From: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com
euleros inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QZ2M CVE: NA
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Provide a facility to autogenerate the name of PGP keys from the contents of the payload. If add_key() is given a blank description, a description is constructed from the last user ID packet in the payload data plus the last 8 hex digits of the key ID. For instance:
keyctl padd asymmetric "" @s </tmp/key.pub
might create a key with a constructed description that can be seen in /proc/keys:
2f674b96 I--Q--- 1 perm 39390000 0 0 crypto \ Sample kernel key 31f0ae93: PGP.RSA 31f0ae93 []
Changelog
v0: - fix style issues (Roberto Sassu)
Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Tianxing Zhang zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: zhoushuiqing zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c index 49913b346c18..27b9efeafc4f 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ struct pgp_key_data_parse_context { struct public_key *pub; unsigned char *raw_fingerprint; char *fingerprint; + const char *user_id; + size_t user_id_len; + size_t fingerprint_len; };
/* @@ -156,6 +159,7 @@ static int pgp_generate_fingerprint(struct pgp_key_data_parse_context *ctx, if (ret < 0) goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint;
+ ctx->fingerprint_len = digest_size * 2; fingerprint = kmalloc(digest_size * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!fingerprint) goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint; @@ -200,6 +204,13 @@ static int pgp_process_public_key(struct pgp_parse_context *context,
kenter(",%u,%u,,%zu", type, headerlen, datalen);
+ if (type == PGP_PKT_USER_ID) { + ctx->user_id = data; + ctx->user_id_len = datalen; + kleave(" = 0 [user ID]"); + return 0; + } + if (ctx->fingerprint) { kleave(" = -ENOKEY [already]"); return -EBADMSG; @@ -292,13 +303,46 @@ static int pgp_key_parse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) kenter("");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); - ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); + ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) | + (1 << PGP_PKT_USER_ID); ctx.pgp.process_packet = pgp_process_public_key;
ret = pgp_parse_packets(prep->data, prep->datalen, &ctx.pgp); if (ret < 0) goto error;
+ if (ctx.user_id && ctx.user_id_len > 0) { + /* Propose a description for the key + * (user ID without the comment) + */ + size_t ulen = ctx.user_id_len, flen = ctx.fingerprint_len; + const char *p; + + p = memchr(ctx.user_id, '(', ulen); + if (p) { + /* Remove the comment */ + do { + p--; + } while (*p == ' ' && p > ctx.user_id); + if (*p != ' ') + p++; + ulen = p - ctx.user_id; + } + + if (ulen > 255 - 9) + ulen = 255 - 9; + prep->description = kmalloc(ulen + 1 + 8 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + ret = -ENOMEM; + if (!prep->description) + goto error; + memcpy(prep->description, ctx.user_id, ulen); + prep->description[ulen] = ' '; + memcpy(prep->description + ulen + 1, + ctx.fingerprint + flen - 8, 8); + prep->description[ulen + 9] = 0; + pr_debug("desc '%s'\n", prep->description); + } + /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;