From: Nikolay Aleksandrov nikolay@nvidia.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc8 commit 99b40610956a8a8755653a67392e2a8b772453be category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6DKZJ CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

As reported[1] if query interval is set too low and we have multiple bridges or even a single bridge with multiple querier vlans configured we can crash the machine. Add a 1 second minimum which must be enforced by overwriting the value if set lower (i.e. without returning an error) to avoid breaking user-space. If that happens a log message is emitted to let the administrator know that the interval has been set to the minimum. The issue has been present since these intervals could be user-controlled.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e8b9ce41-57b9-b6e2-a46a-ff9c791cf0ba@gmail.co...

Fixes: d902eee43f19 ("bridge: Add multicast count/interval sysfs entries") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov nikolay@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org

Conflicts: net/bridge/br_multicast.c net/bridge/br_netlink.c net/bridge/br_private.h net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c

Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao shaozhengchao@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 2 +- net/bridge/br_private.h | 2 ++ net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c index 8ea85a4718f9..de79fbfe1611 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -3625,6 +3625,22 @@ void br_multicast_set_startup_query_intvl(struct net_bridge *br, br->multicast_startup_query_interval = intvl_jiffies; }

+void br_multicast_set_query_intvl(struct net_bridge *br, + unsigned long val) +{ + unsigned long intvl_jiffies = clock_t_to_jiffies(val); + + if (intvl_jiffies < BR_MULTICAST_QUERY_INTVL_MIN) { + br_info(br, + "trying to set multicast query interval below minimum, setting to %lu (%ums)\n", + jiffies_to_clock_t(BR_MULTICAST_QUERY_INTVL_MIN), + jiffies_to_msecs(BR_MULTICAST_QUERY_INTVL_MIN)); + intvl_jiffies = BR_MULTICAST_QUERY_INTVL_MIN; + } + + br->multicast_query_interval = intvl_jiffies; +} + /** * br_multicast_list_adjacent - Returns snooped multicast addresses * @dev: The bridge port adjacent to which to retrieve addresses diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c index 1f85c1b77c89..bed6c798fea9 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netlink.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netlink.c @@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@ static int br_changelink(struct net_device *brdev, struct nlattr *tb[], if (data[IFLA_BR_MCAST_QUERY_INTVL]) { u64 val = nla_get_u64(data[IFLA_BR_MCAST_QUERY_INTVL]);

- br->multicast_query_interval = clock_t_to_jiffies(val); + br_multicast_set_query_intvl(br, val); }

if (data[IFLA_BR_MCAST_QUERY_RESPONSE_INTVL]) { diff --git a/net/bridge/br_private.h b/net/bridge/br_private.h index e439d9aae45a..bfd0e995b078 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_private.h +++ b/net/bridge/br_private.h @@ -1572,4 +1572,6 @@ void br_do_suppress_nd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_bridge *br, struct nd_msg *br_is_nd_neigh_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nd_msg *m); void br_multicast_set_startup_query_intvl(struct net_bridge *br, unsigned long val); +void br_multicast_set_query_intvl(struct net_bridge *br, + unsigned long val); #endif diff --git a/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c b/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c index 1fdc491f648a..c8b477cbc4a3 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c @@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static ssize_t multicast_query_interval_show(struct device *d,

static int set_query_interval(struct net_bridge *br, unsigned long val) { - br->multicast_query_interval = clock_t_to_jiffies(val); + br_multicast_set_query_intvl(br, val); return 0; }

From: Stanislav Fomichev sdf@google.com

stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.163 commit 6d935a02658be82585ecb39aab339faa84496650 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6AVM6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 07ec7b502800ba9f7b8b15cb01dd6556bb41aaca ]

syzkaller managed to trigger another case where skb->len == 0 when we enter __dev_queue_xmit:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2069/0x35e0 net/core/dev.c:4295

