From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.9-rc2 commit 38ba8b9241f5848a49b80fddac9ab5f4692e434e category: bugfix bugzilla: 38684 CVE: NA
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syzbot found that at least 2 bytes of kernel information were leaked during getsockname() on AF_CAN CAN_J1939 socket.
Since struct sockaddr_can has in fact two holes, simply clear the whole area before filling it with useful data.
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in kmsan_copy_to_user+0x81/0x90 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:253 CPU: 0 PID: 8466 Comm: syz-executor511 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x21c/0x280 lib/dump_stack.c:118 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:121 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x238/0x3d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:423 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x81/0x90 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:253 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:91 [inline] _copy_to_user+0x18e/0x260 lib/usercopy.c:39 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:186 [inline] move_addr_to_user+0x3de/0x670 net/socket.c:237 __sys_getsockname+0x407/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1909 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname+0x91/0xb0 net/socket.c:1917 __x64_sys_getsockname+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:1917 do_syscall_64+0xad/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x440219 Code: Bad RIP value. RSP: 002b:00007ffe5ee150c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000033 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440219 RDX: 0000000020000240 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401a20 R13: 0000000000401ab0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Local variable ----address@__sys_getsockname created at: __sys_getsockname+0x91/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1894 __sys_getsockname+0x91/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1894
Bytes 2-3 of 24 are uninitialized Memory access of size 24 starts at ffff8880ba2c7de8 Data copied to user address 0000000020000100
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Cc: Robin van der Gracht robin@protonic.nl Cc: Oleksij Rempel o.rempel@pengutronix.de Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team kernel@pengutronix.de Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel o.rempel@pengutronix.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200813161834.4021638-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong zhangchangzhong@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- net/can/j1939/socket.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/socket.c b/net/can/j1939/socket.c index f7587428febdd..2f4e2142ef268 100644 --- a/net/can/j1939/socket.c +++ b/net/can/j1939/socket.c @@ -553,6 +553,11 @@ static int j1939_sk_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, static void j1939_sk_sock2sockaddr_can(struct sockaddr_can *addr, const struct j1939_sock *jsk, int peer) { + /* There are two holes (2 bytes and 3 bytes) to clear to avoid + * leaking kernel information to user space. + */ + memset(addr, 0, J1939_MIN_NAMELEN); + addr->can_family = AF_CAN; addr->can_ifindex = jsk->ifindex; addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn = jsk->addr.pgn;