From: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com
stable inclusion from stable-5.10.80 commit b917f9b94633bde8982f98965aa1fa534b9e8f46 bugzilla: 185821 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4L7CG
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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[ Upstream commit 8ef9dc0f14ba6124c62547a4fdc59b163d8b864e ]
We got the following lockdep splat while running fstests (specifically btrfs/003 and btrfs/020 in a row) with the new rc. This was uncovered by 87579e9b7d8d ("loop: use worker per cgroup instead of kworker") which converted loop to using workqueues, which comes with lockdep annotations that don't exist with kworkers. The lockdep splat is as follows:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ losetup/156417 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9c7645b02d38 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600
but task is already holding lock: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #5 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0xf0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x163/0x3a0 path_openat+0x74d/0xa40 do_filp_open+0x9c/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0xb1/0x170 __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #4 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xd1/0x3c0 blkdev_get_by_path+0xc0/0xd0 btrfs_scan_one_device+0x52/0x1f0 [btrfs] btrfs_control_ioctl+0xac/0x170 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #3 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 btrfs_rm_device+0x48/0x6a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x2d1c/0x3110 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #2 (sb_writers#11){.+.+}-{0:0}: lo_write_bvec+0x112/0x290 [loop] loop_process_work+0x25f/0xcb0 [loop] process_one_work+0x28f/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x266/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0 lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320 flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop] lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0);
*** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by losetup/156417: #0: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop]
stack backtrace: CPU: 8 PID: 156417 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 check_noncircular+0x10a/0x120 __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0 lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320 ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600 ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop] lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop] ? __lock_acquire+0x3a0/0x1dc0 ? update_dl_rq_load_avg+0x152/0x360 ? lock_is_held_type+0xa5/0x120 ? find_held_lock.constprop.0+0x2b/0x80 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f645884de6b
Usually the uuid_mutex exists to protect the fs_devices that map together all of the devices that match a specific uuid. In rm_device we're messing with the uuid of a device, so it makes sense to protect that here.
However in doing that it pulls in a whole host of lockdep dependencies, as we call mnt_may_write() on the sb before we grab the uuid_mutex, thus we end up with the dependency chain under the uuid_mutex being added under the normal sb write dependency chain, which causes problems with loop devices.
We don't need the uuid mutex here however. If we call btrfs_scan_one_device() before we scratch the super block we will find the fs_devices and not find the device itself and return EBUSY because the fs_devices is open. If we call it after the scratch happens it will not appear to be a valid btrfs file system.
We do not need to worry about other fs_devices modifying operations here because we're protected by the exclusive operations locking.
So drop the uuid_mutex here in order to fix the lockdep splat.
A more detailed explanation from the discussion:
We are worried about rm and scan racing with each other, before this change we'll zero the device out under the UUID mutex so when scan does run it'll make sure that it can go through the whole device scan thing without rm messing with us.
We aren't worried if the scratch happens first, because the result is we don't think this is a btrfs device and we bail out.
The only case we are concerned with is we scratch _after_ scan is able to read the superblock and gets a seemingly valid super block, so lets consider this case.
Scan will call device_list_add() with the device we're removing. We'll call find_fsid_with_metadata_uuid() and get our fs_devices for this UUID. At this point we lock the fs_devices->device_list_mutex. This is what protects us in this case, but we have two cases here.
1. We aren't to the device removal part of the RM. We found our device, and device name matches our path, we go down and we set total_devices to our super number of devices, which doesn't affect anything because we haven't done the remove yet.
2. We are past the device removal part, which is protected by the device_list_mutex. Scan doesn't find the device, it goes down and does the
if (fs_devices->opened) return -EBUSY;
check and we bail out.
Nothing about this situation is ideal, but the lockdep splat is real, and the fix is safe, tho admittedly a bit scary looking.
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain anand.jain@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com [ copy more from the discussion ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Weilong Chen chenweilong@huawei.com Acked-by: Weilong Chen chenweilong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index 8946355dfe44..d9e582e40b5b 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -2069,8 +2069,11 @@ int btrfs_rm_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path, u64 num_devices; int ret = 0;
- mutex_lock(&uuid_mutex); - + /* + * The device list in fs_devices is accessed without locks (neither + * uuid_mutex nor device_list_mutex) as it won't change on a mounted + * filesystem and another device rm cannot run. + */ num_devices = btrfs_num_devices(fs_info);
ret = btrfs_check_raid_min_devices(fs_info, num_devices - 1); @@ -2114,11 +2117,9 @@ int btrfs_rm_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path, mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); }
- mutex_unlock(&uuid_mutex); ret = btrfs_shrink_device(device, 0); if (!ret) btrfs_reada_remove_dev(device); - mutex_lock(&uuid_mutex); if (ret) goto error_undo;
@@ -2194,7 +2195,6 @@ int btrfs_rm_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path, }
out: - mutex_unlock(&uuid_mutex); return ret;
error_undo: