From: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.3-rc1 commit f7cf25b2026dc8441e0fa3a202c2aa8a56211e30 category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: CVE-2021-34556
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Compilers often spill induction variables into the stack, hence it is necessary for the verifier to track scalar values of the registers through stack slots.
Also few bpf programs were incorrectly rejected in the past, since the verifier was not able to track such constants while they were used to compute offsets into packet headers.
Tracking constants through the stack significantly decreases the chances of state pruning, since two different constants are considered to be different by state equivalency. End result that cilium tests suffer serious degradation in the number of states processed and corresponding verification time increase.
before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 6441 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 5908 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1064 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 93790 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 123886 bpf_netdev.o 9721 31413 bpf_overlay.o 6184 18561 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 359445
After further debugging turned out that cillium progs are getting hurt by clang due to the same constant tracking issue. Newer clang generates better code by spilling less to the stack. Instead it keeps more constants in the registers which hurts state pruning since the verifier already tracks constants in the registers: old clang new clang (no spill/fill tracking introduced by this patch) bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 1923 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 3077 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1062 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 166729 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 174607 bpf_netdev.o 9721 8407 bpf_overlay.o 6184 5420 bpf_lcx_jit.o 39389 39389
The final table is depressing: old clang old clang new clang new clang const spill/fill const spill/fill bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 6441 1923 8128 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 5908 3077 6707 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1064 1062 1062 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 93790 166729 380712 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 123886 174607 440652 bpf_netdev.o 9721 31413 8407 31904 bpf_overlay.o 6184 18561 5420 23569 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 359445 39389 359445
Tracking constants in the registers hurts state pruning already. Adding tracking of constants through stack hurts pruning even more. The later patch address this general constant tracking issue with coarse/precise logic.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andriin@fb.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: He Fengqinghefengqing@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wei Yongjun weiyongjun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 0bb6664ced7e1..20aaf884ba972 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -964,6 +964,23 @@ static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); }
+static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) +{ + return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); +} + +static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, + int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) +{ + int i; + + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; + + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) + state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; +} + /* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers, * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() */ @@ -973,7 +990,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, { struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; - enum bpf_reg_type type; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL;
err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE), true); @@ -990,27 +1007,36 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, }
cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; - if (value_regno >= 0 && - is_spillable_regtype((type = cur->regs[value_regno].type))) { + if (value_regno >= 0) + reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
+ if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_const(reg) && + !register_is_null(reg) && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + save_register_state(state, spi, reg); + } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); return -EACCES; }
- if (state != cur && type == PTR_TO_STACK) { + if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); return -EINVAL; }
- /* save register state */ - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = cur->regs[value_regno]; - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; - - for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { - if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC && - !env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + bool sanitize = false; + + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && + register_is_const(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr)) + sanitize = true; + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) { + sanitize = true; + break; + } + if (sanitize) { int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off; int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE;
@@ -1033,8 +1059,8 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } *poff = soff; } - state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; } + save_register_state(state, spi, reg); } else { u8 type = STACK_MISC;
@@ -1053,8 +1079,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
/* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ - if (value_regno >= 0 && - register_is_null(&cur->regs[value_regno])) + if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) type = STACK_ZERO;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) @@ -1071,6 +1096,7 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg; u8 *stype;
if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) { @@ -1079,11 +1105,20 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; } stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; + reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) { if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); - return -EACCES; + if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { + verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + if (value_regno >= 0) { + mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); + state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; + } + mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent); + return 0; } for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) { @@ -1094,16 +1129,14 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (value_regno >= 0) { /* restore register state from stack */ - state->regs[value_regno] = reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; + state->regs[value_regno] = *reg; /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions */ state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; } - mark_reg_read(env, ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, - reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent); - return 0; + mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent); } else { int zeros = 0;
@@ -1118,8 +1151,7 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, off, i, size); return -EACCES; } - mark_reg_read(env, ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, - reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent); + mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent); if (value_regno >= 0) { if (zeros == size) { /* any size read into register is zero extended, @@ -1132,8 +1164,8 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; } - return 0; } + return 0; }
static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, @@ -1793,7 +1825,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, { struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno; struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); - int off, i, slot, spi; + int off, i, j, slot, spi;
if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ @@ -1845,6 +1877,16 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, *stype = STACK_MISC; goto mark; } + + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) { + __mark_reg_unknown(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); + for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) + state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC; + goto mark; + } + + err: verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", off, i, access_size);