Call Trace: dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:4406 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2115 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2140 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x5fb/0xda0 net/core/filter.c:2163 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2447 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x247/0x390 net/core/filter.c:2419 bpf_prog_48159a89cb4a9a16+0x59/0x5e bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:897 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:596 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:603 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x46c/0x890 net/bpf/test_run.c:402 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xbdc/0x14c0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1170 bpf_prog_test_run+0x345/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3648 __sys_bpf+0x43a/0x6c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5005 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5091 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:48 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

The reproducer doesn't really reproduce outside of syzkaller environment, so I'm taking a guess here. It looks like we do generate correct ETH_HLEN-sized packet, but we redirect the packet to the tunneling device. Before we do so, we __skb_pull l2 header and arrive again at skb->len == 0. Doesn't seem like we can do anything better than having an explicit check after __skb_pull?

Cc: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot+f635e86ec3fa0a37e019@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev sdf@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027225537.353077-1-sdf@google.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau martin.lau@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- net/core/filter.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 8102f8ddc974..8c7fa0025341 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2127,6 +2127,10 @@ static int __bpf_redirect_no_mac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,

if (mlen) { __skb_pull(skb, mlen); + if (unlikely(!skb->len)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return -ERANGE; + }

/* At ingress, the mac header has already been pulled once. * At egress, skb_pospull_rcsum has to be done in case that

From: Cui GaoSheng cuigaosheng1@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 188368 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6EEK7 CVE: NA

--------------------------------

Avoid using conflicting compilation parameters during compilation, so we move -fpic from KBUILD_CFLAGS to CFLAGS_KERNEL to avoid using -fpic and fno-pic parameters together.

Fixes: 6bc05b0a27f0 ("arm32: kaslr: Fix the bug of module install failure") Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng cuigaosheng1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang wangweiyang2@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- arch/arm/Makefile | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile index 8300530757ae..d6817de42f24 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/Makefile @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ KBUILD_LDFLAGS += -EL endif

ifeq ($(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE),y) -KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fpic -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h +CFLAGS_KERNEL += -fpic CFLAGS_MODULE += -fno-pic LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -pie -shared -Bsymbolic endif

From: Rik van Riel riel@surriel.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.1-rc2 commit 12df140f0bdfae5dcfc81800970dd7f6f632e00c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6EVPO

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...

--------------------------------

The h->*_huge_pages counters are protected by the hugetlb_lock, but alloc_huge_page has a corner case where it can decrement the counter outside of the lock.

This could lead to a corrupted value of h->resv_huge_pages, which we have observed on our systems.

Take the hugetlb_lock before decrementing h->resv_huge_pages to avoid a potential race.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221017202505.0e6a4fcd@imladris.surriel.com Fixes: a88c76954804 ("mm: hugetlb: fix hugepage memory leak caused by wrong reserve count") Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel riel@surriel.com Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz mike.kravetz@oracle.com Cc: Naoya Horiguchi n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: Glen McCready gkmccready@meta.com Cc: Mike Kravetz mike.kravetz@oracle.com Cc: Muchun Song songmuchun@bytedance.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng zhangpeng362@huawei.com Reviewed-by: tong tiangen tongtiangen@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- mm/hugetlb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c index 5b0d2264b99b..72e16b758471 100644 --- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -2572,11 +2572,11 @@ struct page *alloc_huge_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, page = alloc_buddy_huge_page_with_mpol(h, vma, addr); if (!page) goto out_uncharge_cgroup; + spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock); if (!avoid_reserve && vma_has_reserves(vma, gbl_chg)) { SetHPageRestoreReserve(page); h->resv_huge_pages--; } - spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock); list_add(&page->lru, &h->hugepage_activelist); /* Fall through */ }

From: Huajingjing huajingjing1@huawei.com

driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I67J42 CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

The BMA software is a system management software offered by Huawei. It supports the status monitoring, performance monitoring and event monitoring of various components, including server CPUs, memory hard disks, NICs, IB cards, PCIe cards, RAID controller cards and optical modules.

In this version, the system resets due to the BMA spin lock when the memory usage is too high, the vulnerability has been rectified.

