From: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit e6b9bd7290d334451ce054e98e752abc055e0034 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6C5HV CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Following process will make data lost and could lead to a filesystem corrupted problem: 1. jh(bh) is inserted into T1->t_checkpoint_list, bh is dirty, and jh->b_transaction = NULL 2. T1 is added into journal->j_checkpoint_transactions. 3. Get bh prepare to write while doing checkpoing: PA PB do_get_write_access jbd2_log_do_checkpoint spin_lock(&jh->b_state_lock) if (buffer_dirty(bh)) clear_buffer_dirty(bh) // clear buffer dirty set_buffer_jbddirty(bh) transaction = journal->j_checkpoint_transactions jh = transaction->t_checkpoint_list if (!buffer_dirty(bh)) __jbd2_journal_remove_checkpoint(jh) // bh won't be flushed jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail __jbd2_journal_file_buffer(jh, transaction, BJ_Reserved) 4. Aborting journal/Power-cut before writing latest bh on journal area. In this way we get a corrupted filesystem with bh's data lost. Fix it by moving the clearing of buffer_dirty bit just before the call to __jbd2_journal_file_buffer(), both bit clearing and jh->b_transaction assignment are under journal->j_list_lock locked, so that jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() will wait until jh's new transaction fininshed even bh is currently not dirty. And journal_shrink_one_cp_list() won't remove jh from checkpoint list if the buffer head is reused in do_get_write_access(). Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216898 Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: zhanchengbin <zhanchengbin1@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110015327.1181863-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c index cefee2dead54..8fa88c42fcb4 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c @@ -984,36 +984,28 @@ do_get_write_access(handle_t *handle, struct journal_head *jh, * ie. locked but not dirty) or tune2fs (which may actually have * the buffer dirtied, ugh.) */ - if (buffer_dirty(bh)) { + if (buffer_dirty(bh) && jh->b_transaction) { + warn_dirty_buffer(bh); /* - * First question: is this buffer already part of the current - * transaction or the existing committing transaction? - */ - if (jh->b_transaction) { - J_ASSERT_JH(jh, - jh->b_transaction == transaction || - jh->b_transaction == - journal->j_committing_transaction); - if (jh->b_next_transaction) - J_ASSERT_JH(jh, jh->b_next_transaction == - transaction); - warn_dirty_buffer(bh); - } - /* - * In any case we need to clean the dirty flag and we must - * do it under the buffer lock to be sure we don't race - * with running write-out. + * We need to clean the dirty flag and we must do it under the + * buffer lock to be sure we don't race with running write-out. */ JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "Journalling dirty buffer"); clear_buffer_dirty(bh); + /* + * The buffer is going to be added to BJ_Reserved list now and + * nothing guarantees jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() will be + * ever called for it. So we need to set jbddirty bit here to + * make sure the buffer is dirtied and written out when the + * journaling machinery is done with it. + */ set_buffer_jbddirty(bh); } - unlock_buffer(bh); - error = -EROFS; if (is_handle_aborted(handle)) { spin_unlock(&jh->b_state_lock); + unlock_buffer(bh); goto out; } error = 0; @@ -1023,8 +1015,10 @@ do_get_write_access(handle_t *handle, struct journal_head *jh, * b_next_transaction points to it */ if (jh->b_transaction == transaction || - jh->b_next_transaction == transaction) + jh->b_next_transaction == transaction) { + unlock_buffer(bh); goto done; + } /* * this is the first time this transaction is touching this buffer, @@ -1048,10 +1042,24 @@ do_get_write_access(handle_t *handle, struct journal_head *jh, */ smp_wmb(); spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock); + if (test_clear_buffer_dirty(bh)) { + /* + * Execute buffer dirty clearing and jh->b_transaction + * assignment under journal->j_list_lock locked to + * prevent bh being removed from checkpoint list if + * the buffer is in an intermediate state (not dirty + * and jh->b_transaction is NULL). + */ + JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "Journalling dirty buffer"); + set_buffer_jbddirty(bh); + } __jbd2_journal_file_buffer(jh, transaction, BJ_Reserved); spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock); + unlock_buffer(bh); goto done; } + unlock_buffer(bh); + /* * If there is already a copy-out version of this buffer, then we don't * need to make another one -- 2.25.1

