From: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com
commit 2ad3e17ebf94b7b7f3f64c050ff168f9915345eb upstream.
Commit 219ca39427bf ("audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive") combined a number of separate fields in the audit_field struct into a single union. Generally this worked just fine because they are generally mutually exclusive. Unfortunately in audit_data_to_entry() the overlap can be a problem when a specific error case is triggered that causes the error path code to attempt to cleanup an audit_field struct and the cleanup involves attempting to free a stored LSM string (the lsm_str field). Currently the code always has a non-NULL value in the audit_field.lsm_str field as the top of the for-loop transfers a value into audit_field.val (both .lsm_str and .val are part of the same union); if audit_data_to_entry() fails and the audit_field struct is specified to contain a LSM string, but the audit_field.lsm_str has not yet been properly set, the error handling code will attempt to free the bogus audit_field.lsm_str value that was set with audit_field.val at the top of the for-loop.
This patch corrects this by ensuring that the audit_field.val is only set when needed (it is cleared when the audit_field struct is allocated with kcalloc()). It also corrects a few other issues to ensure that in case of error the proper error code is returned.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 219ca39427bf ("audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive") Reported-by: syzbot+1f4d90ead370d72e450b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 425c67e..1c8a48a 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, bufp = data->buf; for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i]; + u32 f_val;
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -460,12 +461,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, goto exit_free;
f->type = data->fields[i]; - f->val = data->values[i]; + f_val = data->values[i];
/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */ - if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) { + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f_val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) { f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET; - f->val = 0; + f_val = 0; entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY; }
@@ -481,7 +482,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_SUID: case AUDIT_FSUID: case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: - f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val); + f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f_val); if (!uid_valid(f->uid)) goto exit_free; break; @@ -490,11 +491,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_SGID: case AUDIT_FSGID: case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: - f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val); + f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f_val); if (!gid_valid(f->gid)) goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_ARCH: + f->val = f_val; entry->rule.arch_f = f; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: @@ -507,11 +509,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - + } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; + f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, (void **)&f->lsm_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they @@ -520,68 +524,71 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, pr_warn("audit rule for LSM '%s' is invalid\n", str); err = 0; - } - if (err) { - kfree(str); + } else if (err) goto exit_free; - } else - f->lsm_str = str; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - - err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op); + } + err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f_val, f->op); if (err) { kfree(str); goto exit_free; } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; break; case AUDIT_DIR: - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - + } err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op); kfree(str); if (err) goto exit_free; + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; break; case AUDIT_INODE: + f->val = f_val; err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f); if (err) goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: - if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN) + if (entry->rule.filterkey || f_val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN) goto exit_free; - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); - if (IS_ERR(str)) + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) { + err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; + } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; entry->rule.filterkey = str; break; case AUDIT_EXE: - if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX) + if (entry->rule.exe || f_val > PATH_MAX) goto exit_free; - str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val); if (IS_ERR(str)) { err = PTR_ERR(str); goto exit_free; } - entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - - audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val); + audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f_val); if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) { kfree(str); err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark); goto exit_free; } + entry->rule.buflen += f_val; entry->rule.exe = audit_mark; break; + default: + f->val = f_val; + break; } }