Signed-off-by: Huajingjing huajingjing1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: ChenJiesong chenjiesong@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- .../ethernet/huawei/bma/cdev_drv/bma_cdev.c | 2 +- .../huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_devintf.c | 110 +++++++++++------- .../ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_pci.h | 2 +- .../huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_include.h | 2 +- .../ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_panic.c | 4 +- .../huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_printk.c | 4 +- .../huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c | 2 +- .../ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.c | 7 +- .../ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.h | 2 +- 9 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/cdev_drv/bma_cdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/cdev_drv/bma_cdev.c index 0348a83005d6..9468a5a0c768 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/cdev_drv/bma_cdev.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/cdev_drv/bma_cdev.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ #ifdef DRV_VERSION #define CDEV_VERSION MICRO_TO_STR(DRV_VERSION) #else -#define CDEV_VERSION "0.3.4" +#define CDEV_VERSION "0.3.5" #endif

#define CDEV_DEFAULT_NUM 4 diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_devintf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_devintf.c index acf6bbfc50ff..149c393e8b0d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_devintf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_devintf.c @@ -419,8 +419,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(bma_intf_int_to_bmc);

int bma_intf_is_link_ok(void) { - return (g_bma_dev->edma_host.statistics.remote_status == - REGISTERED) ? 1 : 0; + if ((&g_bma_dev->edma_host != NULL) && + (g_bma_dev->edma_host.statistics.remote_status == REGISTERED)) + return 1; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(bma_intf_is_link_ok);

@@ -460,14 +462,10 @@ int bma_cdev_recv_msg(void *handle, char __user *data, size_t count) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bma_cdev_recv_msg);

-int bma_cdev_add_msg(void *handle, const char __user *msg, size_t msg_len) +static int check_cdev_add_msg_param(struct bma_priv_data_s *handle, +const char __user *msg, size_t msg_len) { struct bma_priv_data_s *priv = NULL; - struct edma_msg_hdr_s *hdr = NULL; - unsigned long flags = 0; - int total_len = 0; - int ret = 0; - struct edma_host_s *phost = &g_bma_dev->edma_host;

if (!handle || !msg || msg_len == 0) { BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "input NULL point!\n"); @@ -479,54 +477,80 @@ int bma_cdev_add_msg(void *handle, const char __user *msg, size_t msg_len) return -EINVAL; }

- priv = (struct bma_priv_data_s *)handle; + priv = handle;

if (priv->user.type >= TYPE_MAX) { BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "error type = %d\n", priv->user.type); return -EFAULT; } - total_len = SIZE_OF_MSG_HDR + msg_len; + + return 0; +} + +static void edma_msg_hdr_init(struct edma_msg_hdr_s *hdr, + struct bma_priv_data_s *private_data, + char *msg_buf, size_t msg_len) +{ + hdr->type = private_data->user.type; + hdr->sub_type = private_data->user.sub_type; + hdr->user_id = private_data->user.user_id; + hdr->datalen = msg_len; + BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "msg_len is %zu\n", msg_len); + + memcpy(hdr->data, msg_buf, msg_len); +} + +int bma_cdev_add_msg(void *handle, const char __user *msg, size_t msg_len) +{ + struct bma_priv_data_s *priv = NULL; + struct edma_msg_hdr_s *hdr = NULL; + unsigned long flags = 0; + unsigned int total_len = 0; + int ret = 0; + struct edma_host_s *phost = &g_bma_dev->edma_host; + char *msg_buf = NULL; + + ret = check_cdev_add_msg_param(handle, msg, msg_len); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + priv = (struct bma_priv_data_s *)handle; + + total_len = (unsigned int)(SIZE_OF_MSG_HDR + msg_len); + if (phost->msg_send_write + total_len > HOST_MAX_SEND_MBX_LEN - SIZE_OF_MBX_HDR) { + BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "msg lost,msg_send_write: %u,msg_len:%u,max_len: %d\n", + phost->msg_send_write, total_len, HOST_MAX_SEND_MBX_LEN); + return -ENOSPC; + } + + msg_buf = (char *)kmalloc(msg_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!msg_buf) { + BMA_LOG(DLOG_ERROR, "malloc msg_buf failed\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (copy_from_user(msg_buf, msg, msg_len)) { + BMA_LOG(DLOG_ERROR, "copy_from_user error\n"); + kfree(msg_buf); + return -EFAULT; + }

spin_lock_irqsave(&phost->send_msg_lock, flags);

