From: KP Singh kpsingh@kernel.org
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.173 commit abfed855f05863d292de2d0ebab4656791bab9c8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6V7TU CVE: CVE-2023-1998
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit 6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d upstream.
When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.
The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which STIBP protects.
Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS") Reported-by: José Oliveira joseloliveira11@gmail.com Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco rodrigo@kernelhacking.com Signed-off-by: KP Singh kpsingh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Wei Li liwei391@huawei.com --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 25f3fad210e0..0dd4f8a8d821 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1051,14 +1051,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; }
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; }
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -1121,12 +1125,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) }
/* - * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, - * STIBP is not required. + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * is not required. + * + * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which + * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS + * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return + * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection, + * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return;
/* @@ -2220,7 +2231,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {