From: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 97650148a15e0b30099d6175ffe278b9f55ec66a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6C6UC CVE: CVE-2023-0597
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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Populate a KASAN shadow for the entire possible per-CPU range of the CPU entry area instead of requiring that each individual chunk map a shadow. Mapping shadows individually is error prone, e.g. the per-CPU GDT mapping was left behind, which can lead to not-present page faults during KASAN validation if the kernel performs a software lookup into the GDT. The DS buffer is also likely affected.
The motivation for mapping the per-CPU areas on-demand was to avoid mapping the entire 512GiB range that's reserved for the CPU entry area, shaving a few bytes by not creating shadows for potentially unused memory was not a goal.
The bug is most easily reproduced by doing a sigreturn with a garbage CS in the sigcontext, e.g.
int main(void) { struct sigcontext regs;
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
memset(®s, 0, sizeof(regs)); regs.cs = 0x1d0; syscall(__NR_rt_sigreturn); return 0; }
to coerce the kernel into doing a GDT lookup to compute CS.base when reading the instruction bytes on the subsequent #GP to determine whether or not the #GP is something the kernel should handle, e.g. to fixup UMIP violations or to emulate CLI/STI for IOPL=3 applications.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbc8379ace00 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 16c03a067 P4D 16c03a067 PUD 15b990067 PMD 15b98f067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 3 PID: 851 Comm: r2 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3-next-20221103+ #432 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0xdf/0x190 Call Trace: <TASK> get_desc+0xb0/0x1d0 insn_get_seg_base+0x104/0x270 insn_fetch_from_user+0x66/0x80 fixup_umip_exception+0xb1/0x530 exc_general_protection+0x181/0x210 asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 RIP: 0003:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0003:0000000000000000 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000000001d0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK>
Fixes: 9fd429c28073 ("x86/kasan: Map shadow for percpu pages on demand") Reported-by: syzbot+ffb4f000dc2872c93f62@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221110203504.1985010-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen tongtiangen@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Wandun chenwandun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang wangweiyang2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c index 2eaf9ee41495..88e2cc4d4e75 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c @@ -96,11 +96,6 @@ void cea_set_pte(void *cea_vaddr, phys_addr_t pa, pgprot_t flags) static void __init cea_map_percpu_pages(void *cea_vaddr, void *ptr, int pages, pgprot_t prot) { - phys_addr_t pa = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(ptr); - - kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(cea_vaddr, pages * PAGE_SIZE, - early_pfn_to_nid(PFN_DOWN(pa))); - for ( ; pages; pages--, cea_vaddr+= PAGE_SIZE, ptr += PAGE_SIZE) cea_set_pte(cea_vaddr, per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(ptr), prot); } @@ -200,6 +195,9 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(unsigned int cpu) pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL; #endif
+ kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(cea, CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE, + early_cpu_to_node(cpu)); + cea_set_pte(&cea->gdt, get_cpu_gdt_paddr(cpu), gdt_prot);
cea_map_percpu_pages(&cea->entry_stack_page,