- if (phost->msg_send_write + total_len <= - HOST_MAX_SEND_MBX_LEN - SIZE_OF_MBX_HDR) { - hdr = (struct edma_msg_hdr_s *)(phost->msg_send_buf + - phost->msg_send_write); - hdr->type = priv->user.type; - hdr->sub_type = priv->user.sub_type; - hdr->user_id = priv->user.user_id; - hdr->datalen = msg_len; - BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "msg_len is %zu\n", msg_len); - - if (copy_from_user(hdr->data, msg, msg_len)) { - BMA_LOG(DLOG_ERROR, "copy_from_user error\n"); - ret = -EFAULT; - goto end; - } + hdr = (struct edma_msg_hdr_s *)(phost->msg_send_buf + phost->msg_send_write); + edma_msg_hdr_init(hdr, priv, msg_buf, msg_len);

- phost->msg_send_write += total_len; - phost->statistics.send_bytes += total_len; - phost->statistics.send_pkgs++; + phost->msg_send_write += total_len; + phost->statistics.send_bytes += total_len; + phost->statistics.send_pkgs++; #ifdef EDMA_TIMER - (void)mod_timer(&phost->timer, jiffies_64); + (void)mod_timer(&phost->timer, jiffies_64); #endif - BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "msg_send_write = %d\n", - phost->msg_send_write); - - ret = msg_len; - goto end; - } else { - BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, - "msg lost,msg_send_write: %d,msg_len:%d,max_len: %d\n", - phost->msg_send_write, total_len, - HOST_MAX_SEND_MBX_LEN); - ret = -ENOSPC; - goto end; - } + BMA_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "msg_send_write = %d\n", phost->msg_send_write);

-end: + ret = msg_len; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&g_bma_dev->edma_host.send_msg_lock, flags); + kfree(msg_buf); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bma_cdev_add_msg); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_pci.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_pci.h index 92893b6bfd08..639ed4e58a8b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_pci.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/edma_drv/bma_pci.h @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct bma_pci_dev_s { #ifdef DRV_VERSION #define BMA_VERSION MICRO_TO_STR(DRV_VERSION) #else -#define BMA_VERSION "0.3.4" +#define BMA_VERSION "0.3.5" #endif

#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_include.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_include.h index ffadf3727734..b027306e52c1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_include.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_include.h @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #ifdef DRV_VERSION #define KBOX_VERSION MICRO_TO_STR(DRV_VERSION) #else -#define KBOX_VERSION "0.3.4" +#define KBOX_VERSION "0.3.5" #endif

#define UNUSED(x) (x = x) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_panic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_panic.c index 0c17cd2bae49..2b142ae9bff6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_panic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_panic.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int kbox_panic_init(void) int ret = KBOX_TRUE;

g_panic_info_buf = kmalloc(SLOT_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL); - if (IS_ERR(g_panic_info_buf) || !g_panic_info_buf) { + if (!g_panic_info_buf) { KBOX_MSG("kmalloc g_panic_info_buf fail!\n"); ret = -ENOMEM; goto fail; @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int kbox_panic_init(void) memset(g_panic_info_buf, 0, SLOT_LENGTH);

g_panic_info_buf_tmp = kmalloc(SLOT_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL); - if (IS_ERR(g_panic_info_buf_tmp) || !g_panic_info_buf_tmp) { + if (!g_panic_info_buf_tmp) { KBOX_MSG("kmalloc g_panic_info_buf_tmp fail!\n"); ret = -ENOMEM; goto fail; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_printk.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_printk.c index 3b04ba206108..630a1e16ea24 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_printk.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_printk.c @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ int kbox_printk_init(int kbox_proc_exist)

