From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" bp@alien8.de
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.189 commit 4acaea47e3bcb7cd55cc56c7fd4e5fb60eebdada category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RQ67 CVE: CVE-2023-20569
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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Upstream commit: 233d6f68b98d480a7c42ebe78c38f79d44741ca9
Add the option to mitigate using IBPB on a kernel entry. Pull in the Retbleed alternative so that the IBPB call from there can be used. Also, if Retbleed mitigation is done using IBPB, the same mitigation can and must be used here.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index c93745cd6587..a010ae7fe6fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET -#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) +#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ + defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO) ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 7cb26241dc19..9d53e20f6c8d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2245,18 +2245,21 @@ enum srso_mitigation { SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE, SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE, SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET, + SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB, };
enum srso_mitigation_cmd { SRSO_CMD_OFF, SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE, SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET, + SRSO_CMD_IBPB, };
static const char * const srso_strings[] = { [SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode", [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", };
static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE; @@ -2273,6 +2276,8 @@ static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str) srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE; else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret")) srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET; + else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
@@ -2314,6 +2319,14 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); }
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { + if (has_microcode) { + pr_err("Retbleed IBPB mitigation enabled, using same for SRSO\n"); + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; + goto pred_cmd; + } + } + switch (srso_cmd) { case SRSO_CMD_OFF: return; @@ -2338,6 +2351,16 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) } break;
+ case SRSO_CMD_IBPB: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (has_microcode) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + goto pred_cmd; + } default: break; }