From: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com
euleros inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QZ2M CVE: NA
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This patch introduces a new hard-coded policy to appraise executable code:
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig appraise func=FIRMWARE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig appraise func=POLICY_CHECK appraise_type=imasig appraise func=DIGEST_LIST_CHECK appraise_type=imasig dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673 dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c dont_appraise fsmagic=0x43415d53 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673 dont_appraise fsmagic=0xde5e81e4 dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb dont_appraise fsmagic=0x63677270 appraise func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=imasig appraise func=MMAP_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
The new policy can be selected by specifying ima_policy=appraise_exec_tcb in the kernel command line.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Tianxing Zhang zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: zhoushuiqing zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 27406e421..5d4f298da 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2010,6 +2010,11 @@ of files (eg. kexec kernel image, kernel modules, firmware, policy, etc) based on file signatures.
+ The "appraise_exec_tcb" includes the "secure_boot" + policy and additionally includes all programs exec'd and + files mmap'd for exec. Files in the tmpfs filesystem are + not excluded from appraisal. + The "fail_securely" policy forces file signature verification failure also on privileged mounted filesystems with the SB_I_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 7fbf4fcc2..73a96427b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -226,6 +226,14 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #endif };
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static struct ima_rule_entry appraise_exec_rules[] __ro_after_init = { + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, + {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +}; +#endif static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, @@ -285,6 +293,9 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb __initdata; +#endif static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; static bool ima_use_critical_data __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; @@ -303,6 +314,10 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) #endif else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_tcb") == 0) + ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb = true; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) @@ -901,6 +916,15 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, entries[i].func == FILE_CHECK) continue; } + if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) { + if (entries == default_appraise_rules) { + if (entries[i].action != DONT_APPRAISE) + continue; + if ((entries[i].flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && + entries[i].fsmagic == TMPFS_MAGIC) + continue; + } + } #endif if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules); @@ -1017,7 +1041,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else if (ima_use_secure_boot) +#endif add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
@@ -1037,11 +1065,21 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); }
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + if (ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) +#endif add_rules(default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) + add_rules(appraise_exec_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(appraise_exec_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif if (ima_use_critical_data) add_rules(critical_data_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),