stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit b736b12108fd116c41777628f5a333791604df26 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16613 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component lies within the SL record before dereferencing it. A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255 bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory. ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media - desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled. Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink() fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260607011823.217748-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lai Zewei <laizewei3@huawei.com> --- fs/isofs/rock.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c index 4a791011cb09..1a88f396f968 100644 --- a/fs/isofs/rock.c +++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c @@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(struct iso_directory_record *de, inode->i_size = symlink_len; while (slen > 1) { rootflag = 0; + /* keep the component within the SL record */ + if (slp->len + 2 > slen) + goto eio; switch (slp->flags & ~1) { case 0: inode->i_size += @@ -617,6 +620,14 @@ static char *get_symlink_chunk(char *rpnt, struct rock_ridge *rr, char *plimit) slp = &rr->u.SL.link; while (slen > 1) { rootflag = 0; + /* + * A component is slp->len + 2 bytes (a two-byte header plus + * len bytes of text). If it does not fit in the bytes left in + * the SL record the record is malformed: fail like the plimit + * checks below so readlink() returns -EIO, not a truncated path. + */ + if (slp->len + 2 > slen) + return NULL; switch (slp->flags & ~1) { case 0: if (slp->len > plimit - rpnt) -- 2.52.0

stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit bb0d384c1f42a5b7ace0bd88fee80b9bb1d49acb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16619 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size: map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2; lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads ((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block] so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read. Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode. Fixes: fa5e08156335 ("udf: Handle VAT packed inside inode properly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-9a2317ee-v1-1-fefef5736154@proton.... Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lai Zewei <laizewei3@huawei.com> --- fs/udf/super.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c index 7f63d8f197e4..f898ee6dba16 100644 --- a/fs/udf/super.c +++ b/fs/udf/super.c @@ -1232,6 +1232,14 @@ static int udf_load_vat(struct super_block *sb, int p_index, int type1_index) map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); + if (map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset + > sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size) { + udf_err(sb, "Corrupted VAT header length %u (VAT inode size %lld)\n", + map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset, + sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size); + brelse(bh); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual. -- 2.52.0

stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit 22c1fd1355ad4ca27aa7f0fa02719122dd92d9de category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16595 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the O_ACCMODE access mode. nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid, which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics. POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES. Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local check matches the access the server would have enforced. Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@kernel.org> Fixes: af22f94ae02a ("NFSv4: Simplify _nfs4_do_access()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Lai Zewei <laizewei3@huawei.com> --- fs/nfs/dir.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index bd8009c1aa2e..859e47052060 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -3335,6 +3335,8 @@ static int nfs_open_permission_mask(int openflags) mask |= MAY_READ; if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) mask |= MAY_WRITE; + if (openflags & O_TRUNC) + mask |= MAY_WRITE; } return mask; -- 2.52.0