[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86,fs/resctrl: Prevent out-of-bounds access while offlining CPU when SNC enabled
From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc2 commit fc16126cc11d9f507130bf84ab137ee0938c900e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16766 CVE: CVE-2026-64477 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- The architecture updates the cpu_mask in a domain's header to track which online CPUs are associated with the domain. When this mask becomes empty the architecture initiates offline of the domain that includes calling on resctrl fs to offline the domain. If it is a monitoring domain in which LLC occupancy is tracked resctrl fs forces the limbo handler to clear all busy RMID state associated with the domain. The limbo handler always reads the current event value associated with a busy RMID irrespective of it being checked as part of regular "is it still busy" check or whether it will be forced released anyway. When reading an RMID on a system with SNC enabled the "logical RMID" is converted to the "physical RMID" and this conversion requires the NUMA node ID of the resctrl monitoring domain that is in turn determined by querying the NUMA node ID of any CPU belonging to the monitoring domain. When the monitoring domain is going offline its cpu_mask is empty causing the NUMA node ID query via cpu_to_node() to be done with "nr_cpu_ids" as argument resulting in an out-of-bounds access. Refactor the limbo handler to skip reading the RMID when the RMID will just be forced to no longer be dirty in the domain anyway. Add a safety check to the architecture's RMID reader to protect against this scenario. Fixes: e13db55b5a0d ("x86/resctrl: Introduce snc_nodes_per_l3_cache") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1780456704.git.reinette.chatre%40intel.... Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/16137433df42f85013b2f7a53626795cbd6637b9.1781029125... Conflicts: fs/resctrl/monitor.c fs/resctrl_x86/monitor.c [Redirect file paths without conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c | 5 ++++ fs/resctrl_x86/monitor.c | 39 +++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c index 53d6f642f486..6ad14c9b39a5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int resctrl_arch_rmid_read(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain_hdr *hdr, if (!domain_header_is_valid(hdr, RESCTRL_MON_DOMAIN, RDT_RESOURCE_L3)) return -EINVAL; + if (cpumask_empty(&hdr->cpu_mask)) { + pr_warn_once("Domain %d has no CPUs\n", hdr->id); + return -EINVAL; + } + d = container_of(hdr, struct rdt_l3_mon_domain, hdr); hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_mon_dom(d); cpu = cpumask_any(&hdr->cpu_mask); diff --git a/fs/resctrl_x86/monitor.c b/fs/resctrl_x86/monitor.c index 0cd5476a483a..0b52db0d0f19 100644 --- a/fs/resctrl_x86/monitor.c +++ b/fs/resctrl_x86/monitor.c @@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ void __check_limbo(struct rdt_l3_mon_domain *d, bool force_free) struct rdt_resource *r = resctrl_arch_get_resource(RDT_RESOURCE_L3); u32 idx_limit = resctrl_arch_system_num_rmid_idx(); struct rmid_entry *entry; + bool rmid_dirty = true; u32 idx, cur_idx = 1; void *arch_mon_ctx; void *arch_priv; - bool rmid_dirty; u64 val = 0; arch_priv = mon_event_all[QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID].arch_priv; @@ -161,22 +161,27 @@ void __check_limbo(struct rdt_l3_mon_domain *d, bool force_free) break; entry = __rmid_entry(idx); - if (resctrl_arch_rmid_read(r, &d->hdr, entry->closid, entry->rmid, - QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID, arch_priv, &val, - arch_mon_ctx)) { - rmid_dirty = true; - } else { - rmid_dirty = (val >= resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold); - - /* - * x86's CLOSID and RMID are independent numbers, so the entry's - * CLOSID is an empty CLOSID (X86_RESCTRL_EMPTY_CLOSID). On Arm the - * RMID (PMG) extends the CLOSID (PARTID) space with bits that aren't - * used to select the configuration. It is thus necessary to track both - * CLOSID and RMID because there may be dependencies between them - * on some architectures. - */ - trace_mon_llc_occupancy_limbo(entry->closid, entry->rmid, d->hdr.id, val); + if (!force_free) { + if (resctrl_arch_rmid_read(r, &d->hdr, entry->closid, + entry->rmid, QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID, + arch_priv, &val, arch_mon_ctx)) { + rmid_dirty = true; + } else { + rmid_dirty = (val >= resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold); + + /* + * x86's CLOSID and RMID are independent numbers, + * so the entry's CLOSID is an empty CLOSID + * (X86_RESCTRL_EMPTY_CLOSID). On Arm the RMID + * (PMG) extends the CLOSID (PARTID) space with + * bits that aren't used to select the configuration. + * It is thus necessary to track both CLOSID and + * RMID because there may be dependencies between + * them on some architectures. + */ + trace_mon_llc_occupancy_limbo(entry->closid, entry->rmid, + d->hdr.id, val); + } } if (force_free || !rmid_dirty) { -- 2.43.0
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