From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.110 commit 10ee5662d5a65bf3883eefe59b053eb4c115bc87 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I574AL
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit c51abd96837f600d8fd940b6ab8e2da578575504 upstream.
In many cases, keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() is validating the user buffer lengths against the wrong algorithm properties. Fix it to check against the correct properties.
Probably this wasn't noticed before because for all asymmetric keys of the "public_key" subtype, max_data_size == max_sig_size == max_enc_size == max_dec_size. However, this isn't necessarily true for the "asym_tpm" subtype (it should be, but it's not strictly validated). Of course, future key types could have different values as well.
Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yu Liao liaoyu15@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wei Li liwei391@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c index 931d8dfb4a7f..63e5c646f762 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c @@ -135,15 +135,23 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
switch (op) { case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT: + if (uparams.in_len > info.max_dec_size || + uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size) + return -EINVAL; + break; case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT: if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size || uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size) return -EINVAL; break; case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN: + if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size || + uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size) + return -EINVAL; + break; case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY: - if (uparams.in_len > info.max_sig_size || - uparams.out_len > info.max_data_size) + if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size || + uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) return -EINVAL; break; default: @@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par }
params->in_len = uparams.in_len; - params->out_len = uparams.out_len; + params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */ return 0; }