From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.133 commit 1dbefa57725204be0348351ea4756c52b10b3504 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5PTAS CVE: CVE-2022-29900,CVE-2022-23816,CVE-2022-29901
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 upstream.
This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo cascardo@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun linyujun809@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua chris.zjh@huawei.com --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 +------------------------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 6af379b69b82..8fe701ffee31 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -84,12 +84,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
-/* - * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in - * x86_spec_ctrl_base. - */ -static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - /* * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control. * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu(). @@ -138,10 +132,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
- /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); @@ -199,19 +189,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); + u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
- /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) { - /* - * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the - * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the - * modifiable bits from the guest value. - */ - guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -1621,16 +1602,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) break; }
- /* - * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper - * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the - * case where the host does not enable it. - */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - } - /* * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.