From: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2 commit 315c537068a13f0b5681d33dd045a912f4bece6f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6I7U9 CVE: CVE-2023-1079 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- asus driver has a worker that may access data concurrently. Proct the accesses using a spinlock. Fixes: af22a610bc38 ("HID: asus: support backlight on USB keyboards") Signed-off-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-hid-unregister-leds-v4-4-7860c5763c38@dia... Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Yuyao Lin <linyuyao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-asus.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c b/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c index 9a6b63828634..112c0c25a77f 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-asus.c @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct asus_kbd_leds { struct hid_device *hdev; struct work_struct work; unsigned int brightness; + spinlock_t lock; bool removed; }; @@ -402,7 +403,12 @@ static void asus_kbd_backlight_set(struct led_classdev *led_cdev, { struct asus_kbd_leds *led = container_of(led_cdev, struct asus_kbd_leds, cdev); + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&led->lock, flags); led->brightness = brightness; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&led->lock, flags); + schedule_work(&led->work); } @@ -410,8 +416,14 @@ static enum led_brightness asus_kbd_backlight_get(struct led_classdev *led_cdev) { struct asus_kbd_leds *led = container_of(led_cdev, struct asus_kbd_leds, cdev); + enum led_brightness brightness; + unsigned long flags; - return led->brightness; + spin_lock_irqsave(&led->lock, flags); + brightness = led->brightness; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&led->lock, flags); + + return brightness; } static void asus_kbd_backlight_work(struct work_struct *work) @@ -419,11 +431,14 @@ static void asus_kbd_backlight_work(struct work_struct *work) struct asus_kbd_leds *led = container_of(work, struct asus_kbd_leds, work); u8 buf[] = { FEATURE_KBD_REPORT_ID, 0xba, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x00 }; int ret; + unsigned long flags; if (led->removed) return; + spin_lock_irqsave(&led->lock, flags); buf[4] = led->brightness; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&led->lock, flags); ret = asus_kbd_set_report(led->hdev, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (ret < 0) @@ -485,6 +500,7 @@ static int asus_kbd_register_leds(struct hid_device *hdev) drvdata->kbd_backlight->cdev.brightness_set = asus_kbd_backlight_set; drvdata->kbd_backlight->cdev.brightness_get = asus_kbd_backlight_get; INIT_WORK(&drvdata->kbd_backlight->work, asus_kbd_backlight_work); + spin_lock_init(&drvdata->kbd_backlight->lock); ret = devm_led_classdev_register(&hdev->dev, &drvdata->kbd_backlight->cdev); if (ret < 0) { @@ -1013,9 +1029,13 @@ static int asus_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) static void asus_remove(struct hid_device *hdev) { struct asus_drvdata *drvdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); + unsigned long flags; if (drvdata->kbd_backlight) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&drvdata->kbd_backlight->lock, flags); drvdata->kbd_backlight->removed = true; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&drvdata->kbd_backlight->lock, flags); + cancel_work_sync(&drvdata->kbd_backlight->work); } -- 2.25.1

From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc4 commit 3b8000ae185cb068adbda5f966a3835053c85fd4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6LD0S CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Huge vmalloc higher-order backing pages were allocated with __GFP_COMP in order to allow the sub-pages to be refcounted by callers such as "remap_vmalloc_page [sic]" (remap_vmalloc_range). However a similar problem exists for other struct page fields callers use, for example fb_deferred_io_fault() takes a vmalloc'ed page and not only refcounts it but uses ->lru, ->mapping, ->index. This is not compatible with compound sub-pages, and can cause bad page state issues like BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/0 pfn:00743 page:(____ptrval____) refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x743 flags: 0x7ffff000000000(node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff) raw: 007ffff000000000 c00c00000001d0c8 c00c00000001d0c8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: corrupted mapping in tail page Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-00082-gfc6fff4a7ce1-dirty #2810 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0xa8 (unreliable) bad_page+0x12c/0x170 free_tail_pages_check+0xe8/0x190 free_pcp_prepare+0x31c/0x4e0 free_unref_page+0x40/0x1b0 __vunmap+0x1d8/0x420 ... The correct approach is to use split high-order pages for the huge vmalloc backing. These allow callers to treat them in exactly the same way as individually-allocated order-0 pages. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/14444103-d51b-0fb3-ee63-c3f182f0b546@molgen.mpg.... Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> conflicts: mm/vmalloc.c Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- mm/vmalloc.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index dadbea29241d..a97d3011aa9a 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -2637,14 +2637,17 @@ static void __vunmap(const void *addr, int deallocate_pages) vm_remove_mappings(area, deallocate_pages); if (deallocate_pages) { - unsigned int page_order = vm_area_page_order(area); int i; - for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i += 1U << page_order) { + for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++) { struct page *page = area->pages[i]; BUG_ON(!page); - __free_pages(page, page_order); + /* + * High-order allocs for huge vmallocs are split, so + * can be freed as an array of order-0 allocations + */ + __free_pages(page, 0); } atomic_long_sub(area->nr_pages, &nr_vmalloc_pages); @@ -2924,8 +2927,7 @@ static void *__vmalloc_area_node(struct vm_struct *area, gfp_t gfp_mask, struct page *page; int p; - /* Compound pages required for remap_vmalloc_page */ - page = alloc_pages_node(node, gfp_mask | __GFP_COMP, page_order); + page = alloc_pages_node(node, gfp_mask, page_order); if (unlikely(!page)) { /* Successfully allocated i pages, free them in __vfree() */ area->nr_pages = i; @@ -2937,6 +2939,16 @@ static void *__vmalloc_area_node(struct vm_struct *area, gfp_t gfp_mask, goto fail; } + /* + * Higher order allocations must be able to be treated as + * indepdenent small pages by callers (as they can with + * small-page vmallocs). Some drivers do their own refcounting + * on vmalloc_to_page() pages, some use page->mapping, + * page->lru, etc. + */ + if (page_order) + split_page(page, page_order); + for (p = 0; p < (1U << page_order); p++) area->pages[i + p] = page + p; -- 2.25.1

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.157 commit e87a077d09c05985a0edac7c6c49bb307f775d12 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6NCRH CVE: CVE-2023-1382 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0e5d56c64afcd6fd2d132ea972605b66f8a7d3c4 ] A crash was reported by Wei Chen: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 RIP: 0010:tipc_conn_close+0x12/0x100 Call Trace: tipc_topsrv_exit_net+0x139/0x320 ops_exit_list.isra.9+0x49/0x80 cleanup_net+0x31a/0x540 process_one_work+0x3fa/0x9f0 worker_thread+0x42/0x5c0 It was caused by !con->sock in tipc_conn_close(). In tipc_topsrv_accept(), con is allocated in conn_idr then its sock is set: con = tipc_conn_alloc(); ... <----[1] con->sock = newsock; If tipc_conn_close() is called in anytime of [1], the null-pointer-def is triggered by con->sock->sk due to con->sock is not yet set. This patch fixes it by moving the con->sock setting to tipc_conn_alloc() under s->idr_lock. So that con->sock can never be NULL when getting the con from s->conn_idr. It will be also safer to move con->server and flag CF_CONNECTED setting under s->idr_lock, as they should all be set before tipc_conn_alloc() is called. Fixes: c5fa7b3cf3cb ("tipc: introduce new TIPC server infrastructure") Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> conflict: net/tipc/topsrv.c Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- net/tipc/topsrv.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/topsrv.c b/net/tipc/topsrv.c index 13f3143609f9..6fb088948300 100644 --- a/net/tipc/topsrv.c +++ b/net/tipc/topsrv.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static void tipc_conn_close(struct tipc_conn *con) conn_put(con); } -static struct tipc_conn *tipc_conn_alloc(struct tipc_topsrv *s) +static struct tipc_conn *tipc_conn_alloc(struct tipc_topsrv *s, struct socket *sock) { struct tipc_conn *con; int ret; @@ -202,10 +202,11 @@ static struct tipc_conn *tipc_conn_alloc(struct tipc_topsrv *s) } con->conid = ret; s->idr_in_use++; - spin_unlock_bh(&s->idr_lock); set_bit(CF_CONNECTED, &con->flags); con->server = s; + con->sock = sock; + spin_unlock_bh(&s->idr_lock); return con; } @@ -460,7 +461,7 @@ static void tipc_topsrv_accept(struct work_struct *work) ret = kernel_accept(lsock, &newsock, O_NONBLOCK); if (ret < 0) return; - con = tipc_conn_alloc(srv); + con = tipc_conn_alloc(srv, newsock); if (IS_ERR(con)) { ret = PTR_ERR(con); sock_release(newsock); @@ -472,7 +473,6 @@ static void tipc_topsrv_accept(struct work_struct *work) newsk->sk_data_ready = tipc_conn_data_ready; newsk->sk_write_space = tipc_conn_write_space; newsk->sk_user_data = con; - con->sock = newsock; write_unlock_bh(&newsk->sk_callback_lock); /* Wake up receive process in case of 'SYN+' message */ @@ -570,12 +570,11 @@ bool tipc_topsrv_kern_subscr(struct net *net, u32 port, u32 type, u32 lower, sub.filter = filter; *(u32 *)&sub.usr_handle = port; - con = tipc_conn_alloc(tipc_topsrv(net)); + con = tipc_conn_alloc(tipc_topsrv(net), NULL); if (IS_ERR(con)) return false; *conid = con->conid; - con->sock = NULL; rc = tipc_conn_rcv_sub(tipc_topsrv(net), con, &sub); if (rc >= 0) return true; -- 2.25.1

