From: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.57 commit 937943c042503dc6087438bf3557f9057a588ba0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB2YWQ CVE: CVE-2024-50187 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 0b2ad4f6f2bec74a5287d96cb2325a5e11706f22 upstream. Upon closing the file descriptor, the active performance monitor is not stopped. Although all perfmons are destroyed in `vc4_perfmon_close_file()`, the active performance monitor's pointer (`vc4->active_perfmon`) is still retained. If we open a new file descriptor and submit a few jobs with performance monitors, the driver will attempt to stop the active performance monitor using the stale pointer in `vc4->active_perfmon`. However, this pointer is no longer valid because the previous process has already terminated, and all performance monitors associated with it have been destroyed and freed. To fix this, when the active performance monitor belongs to a given process, explicitly stop it before destroying and freeing it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+ Cc: Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org> Cc: Juan A. Suarez Romero <jasuarez@igalia.com> Fixes: 65101d8c9108 ("drm/vc4: Expose performance counters to userspace") Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Juan A. Suarez <jasuarez@igalia.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20241004123817.890016-2-mcanal... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_perfmon.c drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_drv.h [HULK-5.10 don't merge stable inclusion patch 30f8c74ca9b7b3a2db55f6bb1d2e9f8c47a79f94 ("drm/vc4: Warn if some v3d code is run on BCM2711"). Add struct vc4_dev *dev in struct vc4_file] Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong@huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_drv.h | 2 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_perfmon.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_drv.h index 921463625d82..a094ca5b19b1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_drv.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_drv.h @@ -673,6 +673,8 @@ struct vc4_exec_info { * released when the DRM file is closed should be placed here. */ struct vc4_file { + struct vc4_dev *dev; + struct { struct idr idr; struct mutex lock; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_perfmon.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_perfmon.c index f4aa75efd16b..8aa0825aa85b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_perfmon.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_perfmon.c @@ -83,6 +83,11 @@ void vc4_perfmon_open_file(struct vc4_file *vc4file) static int vc4_perfmon_idr_del(int id, void *elem, void *data) { struct vc4_perfmon *perfmon = elem; + struct vc4_dev *vc4 = (struct vc4_dev *)data; + + /* If the active perfmon is being destroyed, stop it first */ + if (perfmon == vc4->active_perfmon) + vc4_perfmon_stop(vc4, perfmon, false); vc4_perfmon_put(perfmon); @@ -92,7 +97,7 @@ static int vc4_perfmon_idr_del(int id, void *elem, void *data) void vc4_perfmon_close_file(struct vc4_file *vc4file) { mutex_lock(&vc4file->perfmon.lock); - idr_for_each(&vc4file->perfmon.idr, vc4_perfmon_idr_del, NULL); + idr_for_each(&vc4file->perfmon.idr, vc4_perfmon_idr_del, vc4file->dev); idr_destroy(&vc4file->perfmon.idr); mutex_unlock(&vc4file->perfmon.lock); } -- 2.34.1

From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.61 commit a2746ab3bbc9c6408da5cd072653ec8c24749235 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB5AUF CVE: CVE-2024-50272 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit ace149e0830c380ddfce7e466fe860ca502fe4ee upstream. If the caller supplies an iocb->ki_pos value that is close to the filesystem upper limit, and an iterator with a count that causes us to overflow that limit, then filemap_read() enters an infinite loop. This behaviour was discovered when testing xfstests generic/525 with the "localio" optimisation for loopback NFS mounts. Reported-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org> Fixes: c2a9737f45e2 ("vfs,mm: fix a dead loop in truncate_inode_pages_range()") Tested-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: mm/filemap.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com> --- mm/filemap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index b48ec6fc8f4b..c8863a76d531 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -2554,7 +2554,7 @@ ssize_t generic_file_buffered_read(struct kiocb *iocb, if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter))) return 0; - iov_iter_truncate(iter, inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes); + iov_iter_truncate(iter, inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - iocb->ki_pos); if (nr_pages > ARRAY_SIZE(pages_onstack)) pages = kmalloc_array(nr_pages, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.34.1

From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.170 commit 822203f6355f4b322d21e7115419f6b98284be25 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB2BWP CVE: CVE-2024-50116 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 6ed469df0bfbef3e4b44fca954a781919db9f7ab upstream. Syzbot reported that after nilfs2 reads a corrupted file system image and degrades to read-only, the BUG_ON check for the buffer delay flag in submit_bh_wbc() may fail, causing a kernel bug. This is because the buffer delay flag is not cleared when clearing the buffer state flags to discard a page/folio or a buffer head. So, fix this. This became necessary when the use of nilfs2's own page clear routine was expanded. This state inconsistency does not occur if the buffer is written normally by log writing. Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241015213300.7114-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Fixes: 8c26c4e2694a ("nilfs2: fix issue with flush kernel thread after remount in RO mode because of driver's internal error or metadata corruption") Reported-by: syzbot+985ada84bf055a575c07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=985ada84bf055a575c07 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong@huawei.com> --- fs/nilfs2/page.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/page.c b/fs/nilfs2/page.c index 198a74cfc96b..7adf74b52550 100644 --- a/fs/nilfs2/page.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/page.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ void nilfs_forget_buffer(struct buffer_head *bh) const unsigned long clear_bits = (BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) | BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) | - BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected)); + BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) | + BIT(BH_Delay)); lock_buffer(bh); set_mask_bits(&bh->b_state, clear_bits, 0); @@ -410,7 +411,8 @@ void nilfs_clear_dirty_page(struct page *page, bool silent) const unsigned long clear_bits = (BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) | BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) | - BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected)); + BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) | + BIT(BH_Delay)); bh = head = page_buffers(page); do { -- 2.34.1

From: Haoran Zhang <wh1sper@zju.edu.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.227 commit 6592347f06e2b19a624270a85ad4b3ae48c3b241 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYR8T CVE: CVE-2024-49863 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 221af82f606d928ccef19a16d35633c63026f1be upstream. Since commit 3f8ca2e115e5 ("vhost/scsi: Extract common handling code from control queue handler") a null pointer dereference bug can be triggered when guest sends an SCSI AN request. In vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq(), `vc.target` is assigned with `&v_req.tmf.lun[1]` within a switch-case block and is then passed to vhost_scsi_get_req() which extracts `vc->req` and `tpg`. However, for a `VIRTIO_SCSI_T_AN_*` request, tpg is not required, so `vc.target` is set to NULL in this branch. Later, in vhost_scsi_get_req(), `vc->target` is dereferenced without being checked, leading to a null pointer dereference bug. This bug can be triggered from guest. When this bug occurs, the vhost_worker process is killed while holding `vq->mutex` and the corresponding tpg will remain occupied indefinitely. Below is the KASAN report: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 PID: 840 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vhost_scsi_get_req+0x165/0x3a0 Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 2b 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 65 30 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 be 01 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888017affb50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88801b000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888017affcb8 RBP: ffff888017affb80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888017affc88 R14: ffff888017affd1c R15: ffff888017993000 FS: 000055556e076500(0000) GS:ffff88806b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000200027c0 CR3: 0000000010ed0004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x86/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x4b/0xd0 ? exc_general_protection+0x163/0x260 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 ? vhost_scsi_get_req+0x165/0x3a0 vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq+0x2a4/0xca0 ? __pfx_vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq+0x10/0x10 ? __switch_to+0x721/0xeb0 ? __schedule+0xda5/0x5710 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x82/0xf0 vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_kick+0x52/0x90 vhost_run_work_list+0x134/0x1b0 vhost_task_fn+0x121/0x350 ... </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Let's add a check in vhost_scsi_get_req. Fixes: 3f8ca2e115e5 ("vhost/scsi: Extract common handling code from control queue handler") Signed-off-by: Haoran Zhang <wh1sper@zju.edu.cn> [whitespace fixes] Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Message-Id: <b26d7ddd-b098-4361-88f8-17ca7f90adf7@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong@huawei.com> --- drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c index 8531751b28dd..a5c6f0baedda 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c @@ -919,20 +919,23 @@ vhost_scsi_get_req(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct vhost_scsi_ctx *vc, /* virtio-scsi spec requires byte 0 of the lun to be 1 */ vq_err(vq, "Illegal virtio-scsi lun: %u\n", *vc->lunp); } else { - struct vhost_scsi_tpg **vs_tpg, *tpg; - - vs_tpg = vhost_vq_get_backend(vq); /* validated at handler entry */ - - tpg = READ_ONCE(vs_tpg[*vc->target]); - if (unlikely(!tpg)) { - vq_err(vq, "Target 0x%x does not exist\n", *vc->target); - } else { - if (tpgp) - *tpgp = tpg; - ret = 0; + struct vhost_scsi_tpg **vs_tpg, *tpg = NULL; + + if (vc->target) { + /* validated at handler entry */ + vs_tpg = vhost_vq_get_backend(vq); + tpg = READ_ONCE(vs_tpg[*vc->target]); + if (unlikely(!tpg)) { + vq_err(vq, "Target 0x%x does not exist\n", *vc->target); + goto out; + } } - } + if (tpgp) + *tpgp = tpg; + ret = 0; + } +out: return ret; } -- 2.34.1