From: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.255 commit b1c9f470fb724d3cfd6cf8fe4a70c2ec4de2e9f4 category: bugfix bugzilla: 187492, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5N1SO CVE: CVE-2022-26373
--------------------------------
commit ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 upstream.
RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't completed yet.
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ mov $(nr/2), reg; \ 771: \ call 772f; \ 773: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 773b; \ 772: \ call 774f; \ 775: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 775b; \ 774: \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here. \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based attacks.
Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent speculation while RSB is being filled.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Chen Jiahao chenjiahao16@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua chris.zjh@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Liao Chang liaochang1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 1f2a6f183d18..176089fad1b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -52,7 +52,9 @@ 774: \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; \ + /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \ + lfence;
/* Sequence to mitigate PBRSB on eIBRS CPUs */ #define __ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp) \