From: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc7 commit 62e7151ae3eb465e0ab52a20c941ff33bb6332e9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q8LZ CVE: CVE-2024-27415
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
--------------------------------
conntrack nf_confirm logic cannot handle cloned skbs referencing the same nf_conn entry, which will happen for multicast (broadcast) frames on bridges.
Example: macvlan0 | br0 / \ ethX ethY
ethX (or Y) receives a L2 multicast or broadcast packet containing an IP packet, flow is not yet in conntrack table.
1. skb passes through bridge and fake-ip (br_netfilter)Prerouting. -> skb->_nfct now references a unconfirmed entry 2. skb is broad/mcast packet. bridge now passes clones out on each bridge interface. 3. skb gets passed up the stack. 4. In macvlan case, macvlan driver retains clone(s) of the mcast skb and schedules a work queue to send them out on the lower devices.
The clone skb->_nfct is not a copy, it is the same entry as the original skb. The macvlan rx handler then returns RX_HANDLER_PASS. 5. Normal conntrack hooks (in NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) confirm the orig skb.
The Macvlan broadcast worker and normal confirm path will race.
This race will not happen if step 2 already confirmed a clone. In that case later steps perform skb_clone() with skb->_nfct already confirmed (in hash table). This works fine.
But such confirmation won't happen when eb/ip/nftables rules dropped the packets before they reached the nf_confirm step in postrouting.
Pablo points out that nf_conntrack_bridge doesn't allow use of stateful nat, so we can safely discard the nf_conn entry and let inet call conntrack again.
This doesn't work for bridge netfilter: skb could have a nat transformation. Also bridge nf prevents re-invocation of inet prerouting via 'sabotage_in' hook.
Work around this problem by explicit confirmation of the entry at LOCAL_IN time, before upper layer has a chance to clone the unconfirmed entry.
The downside is that this disables NAT and conntrack helpers.
Alternative fix would be to add locking to all code parts that deal with unconfirmed packets, but even if that could be done in a sane way this opens up other problems, for example:
-m physdev --physdev-out eth0 -j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.4 -m physdev --physdev-out eth1 -j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.5
For multicast case, only one of such conflicting mappings will be created, conntrack only handles 1:1 NAT mappings.
Users should set create a setup that explicitly marks such traffic NOTRACK (conntrack bypass) to avoid this, but we cannot auto-bypass them, ruleset might have accept rules for untracked traffic already, so user-visible behaviour would change.
Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217777 Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org
Conflicts: include/linux/netfilter.h net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c [The conflict occurs because the commit 25374f868385("kabi: net: reserve space for net netfilter subsystem related structure") and 3fce16493dc1(" netfilter: core: move ip_ct_attach indirection to struct nf_ct_hook") and 2954fe60e33d("netfilter: let reset rules clean out conntrack entries") are not merged. The hook functions .attach and .set_closing do not exist on the 5.10 branch. As commit 719774377622("netfilter: conntrack: convert to refcount_t api") is not merged, use atomic_read instead of refcount_read] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao shaozhengchao@huawei.com --- include/linux/netfilter.h | 1 + net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++ net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c | 30 +++++++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 128 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter.h b/include/linux/netfilter.h index 9e82454c97b8..233da81717a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter.h @@ -457,6 +457,7 @@ struct nf_ct_hook { void (*destroy)(struct nf_conntrack *); bool (*get_tuple_skb)(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *, const struct sk_buff *); + int (*confirm)(struct sk_buff *skb);
KABI_RESERVE(1) }; diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c index ebba876ec881..34c39464ae21 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c @@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ #include <linux/sysctl.h> #endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) +#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h> +#endif + static unsigned int brnf_net_id __read_mostly;
struct brnf_net { @@ -551,6 +555,90 @@ static unsigned int br_nf_pre_routing(void *priv, return NF_STOLEN; }
