From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.193 commit 0f716b48ed25503e6961f4b5b40ece36f7e4ed26
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commit bf30ca922a0c0176007e074b0acc77ed345e9990 upstream.
As pointed out by Mathy Vanhoef, we implement the RX PN check on fragmented frames incorrectly - we check against the last received PN prior to the new frame, rather than to the one in this frame itself.
Prior patches addressed the security issue here, but in order to be able to reason better about the code, fix it to really compare against the current frame's PN, not the last stored one.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.bfbc340ff071.Id0b690e581da7d03d76df... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 11 +++++++++-- net/mac80211/rx.c | 5 ++--- net/mac80211/wpa.c | 13 +++++++++---- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index 67e78f47a8bd7..d199b4f5424f5 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -225,8 +225,15 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data { */ int security_idx;
- u32 tkip_iv32; - u16 tkip_iv16; + union { + struct { + u32 iv32; + u16 iv16; + } tkip; + struct { + u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; + } ccm_gcm; + }; };
struct ieee80211_csa_settings { diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index b4d35c88d2356..2b01ce17cc684 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2194,7 +2194,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (entry->check_sequential_pn) { int i; u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn; - int queue;
if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; @@ -2209,8 +2208,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (pn[i]) break; } - queue = rx->security_idx; - rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue]; + + rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn; if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index 5dd48f0a4b1bd..dbeccccf0fdf3 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc. * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen j@w1.fi * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH + * Copyright (C) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as @@ -170,8 +171,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
update_iv: /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ - rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32; - rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16; + rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32; + rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -297,8 +298,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) key, skb->data + hdrlen, skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx, - &rx->tkip_iv32, - &rx->tkip_iv16); + &rx->tkip.iv32, + &rx->tkip.iv16); if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
@@ -556,6 +557,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, }
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); + if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) + memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); }
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ @@ -784,6 +787,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) }
memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) + memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); }
/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */