From: Maxim Mikityanskiy maxim@isovalent.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.186 commit 562800447f8beef8ebc5a8640c61411620911ad1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IB4BCM
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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[ Upstream commit 713274f1f2c896d37017efee333fd44149710119 ]
The following scenario describes a bug in the verifier where it incorrectly concludes about equivalent scalar IDs which could lead to verifier bypass in privileged mode:
1. Prepare a 32-bit rogue number. 2. Put the rogue number into the upper half of a 64-bit register, and roll a random (unknown to the verifier) bit in the lower half. The rest of the bits should be zero (although variations are possible). 3. Assign an ID to the register by MOVing it to another arbitrary register. 4. Perform a 32-bit spill of the register, then perform a 32-bit fill to another register. Due to a bug in the verifier, the ID will be preserved, although the new register will contain only the lower 32 bits, i.e. all zeros except one random bit.
At this point there are two registers with different values but the same ID, which means the integrity of the verifier state has been corrupted.
5. Compare the new 32-bit register with 0. In the branch where it's equal to 0, the verifier will believe that the original 64-bit register is also 0, because it has the same ID, but its actual value still contains the rogue number in the upper half. Some optimizations of the verifier prevent the actual bypass, so extra care is needed: the comparison must be between two registers, and both branches must be reachable (this is why one random bit is needed). Both branches are still suitable for the bypass. 6. Right shift the original register by 32 bits to pop the rogue number. 7. Use the rogue number as an offset with any pointer. The verifier will believe that the offset is 0, while in reality it's the given number.
The fix is similar to the 32-bit BPF_MOV handling in check_alu_op for SCALAR_VALUE. If the spill is narrowing the actual register value, don't keep the ID, make sure it's reset to 0.
Fixes: 354e8f1970f8 ("bpf: Support <8-byte scalar spill and refill") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy maxim@isovalent.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Tested-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org # Checked veristat delta Acked-by: Yonghong Song yhs@fb.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230607123951.558971-2-maxtram95@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wang Hai wanghai38@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index fe4918f5c8bd..8d5b9268640d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2419,6 +2419,9 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return err; } save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); + /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */ + if (fls64(reg->umax_value) > BITS_PER_BYTE * size) + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0; } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) { struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};