g_printk_info_buf = kmalloc(SECTION_PRINTK_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); - if (IS_ERR(g_printk_info_buf) || !g_printk_info_buf) { + if (!g_printk_info_buf) { KBOX_MSG("kmalloc g_printk_info_buf fail!\n"); ret = -ENOMEM; goto fail; @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int kbox_printk_init(int kbox_proc_exist)

g_printk_info_buf_tmp = kmalloc(SECTION_PRINTK_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); - if (IS_ERR(g_printk_info_buf_tmp) || !g_printk_info_buf_tmp) { + if (!g_printk_info_buf_tmp) { KBOX_MSG("kmalloc g_printk_info_buf_tmp fail!\n"); ret = -ENOMEM; goto fail; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c index 49690bab1cef..9f6dfe55e3fb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int kbox_write_op(long long offset, unsigned int count, return KBOX_FALSE;

temp_buf_char = kmalloc(TEMP_BUF_DATA_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!temp_buf_char || IS_ERR(temp_buf_char)) { + if (!temp_buf_char) { KBOX_MSG("kmalloc temp_buf_char fail!\n"); up(&user_sem); return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.c index 240db31d7178..7705bb919ead 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.c @@ -638,6 +638,7 @@ s32 veth_refill_rxskb(struct bspveth_rxtx_q *prx_queue, int queue) next_to_fill = (next_to_fill + 1) & BSPVETH_POINT_MASK; }

+ mb();/* memory barriers. */ prx_queue->next_to_fill = next_to_fill;

tail = prx_queue->tail; @@ -672,6 +673,7 @@ s32 bspveth_setup_rx_skb(struct bspveth_device *pvethdev, if (!idx) /* Can't alloc even one packets */ return -EFAULT;

+ mb();/* memory barriers. */ prx_queue->next_to_fill = idx;

VETH_LOG(DLOG_DEBUG, "prx_queue->next_to_fill=%d\n", @@ -886,8 +888,6 @@ s32 bspveth_setup_all_rx_resources(struct bspveth_device *pvethdev) err = bspveth_setup_rx_resources(pvethdev, pvethdev->prx_queue[qid]); if (err) { - kfree(pvethdev->prx_queue[qid]); - pvethdev->prx_queue[qid] = NULL; VETH_LOG(DLOG_ERROR, "Allocation for Rx Queue %u failed\n", qid);

@@ -1328,6 +1328,7 @@ s32 veth_send_one_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb, int queue) pbd_v->off = off; pbd_v->len = skb->len;

+ mb();/* memory barriers. */ head = (head + 1) & BSPVETH_POINT_MASK; ptx_queue->head = head;

@@ -1424,6 +1425,7 @@ s32 veth_free_txskb(struct bspveth_rxtx_q *ptx_queue, int queue) next_to_free = (next_to_free + 1) & BSPVETH_POINT_MASK; }

+ mb(); /* memory barriers. */ ptx_queue->next_to_free = next_to_free; tail = ptx_queue->tail;

@@ -1522,6 +1524,7 @@ s32 veth_recv_pkt(struct bspveth_rxtx_q *prx_queue, int queue) } }

+ mb();/* memory barriers. */ prx_queue->tail = tail; head = prx_queue->head;

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.h index 9a4d699e6421..503636549320 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/veth_drv/veth_hb.h @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ extern "C" { #ifdef DRV_VERSION #define VETH_VERSION MICRO_TO_STR(DRV_VERSION) #else -#define VETH_VERSION "0.3.4" +#define VETH_VERSION "0.3.5" #endif

#define MODULE_NAME "veth"

From: Andrey Ryabinin ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 3f148f3318140035e87decc1214795ff0755757b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6C6UC CVE: CVE-2023-0597

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

KASAN maps shadow for the entire CPU-entry-area: [CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE, CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE]

This will explode once the per-cpu entry areas are randomized since it will increase CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE to 512 GB and KASAN fails to allocate shadow for such big area.

Fix this by allocating KASAN shadow only for really used cpu entry area addresses mapped by cea_map_percpu_pages()

Thanks to the 0day folks for finding and reporting this to be an issue.

