From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.205 commit 11cad2a46103388a46f31ab69b3e0e152a08df9c
--------------------------------
commit a0761a301746ec2d92d7fcb82af69c0a6a4339aa upstream.
If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore.
This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ.
Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen j@w1.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho luciano.coelho@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b0642... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com [pali: Backported to 4.19 and older versions] Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c | 1 + net/mac80211/key.c | 1 + net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 1 + net/mac80211/tx.c | 12 +++++++++--- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c index 4105081dc1df0..6f390c2e4c8ea 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c +++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static const char * const sta_flag_names[] = { FLAG(MPSP_OWNER), FLAG(MPSP_RECIPIENT), FLAG(PS_DELIVER), + FLAG(USES_ENCRYPTION), #undef FLAG };
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index 6775d6cb7d3d4..7fc55177db847 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ static void ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (sta) { if (pairwise) { rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new); + set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION); sta->ptk_idx = idx; ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); } else { diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h index c33bc5fc0f2d8..75d982ff7f3d0 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ enum ieee80211_sta_info_flags { WLAN_STA_MPSP_OWNER, WLAN_STA_MPSP_RECIPIENT, WLAN_STA_PS_DELIVER, + WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION,
NUM_WLAN_STA_FLAGS, }; diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 98d048630ad2f..3530d1a5fc98e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tx->skb); struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)tx->skb->data;
- if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT)) + if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT)) { tx->key = NULL; - else if (tx->sta && - (key = rcu_dereference(tx->sta->ptk[tx->sta->ptk_idx]))) + return TX_CONTINUE; + } + + if (tx->sta && + (key = rcu_dereference(tx->sta->ptk[tx->sta->ptk_idx]))) tx->key = key; else if (ieee80211_is_group_privacy_action(tx->skb) && (key = rcu_dereference(tx->sdata->default_multicast_key))) @@ -657,6 +660,9 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) if (!skip_hw && tx->key && tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; + } else if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) && tx->sta && + test_sta_flag(tx->sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION)) { + return TX_DROP; }
return TX_CONTINUE;