From: Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.94 commit 8f12dcab90e886d0169a9cd372a8bb35339cfc19 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6FB6C CVE: CVE-2022-27672
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit be8de49bea505e7777a69ef63d60e02ac1712683 upstream.
Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling threads transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return target predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.
The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM to prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0. A guest could act maliciously in this situation, so create a new x86 BUG that can be used to detect if the processor is vulnerable.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com Message-Id: 91cec885656ca1fcd4f0185ce403a53dd9edecb7.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Guo Mengqi <guomengqi3@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang wangweiyang2@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Weilong Chen chenweilong@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 9 +++++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 3cb7e1793c25..949325c8af52 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -471,5 +471,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */ #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ +#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 9c7708e98b32..12931233fdd7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1124,6 +1124,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ #define RETBLEED BIT(3) +/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */ +#define SMT_RSB BIT(4)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1155,8 +1157,8 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB), {} };
@@ -1274,6 +1276,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return;