mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc1 commit 5d99e198be279045e6ecefe220f5c52f8ce9bfd5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYPJF CVE: CVE-2024-47703
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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A bpf prog returning a positive number attached to file_alloc_security hook makes kernel panic.
This happens because file system can not filter out the positive number returned by the LSM prog using IS_ERR, and misinterprets this positive number as a file pointer.
Given that hook file_alloc_security never returned positive number before the introduction of BPF LSM, and other BPF LSM hooks may encounter similar issues, this patch adds LSM return value check in verifier, to ensure no unexpected value is returned.
Fixes: 520b7aa00d8c ("bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks") Reported-by: Xin Liu liuxin350@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai xukuohai@huawei.com Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719110059.797546-3-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org
Conflicts: include/linux/bpf.h include/linux/bpf_verifier.h include/linux/bpf_lsm.h kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c kernel/bpf/btf.c kernel/bpf/verifier.c [This is because we did not backport 5f99f312bd3b, 61df7b828204, 8fa4ecd49b81, c871d0e00f0e and 69fd337a975c] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu wutengda2@huawei.com --- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 8 +++++ include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 5 +++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 3 ++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index ba69705526eb..cac54ec14eb2 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ static_assert(__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX <= BPF_BASE_TYPE_LIMIT); */ struct bpf_insn_access_aux { enum bpf_reg_type reg_type; + bool is_retval; /* is accessing function return value ? */ union { int ctx_field_size; u32 btf_id; diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h index aaacb6aafc87..272655378f94 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H
#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM @@ -39,6 +40,8 @@ extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_inode_storage_get_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_inode_storage_delete_proto; void bpf_inode_storage_free(struct inode *inode);
+int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_retval_range *range); #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
static inline int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog, @@ -57,6 +60,11 @@ static inline void bpf_inode_storage_free(struct inode *inode) { }
+static inline int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_retval_range *range) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 351923aab869..aba15abf3819 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ struct bpf_reference_state { int insn_idx; };
+struct bpf_retval_range { + s32 minval; + s32 maxval; +}; + /* state of the program: * type of all registers and stack info */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index 936dce810351..54a655c05f2f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> #include <linux/kallsyms.h> -#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> #include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h> #include <linux/bpf_local_storage.h> #include <linux/btf_ids.h> @@ -101,3 +100,35 @@ const struct bpf_verifier_ops lsm_verifier_ops = { .get_func_proto = bpf_lsm_func_proto, .is_valid_access = btf_ctx_access, }; + +/* hooks return 0 or 1 */ +BTF_SET_START(bool_lsm_hooks) +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match) +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known) +#endif +BTF_SET_END(bool_lsm_hooks) + +int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_retval_range *retval_range) +{ + /* no return value range for void hooks */ + if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) + return -EINVAL; + + if (btf_id_set_contains(&bool_lsm_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id)) { + retval_range->minval = 0; + retval_range->maxval = 1; + } else { + /* All other available LSM hooks, except task_prctl, return 0 + * on success and negative error code on failure. + * To keep things simple, we only allow bpf progs to return 0 + * or negative errno for task_prctl too. + */ + retval_range->minval = -MAX_ERRNO; + retval_range->maxval = 0; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 3a73b6bdf6c7..cb54404b5ab6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -4466,6 +4466,9 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, if (arg == nr_args) { switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { case BPF_LSM_MAC: + /* mark we are accessing the return value */ + info->is_retval = true; + fallthrough; case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: /* When LSM programs are attached to void LSM hooks * they use FEXIT trampolines and when attached to diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index a2a77348fa60..6999e1e5bfa7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1387,6 +1387,25 @@ static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); }
+static int __mark_reg_s32_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *regs, + u32 regno, + s32 s32_min, + s32 s32_max) +{ + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; + + reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, s32_min); + reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, s32_max); + + reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, s32_min); + reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, s32_max); + + reg_bounds_sync(reg); + + return 0; +} + static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) { @@ -1440,6 +1459,11 @@ static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; }
+static struct bpf_retval_range retval_range(s32 minval, s32 maxval) +{ + return (struct bpf_retval_range){ minval, maxval }; +} + #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, @@ -3024,11 +3048,12 @@ static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, - u32 *btf_id) + u32 *btf_id, bool *is_retval) { struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { .reg_type = *reg_type, .log = &env->log, + .is_retval = false, };
if (env->ops->is_valid_access && @@ -3041,6 +3066,7 @@ static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, * type of narrower access. */ *reg_type = info.reg_type; + *is_retval = info.is_retval;
if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) *btf_id = info.btf_id; @@ -3749,6 +3775,17 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( return grow_stack_state(env, state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); }
+static bool get_func_retval_range(struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_retval_range *range) +{ + if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && + prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC && + !bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(prog, range)) { + return true; + } + return false; +} + /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory @@ -3832,6 +3869,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { + bool is_retval = false; + struct bpf_retval_range range; enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; u32 btf_id = 0;
@@ -3845,7 +3884,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn if (err < 0) return err;
- err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf_id); + err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, + &btf_id, &is_retval); if (err) verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { @@ -3854,7 +3894,14 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn * case, we know the offset is zero. */ if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { - mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); + if (is_retval && get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range)) { + err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, value_regno, + range.minval, range.maxval); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); + } } else { mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, value_regno); @@ -8361,6 +8408,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; struct bpf_reg_state *reg; struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); + struct bpf_retval_range precise_range = retval_range(S32_MIN, S32_MAX); enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); int err; const bool is_subprog = env->cur_state->frame[0]->subprogno; @@ -8442,6 +8490,14 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); break; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: + /* no range found, any return value is allowed */ + if (!get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &precise_range)) + return 0; + /* no restricted range, any return value is allowed */ + if (precise_range.minval == S32_MIN && precise_range.maxval == S32_MAX) + return 0; + break; case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: /* freplace program can return anything as its return value * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program.