From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit 53a05ad9f21d858d24f76d12b3e990405f2036d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6NK0S CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Patch series "mm: COW fixes part 1: fix the COW security issue for THP and swap", v3. This series attempts to optimize and streamline the COW logic for ordinary anon pages and THP anon pages, fixing two remaining instances of CVE-2020-29374 in do_swap_page() and do_huge_pmd_wp_page(): information can leak from a parent process to a child process via anonymous pages shared during fork(). This issue, including other related COW issues, has been summarized in [2]: "1. Observing Memory Modifications of Private Pages From A Child Process Long story short: process-private memory might not be as private as you think once you fork(): successive modifications of private memory regions in the parent process can still be observed by the child process, for example, by smart use of vmsplice()+munmap(). The core problem is that pinning pages readable in a child process, such as done via the vmsplice system call, can result in a child process observing memory modifications done in the parent process the child is not supposed to observe. [1] contains an excellent summary and [2] contains further details. This issue was assigned CVE-2020-29374 [9]. For this to trigger, it's required to use a fork() without subsequent exec(), for example, as used under Android zygote. Without further details about an application that forks less-privileged child processes, one cannot really say what's actually affected and what's not -- see the details section the end of this mail for a short sshd/openssh analysis. While commit 17839856fd58 ("gup: document and work around "COW can break either way" issue") fixed this issue and resulted in other problems (e.g., ptrace on pmem), commit 09854ba94c6a ("mm: do_wp_page() simplification") re-introduced part of the problem unfortunately. The original reproducer can be modified quite easily to use THP [3] and make the issue appear again on upstream kernels. I modified it to use hugetlb [4] and it triggers as well. The problem is certainly less severe with hugetlb than with THP; it merely highlights that we still have plenty of open holes we should be closing/fixing. Regarding vmsplice(), the only known workaround is to disallow the vmsplice() system call ... or disable THP and hugetlb. But who knows what else is affected (RDMA? O_DIRECT?) to achieve the same goal -- in the end, it's a more generic issue" This security issue was first reported by Jann Horn on 27 May 2020 and it currently affects anonymous pages during swapin, anonymous THP and hugetlb. This series tackles anonymous pages during swapin and anonymous THP: - do_swap_page() for handling COW on PTEs during swapin directly - do_huge_pmd_wp_page() for handling COW on PMD-mapped THP during write faults With this series, we'll apply the same COW logic we have in do_wp_page() to all swappable anon pages: don't reuse (map writable) the page in case there are additional references (page_count() != 1). All users of reuse_swap_page() are remove, and consequently reuse_swap_page() is removed. In general, we're struggling with the following COW-related issues: (1) "missed COW": we miss to copy on write and reuse the page (map it writable) although we must copy because there are pending references from another process to this page. The result is a security issue. (2) "wrong COW": we copy on write although we wouldn't have to and shouldn't: if there are valid GUP references, they will become out of sync with the pages mapped into the page table. We fail to detect that such a page can be reused safely, especially if never more than a single process mapped the page. The result is an intra process memory corruption. (3) "unnecessary COW": we copy on write although we wouldn't have to: performance degradation and temporary increases swap+memory consumption can be the result. While this series fixes (1) for swappable anon pages, it tries to reduce reported cases of (3) first as good and easy as possible to limit the impact when streamlining. The individual patches try to describe in which cases we will run into (3). This series certainly makes (2) worse for THP, because a THP will now get PTE-mapped on write faults if there are additional references, even if there was only ever a single process