From: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.198 commit 77c94b2a1deea733e2796a2da7b637c1afd0cdb8
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commit 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c upstream.
EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.
Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.
Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Conflicts: security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c [yyl: keep same as mainline] Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm index 201d10319fa18..1df1177df68ad 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm @@ -42,8 +42,30 @@ Description: modification of EVM-protected metadata and disable all further modification of policy
- Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be - possible to enable metadata modification. + Echoing a value is additive, the new value is added to the + existing initialization flags. + + For example, after:: + + echo 2 ><securityfs>/evm + + another echo can be performed:: + + echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm + + and the resulting value will be 3. + + Note that once an HMAC key has been loaded, it will no longer + be possible to enable metadata modification. Signaling that an + HMAC key has been loaded will clear the corresponding flag. + For example, if the current value is 6 (2 and 4 set):: + + echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm + + will set the new value to 3 (4 cleared). + + Loading an HMAC key is the only way to disable metadata + modification.
Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 6a6e293d4e411..7024b14831e3d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -85,12 +85,12 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0) return -EINVAL;
- /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if - * keys are loaded. + /* + * Don't allow a request to enable metadata writes if + * an HMAC key is loaded. */ if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) && - ((evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) && - !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) + (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) return -EPERM;
if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) {