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) +/* conntracks' nf_confirm logic cannot handle cloned skbs referencing + * the same nf_conn entry, which will happen for multicast (broadcast) + * Frames on bridges. + * + * Example: + * macvlan0 + * br0 + * ethX ethY + * + * ethX (or Y) receives multicast or broadcast packet containing + * an IP packet, not yet in conntrack table. + * + * 1. skb passes through bridge and fake-ip (br_netfilter)Prerouting. + * -> skb->_nfct now references a unconfirmed entry + * 2. skb is broad/mcast packet. bridge now passes clones out on each bridge + * interface. + * 3. skb gets passed up the stack. + * 4. In macvlan case, macvlan driver retains clone(s) of the mcast skb + * and schedules a work queue to send them out on the lower devices. + * + * The clone skb->_nfct is not a copy, it is the same entry as the + * original skb. The macvlan rx handler then returns RX_HANDLER_PASS. + * 5. Normal conntrack hooks (in NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) confirm the orig skb. + * + * The Macvlan broadcast worker and normal confirm path will race. + * + * This race will not happen if step 2 already confirmed a clone. In that + * case later steps perform skb_clone() with skb->_nfct already confirmed (in + * hash table). This works fine. + * + * But such confirmation won't happen when eb/ip/nftables rules dropped the + * packets before they reached the nf_confirm step in postrouting. + * + * Work around this problem by explicit confirmation of the entry at + * LOCAL_IN time, before upper layer has a chance to clone the unconfirmed + * entry. + * + */ +static unsigned int br_nf_local_in(void *priv, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct nf_hook_state *state) +{ + struct nf_conntrack *nfct = skb_nfct(skb); + const struct nf_ct_hook *ct_hook; + struct nf_conn *ct; + int ret; + + if (!nfct || skb->pkt_type == PACKET_HOST) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + ct = container_of(nfct, struct nf_conn, ct_general); + if (likely(nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct))) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_shared(skb)); + WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&nfct->use) != 1); + + /* We can't call nf_confirm here, it would create a dependency + * on nf_conntrack module. + */ + ct_hook = rcu_dereference(nf_ct_hook); + if (!ct_hook) { + skb->_nfct = 0ul; + nf_conntrack_put(nfct); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } + + nf_bridge_pull_encap_header(skb); + ret = ct_hook->confirm(skb); + switch (ret & NF_VERDICT_MASK) { + case NF_STOLEN: + return NF_STOLEN; + default: + nf_bridge_push_encap_header(skb); + break; + } + + ct = container_of(nfct, struct nf_conn, ct_general); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)); + + return ret; +} +#endif
/* PF_BRIDGE/FORWARD *************************************************/ static int br_nf_forward_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -960,6 +1048,14 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops br_nf_ops[] = { .hooknum = NF_BR_PRE_ROUTING, .priority = NF_BR_PRI_BRNF, }, +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) + { + .hook = br_nf_local_in, + .pf = NFPROTO_BRIDGE, + .hooknum = NF_BR_LOCAL_IN, + .priority = NF_BR_PRI_LAST, + }, +#endif { .hook = br_nf_forward_ip, .pf = NFPROTO_BRIDGE, diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c index d14b2dbbd1df..83743e95939b 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c @@ -290,6 +290,30 @@ static unsigned int nf_ct_bridge_pre(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, return nf_conntrack_in(skb, &bridge_state); }
+static unsigned int nf_ct_bridge_in(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct nf_hook_state *state) +{ + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + struct nf_conn *ct; + + if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_HOST) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* nf_conntrack_confirm() cannot handle concurrent clones, + * this happens for broad/multicast frames with e.g. macvlan on top + * of the bridge device. + */ + ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); + if (!ct || nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) || nf_ct_is_template(ct)) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* let inet prerouting call conntrack again */ + skb->_nfct = 0; + nf_ct_put(ct); + + return NF_ACCEPT; +} + static void nf_ct_bridge_frag_save(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_bridge_frag_data *data) { @@ -414,6 +438,12 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops nf_ct_bridge_hook_ops[] __read_mostly = { .hooknum = NF_BR_PRE_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK, }, + { + .hook = nf_ct_bridge_in, + .pf = NFPROTO_BRIDGE, + .hooknum = NF_BR_LOCAL_IN, + .priority = NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_CONFIRM, + }, { .hook = nf_ct_bridge_post, .pf = NFPROTO_BRIDGE, diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index f82a234ac53a..f2634cda262c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -2681,6 +2681,7 @@ static struct nf_ct_hook nf_conntrack_hook = { .update = nf_conntrack_update, .destroy = destroy_conntrack, .get_tuple_skb = nf_conntrack_get_tuple_skb, + .confirm = __nf_conntrack_confirm, };
void nf_conntrack_init_end(void)