From: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk
mainline inclusion from mainline-5.1-rc1 commit f4e65870e5cede5ca1ec0006b6c9803994e5f7b8 category: feature bugzilla: https://bugzilla.openeuler.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27 CVE: NA ---------------------------
We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is m/y.
No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around.
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.com Acked-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng chengzhihao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: yangerkun yangerkun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: zhangyi (F) yi.zhang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Cheng Jian cj.chengjian@huawei.com --- include/net/af_unix.h | 1 + net/Makefile | 2 +- net/unix/Kconfig | 5 ++ net/unix/Makefile | 2 + net/unix/af_unix.c | 63 +----------------- net/unix/garbage.c | 71 +------------------- net/unix/scm.c | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/unix/scm.h | 10 +++ 8 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/unix/scm.c create mode 100644 net/unix/scm.h
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h index a5ba41b3b867..7ec1cdb66be8 100644 --- a/include/net/af_unix.h +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp); void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp); +void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb); void unix_gc(void); void wait_for_unix_gc(void); struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp); diff --git a/net/Makefile b/net/Makefile index bdaf53925acd..449fc0b221f8 100644 --- a/net/Makefile +++ b/net/Makefile @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER) += netfilter/ obj-$(CONFIG_INET) += ipv4/ obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls/ obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm/ -obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX) += unix/ +obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_SCM) += unix/ obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += ipv6/ obj-$(CONFIG_BPFILTER) += bpfilter/ obj-$(CONFIG_PACKET) += packet/ diff --git a/net/unix/Kconfig b/net/unix/Kconfig index 8b31ab85d050..3b9e450656a4 100644 --- a/net/unix/Kconfig +++ b/net/unix/Kconfig @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ config UNIX
Say Y unless you know what you are doing.
+config UNIX_SCM + bool + depends on UNIX + default y + config UNIX_DIAG tristate "UNIX: socket monitoring interface" depends on UNIX diff --git a/net/unix/Makefile b/net/unix/Makefile index ffd0a275c3a7..54e58cc4f945 100644 --- a/net/unix/Makefile +++ b/net/unix/Makefile @@ -10,3 +10,5 @@ unix-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_unix.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG) += unix_diag.o unix_diag-y := diag.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_SCM) += scm.o diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 2020306468af..b09f0b567db5 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -119,6 +119,8 @@ #include <linux/freezer.h> #include <linux/file.h>
+#include "scm.h" + struct hlist_head unix_socket_table[2 * UNIX_HASH_SIZE]; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unix_socket_table); DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_table_lock); @@ -1514,67 +1516,6 @@ static int unix_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int peer) return err; }
-static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - int i; - - scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp; - UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL; - - for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--) - unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); -} - -static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - struct scm_cookie scm; - memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm)); - scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid; - if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) - unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb); - - /* Alas, it calls VFS */ - /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */ - scm_destroy(&scm); - sock_wfree(skb); -} - -/* - * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage - * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go - * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing - * it across threads. Tough. - */ -static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p) -{ - struct user_struct *user = current_user(); - - if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE))) - return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); - return false; -} - -static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - int i; - - if (too_many_unix_fds(current)) - return -ETOOMANYREFS; - - /* - * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage - * collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a - * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued. - */ - UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp); - if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp) - return -ENOMEM; - - for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) - unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); - return 0; -} - static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds) { int err = 0; diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c index f81854d74c7d..8bbe1b8e4ff7 100644 --- a/net/unix/garbage.c +++ b/net/unix/garbage.c @@ -86,80 +86,13 @@ #include <net/scm.h> #include <net/tcp_states.h>
+#include "scm.h" + /* Internal data structures and random procedures: */
-static LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list); static LIST_HEAD(gc_candidates); -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock); static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(unix_gc_wait);
-unsigned int unix_tot_inflight; - -struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp) -{ - struct sock *u_sock = NULL; - struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); - - /* Socket ? */ - if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) { - struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode); - struct sock *s = sock->sk; - - /* PF_UNIX ? */ - if (s && sock->ops && sock->ops->family == PF_UNIX) - u_sock = s; - } else { - /* Could be an io_uring instance */ - u_sock = io_uring_get_socket(filp); - } - return u_sock; -} - -/* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file - * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket. - */ - -void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) -{ - struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); - - spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); - - if (s) { - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); - - if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) { - BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link)); - list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list); - } else { - BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); - } - unix_tot_inflight++; - } - user->unix_inflight++; - spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); -} - -void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) -{ - struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); - - spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); - - if (s) { - struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); - - BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight)); - BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); - - if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight)) - list_del_init(&u->link); - unix_tot_inflight--; - } - user->unix_inflight--; - spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); -} - static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *), struct sk_buff_head *hitlist) { diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8c40f2b32392 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/unix/scm.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <net/af_unix.h> +#include <net/scm.h> +#include <linux/init.h> + +#include "scm.h" + +unsigned int unix_tot_inflight; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_tot_inflight); + +LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gc_inflight_list); + +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_gc_lock); + +struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp) +{ + struct sock *u_sock = NULL; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); + + /* Socket ? */ + if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) { + struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode); + struct sock *s = sock->sk; + + /* PF_UNIX ? */ + if (s && sock->ops && sock->ops->family == PF_UNIX) + u_sock = s; + } else { + /* Could be an io_uring instance */ + u_sock = io_uring_get_socket(filp); + } + return u_sock; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_get_socket); + +/* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file + * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket. + */ +void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) +{ + struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); + + spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); + + if (s) { + struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); + + if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) { + BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link)); + list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list); + } else { + BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); + } + unix_tot_inflight++; + } + user->unix_inflight++; + spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); +} + +void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp) +{ + struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp); + + spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); + + if (s) { + struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s); + + BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight)); + BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link)); + + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight)) + list_del_init(&u->link); + unix_tot_inflight--; + } + user->unix_inflight--; + spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); +} + +/* + * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage + * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go + * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing + * it across threads. Tough. + */ +static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p) +{ + struct user_struct *user = current_user(); + + if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE))) + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + return false; +} + +int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int i; + + if (too_many_unix_fds(current)) + return -ETOOMANYREFS; + + /* + * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage + * collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a + * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued. + */ + UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp); + if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) + unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_attach_fds); + +void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int i; + + scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp; + UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL; + + for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--) + unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_detach_fds); + +void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct scm_cookie scm; + + memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm)); + scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid; + if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) + unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb); + + /* Alas, it calls VFS */ + /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */ + scm_destroy(&scm); + sock_wfree(skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_destruct_scm); diff --git a/net/unix/scm.h b/net/unix/scm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5a255a477f16 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/unix/scm.h @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +#ifndef NET_UNIX_SCM_H +#define NET_UNIX_SCM_H + +extern struct list_head gc_inflight_list; +extern spinlock_t unix_gc_lock; + +int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb); +void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb); + +#endif