From: Lukas Bulwahn lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.94 commit 5d38cbf66dd7df04f06be86d812c7e5861cd3a69 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I531X9
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream.
The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within the same sentence.
Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to the config that provides that.
Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet corbet@lwn.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index e05e581af5cf..985181dba0ba 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits using the firmware.
- Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.