[ dhansen: tweak changelog since this will get committed before peterz's actual cpu-entry-area randomization ]

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Tested-by: Yujie Liu yujie.liu@intel.com Cc: kernel test robot yujie.liu@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202210241508.2e203c3d-yujie.liu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen tongtiangen@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Wandun chenwandun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang wangweiyang2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h index 13e70da38bed..de75306b932e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h @@ -28,9 +28,12 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN void __init kasan_early_init(void); void __init kasan_init(void); +void __init kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(void *va, size_t size, int nid); #else static inline void kasan_early_init(void) { } static inline void kasan_init(void) { } +static inline void kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(void *va, size_t size, + int nid) { } #endif

#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c index 98396a67958c..bf5786f3f3c4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> #include <asm/desc.h> +#include <asm/kasan.h>

static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage);

@@ -95,8 +96,13 @@ void cea_set_pte(void *cea_vaddr, phys_addr_t pa, pgprot_t flags) static void __init cea_map_percpu_pages(void *cea_vaddr, void *ptr, int pages, pgprot_t prot) { + phys_addr_t pa = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(ptr); + + kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(cea_vaddr, pages * PAGE_SIZE, + early_pfn_to_nid(PFN_DOWN(pa))); + for ( ; pages; pages--, cea_vaddr+= PAGE_SIZE, ptr += PAGE_SIZE) - cea_set_pte(cea_vaddr, per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(ptr), prot); + cea_set_pte(cea_vaddr, pa, prot); }

static void __init percpu_setup_debug_store(unsigned int cpu) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c index 1a50434c8a4d..18d574af30ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c @@ -318,6 +318,18 @@ void __init kasan_early_init(void) kasan_map_early_shadow(init_top_pgt); }

+void __init kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(void *va, size_t size, int nid) +{ + unsigned long shadow_start, shadow_end; + + shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(va); + shadow_start = round_down(shadow_start, PAGE_SIZE); + shadow_end = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(va + size); + shadow_end = round_up(shadow_end, PAGE_SIZE); + + kasan_populate_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end, nid); +} + void __init kasan_init(void) { int i; @@ -395,9 +407,6 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)VMALLOC_END + 1), shadow_cpu_entry_begin);

- kasan_populate_shadow((unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_begin, - (unsigned long)shadow_cpu_entry_end, 0); - kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_cpu_entry_end, kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)__START_KERNEL_map));

From: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 97650148a15e0b30099d6175ffe278b9f55ec66a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6C6UC CVE: CVE-2023-0597

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

Populate a KASAN shadow for the entire possible per-CPU range of the CPU entry area instead of requiring that each individual chunk map a shadow. Mapping shadows individually is error prone, e.g. the per-CPU GDT mapping was left behind, which can lead to not-present page faults during KASAN validation if the kernel performs a software lookup into the GDT. The DS buffer is also likely affected.

The motivation for mapping the per-CPU areas on-demand was to avoid mapping the entire 512GiB range that's reserved for the CPU entry area, shaving a few bytes by not creating shadows for potentially unused memory was not a goal.

The bug is most easily reproduced by doing a sigreturn with a garbage CS in the sigcontext, e.g.

int main(void) { struct sigcontext regs;

syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);

memset(&regs, 0, sizeof(regs)); regs.cs = 0x1d0; syscall(__NR_rt_sigreturn); return 0; }

to coerce the kernel into doing a GDT lookup to compute CS.base when reading the instruction bytes on the subsequent #GP to determine whether or not the #GP is something the kernel should handle, e.g. to fixup UMIP violations or to emulate CLI/STI for IOPL=3 applications.