involved: once PTE-mapped, we'll copy each and every subpage and won't reuse any subpage as long as the underlying compound page wasn't split. I'm working on an approach to fix (2) and improve (3): PageAnonExclusive to mark anon pages that are exclusive to a single process, allow GUP pins only on such exclusive pages, and allow turning exclusive pages shared (clearing PageAnonExclusive) only if there are no GUP pins. Anon pages with PageAnonExclusive set never have to be copied during write faults, but eventually during fork() if they cannot be turned shared. The improved reuse logic in this series will essentially also be the logic to reset PageAnonExclusive. This work will certainly take a while, but I'm planning on sharing details before having code fully ready. cleanups related to reuse_swap_page(). Notes: * For now, I'll leave hugetlb code untouched: "unnecessary COW" might easily break existing setups because hugetlb pages are a scarce resource and we could just end up having to crash the application when we run out of hugetlb pages. We have to be very careful and the security aspect with hugetlb is most certainly less relevant than for unprivileged anon pages. * Instead of lru_add_drain() we might actually just drain the lru_add list or even just remove the single page of interest from the lru_add list. This would require a new helper function, and could be added if the conditional lru_add_drain() turn out to be a problem. * I extended the test case already included in [1] to also test for the newly found do_swap_page() case. I'll send that out separately once/if this part was merged. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211217113049.23850-1-david@redhat.com [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/3ae33b08-d9ef-f846-56fb-645e3b9b4c66@redhat.com This patch (of 9): Liang Zhang reported [1] that the current COW logic in do_wp_page() is sub-optimal when it comes to swap+read fault+write fault of anonymous pages that have a single user, visible via a performance degradation in the redis benchmark. Something similar was previously reported [2] by Nadav with a simple reproducer. After we put an anon page into the swapcache and unmapped it from a single process, that process might read that page again and refault it read-only. If that process then writes to that page, the process is actually the exclusive user of the page, however, the COW logic in do_co_page() won't be able to reuse it due to the additional reference from the swapcache. Let's optimize for pages that have been added to the swapcache but only have an exclusive user. Try removing the swapcache reference if there is hope that we're the exclusive user. We will fail removing the swapcache reference in two scenarios: (1) There are additional swap entries referencing the page: copying instead of reusing is the right thing to do. (2) The page is under writeback: theoretically we might be able to reuse in some cases, however, we cannot remove the additional reference and will have to copy. Note that we'll only try removing the page from the swapcache when it's highly likely that we'll be the exclusive owner after removing the page from the swapache. As we're about to map that page writable and redirty it, that should not affect reclaim but is rather the right thing to do. Further, we might have additional references from the LRU pagevecs, which will force us to copy instead of being able to reuse. We'll try handling such references for some scenarios next. Concurrent writeback cannot be handled easily and we'll always have to copy. While at it, remove the superfluous page_mapcount() check: it's implicitly covered by the page_count() for ordinary anon pages. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220113140318.11117-1-zhangliang5@huawei.com [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0480D692-D9B2-429A-9A88-9BBA1331AC3A@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220131162940.210846-2-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reported-by: Liang Zhang <zhangliang5@huawei.com> Reported-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: tong tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- mm/memory.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 4d720f3b73e4..422d2be8e610 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -3179,19 +3179,27 @@ static vm_fault_t do_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (PageAnon(vmf->page)) { struct page *page = vmf->page; - /* PageKsm() doesn't necessarily raise the page refcount */ - if (PageKsm(page) || page_count(page) != 1) + /* + * We have to verify under page lock: these early checks are + * just an optimization to avoid locking the page and freeing + * the swapcache if there is little hope that we can reuse. + * + * PageKsm() doesn't necessarily raise the page refcount. + */ + if (PageKsm(page) || page_count(page) > 1 + PageSwapCache(page)) goto copy; if (!trylock_page(page)) goto copy; - if (PageKsm(page) || page_mapcount(page) != 1 || page_count(page) != 1) { + if (PageSwapCache(page)) + try_to_free_swap(page); + if (PageKsm(page) || page_count(page) != 1) { unlock_page(page); goto copy; } /* - * Ok, we've got the only map reference, and the only - * page count reference, and the page is locked, - * it's dark out, and we're wearing sunglasses. Hit it. + * Ok, we've got the only page reference from our mapping + * and the page is locked, it's dark out, and we're wearing + * sunglasses. Hit it. */ unlock_page(page); wp_page_reuse(vmf); -- 2.25.1

From: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc2 commit ee92fa443358f4fc0017c1d0d325c27b37802504 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6NJNA CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- KASAN reported follow problem: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in lookup_rec Read of size 8 at addr ffff000199270ff0 by task modprobe CPU: 2 Comm: modprobe Call trace: kasan_report __asan_load8 lookup_rec ftrace_location arch_check_ftrace_location check_kprobe_address_safe register_kprobe When checking pg->records[pg->index - 1].ip in lookup_rec(), it can get a pg which is newly added to ftrace_pages_start in ftrace_process_locs(). Before the first pg->index++, index is 0 and accessing pg->records[-1].ip will cause this problem. Don't check the ip when pg->index is 0. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230309080230.36064-1-chenzhongj... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9644302e3315 ("ftrace: Speed up search by skipping pages by address") Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index 945e87b0084e..65e7d74fc3e7 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -1538,7 +1538,8 @@ static struct dyn_ftrace *lookup_rec(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) key.flags = end; /* overload flags, as it is unsigned long */ for (pg = ftrace_pages_start; pg; pg = pg->next) { - if (end < pg->records[0].ip || + if (pg->index == 0 || + end < pg->records[0].ip || start >= (pg->records[pg->index - 1].ip + MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE)) continue; rec = bsearch(&key, pg->records, pg->index, -- 2.25.1

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit a1140cb215fa13dcec06d12ba0c3ee105633b7c4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6NVC3 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... ---------------------------------------- Our syzbot instance reported memory leaks in do_seccomp() [0], similar to the report [1]. It shows that we miss freeing struct seccomp_filter and some objects included in it. We can reproduce the issue with the program below [2] which calls one seccomp() and two clone() syscalls. The first clone()d child exits earlier than its parent and sends a signal to kill it during the second clone(), more precisely before the fatal_signal_pending() test in copy_process(). When the parent receives the signal, it has to destroy the embryonic process and return -EINTR to user space. In the failure path, we have to call seccomp_filter_release() to decrement the filter's refcount. Initially, we called it in free_task() called from the failure path, but the commit 3a15fb6ed92c ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully dead") moved it to release_task() to notify user space as early as possible that the filter is no longer used. To keep the change and current seccomp refcount semantics, let's move copy_seccomp() just after the signal check and add a WARN_ON_ONCE() in free_task() for future debugging. [0]: unreferenced object 0xffff8880063add00 (size 256): comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.914s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ backtrace: do_seccomp (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/seccomp.c:666 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) unreferenced object 0xffffc90000035000 (size 4096): comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3226) __vmalloc_node (mm/vmalloc.c:3261 (discriminator 4)) bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (kernel/bpf/core.c:91) bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129) bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414) do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) unreferenced object 0xffff888003fa1000 (size 1024): comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/bpf/core.c:95) bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129) bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414) do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) unreferenced object 0xffff888006360240 (size 16): comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s) hex dump (first 16 bytes): 01 00 37 00 76 65 72 6c e0 83 01 06 80 88 ff ff ..7.verl........ backtrace: bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1137) bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428) do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) unreferenced object 0xffff8880060183e0 (size 8): comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 06 00 00 00 00 00 ff 7f ........ backtrace: kmemdup (mm/util.c:129) bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1144) bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428) do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) [1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=2809bb0ac77ad9aa3f4afe42d6a610aba594a98... [2]: void main(void) { struct sock_filter filter[] = { BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), }; struct sock_fprog fprog = { .len = sizeof(filter) / sizeof(filter[0]), .filter = filter, }; long i, pid; syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &fprog); for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { pid = syscall(__NR_clone, CLONE_NEWNET | SIGKILL, NULL, NULL, 0); if (pid == 0) return; } } Fixes: 3a15fb6ed92c ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully dead") Reported-by: syzbot+ab17848fe269b573eb71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Ayushman Dutta <ayudutta@amazon.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823154532.82913-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Conflicts: kernel/fork.c Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- kernel/fork.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 6cf10d791375..13db29515605 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -445,6 +445,9 @@ void put_task_stack(struct task_struct *tsk) void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + WARN_ON_ONCE(tsk->seccomp.filter); +#endif scs_release(tsk); #ifndef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK @@ -2301,12 +2304,6 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock); - /* - * Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed - * before holding sighand lock. - */ - copy_seccomp(p); - rseq_fork(p, clone_flags); /* Don't start children in a dying pid namespace */ @@ -2321,6 +2318,14 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup; } + /* No more failure paths after this point. */ + + /* + * Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed + * before holding sighand lock. + */ + copy_seccomp(p); + init_task_pid_links(p); if (likely(p->pid)) { ptrace_init_task(p, (clone_flags & CLONE_PTRACE) || trace); -- 2.25.1

From: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6NVPT -------------------------------- Currently, arch_klp_code_modify_{prepare, post_process} is implemented only in the x86 architecture. It is used to hold the 'text_mutex' lock before entering the stop_machine and modifying the code, and to release the lock after exiting the stop_machine. klp_mem_prepare() needs to hold the 'text_mutex' lock only when saving old instruction code on x86 to ensure that it holds valid instructions. Place klp_mem_prepare() before arch_klp_code_modify_prepare() and lock the save instruction action separately to narrow the 'text_mutex' lock. Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/livepatch.c | 11 +++++++++-- kernel/livepatch/core.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/livepatch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/livepatch.c index fe34183826d3..0a2ba5c8ba4e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/livepatch.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/livepatch.c @@ -386,8 +386,15 @@ void arch_klp_code_modify_post_process(void) long arch_klp_save_old_code(struct arch_klp_data *arch_data, void *old_func) { - return copy_from_kernel_nofault(arch_data->old_code, - old_func, JMP_E9_INSN_SIZE); + long ret; + + /* Prevent text modification */ + mutex_lock(&text_mutex); + ret = copy_from_kernel_nofault(arch_data->old_code, + old_func, JMP_E9_INSN_SIZE); + mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); + + return ret; } int arch_klp_patch_func(struct klp_func *func) diff --git a/kernel/livepatch/core.c b/kernel/livepatch/core.c index 4d79543d9155..957f16f6c6c4 100644 --- a/kernel/livepatch/core.c +++ b/kernel/livepatch/core.c @@ -1696,12 +1696,10 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) } #endif - arch_klp_code_modify_prepare(); ret = klp_mem_prepare(patch); - if (ret) { - arch_klp_code_modify_post_process(); + if (ret) return ret; - } + arch_klp_code_modify_prepare(); ret = stop_machine(klp_try_enable_patch, &patch_data, cpu_online_mask); arch_klp_code_modify_post_process(); if (ret) { -- 2.25.1