From: Kim Phillips kim.phillips@amd.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.137 commit fd96b61389f8650d880df4b7f8f55f880c19bff9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit e6cfcdda8cbe81eaf821c897369a65fec987b404 upstream.
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion, Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation.
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, and now also for retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
[ bp: Remove the "we" and remove "[AMD]" applicability parameter which doesn't work here. ]
Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb") Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10, 5.15, 5.19 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220804192201.439596-1-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wei Li liwei391@huawei.com --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 29 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++--- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index dca5a96e49b2..26c5ebffa697 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4861,20 +4861,33 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability.
+ AMD-based UNRET and IBPB mitigations alone do not stop + sibling threads from influencing the predictions of other + sibling threads. For that reason, STIBP is used on pro- + cessors that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors + that don't. + off - no mitigation auto - automatically select a migitation auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, disabling SMT if necessary for the full mitigation (only on Zen1 and older without STIBP). - ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on - basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest - perf impact. - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, - only effective on AMD f15h-f17h - based systems. - unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP - is not available. + ibpb - On AMD, mitigate short speculation + windows on basic block boundaries too. + Safe, highest perf impact. It also + enables STIBP if present. Not suitable + on Intel. + ibpb,nosmt - Like "ibpb" above but will disable SMT + when STIBP is not available. This is + the alternative for systems which do not + have STIBP. + unret - Force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based + systems. + unret,nosmt - Like unret, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP.
Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 859a3f59526c..aa4ee46f00ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is - * forced for UNRET. + * forced for UNRET or IBPB. */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); @@ -1135,7 +1135,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
- if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n"); @@ -2283,10 +2284,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n");
return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],