From: Richard Haines richard_c_haines@btinternet.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.110 commit 448857f58009fd950f4d732e8f1e4fcf859cb4b1 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I574AL
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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[ Upstream commit 65881e1db4e948614d9eb195b8e1197339822949 ]
These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux always allows too. Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it.
As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls.
Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour demiobenour@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Richard Haines richard_c_haines@btinternet.com [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yu Liao liaoyu15@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wei Li liwei391@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 7 +++++++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 63e61f2f1ad6..8c901ae05dd8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3647,6 +3647,12 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break;
+ case FIOCLEX: + case FIONCLEX: + if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec()) + error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); + break; + /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h index 2ec038efbb03..a9e572ca4fd9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum { POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC, __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX }; #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index b89289f092c9..ebd64afe1def 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = { "always_check_network", "cgroup_seclabel", "nnp_nosuid_transition", - "genfs_seclabel_symlinks" + "genfs_seclabel_symlinks", + "ioctl_skip_cloexec" };
#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 63ca6e79daeb..1521460a97d4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); }
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]); +} + struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
struct selinux_load_state {