From: Daniel Sneddon daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc6 commit 53cf5797f114ba2bd86d23a862302119848eff19 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7XLNT CVE: CVE-2022-40982
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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commit 53cf5797f114ba2bd86d23a862302119848eff19 upstream
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is mitigated in microcode. However, on systems that haven't received the updated microcode, disabling AVX can act as a mitigation. Add a Kconfig option that uses the microcode mitigation if available and disables AVX otherwise. Setting this option has no effect on systems not affected by GDS. This is the equivalent of setting gather_data_sampling=force.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng zengheng4@huawei.com --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 42f03c50857f..8c08ca6ddde1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2530,6 +2530,25 @@ config SLS against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly larger.
+config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION + bool "Force GDS Mitigation" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default n + help + Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows + unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in + vector registers. + + This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the + command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise + AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing + the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will + break with this option set. + + Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect. + + If in doubt, say N. + endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 1c90239ff088..f5b1020187cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -655,7 +655,11 @@ enum gds_mitigations { GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, };
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION) +static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; +#else static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; +#endif
static const char * const gds_strings[] = { [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",