[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2 0/2] LTS patch backport
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Dong Chenchen (1): net: fix kabi broken in struct netns_xfrm Eric Dumazet (1): xfrm: fix a data-race in xfrm_gen_index() include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 3 +++ net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1
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From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.296 commit 17c75411e25a84ed25fe6bbbcf707e1068ff985c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8MNNN CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- commit 3e4bc23926b83c3c67e5f61ae8571602754131a6 upstream. xfrm_gen_index() mutual exclusion uses net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock. This means we must use a per-netns idx_generator variable, instead of a static one. Alternative would be to use an atomic variable. syzbot reported: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in xfrm_sk_policy_insert / xfrm_sk_policy_insert write to 0xffffffff87005938 of 4 bytes by task 29466 on cpu 0: xfrm_gen_index net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1385 [inline] xfrm_sk_policy_insert+0x262/0x640 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2347 xfrm_user_policy+0x413/0x540 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2639 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x1317/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:943 ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012 rawv6_setsockopt+0x21e/0x410 net/ipv6/raw.c:1054 sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3697 __sys_setsockopt+0x1c9/0x230 net/socket.c:2263 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2274 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2271 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2271 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd read to 0xffffffff87005938 of 4 bytes by task 29460 on cpu 1: xfrm_sk_policy_insert+0x13e/0x640 xfrm_user_policy+0x413/0x540 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2639 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x1317/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:943 ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012 rawv6_setsockopt+0x21e/0x410 net/ipv6/raw.c:1054 sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3697 __sys_setsockopt+0x1c9/0x230 net/socket.c:2263 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2274 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2271 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2271 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0x00006ad8 -> 0x00006b18 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 29460 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00243-g9106536c1aa3 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Fixes: 1121994c803f ("netns xfrm: policy insertion in netns") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h index 9991e5ef52cc..e3775b260bb3 100644 --- a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct netns_xfrm { struct list_head policy_all; struct hlist_head *policy_byidx; unsigned int policy_idx_hmask; + unsigned int idx_generator; struct hlist_head policy_inexact[XFRM_POLICY_MAX]; struct xfrm_policy_hash policy_bydst[XFRM_POLICY_MAX]; unsigned int policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_MAX * 2]; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 8c133ecec9ab..74ce9aee28ba 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -654,8 +654,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild); * of an absolute inpredictability of ordering of rules. This will not pass. */ static u32 xfrm_gen_index(struct net *net, int dir, u32 index) { - static u32 idx_generator; - for (;;) { struct hlist_head *list; struct xfrm_policy *p; @@ -663,8 +661,8 @@ static u32 xfrm_gen_index(struct net *net, int dir, u32 index) int found; if (!index) { - idx = (idx_generator | dir); - idx_generator += 8; + idx = (net->xfrm.idx_generator | dir); + net->xfrm.idx_generator += 8; } else { idx = index; index = 0; -- 2.25.1
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Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8MNNN CVE: NA -------------------------------- Fix kabi broken in struct netns_xfrm. Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com> --- include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h index e3775b260bb3..55a1f26d9a8b 100644 --- a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h @@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ struct netns_xfrm { struct list_head policy_all; struct hlist_head *policy_byidx; unsigned int policy_idx_hmask; +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ unsigned int idx_generator; +#endif struct hlist_head policy_inexact[XFRM_POLICY_MAX]; struct xfrm_policy_hash policy_bydst[XFRM_POLICY_MAX]; unsigned int policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_MAX * 2]; -- 2.25.1
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反馈: 您发送到kernel@openeuler.org的补丁/补丁集,已成功转换为PR! PR链接地址: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/3279 邮件列表地址:https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/X... FeedBack: The patch(es) which you have sent to kernel@openeuler.org mailing list has been converted to a pull request successfully! Pull request link: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/3279 Mailing list address: https://mailweb.openeuler.org/hyperkitty/list/kernel@openeuler.org/message/X...
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