From: Wander Lairson Costa wander@redhat.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAT CVE: CVE-2023-39192
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries.
Add a checkentry function to validate the structure.
This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408).
Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa wander@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Lu Wei luwei32@huawei.com --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; }
+static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, };