cryptlen || (!sreq->c_req.encrypt && req->cryptlen <= authsize))) { - ctx->a_ctx.fallback = true; + sreq->aead_req.fallback = true; return -EINVAL; } } @@ -2274,16 +2282,9 @@ static int sec_aead_soft_crypto(struct sec_ctx *ctx, bool encrypt) { struct sec_auth_ctx *a_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx; - struct device *dev = ctx->dev; struct aead_request *subreq; int ret; - /* Kunpeng920 aead mode not support input 0 size */ - if (!a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm) { - dev_err(dev, "aead fallback tfm is NULL!\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - subreq = aead_request_alloc(a_ctx->fallback_aead_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); if (!subreq) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2310,6 +2311,7 @@ static int sec_aead_crypto(struct aead_request *a_req, bool encrypt) struct sec_req *req = aead_request_ctx(a_req); struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); int ret; + req->aead_req.fallback = false; req->flag = a_req->base.flags; req->aead_req.aead_req = a_req; @@ -2319,7 +2321,7 @@ static int sec_aead_crypto(struct aead_request *a_req, bool encrypt) ret = sec_aead_param_check(ctx, req); if (unlikely(ret)) { - if (ctx->a_ctx.fallback) + if (req->aead_req.fallback) return sec_aead_soft_crypto(ctx, a_req, encrypt); return -EINVAL; } -- 2.43.0
driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBATCK CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- When trng device is busy and fails to apply for tfm, the driver applies for software computed tfm to prevent task failures. Signed-off-by: Weili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: JiangShui Yang <yangjiangshui@h-partners.com> --- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig index 4137a8bf131f..257c64809b48 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig @@ -80,5 +80,6 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_HISI_TRNG depends on ARM64 && ACPI select HW_RANDOM select CRYPTO_RNG + select CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR help Support for HiSilicon TRNG Driver. diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c index a1eaac5f3311..8f1743a053df 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #define SEED_SHIFT_24 24 #define SEED_SHIFT_16 16 #define SEED_SHIFT_8 8 +#define WAIT_PERIOD 20 struct hisi_trng_list { struct mutex lock; @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ struct hisi_trng { struct hisi_trng_list *trng_list; struct list_head list; struct hwrng rng; + u32 ctx_num; u32 ver; bool is_used; struct mutex mutex; @@ -60,6 +62,7 @@ struct hisi_trng { struct hisi_trng_ctx { struct hisi_trng *trng; + struct crypto_rng *drbg; }; static atomic_t trng_active_devs; @@ -85,6 +88,7 @@ static int hisi_trng_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen) { struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + struct crypto_rng *drbg = ctx->drbg; struct hisi_trng *trng = ctx->trng; u32 val = 0; int ret = 0; @@ -95,6 +99,12 @@ static int hisi_trng_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, return -EINVAL; } + /* when the device is busy, use soft tfm instead */ + if (drbg) { + crypto_rng_set_entropy(drbg, seed, slen); + return crypto_rng_reset(drbg, NULL, 0); + } + writel(0x0, trng->base + SW_DRBG_BLOCKS); hisi_trng_set_seed(trng, seed); @@ -114,6 +124,7 @@ static int hisi_trng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, u8 *dstn, unsigned int dlen) { struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + struct crypto_rng *drbg = ctx->drbg; struct hisi_trng *trng = ctx->trng; u32 data[SW_DRBG_DATA_NUM]; u32 currsize = 0; @@ -127,6 +138,9 @@ static int hisi_trng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, return -EINVAL; } + if (drbg) + return crypto_rng_generate(drbg, src, slen, dstn, dlen); + do { ret = readl_relaxed_poll_timeout(trng->base + SW_DRBG_STATUS, val, val & BIT(1), SLEEP_US, TIMEOUT_US); @@ -156,19 +170,41 @@ static int hisi_trng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) { struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct hisi_trng *trng; - int ret = -EBUSY; + int ret = 0; mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); list_for_each_entry(trng, &trng_devices.list, list) { if (!trng->is_used) { trng->is_used = true; + trng->ctx_num++; ctx->trng = trng; - ret = 0; break; } } mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); + if (!ctx->trng) { + ctx->drbg = crypto_alloc_rng("drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->drbg)) { + pr_err("Can not alloc rng!\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(ctx->drbg); + return ret; + } + + mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); + if (list_empty(&trng_devices.list)) { + mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); + crypto_free_rng(ctx->drbg); + return -ENODEV; + } + + trng = list_first_entry(&trng_devices.list, + struct hisi_trng, list); + trng->ctx_num++; + ctx->trng = trng; + mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); + } + return ret; } @@ -177,7 +213,12 @@ static void hisi_trng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); - ctx->trng->is_used = false; + if (!ctx->drbg) + ctx->trng->is_used = false; + else + crypto_free_rng(ctx->drbg); + + ctx->trng->ctx_num--; mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); } @@ -239,7 +280,7 @@ static int hisi_trng_del_from_list(struct hisi_trng *trng) int ret = -EBUSY; mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); - if (!trng->is_used) { + if (!trng->ctx_num) { list_del(&trng->list); ret = 0; } @@ -264,6 +305,7 @@ static int hisi_trng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return PTR_ERR(trng->base); trng->is_used = false; + trng->ctx_num = 0; trng->ver = readl(trng->base + HISI_TRNG_VERSION); if (!trng_devices.is_init) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&trng_devices.list); @@ -310,7 +352,7 @@ static void hisi_trng_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) /* Wait until the task is finished */ while (hisi_trng_del_from_list(trng)) - ; + msleep(WAIT_PERIOD); if (trng->ver != HISI_TRNG_VER_V1 && atomic_dec_return(&trng_active_devs) == 0) -- 2.43.0
反馈： 您发送到kernel@openeuler.org的补丁/补丁集，已成功转换为PR！ PR链接地址： https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14152 邮件列表地址：https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/M... FeedBack: The patch(es) which you have sent to kernel@openeuler.org mailing list has been converted to a pull request successfully! Pull request link: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/14152 Mailing list address: https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/M...
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