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbc8379ace00 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 16c03a067 P4D 16c03a067 PUD 15b990067 PMD 15b98f067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 3 PID: 851 Comm: r2 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3-next-20221103+ #432 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0xdf/0x190 Call Trace: <TASK> get_desc+0xb0/0x1d0 insn_get_seg_base+0x104/0x270 insn_fetch_from_user+0x66/0x80 fixup_umip_exception+0xb1/0x530 exc_general_protection+0x181/0x210 asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 RIP: 0003:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0003:0000000000000000 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000000001d0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK>

Fixes: 9fd429c28073 ("x86/kasan: Map shadow for percpu pages on demand") Reported-by: syzbot+ffb4f000dc2872c93f62@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221110203504.1985010-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen tongtiangen@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Wandun chenwandun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang wangweiyang2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c index 2eaf9ee41495..88e2cc4d4e75 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c @@ -96,11 +96,6 @@ void cea_set_pte(void *cea_vaddr, phys_addr_t pa, pgprot_t flags) static void __init cea_map_percpu_pages(void *cea_vaddr, void *ptr, int pages, pgprot_t prot) { - phys_addr_t pa = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(ptr); - - kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(cea_vaddr, pages * PAGE_SIZE, - early_pfn_to_nid(PFN_DOWN(pa))); - for ( ; pages; pages--, cea_vaddr+= PAGE_SIZE, ptr += PAGE_SIZE) cea_set_pte(cea_vaddr, per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(ptr), prot); } @@ -200,6 +195,9 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(unsigned int cpu) pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL; #endif

+ kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(cea, CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE, + early_cpu_to_node(cpu)); + cea_set_pte(&cea->gdt, get_cpu_gdt_paddr(cpu), gdt_prot);

cea_map_percpu_pages(&cea->entry_stack_page,

From: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit bde258d97409f2a45243cb393a55ea9ecfc7aba5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6C6UC CVE: CVE-2023-0597

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

Add helpers to dedup code for aligning shadow address up/down to page boundaries when translating an address to its shadow.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221110203504.1985010-5-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen tongtiangen@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Wandun chenwandun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang wangweiyang2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang zhangjialin11@huawei.com --- arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c index 75b0eb482487..c1d99556c024 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c @@ -318,22 +318,33 @@ void __init kasan_early_init(void) kasan_map_early_shadow(init_top_pgt); }

+static unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow_align_down(unsigned long va) +{ + unsigned long shadow = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)va); + + return round_down(shadow, PAGE_SIZE); +} + +static unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow_align_up(unsigned long va) +{ + unsigned long shadow = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)va); + + return round_up(shadow, PAGE_SIZE); +} + void __init kasan_populate_shadow_for_vaddr(void *va, size_t size, int nid) { unsigned long shadow_start, shadow_end;

- shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(va); - shadow_start = round_down(shadow_start, PAGE_SIZE); - shadow_end = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(va + size); - shadow_end = round_up(shadow_end, PAGE_SIZE); - + shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow_align_down((unsigned long)va); + shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow_align_up((unsigned long)va + size); kasan_populate_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end, nid); }

void __init kasan_init(void) { + unsigned long shadow_cea_begin, shadow_cea_end; int i; - void *shadow_cea_begin, *shadow_cea_end;

memcpy(early_top_pgt, init_top_pgt, sizeof(early_top_pgt));

@@ -374,16 +385,9 @@ void __init kasan_init(void) map_range(&pfn_mapped[i]); }

- shadow_cea_begin = (void *)CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE; - shadow_cea_begin = kasan_mem_to_shadow(shadow_cea_begin); - shadow_cea_begin = (void *)round_down( - (unsigned long)shadow_cea_begin, PAGE_SIZE); - - shadow_cea_end = (void *)(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE + - CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE); - shadow_cea_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(shadow_cea_end); - shadow_cea_end = (void *)round_up( - (unsigned long)shadow_cea_end, PAGE_SIZE); + shadow_cea_begin = kasan_mem_to_shadow_align_down(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE); + shadow_cea_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow_align_up(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE + + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);

kasan_populate_early_shadow( kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)PAGE_OFFSET + MAXMEM), @@ -405,9 +409,9 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)

kasan_populate_early_shadow( kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)VMALLOC_END + 1), - shadow_cea_begin); + (void *)shadow_cea_begin);

- kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_cea_end, + kasan_populate_early_shadow((void *)shadow_cea_end, kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)__START_KERNEL_map));

kasan_populate_shadow((unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(_stext),