From: Jan Beulich jbeulich@suse.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit cce8ba6fa4ec43ad778d64823a2f8ca120d362c1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I8YCSC CVE: CVE-2023-46838
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit c7ec4f2d684e17d69bbdd7c4324db0ef5daac26a upstream.
While frontends may submit zero-size requests (wasting a precious slot), core networking code as of at least 3ece782693c4b ("sock: skb_copy_ubufs support for compound pages") can't deal with SKBs when they have all zero-size fragments. Respond to empty requests right when populating fragments; all further processing is fragment based and hence won't encounter these empty requests anymore.
In a way this should have been that way from the beginning: When no data is to be transferred for a particular request, there's not even a point in validating the respective grant ref. That's no different from e.g. passing NULL into memcpy() when at the same time the size is 0.
This is XSA-448 / CVE-2023-46838.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich jbeulich@suse.com Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant paul@xen.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan william.xuanziyang@huawei.com --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 1c366ddf62bc..d25bb5b9a54c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -463,12 +463,25 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, }
for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS; - shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) { + nr_slots--) { + if (unlikely(!txp->size)) { + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->response_lock, flags); + make_tx_response(queue, txp, 0, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY); + push_tx_responses(queue); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->response_lock, flags); + ++txp; + continue; + } + index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, txp == first ? extra_count : 0, gop); frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[shinfo->nr_frags], pending_idx); + ++shinfo->nr_frags; + ++gop;
if (txp == first) txp = txfrags; @@ -481,20 +494,39 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb); frags = shinfo->frags;
- for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; - shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) { + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; ++txp) { + if (unlikely(!txp->size)) { + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->response_lock, flags); + make_tx_response(queue, txp, 0, + XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY); + push_tx_responses(queue); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->response_lock, + flags); + continue; + } + index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, 0, gop); frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[shinfo->nr_frags], pending_idx); + ++shinfo->nr_frags; + ++gop; }
- skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; - } else if (nskb) { + if (shinfo->nr_frags) { + skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; + nskb = NULL; + } + } + + if (nskb) { /* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed - * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above. + * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above or some + * were empty. */ kfree_skb(nskb); }