[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-80747
CVE-2026-80747 William Palacek (1): [Backport] drm/amdkfd: Add bounds check for CRAT subtype length Yongqiang Sun (1): [Backport] drm/amdkfd: Fix infinite loop parsing CRAT with zero subtype length drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1
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From: Yongqiang Sun <Yongqiang.Sun@amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 961323c26ad4c895e3b0ea1711fc41dfd6368c12 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18596 CVE: CVE-2026-80747 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- Malformed ACPI CRAT tables can advertise a zero or undersized subtype length. The parser then fails to advance the cursor and loops forever while the remaining image still looks large enough for a generic header. Validate sub_type_hdr->length on each iteration before parsing or advancing. Return -EINVAL and warn when length is zero or smaller than the generic subtype header. Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Sun <Yongqiang.Sun@amd.com> Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3@huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c index 29a02c175228..aadfc8b9e76d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c @@ -1314,6 +1314,14 @@ int kfd_parse_crat_table(void *crat_image, struct list_head *device_list, sub_type_hdr = (struct crat_subtype_generic *)(crat_table+1); while ((char *)sub_type_hdr + sizeof(struct crat_subtype_generic) < ((char *)crat_image) + image_len) { + if (!sub_type_hdr->length || + sub_type_hdr->length < sizeof(struct crat_subtype_generic)) { + pr_warn("Invalid CRAT subtype length %u\n", + sub_type_hdr->length); + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + if (sub_type_hdr->flags & CRAT_SUBTYPE_FLAGS_ENABLED) { ret = kfd_parse_subtype(sub_type_hdr, device_list); if (ret) -- 2.34.1
From: William Palacek <William.Palacek@amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc6 commit 6e7566ba4739dd573c331adde1c96690f7a567bd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18596 CVE: CVE-2026-80747 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- The CRAT parser validates that the subtype header fits within the image, but does not verify that the advertised subtype length fits. A malformed CRAT table with an oversized length field causes out-of-bounds reads when kfd_parse_subtype() casts the header to specific subtype structures. Add validation that sub_type_hdr + length does not exceed the image boundary before parsing the subtype contents. Signed-off-by: William Palacek <William.Palacek@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alysa Liu <Alysa.Liu@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 48e1d1e6e8798aef0312e68d8e586021b5b3cf4d) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3@huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c index aadfc8b9e76d..2753e98dac2f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_crat.c @@ -1322,6 +1322,15 @@ int kfd_parse_crat_table(void *crat_image, struct list_head *device_list, break; } + /* Validate subtype fits within remaining image */ + if ((char *)sub_type_hdr + sub_type_hdr->length > + (char *)crat_image + image_len) { + pr_warn("CRAT subtype length %u exceeds image bounds\n", + sub_type_hdr->length); + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + if (sub_type_hdr->flags & CRAT_SUBTYPE_FLAGS_ENABLED) { ret = kfd_parse_subtype(sub_type_hdr, device_list); if (ret) -- 2.34.1
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