From: "Fabio M. De Francesco" fmdefrancesco@gmail.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit ce48ee81a1930b2218bea23490adb6673c88bf70 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5OOWG CVE: NA
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted".
Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco fmdefrancesco@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) joelaf@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet corbet@lwn.net Signed-off-by: Lin Shengwang linshengwang1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: lihua hucool.lihua@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst index 7b410aef9c5c..0febe458597c 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst @@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve -------------------------------------------------------- 1. For MDS ~~~~~~~~~~ -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings +running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all +siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing +code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the +sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes +(host or guest mode).
2. For L1TF ~~~~~~~~~~~